Introduction

Military equipment and tactical organization in pre-modern western civilizationunderwent fundamental changes between the rise of civilizationin Mesopotamia in the late fourth millennium scr and the revival of Europe in the seventeenthcentury of the Common Era. During this four and a half millennium span, the art of warfare reached a sophisticatedlevel, with commandersfully realizingthe tacticalcapabilities of shock and missilecombat in largebattlefield situations, situations where perhaps150,000 men took the field at the sametime along a narrow front. On a battlefield where the force-to- spaceratio wasso high, the ability to orchestratetens of thousandsof infantry and cavalry becamenecessary for ultimate victory. Modern principles of war, such as the primacy of the offensive, mass and economy of force, were understoodby ancient, classical,medieval and early modern generals,and appliedon battlefieldsthroughout the period under study. Warfarein the Medieaal LVorldis the secondvolume of a two-volume study. It covers the developmentof warfare from the rise of Byzantium in the early medievalperiod through to the Thirty YearsWar (c.500--1648cn), following volume l, Warfare in the Ancient ll/orld, which surveyed the evolution of warfare on the battlefields of the Near East and Europe between the beginning of the Bronze Age and the fall of the Western Roman Empire (r.3000BCE - r.500 cr). Through an explorationof fifty-four selectbattlefield engagements(thirty-three battles in volume two and twenty-one battles in volume one), it is this author's intention to survey the changing tactical relationshipsbetween the four weaponsystems - heavyand light infantry, and heavyand light cavalry- focusingon how shockand missilecombat evolved on the battlefieldsof the Near East and Europe.

Overview of Warfare in the Med.ieaal World In eastern Europe the torch of Roman imperialism was passed to Constantinoplefor anotherthousand years. The ByzantineEmpire (337-1453) enjoyed its greatest territorial expansion in the century after the fall of the 2 Warforein theMedieual World

Western Roman Empire. Emperor Justinian shored up the easternfrontiers and briefly won back ltaly and parts of north Africa and Spain, but, after his deathin 565,later emperorswould losethese lands to the expansionof Islam in the seventhcentury. Faced with a mounted and highly mobile foe,Byzantine emperorsincreased the percentageof cavalryto infantry in their armies,then fused heavyand light cavalryinto one systemby giving bows to someof their heavily armoured shock cavalry. In Byzantine warfare exclusive cavalry engagementsoften took place(Dara, Tricameron,Manzikerl) while combined arms also continuedat a high level, rvith light infantry taking an important placebeside cavalry in military operations,as seenat Taginaeand Casilinum. But centuriesof defensiveaction against assaults from the Bulgars,Muslims and westernEuropeans took their toll, forcing the Byzantineemperors to rely increasinglyon mercenarieg.By the eleventhcentury Byzantium faceda new and dangerousthreat from the east, the Seliuk Turks, who fought from horsebackas lancers and archers. The Byzantineloss at the battleof Manzikert in 1071robbed the EasternRoman Empire of its prime conscriptionlands and precipitateda call for help to the west.In 1095the First Crusadewas born. In westernEurope the fall of the WesternRoman Empire usheredin the earlyMiddle Ages(r.500-r.1000), a time when victoriousGermanic successor kingdoms converted to Catholicism and consolidatedpolitically, with the Franks in Gaul emergingas the most powerful new kingdom in western Europe. Frankish rulers faced new threats as Muslim raiders crossedthe Pyreneesand pillaged France. One such Muslim expeditionaryforce was soundlydefeated in732 at Toursby CharlesMartel, layingthe foundationsfor the Carolingian dynasty that would produce Charlemagne,the first holy Roman emperor in the West. But at Charlemagne'sdeath in 814, Europewas besieged by a new waveof invasionsthat lastedover 200 years.Muslim, Magyar and Viking raidersand invadersstruck the whole of Christian Europe. From their basesin north Africa, the Muslims attackedthe southern coastlineof Europe, while Magyar horsemenswept in from the eastand settledin what is now Hungary, raiding deepinto centraland westernEurope until their defeatin 955 at the handsof the German king Otto I at Lechfeld.Of thesenew invasions,the Viking attacks were the most devastatingand widespread.Masters of ship-to-shipbattles such as the battle of l,,lisa,these fierce Scandinavianwarriors rowed up the rivers and estuariesof Europe in their longships,raiding and then invading territories as far west as Ireland and as far eastas Russia, creating cultural and martial synthesisalong the way. In responseto this 'Second Ag. of Invasions', western European monarchiesdeveloped an art of war unique in world history in its relianceon heavycavalry as the dominant weaponsystem. Needing the kind of strategic mobility only cavalrycould provide, westernEuropean commanders initiated a gradualtransformation in the compositionof medievalarmies. Consequently, Inftoduction 3 heavycavalry replaced infantry as the decisivearm. The mountedknight and lancer,with his stabilizing stirrup, expensivepanoply and well-trained horse, graduallybecame the centrepieceof a combined-armsarmy where all other weaponsystems were subordinatedto heavycavalry. The decentralizationof political authority in westernEurope also had a profound effect on the characterof medievalwarfare. Insufficient resources meantlarge-scale battles such as those seen in the classicalperiod did not take place,and when battle was ioined, the participatingarmies rarely included more than a few thousandmen. In theselimited wars of attrition. battle was often avoidedbecause the outcome was too unpredictable.Instead, medieval warfare revolved around the construction and control of castlesand fortified towns or the destructionof the enemy'seconomic resources. In fact, during this 'Ageof Castles',warfare consisted of perhapsI per centbattles and 99 per centsieges.l The Normans masteredthis strategy of combining castlebuilding and pitched battles in campaignsin Italy and England. In Italy, Duke Robert Guiscardof Apulia and his successorscarved out a Norman statein southern Italy and Sicily then set their sights on expanding, at the expenseof Byzantium, in Albania. At Durazzo, Guiscard defeated an impressive Byzantine infantry host with his heavycavalry supported by light infantry. In England in 1066, the Anglo-Saxon king Harold Godwinson successfully defeatedthe Norwegian king Harald Hardradaat StamfordBridge, but proved unableto masterWilliam, duke of Normandy,at Hastings.The duke usedthese samesophisticated combined-arms tactics to securethe throne as William I. William's victory initiatedan Anglo-Normandynasty and hundreds of yearsof soured Anglo-Frenchrelations. His successorswould add to his conquests, bringing Walesunder English hegemonyand making war with Ireland and Scotland. Through the high Middle Ages(r.100G-c.1300), heavy cavalry lancers ruled the battlefieldsof westernEurope, giving rise to the idealsof chivalry and reinforcing the socialposition of the knightly class.Here, cavalryengagements, supported by infantry, becamethe norm, as illustrated by the French victory over an English-sponsoredimperialist army at the battle of Bouainesin 1214. But the tacticalrealities faced by the mounted aristocracyin the Near East and the British Isles showedthe weaknessesof heavy cavalry.In the Holy Land, Latin knightsfaced a sophisticatedIslamic combined-arms system and learned first-hand at Dorylaeum, Hattin and Arsuf the dangers in confronting composite-bow-wieldinginfantry and horse archers in open terrain. Similar lessonswere learned in the Reconquistain Spain at the battles of Sagrajasin 1086and Las l{aaas de Tolosain 1212. As westernEuropean crusaders were learning new tacticallessons in the Levant, eastern and central Europe was brutally attacked by the most successfulwave of steppe warriors, the Mongols. Under the charismatic 4 Warfarein theMedieual World leadershipof Genghis Khan, Mongol light and heavy cavalry swept out of Central Asia and conquerednorthern China and the Khwarizmian Empire in Transoxiana.After GenghisKhan's death in t?27, his successorscontinued his conquestswestward, pushing first into Russia,destroying the Kievankingdom, and then into Polandand Hungary.The Mongols, who relied exclusivelyon cavalry;perfected shock and missile combat from horsebackand vanquished numericallylarger Christian armiesat Liegnitz andSajo Riaer. European heavy cavalry tactics, always confrontational, fell prey to the traditional steppe- warrior game of luring an attackerwith a retreat. Islamic armies suffered similar fates.But the Mamluks in Egypt fought fire with fire, using their own heavyand light cavalryarms to finally blunt Mongol westwardexpansion at Ain Jalut in 1260. In the late Middle Ages (c.1300-c.1500)the 300-yeardomination of the mountedknight was challengedby the return of a more balancedcombined- armstactical mix, onewhich featuredlight infantry archersand heavyinfantry battlesquares against heavy cavalry. The Anglo-Normancampaigns against the Welsh,and later againstthe Scottish,showed the potentialof light infantry archersagainst enemy infantry formations,and, more ominously,against heavy cavalry.King Edward I's victory at Falkirk was similar to the earlier battlesof Hastings and Durazzo, where heavy cavalry and archers worked together againstdense heavy-infantry positions. But the unusualaspect of the battleof Falkirk is in the steadfastnessof the Scottish infantry formations,a harbinger of thingsto come.One exampleof heavyinfantry's ability to meetand defeat enemy heavy cavalry and light infantry attacks can be seen in the later campaignsof the Anglo-ScottishWars, most notablythe Scottishvictory over the Englishat Bannockburnin 1314. Nineteenyears later, the roles were reversed.The victory of the English monarchEdward III againstthe Scotsat HalidonHill in 1333introduced the English defensivetactical systemto medievalwarfare, a systemthat relied heavilyon infantry. Later English monarchswould perfect this tacticalsystem in the Hundred Years War (1337-1453)and help break the back of the dominanceof heavycavalry. On the continent, two English kings, Edward III and Henry V, werevictorious against the French during this war, utilizing light infantry archersand dismountedheavy cavalry in a defensiveposture against the repeatedcharges of French lancers,with great successat Cricy in 1346and Agincourtin 1415. Meanwhile, in the Swiss Alps, farmer-militiamen were training with speciallydesigned polearms to fight in close order againstHabsburg and Burgundian heavy cavalry, winning a string of decisive victories in the fourteenthand fifteenth centuriesat Mlrgarten, Laupen,Sempach,, Murten and lllancy.The successof the Swiss battle squarebrought first employment as mercenariesin foreignarmies, then emulationby enemies.Bythe closeof the medievalperiod, heavyinfantry battle squaresand light infantry archerswere l|

I Introcluction5

modern commonfeatures in Europeanarmies. By the beginningof the early period(c.1500-c.1750), the four weaponsystems were operating together again in a new combined-armssYnthesis. The additionof well-articulatedheavy infantry basedon the Swissmodel, the to the armiesof France,Germany and Italy in the sixteenthcentury marks the return of a balancedcombined-arms tactical system to westernEurope' But integrationof this superiorheavy infantry into Europeandoctrine coincided The with the introduction of reliable hand-held gunpowdertechnologies' and sixteenth century witnessed the gradual replacementof longbows crossbowswith the muzzle-loadingarquebus and musket.Although archers gave way to musketeers,pikemen persisted as a tactical entity until the inventionof the ring bayonetin the eighteenthcentury fused heavy and light infantry together,eliminating the need for the defensivecharacteristics of the pike. The interesrin all things classicalthat was the hallmarkof the Italian and in northern EuropeanRenaissance spilled over to warfareas a renaissance the tacticaldoctrine took place.Commanders in the earlymodern period reread classicaltexts and recognizedthe value of a balancedcombined-arms tactical a well- system,one that irrcorplratedthe new technologyof gunpowderwithin Italian disciplinedand professionalrank and file. In the sixteenthcentury's and W"r, (1494-1559),France fought againstthe imperialistpowers of Spain in the the Holy Roman Empire for mastery of the Italian peninsula, and process,all partiesexperimented with the ratio of musketeersand arquebusiers of to pikemen-This experimentationlecl to an imperialistvictory at the battle paaia againstthe Fiench in 1525and the gradual adoptionof the Spanish tercio,which combined shock and missile units in the same formation' Tactically, Pavia showed the prowess of heavy infantry pikemen and light cavalry infantry arquebusiersworking togetherin the openfield againstenemy andbattle squares. In this engagement,artillery played little part. so one-sided from was the battle of Paviathat the decisiveengagement all but disappeared Europeanwarfare for more than 100years' late wanting to maximize'shotover shock" Prince Maurice of Nassauin the sixteenth and Swedish king GustavusAdolphus in the early seventeenth linear century explored the Roman art of war and experimentedwith War formations,winning victoriesagainst the imperialistsin the Thirty Years (1618-1648)at Aieltenfeld and Liitzen. Consequently,new model armies as the emerged with the position of light infantry gunners ascending p.oportion of light infantry roseat the expenseof heavyinfantry, anticipating to the the role of firearms in modern warfare.With the addition of gunners on the tactical mix, a new age of warfare was dawning, one that drew in contributions of the foity-eight centuriesof western warfareunder survey thesevolumes. 6 Warforein theMedieaal World

Relevance of the Cornbined-Arrns Tactical System The history of combined-armstactical systems in the westernworld witnessed a watershedevent in the fourth century scE. Warfare before the conquestof Persiaby King AlexanderIII of Macedon wascharacterized by the limited use of combined-armsforces. Bronze Age armiesin Mesopotamiaand Egypt and the early Iron Age empires of Assyria and Persia did utilize limited co- operation between farmer-militia infantry forces and their chariot-borne aristocraticmasters. But for the most part, Near Eastern infantry levieswere not trained to fully participate in effective offensive action against enemy chariots,and later, againstcavalry. Their role remainedprimarily defensiveon the battlefield. Across the Aegean in Greece, the invention of the heavy infantry battle squarein the seventhcentury BCEwitnessed for the first time citizen-militia trainedto fight collectivelyin'an offensivemanner. The PersianWars between Persiaand the Greekpoleis exposed the light infantry and light cavalryof Asia to the heavyinfantry of Europe,creating a new combined-armssynthesis. The conquestof the Greek city-statesby Philip II of Macedon in the fourth century BCEfused the conqueror'sstrong tradition of heavycavalry with the Greek world's new tradition of limited combined-armsco-operation. The Macedonianking Alexanderthe Great'svictories at GranicusRiver (334ncr), Issus(333 ncE) and Gaugamela(331 ncE)represent a high point in pre-modern western warfare with the Macedoniansfielding heavy and light infantry and heavyand light cavalryin a fully integratedand balancedcombined-arms army. Tactically, utilizing a combined-arms system meant bringing to the battlefieldthe capabilitiesof both shock and missilecombat. In the periods under study,this meant the ability to kill in closeproximity in hand-to-hand engagementsusing hand-heldweapons (shock) or at a distanceusing slings, javelins, spears,bows and, later, handguns (missile). Modern military historians describe tactical systems with shock capabilities as heavy, while tactical systemsthat utilize missilesare describedas light. Heavy weapon systems,both infantry and cavalry, are consideredheavy becauseof their protective factor. Becausethey wore more armour, heavy infantry and heavy cavalry were better able to perform their shock role as well as being better protectedagainst lance and arrow,even though this addedprotection sacrificed tactical mobility. Heavy weapon systems relied on collective effort to be effective,and collectiveeffort required discipline and training. The degreeof disciplineand training determinedthe offensivecapability or articulationof the units in combat. Articulated tactical formations such as the Greek and Macedonianphalanx were capableof someoffensive tactical mobility, keepingclose order during an offensivemarch and then striking in a frontal attack.But the classicalphalanx wasnot capableof attackingin all directions,nor could it protect its own flank and rear. Well-articulated tactical formations such as the Roman legion, Innoduction 7 medievalheavy cavalrybataille and Swissbattle squarewere capableof great tacticalflexibility and responsiveness,wheeling and attackingor defendingin many directions.Less articulatedor unarticulatedformations such as the Persiansparabara, Germanic ltundred or Scottishschiltron, because of their lack of drill and discipline,performed poorly in offensiveshock action, preferring to remain on the defensivein static formations. Hand-to-hand shock combat rarelylasted very long becauseof the enormousphysical and emotionalstrain on combatants.Most engagementslasted only a few minutes, with total exhaustionsetting in after only fifteen or twenty minutes of uninterrupted combat.zIf a battle lastedan afternoonor longer,then multiple engagements took place,compounding the emotionaland physicalstrain of the eventon the combatants. Light infantry and light cavalryweapon systems relied on a missileweapon system that dealt out death at a distance.These lighter units were less armoured than their heavier counterparts,and consequentlyhad greater tacticalmobility. Archers and javelineers,whether mounted or not, did not haveto fight in closeorder to be effective:instead they usuallyfought in open formation where they could best use their mobility. Becauseof this tactical mobility, light units were often usedby ancient,classical, medieval and early modern commandersin guerrilla roles and as physicalprobes (skirmishers) againsttheir less mobile but better protectedheavy counterparts.But this mobility did little to protect them when shock combat ensued.Unable to withstand hand-to-handcombat with enemy infantry and mounted shock troops, these light units often retired through the ranks of their heavier companionsto act asflank and rear protectionduring the engagement. Each weapon systemhad strengthsand weaknessesas illustrated in the diagram explainingthe tactical capabilitiesof the four weapon systemsin ancientand medievalwxfare. With someor all of the weaponsystems present and co-operatingin a combined-armssynthesis, a generalof the calibre of Alexanderthe Great, Hannibal Barca, William the Bastard,Batu Khan or GustavusAdolphus proved irresistible on the battlefield. Still, it shouldbe rememberedthat the mere presenceof a combined-arms army under the commandof a generalwho had showedbrilliance on the battlefield in the past did not guaranteevictory. History is replete with examplesof outstandingcommanders who fell victim to what the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called'friction' in his seminal work On War,,published in 1832.3Although Clausewitzwas a student of Napoleon and his campaigns,his appraisalof what hasbeen called the 'fog of war' holdstrue in any era. Friction refers to the accidents,uncertainties, errors, technical difficulties or unknown factors on the battlefield, and to their effect on decisions,morale and actionsin warfare.aTo Clausewitz,'Action in war is like movementin a resistantelement. Just as the simplestand most natural of movements,walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is 1- I I I j 8 Warforein theMed,ieoal World

INFANTRY CAVALRY

SHOCK HEAVYINFANTRY D.r+> HEAVYCAVALRY

t \ I A A-

I / \ I MISSILE LIGHT INFANTRY -> LIGHTCAVALRY

a)

INFANTRY CAVALRY

SHOCK HEAVYINFANTRY D -> HEAVYCAVALRY

t \ t A A I \l MISSILE LIGHTINFANTRY { --> LTGHTCAVALRY

b)

Figure I. The Four WeaponSystems. (a) Ancient WeaponSystems. An illustration of generalrules of dominance in conflicts betweendifferent ancient weapln systems: (1) heauy infantry is generally dominant nhen defending against heaajt caaalry; (2) heaay caaalry is generally dominant when attacking light infanny or light caualry; (3) light infontry is generally dominant when defending against light ca"^alry; and (4) light caualry is generally d,ominantwhen attacking heaay infantry. Dominancebetween heaay and light infantry aariesaccording to theperiod and unit type inaoloedin the action. Based on Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Urbana and Chicago: Uniaersiyof lllinoisPress,1987),schematic 1.2. (b) MedieualWeaponSystems.AnillustrationoJ' generalrules of dominancein conflictsbetpeen dtJferent medieaal Deapln q/stems: (1) heauy idantry is generallydominant when defendingagainst heaay caaalry; (2) heauy caxalry is generallydominant when attaching light infantry; (3) light infantry is generally dominant when d.efend.ingagainst light caaalry or attacking heaay infantry; and (4) light caaalry is generallyd.ominant when attacbing heaay infantry or heaay caaalry. Based.on Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Urbana and Chicago:Uniaersity of lllinois Press,1987), schematic2.1. Introd.uction I

difficult from normal efforts to achieve even moderate results.'s Friction. 'is Clausewitz tells us, the force that makes the apparently easyso difficult'.6 The great commanderswho fought, won and sometimeslost the battlesthat shaped the history of western civilization understood the repercussionsof friction when making war. They understood that the best strategies,bravest soldiers,mo.st modern equipment and ingenioustactics did not alwayscarry the day.Ancient, classical,medieval and early modern commandersrecognized that each engagementcarried the possibility of victory',with all its spoils,or defeatand possibledeath, enslavementor the extermination of their soldiers and families, and loss of homeland. Warfare, to these men and their cultures, 'the was more than, in the famous statementby Clausewitz, continuation of politics by other means'.7Warfare in the pre-modern world was instead,in the 'an words of the British military historianJohn Keegan, expressionof culture, often a determinantof cultural forms, and in somesocieties, the culture itself'.8 And in the period under study here,a period without the GenevaConventions and formal rules of war, the distinction between how 'civilized' and 'barbarian' peoplesfought was often blurred, with all sides routinely killing or maiming combatantsand non-combatantsalike, and enslavingor ethnically cleansing entire populations. This monograph is by no meanscomprehensive. It is the secondpart of a two-volume introduction to the developmentof the art of war during western civilization'sancient, classical, medieval and early modern periods.By pulling togetherboth primary and secondarysources, it is my hope that this synthetic work will help my undergraduatestudents at the AmericanMilitary University and armchair military historiansalike better appreciatethe sophisticatednature of pre-modern warfare and the importance of organizedviolence in shaping westerncivilization's history and culture. The story continueswith the rise of Byzantium in the early medievalperiod. { il': !"

Chapter6 Late MedievalWarfare: The Return of Heavv Infantry

The Rise of the Swiss Battle Square Although medieval commandershad long known the importance of foot soldiersas the backboneof their defensiveformations, the return of heavy infantrycapable of well-articulatedoffensive action began with the Swiss,who rediscoveredthis weaponsystem in their strugglewith the AustrianHabsburgs and the duchy of Burgundy. As early as the beginning of the fourteenth century,the Swisshad developedheavy infantry who fought in a battlesquare that rivalled the best from the classicalperiod and profoundly affectedthe developmentof Europeanwarfare in the lateMiddle Agesand beyond.t Fighting on foot camenaturally to the poor Swissmountaineers, suiting both the ruggedterrain of their homelandand their limitedresources. Isolated from the feudalmainstream of westernEurope by the Alps andorganized into small rural valley communities,the Srvisssubscribed to the old Germanic tradition wherebyall able-bodiedmen were expectedto participatein their Waldstaatezor forestcanton militia (Map 6.I).t Also in the old Germanic tradition, Swisscantonal societies were organizedaround clans,with clan leadersand aldermen serving on localcouncils that ruledthrough laws of their own making.Consequently, Swiss society was more democratic, less rigid and moreunstructured than medieval societies elsewhere.3 But asthe Middle Ages waned,the democraticideals of the poor, rural forest cantonscame under attack by the periodic encroachmentsof the neighbouringHabsburgs of Austria and Burgundian lords who wanted to impose their own feudal structureson the swisscantons.a Forced to take up arms to maintain their self-determination,the Swiss developeda militia-basedtactical system shapedby their own social and economicrealities. Like classicalGreek citizen militia of two millenniabefore, the Swissadopted the battlesquare or phalanx,based on a simple,distinctive heavyinfantry doctrineand drilled themselvesin its application.Before the late medievalperiod, these cantonal armies were essentially defensive in designand capability,but as the fourteenthcentury unfolded, Swiss militias gainedthe :l

178 Warfarein theMedieaal World

* s'' :18" il"n"y (1477)

---+ Burgundians ZUG RegionalCanton

ALSACE

\l

UNTERWALDEN ilurlen Freiberg URI ' (14'76) -\"0'u?"*JOUgne BER[\ PAYS DE VAUD /- GRUYERE

Lausanne umyere l SWISS FEDERA ION A N SAYOY OWER i4LAlS Geneva Albers Conic Equal Area 50 miles 3"

Mao 6.1 TheSpiss Wars.

training,discipline and experiencenecessary for effectiveoffensive action, and the Swissheavy infantry tacticalsystem was born. The Swissphalanx went through a period of evolutionin size,composition and armamentduring its history.The early Swissphalanx was composedof two or more cantonalcontingents, called banners,because this is where the standardsof the contingentswere displayed. Each banner was commanded by its own officersand wasdivided into subunitscalled/ahnleins, or'little flags', of between50 and 150men. Fahnleinswere further subdividedinto ten-man squadscalled rztten or sections.sIn the early fourteenthcentury, when the SwissConfederation was still small, the cantonalphalanx contained perhaps 900 heavyinfantrymen arrayed in a formation of 30 ranksby 30 files. But as more cantonsioined the confederationin the late fourteenth and fifteenth F r.:E i

LateMedieual Warfore: The Return of HeaoyInfantry 179

centuriesand a nationalarmy wasborn, the sizeof the battlesquare increased to 50 ranksby 50 filesand around2,500 men.6 The articulationof the Swissphalanx was excellent, with the battle square organizedin deep files. Beforethe battle of Laupen in 1339,the normal configurationof Swiss forceswas the keil or wedgeformation. This tactical array was lessa wedgethan a column,narrower than it was deep.7When attackedby enemycavalry, the pikemenin the keilfacedoutwards and lowered their pikes,creating a bristlinghedgehog that would be difficult to approachon horseback.8By the battleof Laupen,this formationevolved into a true battle square,with the columns becomingsquarer as the width of the formation increased. By simplyfollowing the man ahead,the Swissbattle square could maintain its integrity,avoiding gaps like the smallerRoman maniple of the classicalage. And like legionariesin the Romanmaniple, Swiss infantrymen did not form a line on the battlefield,but usuallyarrayed in threesquares in echelonor in a chequerboardformation reminiscent of the Romanquincunx. These squares consistedof a vanguardor Vorhut.,smaller than the main body and often including skirmishersarmed with crossbowsor handguns;a main body or Genalthutmuch larger than the advanceguard; and a rearguardor Nachhut, which was usuallysmaller than the main body as well. The Swissdrilled, marchedand evenadvanced to the attackto the soundof the drum, with some authoritiesstating that the troops marchedin cadence.eSwiss drill was sophisticatedenough to defendthe squarein all directionswhen halted,but unlike usually immobile medieval heavy infantry, the Swiss stressedthe offensive,and the militias drilled constantlyto improvearticulation, producing a battle squarecomparable to the Macedonianphalanx in manoeuvrability, cohesivenessand shock power.lo Initially unarmouredand with no shield,the earlySwiss militiaman fought with a halberd,a broad-headedaxe with an 8 foot handlethat had a point for useas a short pike,and a spikeopposite the axeblade to hooka cavalrymen's reins or puncture his armour.rrThis weapon proved its worth on the battlefieldsof Morgarten,Laupen and Sempach in the fourteenthcentury, but subsequentbattles in the fifteenth century betweenthe Swiss phalanx and enemy formations showedthe weaknessof the short-haftedhalberd as an offensiveweapon, especially against well-armoured cavalry charges. The Swiss infantrymanresponded to this threatby adoptinga long-haftedpike l0 to l8 feet long with a l0 inch long spearhead,giving him a formidablereach.l2 By 1425the pike wasreplacing the halberdas the primary offensiveweapon of the Swissarmy. By the end of the fifteenth century over two-thirds of the Swiss infantrywere armed with this polearm.13 When arrayedin a defensiveposture for battle, the Swissinfantry square utilized the first four ranksof pikemento createa 'hedgehog'orhollow square formation, levellingtheir pikesoutward on all four sidesto discouragecavalry 180 ll/arfarein theMedieaal World charges.Each of the five ranks held their pikesat a slightly different angleto achievethe hedgehogeffect, with the first rank kneelingdown and holding theirpikes near the ground,the secondrank stooping down and supporting the butt with their right foot,the third rankholding the pikeat waistlevel, and the fourth ranklevelling the spearheadat the enemy'shead. The menbehind these ranksheld their pikessloping upward to the front to protect the squarefrom missilefire. If the phalanxwas advancing in an offensivemanoeuvre, all pikes wereheld at chestlevel with the spearheadpointed slightly downward for a downwardthrust.ra As their military and economicfortunes improved, Swiss infantry gradually armouredthemselves with steelcaps and breastplates,though no standard- izationof armourever took placethroughout the rankand file, and infantry in the interiorof the squarecontinued to wearleather jerkins or paddedjackets.rs Betterprotected, the armoured pikemen became the major offensive element of the phalanx,though some halberdiers were retained in the centreof the square, wherethey could attackany enemy,cavalry or infantry that breachedthe pike wall. The Swisstactical system also recognizedthe need for ancillaryweapon systemsto support the pikemen and halberdiersin battle. Light infantry crossborvmen,and laterhandgunners, were usually deployed as skirmishers in front of the vanguardof the main force,engaging the enemyto provide time for the main heavyinfantry force to deploy from column to square.Once the phalanxwas in position,the light infantry usuallyretreated between the files and formed in the rear wherethey actedas flank and rear protection.Also, by the beginningof the sixteenthcentury, the Swissstationed within the phalanx specialshock troops armed with two-handedswords, morning stars(maces toppedwith a bristleof long,sharp spikes) and Lucernehammers (polearms similarto the halberd,but with a three-prongedhammer for the strikingarea insteadof an axeblade). Their missionwas to rush out of the pike wall and engagethe enemyin closequarters combat.l6 As the Swissgained more experiencein raisingconscript armies, and as these armies grew in size and tactical complexity,strict regulationswere introducedgoverning military service.By the mid-1400sthree different kinds of troops were in existence:the Auszugor elite forces,composed of mostly unmarried men betweenthe agesof eighteenand thirty; the Land,wehr,or primary combatforce, composed of men willing and ableto leavehome if the need arose;and the Landsturrn)or lev6een masseof all able-bodiedmen, a reserveforce calledto arms only in an emergency.lTThe Swisswere alsothe first army of the period to repair damagedweapons and armour and take responsibilityover soldiers wounded in battleand their widowsand children. By 1500the professionalismof the Swissarmy was unsurpassedand 'free groups'of Swisstroops found themselves a wanted commodity as mercenaries in foreignarmies.18 G Il

LateMedieual ll/arfare: The Return of HeaayInfantry I8l

Heavy Infantry versus Heavy Cavalry: The Battles of Morgarten, Laupen and Sempach As earlyas 1315at the battleof Morgarten,the Swissdemonstrated the ability of their well-trainedheavy infantry militia to defendtheir homelandagainst the heavycavalry of their Austrian neighbours.reFor more than twenty years the tensionsbetween the Swissforest cantonof Schwyz and the Austrian Habsburgsstewed as the Austrianmonarchy attempted to bring the region underHabsburg hegemony. When the holy Romanemperor Henry VII diedin I3l+, the citizensof the cantonof Schwyzdeclared their support for the Bavariancandidate, forcing Duke Leopoldof Austriato assemblea feudal army from Habsburglands in Swabiaand friendlySwiss cities. In November1315 Leopoldprepared to marchinto the high forestcanton of Schwyzand squash the growingrebellion before it spreadto otherareas of the country. The host that Duke Leopold assembledat Zug wascomposed of between 2,000and 3,000 men altogether, including perhaps 1,500 mounted knights and an equal number of squires,light infantry crossbowmenand levied unarticulatedheavy infantry.2o Confident in the abilityof this sizablearmy to dealwith the peasantuprising in the uplandvalley of Schwyz,Leopold placed his armyin columnsand marched south down the eastern shore of LakeAegeri towardsthe city of Schwyz(Mup 6.2(a)).This routeran througha narrowpass betweensteep mountains and the lakeitself, presenting an excellentplace for an ambush. Knowing the Austrianroute in advance,the Schwyzcommander Werner Stauffachermarched an army of between2,000 and 4,000 men (mostly halberdierswith a few crossbowmen)to a ridge aboveLake Aegeri that overlookedthe narrowmountain road below.2r The roaditself snakedbetween a steephillside that led to the ridge and a steepbank which led to the lake below.To best exploit the terrain, Stauffachersent a small detachmentof engineersto the roadto hastilybuild a timberand rock wall. He thenreinforced this blocking force with his light infantry crossbowmen,stationing them behindthe makeshiftobstacle in order to stopthe Austrianheavy cavalry from quicklyoverrunning the defensiveposition. After blockingthe mountainroad, the Swisscommander hid most of his men in a shallowravine atop the ridge until Leopold'svanguard of Austrianheavy cavalry appeared. Stoppedby the timberand rock wall, the Austrian vanguard began to pileup asthe restof the columnmarched and trotted forward. Aware of his precarious positionbut believinghe facedonly a smalldelaying force, Leopold ordered the knightsin the front batailleto dismountand attackthe Swissposition and removethe obstacle(Map 6.2(b)).As the defendingcrossbowmen fended off the approachingdismounted knights from behindthe wall, the main body of Swiss attackedfrom the ridgeline. At first throwing rocks and rolling tree trunks down the slope,the Swissfollowed up with a suddenand violent 'j," infantryattack. The Swissphalanx moved out of theravine and across the edge ill gi

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tllap 6.2 The Battle 0f Mlrgarten, 1315. (a) Phase I: An Austrian arrn)/ untler Duke Leopokl adaancesalong the shoreof LakeAegeri ( I ) to put dorona peasantuprising in Schroyz.A Schwyz army commandedby WernerStatfficher paits in ambush,aforce of crossbopmend,eptoyed behind a maheshift wall of timber and stone (2) blocbingthe narrop road, and another of halberdiersin a shallop rauine atop the ridgeline (3) looking dorpn the steepslope towartls the approachingenemy. (b) Phase II: Leopold orders his aanguard to disrnount (l ), reduce the blockadeand bilt the defentlers. The Schnyz i! * crossbowrnenopenfire on the adaancingAustrians (2) as the remainderof Leopold'smen begin to bunch ; up on the n&rrzIDPath (3). High aboaethe congestedcolumn, Stauffacher's men roll bouldersand tree trunks dopn the steepslope into the Ausnians ft). (c) PhaseIII: The Swissphalanx emergesfromthe I raoine and adpancesdopn the slope ( I ), gaining mlmentum as they chargethe lead Austrian diaision (2). Thc Austrian colurunbecomes eDen mlre crmpressedas the pressurefrom the rear units increases t (3). (d') PhaseIV: The Spiss infantry fight their way into the midst of the Austrian ranhs and begin i slaughteringboth rnan and beastwith their halberds(l ). Leopold is to his way through his I forced, fight lvn trllps escl,Pe(2). (e) I I0 Phase V: The Spiss halberdiersbegin to cut their paJ/ thrlugh the remaining Austrian trllps, manJ of whom are driaen into the lake and drown. The Spiss take no prisonersin the action, helping to establisha reputationforferocity in battle. -

184 Warfarein theMedieaal World

of the ridge,then descended with gatheringmomentum on the first divisionof the Austriancolumn trappedby the extremeterrain and the densityof its own army on the road below(Map 6.2(c)).Moments later, the Swisshalberdiers were inside the ranks of the enemycavalry, dismembering bodies and killing horseand dismountedknight alike(Map 6.2(d)). The Swissheavy infantry hacked and hewed their waythrough the Austrian vanguard,then beganworking their way down the congestedcolumn toward the secondbataille where Leopold himself commanded.Unable to pushpast the timber wall, the dukewas forced to literallyfight throughhis own knights andinfantry to escapethe trap.As the battleraged, many of the Austrianswere forced off the road and drownedin the lake below (Map 6.2(e)).Leopold escaped,but perhaps1,500 of his knightsand infantrymen died.22 Chronicling the battlesome twenty-five years later, the monkJohnof Winterthurwrites: 'It wasnot a battle,but a merebutcher of Duke Leopold'smen; for the mountain folk slewthem like sheepin the shambles:no onegave any quarter, but theycut downall, without distinction,until therewere none left to kill.'23 From the battleof Morgartenonward, the Swisswould pride themselvesin their battlefield brutality. Breaking with the long medievaltradition of ransomingenemy knights, the Swissoffered no quarterto their foeson the battlefieldand any prisonerstaken were killed later.2aThe result of this deliberatepsychological warfare was a reputationthat struckterror into their enemies,adding to the mystiqueof this emergingtactical system. The battleof Morgartenmarks the return of well-articulatedheavy infantry to westernEurope after a thousand-yearabsence. Aided by terrain, tactical surpriseand parity in numbers,Swiss heavy infantry took the offensiveand destroyeda combined-armsfeudal army without the useof heavycavalry. And though the victory had as much to do with Leopold'sstupidity in allorving himselfto be ambushedas it did with excellencein Swisstactics, the battledid illustratewhat a well-disciplinedand motivated peasant infantry levy could do againstthe flowerof Austrianchivalry.2s The Swiss victory at Morgarten establishedthe three forest cantons (Schwyz,Uri and Unterwalden)as a military confederationto be reckoned with. Within a generationafter Morgarten, the rebellionagainst the Habsburgs developedinto a union of city republicsand rural republics,spreading down into the lowlands.These forest cantons entered into an alliancewith the city of Lucernein 1319,resulting in the originsof a Swissconfederation capable of challengingforeign hegemony. Over the next few decades,Swiss success on the battlefieldstimulated the causefor Swissnationalism, spurring the alliance's enemiesto openaggression. When in 1339the city of Bern, the largestand most important urban community south of the Rhine, threatenedan alliance with the Swiss Confederation,Bern's enemies to the westin Burgundy marchedeastward and laid siegeto thecity of Laupen,10 miles south-west of Bern.The Burgundians LateMed,iet:al Warfare: The Return of HeaayInfantry 185 took advantageof yearsof civil warsto extendtheir boundariesat the expense of the Swiss,going so far as to support Swisslords unwilling to join the growing confederation.Under the commandof Count Gerard of Vallangin, the besiegingBurgundian army was joined by local lords and their levies, swellingto perhaps12,000 infantry and 1,000mounted knights.26 Dismayed.atthe strengthof this coalition,the Councilof Bern askedthe forestcantons for aid, offering them both an allianceand monetarysubsidies. Unwilling to toleratea strongBurgundian presence in Swissaffairs, the forest cantonsjoined with the Bernesemilitia and, using the coverof the forest, movedundetected to a spotvery close to Laupen.On the afternoonof 2l June, the Swissarmy assumeda defensiveposition on the Bramberg,a grassyhill 2 mileseast of the besiegedcity (Mrp 6.3(a)). The Swissforce was comrtanded by an experiencedBernese knight named Rudolf of Erlach and numbered6,000 men, including 1,000men from the forestcantons. Believing the enemywould sooneror later haveto breaktheir siegeand challengean army at their backs,Erlach arrayed 1,000 halberdiers from the forestcantons on the left, just outsidethe skirtsof the woodsalong the crestof the gentlerslope of the Bramberg.The Swisscentre consisted of three 900-manBernese phalanxes armed with long infantry pikes, unusual weaponsfor Swissmilitia at this earlydate. These three battle squares were arrayed30 men wide by 30 men deep.On the right, Erlach placeda larger Bernesebattle square2,000 strong, arrayed 50 men wide by 40 men deep. Finally,Erlach deployeda small contingentof light infantry crossbowmen, supplementedby a few medievalhandgunners, in front of the phalanxesand in the gaps betweenthe battle squares.To distinguish themselvesfrom their enemyon the battlefield,the Swisssewed white crosseson their clothing,an emblemlater adopted as the nationalsymbol.2i Count Gerardwas surprised by the suddenappearance of the Swissrelief army,but wasgranted time to arrayhis own numericallysuperior forces when the Swisstook a defensiveposition on theBramberg. He placedall of his 1,000 heavycavalry on his own right wing oppositethe confederatehalberdiers, intendingto chargeup the gentlerslope of the hill and then turn the Swiss flank inward.The count then placedhis 12,000heavy infantry in the centreand right wings.Anchoring the centrewere a cadreof well-equippedheavy infantry from the coalitioncity of Freiburg, while the left was occupiedwith a large contingentof unarticulatedinfantry describedby contemporarychroniclers as 'raw andill-armed bands'. The battle of Laupen began late in the afternoon when Count Gerard ordereda generalassault up the Brambergtoward the Swissposition. As the massof coalitioncavalry and infantry climbedthe hill, Erlachordered his light infantry forwardto meet the attackwith bolts and shot (Map 6.3(b)).After someinitial skirmishin&the Swisscrossbowmen and handgunnersfiltered back through their heavyinfantry squares.As the light infantry madeits way *r

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Map 6.3 The Battle of Laupen, 1339. (a) PhaseI: The Spiss army deploysalong the crest of the Bramberg,just eastof Laupen ( I ). Halberd.iersfrom theforest cantnnsare on the left, threeBernese pihe squaresin the centre,and a much larger squareof Berneseinfantry is on the right, screenedby and, interspersedwith light infantry crossbowmenand a few handgunners(2). The Burgundians interrupt their siegeof the toronand arralt themselztesopposite the enemyrelidforce on the lop hill (3). Gerard. ordersa generaladoance (4). (b) PhaseII: The Spisscrossbopmen and handgunnersopenfire on the aduancingtroops ( I ) and thenfall backthrough their idantry squ&res(2), re-forming to the rear of their phalanxes.Seaeral ranbs ofBernese infantry breakand runfor the poodsto the rear (3). (c) PhaseIII: Erlach ord.ersthe Spissinfantry to charge(l ), and the coalition and Freiburgerinfantry scetter (2). On the Spissleft, the charginghalberdiers (3) collidepith the oncomingheaoy caaalry. Unlihe the infantry, the horsemenwithdrap in good.ord.er and re-form (4). (d) PhaseII/: The Burgund.ianheauy caaalry chargethe halberd,iers(l), who quichlyform a hedgehog(2) against the assault; howeaer,the short- hafted halberd.sfail to prooide muchprotection against the hnights.Erlach orders hisinfantry squarest0 roheelleft to assisttheir beleagueredcomradcs (3), catchingthe enemyin theflanh antl rear. (e) PhaseV The Spisscharge ( I ) shattersthe enemycaaalry. Many are killed.and, the suroiaorsscattered, (2). Swiss lossesare light and are almostentirelyfrom amongthe ranks of the halberdierson the left. "Y

188 Warfarein theMed,ieaal Wbrld to the backof the phalanxes,several ranks of the centreBernese phalanx broke and ran for the prorectionof the woods.Undeterred, Erlach ordered his entire army downhillto engagethe enemy(Map 6.3(c)). The Swiss halberdiersfrom the forest cantonsclashed head-on with the massedheavy cavalry directly to their front. Though the Swissinfantry's downhill chargeshattered the Freiburgerand coalitioninfantry in the centre andon the left, the well-trainedBurgundian feudal heavy cavalry on the right fell back, re-formed and counter-attackedthe forest canton halberdiers, strikingthe square'sfront, flankand rear. Under attack,the halberdiershalted and foimed a hedgehog,lowering their weaponsand facing their formationin all four directionsto repelrepeated charges by feudalcavalry (Mtp 6'3(d))' But the short-haftedSwiss halberd, ideal for inflicting horrible wounds againstenemy foot and horse.during the offensive,was not asefficient as the long-haftedpike in keeping enemy cavalry at bay when in a defensive formation.28 Seeingthe beleagueredhalberdiers, Erlach ordered his victoriousBernese phalanxesto wheel90 degreesand strike the heavycavalry attacking the forest cantonunits on the Swissleft, catchingthe enemyhorsemen in the flank and rearwith completesurprise and shattering the enemyhorse (Mup 6'3(e))'And though casualtieswere generally light whereinfantry clashed,the flank attack agai.rstcoalition cavalry caused heavy casualties, with perhapsas many as 1,500 noblesand commonersdying. Three countsand eightybarons and bannerets were killed, alongwith severalhundred of their men-at arms.The victors displayedtwenty-seven feudal banners and seventycrested helms as trophies when they returnedhome the next day.Swiss casualties were moderate and almostentirely among the men of the forestcantons.2e At thebattle of Laupen,Swiss militia demonstratedthat it couldwin a battle under lessfavourable circumstances than the battle of Morgarten, specifically on an open field againstunarticulated heavy infantry supportedby feudal cavalry.rdThe Swissvictory at Laupenalso illustrated the tacticalmobility and capacityof the battlesquare to defendagainst all-round attacks' even when the defenderswere wielding short-hafted halberds. Having begun as a defensivealliance between three forestcantons in 1307, the Swiss Confederationhad, by 1386,grown into a formal political and military alliance designedto safeguardSwiss national independencefrom intrusion by the house of Habsburg. The city of Lucerne ioined the confederationin 1332,while Zurichjoined in 1353,Zugand Glarusin 1352, and Bern in 1353.As the Swiss Confederationgrew and becamemore confident in its military capabilities,it began to challengeHabsburg possessionssourh of the Rhine. In 1386the Swisstook the offensiveand attackedthe smalltown of Sempach,sacking Habsburg fortresses and layingto wasteagricultural areas loyal to the local Habsburglord, Duke Leopold III, nephewof the Leopolddefeated at Morgarten.3l LateMedieaal Waffire: TheReturn of Heaz;yInfantry 189

In the summerof 1386Leopold raiseda formidablearmy of 4,000men, including 2,500 feudal infantry and 1,500 knights and mercenaries,and marched into Switzerlandto punish the Lucerners and regain his lost territory.3zHe marchedon Sempachand surroundedthe city, entrappingits garrison,then continuedfurther alongthe road to interceptany Swissrelief forcesmoving in east from Zurich. The strength of the Swissarmy in and aroundSempach was between 6,000 and 8,000, and the vanguardmarching on Sempachconsisted of between1,500 and 2,000men composedentirely of the leviesfrom Lucerne.33As the two hostsmoved toward each other, neither army deployedadvance scouts. Around noonon 9 July,lead elements of two armies stumbledinto eachother on a hillsideroad, a mile and a half north-eastof Sempach,near the villageof Hildisrieden(Mtp 6.+(a)). Immediatelyafter makingcontact with the Austrianvanguard, the Swiss deployedfor battleon a pieceof levelground halfway up the terracedslope of the mountainside.Meanwhile, the Austrianarmy, marching in threebatailles, wasstrung out in columnlvhen their van madecontact. The first corpswas Austrianand commanded byJohn of Ochenstein,the second corps by the duke himself,and the third divisionwas composed of Alsatian,Swabian and hired mercenariesunder the commandof the countof Hohenzollern.Well awareof the Srvissphalanx's ability againstmounted attacks,Leopold orderedthe knightsof the first division to dismountand fight as heavyinfantry (Map 6.4(b)).He believedhis heavycavalry's lances would makeexcellent infantry spears,outreaching the enemy'shalberds, and that their superiorplate armour wouldprotect them in their assaultagainst the lessprotected Swiss militiamen. The remainingtwo Austriandivisions remained mounted and readyto charge the Swissinfantry square once it hadlost cohesion. Believing the entire Swiss army was in front of him, Duke Leopold commandedhis light infantry crossbowmento harassthe Swissphalanx, then orderedhis dismountedknights up the hill to attackthe weakenedSwiss battle square(Map 6.a(c)).Wielding their lancesas infantry pikes, the Austrianknights wadedinto the Swissformation. Soon, Swiss losses mounted and the phalanx beganto collapse.As the Lucerne banner fell into Austrian hands,Leopold preparedto ordera generalcavalry charge against the disintegrating Swiss square. But beforethe Austrianduke could order the cavalryto the attack,the main bodyof the Swissarmy appeared over the risenear the village.Led by the men of Uri, the Swissarmy immediatelymoved from line of columninto the attack, smashinginto the flank of the dismountedknights (Map 6.4(d)).The sudden assaultwas devastating. Fresh and superiorin numbers,the Swisshalberdiers hackedand hewedinto the Austrian knights who were themselvesbecoming exhaustedafter fighting for an hour in plate armour.Watching the knights of his first divisionbeing trampled under the Swissassault, Leopold jumped from his horseand orderedthe mountedand dismountedkniehts of his second corpsto follow him into the fray. jli4r rl

--____ -\ .- --

Map 6.4 The Battle of Sempach,1386. (a) PhaseI: Marching north-eastfrom Sempach(l), Duke Leopold'sAustrian army is unaraareof the approachof a Swissforce mouing torpardshim on the same road (2). The Spissoanguard and the Austrians' first dioisionspot eachother and beginto dephy (3). (b) PhaseII: Recognizingtlre threatfrom the Swissphalanx, Leopoldorders his lead diaisionto dismount ( I ) and deplol,slight infantrj crossbopmen(2) tofire into the Srpissbattle squareto beginchipping away at theformation (3). (c) PhaseIII: The Swissbattle stluarebegins to losecohesion (l) and Leopold ordershis dismountedknights into thefight (2). The Austians inflict heaay losseson the Swiss,and Leopold readieshis mountedhnights for a charge(3) t0 finhh olf the diintegrating phalanx, but before the duke can order his horsemenforward, the Spissmain body appearsloer the rise towardsHildisrieden (4) and head; d.ownthe slopetopards the action. (d) PhaseIV: The Swissquichly deployfrom column into battle square (1) and smashinto theJlank and,rear of the d.ismountedfirstdiaision (2). Fatigued after an hour offighting andfoced with a seeminglyunstoppable mass offresh halberd-pieldinginfantry, the Austrians beginto rout (3). Leopoldleapsfrom his horseand. ord.ers his diaisionforward againstthis nev menace@. (e) PhaseV: BeforeLeopold can launchhis counter-attnck,the Spis pheel their square in a deaastatingassault on the Austrian flank ( I ). Thoughthe Austrian knightsfight braaely, they are gradually ooerczmeby the Swisshalberdiers (2). The count of Hohenzollern, command.ingthe Austrian reserjJe,panics and,orders a precipitate retreat (3), causingthe squiresand pagestending to the second dioision'shorses to look to their orpnsafety and,flee as well, abandoningtheir masters,including Duke Leopold,to certain death at the handsof the Swissinfantry (4). l

192 Warfarein theMedieaol World

But beforethe counter-attackof the Austrian seconddivision could form, the attackingSwiss phalanx turned 90 degreesand struckthe Austrians(Map 6.a(e)).In the swirlingm6l6e,, Duke Leopoldand his knightsfought well, but in the end they were overcomeby enemy halberdiers.3aWatching the disintegratingsituation from a distance,the commanderof the Austrian reserveslost his nerveand turned and fled the field. Oncethe third division left, the squiresand pages who weretending the horsesof the seconddivision alsofled, abandoning those knights who wereable to disengagefrom themdl6e. Exhaustedand outnumbered,these knights were cut down wherethe Swiss found them.Austrian casualties were 1,800men, includingthe dukehimself, threecounts, five baronsand sevenbannerets. Swiss losses were about 120 men andmostly among the vanguard.3s When the corpsesof the fallen at Sempachwere exhumedin 1898, archaeologistsdiscovered that almostall of the Austriandead had been killed by havingtheir skullssplit openby halberds.Leopold's tactical calculation to havehis dismountedknights use their lancesas infantry pikesagainst Swiss heavyinfantry halberdiersproved disastrous.If the halberdwas too short for an effectivedefence against enemy heavycavalry, in closequarter combat it workedmurderously well againstthe lance.36At the battleof Laupen,Swiss heavyinfantry proved they could beat the knight on his horse,while at the battle of Sempachthey proved they could beat him dismountedas heavy infantry,on fair ground and with no greatdisparity in numbers.rT As the Swissexpanded their confederation,they beganto threatenthe powerof the Habsburgdynasty. In the spring of 1444the Habsburgemperor FriedrichIII askedthe Frenchking CharlesVII for assistancewith the growing Swissalliance. Charles dispatched a huge army of 40,000men to penetrate confederateterritory through Alsace,securing Basle as a bridgehead.On receivingnews of an invasionarmy, the confederatecity of Bern senta small reconnaissanceforce of 1,200men northwardto observethe Frencharmy'. But at the Birs River nearthe smallhospital of SaintJacob, the Swissarmy was confrontedby the entireFrench host. Refusingto retreat,the 1,500Swiss infantrymen grouped immediately into threesquares, levelled their pikesand launchedan attackinto the Frenchlines. In whatbecame known as the battleof SaintJacob-en-Birs, the Swisssquares madea profoundimpression when they attackeda French army,even though they wereoutnumbered perhaps fifteen to one.38French cavalry assaults on the flanks of the battle squareshalted the Swiss,then the French used their crossbowmento weardown the immobilesquares. After five hoursof rebuffing enemycavalry charges, the Swissmanaged to withdrawto the smallhospital of Saint Jacob,which was surrounded by a wall high enough to offer some protection.The disciplinedSwiss stood their ground and, in the face of artillery barragesand crossbowbolts, suffered heavy casualties. As the wallsof the hospitalwere reduced to rubble,the Frenchfoot stormedthe courtyard.In iI ;i' i

LateMedieaal Warfore: The Return of HeaayIffintry 193

the bitter hand-to-handcombat that followed,the Swissdied to a man. Like the Spartans'defence at the battleof Thermopylaenearly two thousandyears earlier,the Swissstand at SaintJacob-en-Birs elevated the statusof the battle squarein westernEuropean warfare.

The Burgundian Wars: A New Cornbined-Arms Synthesis versus Swiss Heavy Infantry The reputationof the Swisstactical system was further enhancedin campaigns againstthe duke of Burgundy,Charles the Bold (r. 1465-1477).Charles had operatedwith impunity againstthe Frenchcrown followinghis defeatof King Louis XI of France(r. 1461-1483)at Monthlh6ry in 1465.After Charles's follow-onvictories at Lidge(1466) and Brustem (1467), he turnedhis attention to the Swisson his easternfront. Here, the growing SwissConfederation providedthe militaryopposition to his plans.In orderto weakenthe Swiss,the dukeof Burgundyplanned to divideand conquer,cutting a path throughthe alpinealliance with the mostmodern army he couldassemble. To meetthis objective,Charles fielded a well-financedcombined-arms army of 30,000men, consisting of Burgundianheavy cavalry, Flemish heavy infantry pikemen, Italian light infantry crossbowmen,German arquebusiersand mounted light infantry English longbowmen.Traditionally, Burgundian armieswere small, with mercenariesmaking up at least30 per cent of anyforce. But Charles'sgrand ambitions required a largerfighting force, and beginning in the early1470s, the duke stroveto createpermanent troops in mixed units (companies)of heavy cavalry, heavy infantry and light infantry archers, crossbowmenand handgunners,supported by the most modern artillery available. Gunpowdertechnologies appeared on the battlefieldsof westernEurope some time in the middle of the thirteenth century. Gunpowder was first utilizedas a weaponby the Chineseprior to 1000cr, whereit wasmade into bombsand rockets.The likely conduitof diffusionfrom China wasrhrough Islamiclands to Byzantiumor to Spain,then north of the Pyreneesto western Europe.References to gunpowderweaponry were includedin armouriesin Lille, Lucca,Aachen, London and Sienain the late 1330sand 1340s,and it appearedat the siegesof Tournaiin 1340and Calais in 1346-1347., and perhaps evenat the battle of Cr6cy in 1346.3e The first cannonmade in Europe,in the earlyfourteenth century, were vase- shapedtubes which fired huge darts like those shot from the old Roman ballistae.Over time the darts gaveway to round stoneor metalprojectiles and the barrelsevolved into a straighttube. But overthe next 150years gunpowder weaponryunderwent a spectacularevolutionary process as guns becameless frequently forged and more frequently cast, increasingboth reliability and durability.These improvements also allowed gunsmiths to maketheir weapons both much larger and much smaller,with the largestguns being capableof