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Pushing Boundaries - Chinese Diplomatic and Military Behavior Intensifies in the Run-Up to the 19Th Party Congress

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Pushing Boundaries - Chinese Diplomatic and Military Behavior Intensifies in the Run-Up to the 19Th Party Congress Volume 17, Issue 11 August 17, 2017 In a Fortnight: Pushing Boundaries - Chinese Diplomatic and Military Behavior Intensifies in the Run-up to the 19th Party Congress The PLA at 90: On the Road to Becoming a World-Class Military? Dennis J. Blasko, Elsa B. Kania and Stephen Armitage Counterintelligence Remains Weakness in Taiwan’s Defense Peter Mattis Disruption Under the Radar: Chinese Advances in Quantum Sensing Elsa B. Kania and Stephen Armitage Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance and the CCP’s Plan for China Samantha Hoffman Pushing Boundaries - Chinese miscalculation in the region” (Takungpao, Au- gust 15; Pengpai, August 15). Diplomatic and Military Behavior Intensifies in the Although both parties are aligned in their desire for stability on the Korean Peninsula, China’s re- Run-up to the 19th Party lations with the United States and its neighbors Congress have worsened over the course of 2017. From its border with India, to the East China Sea, China appears to have decided to ratchet up, rather Amid rising tensions between the United States than moderate, areas of friction. In the case of and North Korea, Gen. Fang Fenghui (房峰辉) the U.S., tension is rising over possible trade war, greeted his American counterpart, Chairman of right as China is entering an important political the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford in season. More than ever, it is important to under- Beijing on August 14. Recognizing the necessity stand the factors that go into determining of clear communication as the U.S. assesses pos- China’s willingness to use force, expend political sible military action against North Korea, the two capital, and confidence when challenging its held talks targeted at “mitigat[ing] the risk of neighbors. ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 A review of China’s recent diplomatic and mili- somewhat as he enlists U.S. military support to tary actions—and their impact on U.S.-China deal with a terrorist crisis in the south of his ties—can provide some useful context as both country. However, his eagerness to improve ties sides attempt to cooperate on North Korea and with China, and plans for large Chinese invest- other issues. ments, will remain important parts of his political platform. China has achieved a number of important dip- lomatic successes in the first eight months of To the west, Vietnam has entered a particularly 2017. Perhaps the most important progress was tense stage of relations with China. In July, Vi- seen in China’s long attempt to undermine in- etnam withdrew oil drilling ships in the East ternational support for the Republic of China China Sea after China threatened military action. (Taiwan). Particularly after the effective setback This followed earlier tensions in June that re- the People’s Republic of China (PRC) experi- sulted in Central Military Commission Vice- enced when Democratic Progressive Party can- Chairman Fan Changlong (范长龙) cutting short didate Tsai Ing-Wen was elected to the ROC’s his visit (Xinhua, June 18). In both cases the level presidency in 2016, the PRC has made significant of animosity, as the two nations maintain close headway in reducing the ROC’s diplomatic pres- ties at the Party-to-Party level, and have a num- ence abroad. ber of off-ramps to decrease tensions. But with the withdrawal of the drilling ships it is clear who In January, Nigeria closed a Republic of China has the upper hand. China’s position in the trade mission in its capital, Abuja. This followed South China Sea—via carrot and stick—is more São Tomé and Príncipe‘s switch in recognition to secure than ever and the lack of major cohesive the PRC in December 2016 (ROC-Taiwan.org, pushback from Southeast Asian nations is hav- December 21, 2016). In early June, Panama cut ing is generating national confidence in China’s ties with the ROC and recognized the PRC. Tai- rise. wan is consistently rated at the top of China’s diplomatic and military objectives, and as of Au- This confidence in dealing with its neighbors is gust 2017, only 20 nations worldwide recognize reflected with a generally upbeat feeling among the Republic of China. These successes can be Chinese nationalists at home. On July 1, the PRC expected to embolden China’s use of economic celebrated the 20th anniversary of the handover diplomacy to effectively sway other countries to of Hong Kong. The celebrations were meant to support its causes. emphasize that whatever “One Country, Two Systems” may imply, Hong Kong was firmly part In Southeast Asia, targeted Chinese diplomacy of the Mainland. China’s sole active aircraft car- and distrust of U.S. commitment to involvement rier, the Liaoning, visited Hong Kong harbor and in the South China Sea appears to be having an hosted current and former Hong Kong Chief Ex- effect. Little more than a year after an interna- ecutives—Beijing’s appointed stewards—Carrie tional tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines’ Lam, Leung Chun-ying and Tung Chee-hwa territorial claims in the South China Sea, China (SCMP, July 7). Foreign Ministry spokesperson enjoys unprecedented influence in Manila. Phil- Lu Kang even took a victory lap, stating that the ippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who regularly Sino-British Joint Declaration, which had guar- criticizes the U.S., has moderated his stance anteed a “high degree of autonomy, except in 2 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 foreign and defense affairs” through 2047 “no plane collecting data about North Korean nu- longer has any practical significance nor any clear tests. In a series of incidents during June binding force on the central government's ad- and July, Chinese jets performed aggressive in- ministration of Hong Kong SAR” (Xinhua, June terceptions of U.S. electronic surveillance aircraft 30). [1] This is understood to undermine the of the East China Sea. While Chinese intercep- “One Country, Two Systems” plan outlined from tions of U.S. flights are routine, the decision to Hong Kong, and for PRC-proposed plans for allow such unsafe behavior is instructive. And peaceful integration of Taiwan. whereas Chinese jets conducting long-distance flights near Japan tend to be lightly armed, if at In a year that marks the 90th founding of the all, footage of Chinese intercepts reveal they People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese military carry a full weapons load when intercepting U.S. has made a series of symbolic and concrete ad- aircraft. vances. Nationalistic, feel-good events included the April launch of China’s first domestically pro- Chinese navy ships are traveling much further duced aircraft carrier. For the PLA, an August cel- afield than they traditionally did. A small group ebratory parade—traditionally held in Beijing— from the South Sea Fleet recently participated was instead broadcast from the Zhurihe training with their Russian counterparts in the Baltic Sea. ground and included more realistic operations Chinese signals intelligence ships were spotted (see the full analysis of the parade in this issue). off the coast of Alaska for the first time, likely to observe a U.S. missile test (Sina, July 14). China’s diplomatic and symbolic achievements are mirrored, perhaps, in its military’s new confi- In mid-June of this year Indian soldiers con- dence. Indeed, China’s military had a number of fronted Chinese troops building a road along real confrontations with its neighbors and the the border between China and Bhutan. Although U.S. military. both sides regularly interact at the small unit level at a number of places along the border, in The Chinese military is also stepping up its long- this case the situation escalated. The area is range patrols near Japan and Taiwan. While the viewed by India and China as a strategic bottle- Chinese Air Force frequently visits the ‘center- neck, necessary for power, economic and cul- line’ between the PRC and ROC (an ROC white tural projection in the region (China Brief, April paper recorded an average of 1,385 flights per 20). In mid-August similar confrontations took year between 2004 and 2007), they now regu- place along the western portion of China and In- larly circle the island and collect electronic infor- dia’s border near Pangong lake (Times of India, mation. ROC Ministry of Defense Spokesperson August 16). Together, these have pushed Sino- Major General Chen Chung-chi emphasized that Indian relations to the tensest point since the these are normal activities (UDN [Taiwan], Au- 1980s. gust 10). [2] However, in aggregate the PLA Air Force appears to be increasing its activity. The Political and military decisions are not made in a Japanese Air Self Defense Force continued to vacuum. Some military training exercises are see a yearly increase in the number of scrambles routine; sometimes errant behavior escalates to intercept Chinese aircraft. [3] In May, a Chi- nese fighter jet flew upside-down over a U.S. 3 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 unnecessarily. But overall, policy, and the deci- 2. Republic of China Ministry of Defense, sion to exert diplomatic or political pressures are National Defense Report 2008 p. 85 the result of deliberate decisions. 3. In fiscal year 2016 the JASDF scrambled fighter jets 871 times compared to 571 Though, not a popular democracy, China’s polit- in 2015. Ministry of Defense Joint Staff, ical system still rewards political deliverables— Statistics On Scrambles Through Fiscal economic growth or other noteworthy achieve- Year 2016, ments play a role in getting ahead for govern- http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2017 ment cadres. The same goes for diplomatic and /press_pdf/p20170413_02.pdf military achievements. Ahead of the 19th Na- tional Congress of the Chinese Communist Party planned for October, there may be increased *** willingness to more directly challenge the U.S.
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