Volume 17, Issue 11 August 17, 2017

In a Fortnight: Pushing Boundaries - Chinese Diplomatic and Military Behavior Intensifies in the Run-up to the 19th Party Congress

The PLA at 90: On the Road to Becoming a World-Class Military? Dennis J. Blasko, Elsa B. Kania and Stephen Armitage

Counterintelligence Remains Weakness in ’s Defense Peter Mattis

Disruption Under the Radar: Chinese Advances in Quantum Sensing Elsa B. Kania and Stephen Armitage

Managing the State: Social Credit, and the CCP’s Plan for Samantha Hoffman

Pushing Boundaries - Chinese miscalculation in the region” (Takungpao, Au- gust 15; Pengpai, August 15). Diplomatic and Military Behavior Intensifies in the Although both parties are aligned in their desire for stability on the Korean Peninsula, China’s re- Run-up to the 19th Party lations with the United States and its neighbors Congress have worsened over the course of 2017. From its border with India, to the East China Sea, China

appears to have decided to ratchet up, rather Amid rising tensions between the United States than moderate, areas of friction. In the case of and North Korea, Gen. Fang Fenghui (房峰辉) the U.S., tension is rising over possible trade war, greeted his American counterpart, Chairman of right as China is entering an important political the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford in season. More than ever, it is important to under- Beijing on August 14. Recognizing the necessity stand the factors that go into determining of clear communication as the U.S. assesses pos- China’s willingness to use force, expend political sible military action against North Korea, the two capital, and confidence when challenging its held talks targeted at “mitigat[ing] the risk of neighbors.

ChinaBrief August 17, 2017

A review of China’s recent diplomatic and mili- somewhat as he enlists U.S. military support to tary actions—and their impact on U.S.-China deal with a terrorist crisis in the south of his ties—can provide some useful context as both country. However, his eagerness to improve ties sides attempt to cooperate on North Korea and with China, and plans for large Chinese invest- other issues. ments, will remain important parts of his political platform. China has achieved a number of important dip- lomatic successes in the first eight months of To the west, Vietnam has entered a particularly 2017. Perhaps the most important progress was tense stage of relations with China. In July, Vi- seen in China’s long attempt to undermine in- etnam withdrew oil drilling ships in the East ternational support for the Republic of China China Sea after China threatened military action. (Taiwan). Particularly after the effective setback This followed earlier tensions in June that re- the People’s Republic of China (PRC) experi- sulted in Central Military Commission Vice- enced when Democratic Progressive Party can- Chairman Fan Changlong (范长龙) cutting short didate Tsai Ing-Wen was elected to the ROC’s his visit (Xinhua, June 18). In both cases the level presidency in 2016, the PRC has made significant of animosity, as the two nations maintain close headway in reducing the ROC’s diplomatic pres- ties at the Party-to-Party level, and have a num- ence abroad. ber of off-ramps to decrease tensions. But with the withdrawal of the drilling ships it is clear who In January, Nigeria closed a Republic of China has the upper hand. China’s position in the trade mission in its capital, Abuja. This followed South China Sea—via carrot and stick—is more São Tomé and Príncipe‘s switch in recognition to secure than ever and the lack of major cohesive the PRC in December 2016 (ROC-Taiwan.org, pushback from Southeast Asian nations is hav- December 21, 2016). In early June, Panama cut ing is generating national confidence in China’s ties with the ROC and recognized the PRC. Tai- rise. wan is consistently rated at the top of China’s diplomatic and military objectives, and as of Au- This confidence in dealing with its neighbors is gust 2017, only 20 nations worldwide recognize reflected with a generally upbeat feeling among the Republic of China. These successes can be Chinese nationalists at home. On July 1, the PRC expected to embolden China’s use of economic celebrated the 20th anniversary of the handover diplomacy to effectively sway other countries to of . The celebrations were meant to support its causes. emphasize that whatever “One Country, Two Systems” may imply, Hong Kong was firmly part In Southeast Asia, targeted Chinese diplomacy of the Mainland. China’s sole active aircraft car- and distrust of U.S. commitment to involvement rier, the Liaoning, visited Hong Kong harbor and in the South China Sea appears to be having an hosted current and former Hong Kong Chief Ex- effect. Little more than a year after an interna- ecutives—Beijing’s appointed stewards—Carrie tional tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines’ Lam, Leung Chun-ying and Tung Chee-hwa territorial claims in the South China Sea, China (SCMP, July 7). Foreign Ministry spokesperson enjoys unprecedented influence in Manila. Phil- Lu Kang even took a victory lap, stating that the ippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who regularly Sino-British Joint Declaration, which had guar- criticizes the U.S., has moderated his stance anteed a “high degree of autonomy, except in

2 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 foreign and defense affairs” through 2047 “no plane collecting data about North Korean nu- longer has any practical significance nor any clear tests. In a series of incidents during June binding force on the central government's ad- and July, Chinese jets performed aggressive in- ministration of Hong Kong SAR” (Xinhua, June terceptions of U.S. electronic surveillance aircraft 30). [1] This is understood to undermine the of the East China Sea. While Chinese intercep- “One Country, Two Systems” plan outlined from tions of U.S. flights are routine, the decision to Hong Kong, and for PRC-proposed plans for allow such unsafe behavior is instructive. And peaceful integration of Taiwan. whereas Chinese jets conducting long-distance flights near Japan tend to be lightly armed, if at In a year that marks the 90th founding of the all, footage of Chinese intercepts reveal they People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese military carry a full weapons load when intercepting U.S. has made a series of symbolic and concrete ad- aircraft. vances. Nationalistic, feel-good events included the April launch of China’s first domestically pro- Chinese navy ships are traveling much further duced aircraft carrier. For the PLA, an August cel- afield than they traditionally did. A small group ebratory parade—traditionally held in Beijing— from the South Sea Fleet recently participated was instead broadcast from the Zhurihe training with their Russian counterparts in the Baltic Sea. ground and included more realistic operations Chinese signals intelligence ships were spotted (see the full analysis of the parade in this issue). off the coast of Alaska for the first time, likely to observe a U.S. missile test (Sina, July 14). China’s diplomatic and symbolic achievements are mirrored, perhaps, in its military’s new confi- In mid-June of this year Indian soldiers con- dence. Indeed, China’s military had a number of fronted Chinese troops building a road along real confrontations with its neighbors and the the border between China and Bhutan. Although U.S. military. both sides regularly interact at the small unit level at a number of places along the border, in The Chinese military is also stepping up its long- this case the situation escalated. The area is range patrols near Japan and Taiwan. While the viewed by India and China as a strategic bottle- Chinese Air Force frequently visits the ‘center- neck, necessary for power, economic and cul- line’ between the PRC and ROC (an ROC white tural projection in the region (China Brief, April paper recorded an average of 1,385 flights per 20). In mid-August similar confrontations took year between 2004 and 2007), they now regu- place along the western portion of China and In- larly circle the island and collect electronic infor- dia’s border near Pangong lake (Times of India, mation. ROC Ministry of Defense Spokesperson August 16). Together, these have pushed Sino- Major General Chen Chung-chi emphasized that Indian relations to the tensest point since the these are normal activities (UDN [Taiwan], Au- 1980s. gust 10). [2] However, in aggregate the PLA Air Force appears to be increasing its activity. The Political and military decisions are not made in a Japanese Air Self Defense Force continued to vacuum. Some military training exercises are see a yearly increase in the number of scrambles routine; sometimes errant behavior escalates to intercept Chinese aircraft. [3] In May, a Chi- nese fighter jet flew upside-down over a U.S.

3 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 unnecessarily. But overall, policy, and the deci- 2. Republic of China Ministry of Defense, sion to exert diplomatic or political pressures are National Defense Report 2008 p. 85 the result of deliberate decisions. 3. In fiscal year 2016 the JASDF scrambled fighter jets 871 times compared to 571 Though, not a popular , China’s polit- in 2015. Ministry of Defense Joint Staff, ical system still rewards political deliverables— Statistics On Scrambles Through Fiscal economic growth or other noteworthy achieve- Year 2016, ments play a role in getting ahead for govern- http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2017 ment cadres. The same goes for diplomatic and /press_pdf/p20170413_02.pdf military achievements. Ahead of the 19th Na- tional Congress of the planned for October, there may be increased *** willingness to more directly challenge the U.S. and its allies. The PLA at 90: On the Road A second factor to consider is prestige as a mo- to Becoming a World-Class tivation for diplomatic and military action. China’s successes in both fields have had real ef- Military? fects in increasing Chinese citizens sense of na- By Dennis J. Blasko, Elsa B. Kania and tional confidence and pride. Although continu- Stephen Armitage ing internal challenges (rising local government and SOE debt, environmental issues and social China recently celebrated the 90th anniversary inequality) and the militaries’ shortcomings (lack of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army of realism in training, incomplete reforms) could (PLA) with a parade and military exercises at the act as a check on adventurism, more confident Zhurihe Training Base in (CCTV, military and foreign policy behavior should be July 30). Although the display was characterized expected. as a demonstration of China’s growing military might—particularly new equipment and weap- Throughout, the Chinese leadership appears to ons platforms, including advanced missiles and wish to maintain escalation control: adopting aircraft—the event also provided important in- heavy-handed tactics while forcing other coun- dications of the PLA’s approach to operations tries to acknowledge China’s ability to go further and the first-ever demonstration of an actual if needed. military operation during a parade. The PLA’s anniversary celebration thus reflected its pro- Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can gress toward becoming a “world-class military” follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW and confidence despite remaining challenges related to the ongoing, historic reforms. Shortly Notes after the parade, announced: “The PLA 1. Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bu- has basically completed mechanization and is reau, Joint Declaration, June 30, 1985 moving rapidly toward ‘strong’ informationized http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/is- armed forces,” achieving the 2020 goal of its sues/jd2.htm

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“three-step development strategy” (PLA Daily, August 2). The parade itself was centered around the dis- play of the PLA’s joint force units responsible for PLA Parades in Perspective actual operations, known as “operations groups” (作战群) and other support groups (Xinhua, July Traditionally, PLA parades such as those held in 31, 2017). In modern combat, the PLA seeks to Beijing in 2009 and the 2015 Victory Day Pa- integrate the capabilities of these various rade—have tended to be highly choreographed groups in joint “systems of systems operations” displays that are counterproductive in terms of (体系作战). Each group was composed of a se- the force’s operational capabilities in actual ries of “formations” (fangdui, 方队) or aerial for- combat (实战), taking considerable time away mations/echelon (tidui, 梯队), which were com- from training for the units involved (China Brief, prised of units from one or more service or the September 24, 2009). For prior parades in Bei- People’s Armed Police (PAP). [1] Unfortunately, jing, units from all over the country were re- the parade did not provide new insights about quired to send personnel and equipment to pre- the PLA’s evolving organizational structure, pare for the drive down ’an Jie months in which is increasingly centered on combined advance, losing the opportunity to train in a arms brigades (hechenglu, 合成旅). Nonetheless, more realistic way for almost an entire training the formations associated with each operations season. group revealed the types of weapons and equip- ment that will be employed in future joint cam- The ongoing military reforms, announced in paigns. [2] 2015 and set to continue until 2020, are in- tended to bridge the gap between the “two in- compatibles,” the “two inabilities,” and “five In addition to the units that passed in review in incapables” relative to where the State and Party the air or on the ground, Xi Jinping also reviewed need the PLA to be (China Brief, May 9, 2013). In seven large formations of roughly 900 dis- other words, the true test for the PLA is whether mounted personnel each. Across from the VIP the units that operate its equipment can actually reviewing stand, the Central Theater Army’s perform the missions assigned, and that de- 112th Mechanized Infantry Division set up a pends on the level and realism of training the static display of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, units receive and the quality of their personnel. and artillery, along with other weapons from the That this parade was organized at a training Rocket Force, like the CJ-10 cruise missile. After base at least enabled some units to engage in the ground and air formations had passed, these training while preparing for the parade, reflect- seven personnel formations ran at “double- ing a greater commitment to preparation for time” to form up opposite the reviewing stand, combat operations. Additionally, PLA parades have been opportunities to display a vast array of new equipment, which has greater potential capabilities than the older equipment replaced, signaling the military’s modernization.

Integrated Combat Operations

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where they listened to Xi’s speech on the re- supported by elements of two other Army Avia- quirements for PLA modernization. tion units (Xinhua, July 30). The air assault simu- lated the integration of reconnaissance, attack, A Historic First for Army Aviation and transport helicopters with infantry to deliver soldiers to a distant location on a battlefield. It The parade also marked a historic moment for is unclear if the infantry troops transported by PLA Army Aviation: the first time the PLA has the helicopters are assigned permanently to the ever executed tactical procedures during a pa- army aviation brigade. rade, marking the “public debut” of an Army air- borne assault unit (, July 31). The The air-assault demonstration brought together demonstration was conducted by an air assault a series of army-aviation unit maneuvers meant brigade (空中突击旅) from the 83rd Group Army,

6 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 to display the ability to assault and secure a re- force capable of achieving dominance in these mote landing zone (China Military Online, July critical domains (China Brief, February 6, 2016; 31). The demonstration involved an initial sortie China Brief, December 21, 2016). by a “reconnaissance and alert unit,” which flew over the landing zone to determine the situa- The information operations group formation it- tion, followed by a “firepower assault unit” com- self resolves a few remaining questions on the posed of attack helicopters that secure the land- relationship between the SSF and China’s war- ing zone by targeting and neutralizing nearby time structure for information operations. First known enemy positions. Finally, three “air-land- and foremost, the parade formally indicates the ing units” delivered the infantry troops to the SSF’s role as the primary fighting force for infor- battlefield (here on evenly-spaced concrete mation operations and “information support” ( pads), where they disembarked and would have 信息支援), which involves C4ISR support in criti- proceeded to fight. These units were supported cal, emerging domains like space, cyber, and the by an escort unit to provide extra firepower. Fi- electromagnetic spectrum. Like the relationship nally, the troops reassembled at their helicopters between the other services and their corre- and stood by for the remainder of the parade. sponding operations groups—the PLA Navy While not a realistic test of capabilities, this was with the maritime operations groups, the PLA Air a major step for a PLA parade—an improvement Force with the air operations group, and the PLA that added actual value compared to marching Rocket Force with the strategic strike group— or flying straight lines simply for show—while the SSF serves as the central component of the reflecting the progress made by Army Aviation. information operations group. Secondly, while [5] the SSF is the primary fighting force for infor- mation operations, it is not the only one. The SSF The Information Operations Group on only incorporates strategic-level and former Display GSD, GPD, and GAD units, not those from the theater or campaign-level, which are now part of Notably, the parade also showcased the infor- the new Theater Commands (战区). For instance, mation operations group, a joint-force wartime the electronic countermeasures (ECM) for- construct that would bring together the various, mation came from the PLA Army, specifically disparate elements responsible for cyber, elec- from an air defense brigade and a division’s ECM tronic, and psychological warfare into an opera- fendui (电子对抗分队) (Xinhua, July 30). What is tional command at strategic, campaign, and tac- still unclear are the composition of information tical levels. Prior to reforms, the national-level or operations groups of different echelons, strategic information operations group would whether tactical or campaign-level groups could have drawn units from the General Staff Depart- have a national mission, and how their respec- ment (GSD), the General Political Department tive missions would be coordinated or decon- (GPD), and the General Armament Department flicted. (GAD). The newly-established Strategic Support Force (SSF) has knocked down the silos between China’s Strategic Deterrence on Parade these units, incorporating them into a cohesive force in peacetime both to facilitate the transi- The strategic strike group showcased the newly- tion to wartime and to construct a war-fighting elevated PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which is

7 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 considered the “core force” for China’s strategic on the parade ground. Prior to the parade, ele- deterrence (Xinhua, July 30). The PLA’s 90th an- ments of the 112th Mechanized Division and the niversary served as an occasion to display and same Army Aviation units that were seen in the unveil some of the PLA’s most advanced mis- parade conducted live fire field training, simulat- siles. [6] The DF-26, an intermediate-range bal- ing an actual air assault coordinated with listic missile with a maximum range of 4,000 kil- ground maneuvers (CCTV, August 1). Moreover, ometers, was highlighted as having combined the parade was preceded by a combined ballistic nuclear and conventional (核常兼备) capabilities and cruise missile exercise against mock targets (Xinhua, July 30). The DF-21D medium-range that reportedly resembled U.S. THAAD missile anti-ship ballistic missile, which has a range of batteries and models of U.S. F-22 stealth fighters 1,750–2,000 kilometers, would have particular (Fox News, August 2). This exercise was con- utility against maritime targets and thus is pop- ducted by units from the Air Force and Rocket ularly known as the “carrier-killer” missile Force, which fired live HQ-6, HQ-16, and HQ-22 (Xinhua, July 30). Of its conventional missiles, the SAMs and DF-26, DF-16, and CJ-10 ballistic and PLA also displayed the modified DF-16, a me- cruise missiles, respectively (The Diplomat, Au- dium-range ballistic missile with a range of 800– gust 3). 1,000 kilometers (Xinhua, July 30). Conclusion The parade concluded with the first parade ap- pearance of the DF-31AG, a modified version of Although much of the media coverage to date the road-mobile DF-31A intercontinental ballis- has focused on the symbolic and political im- tic missile (Xinhua, July 30). The new version portance of the parade as a powerful reaffirma- could have a range over 11,000 kilometers and tion of the military’s loyalty to the CCP and greater survivability due to the use of a trans- Chairman Xi Jinping ahead of the pivotal 19th porter erector launcher (TEL) that can go off- Party Congress later this year, the parade reveals road, over rougher terrain to enhance its mobil- a force that is still growing and developing, con- ity (IHS, August 8). A week before the parade, a currently envisioning itself as a modern, ad- model of the DF-31AG was displayed at the PLA vanced military and acknowledging its own Military Museum in Beijing (South China Morn- weaknesses. The parade demonstrated an im- ing Post, July 24). These dual-capable, conven- portant development in the PLA’s pursuit of de- tional, and nuclear missiles constitute integral veloping improved joint operations capabilities elements of China’s deterrence capabilities that by incorporating the key components necessary enable regional defense and long-range preci- for combat operations, supported by infor- sion strike. [7] mation support, electronic warfare, logistics support, and other non-combat units. The air- Real Training Off the Parade Ground assault demonstration, the integration of the SSF through the information operations group, Because the parade was held at Zhurihe in the and the prominent display of the PLA’s latest middle of the large unit training season, several and most advanced missiles are clear signs of units took the opportunity to conduct training the PLA’s developing operational capabilities that is much more realistic than what occurred and evolving force structure. The demeanor of the both PLA leadership and troops indicated a

8 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 highly disciplined force. The parade and media 4. The term 抽组 (chouzu) is typically used coverage both signify that the Party will always to refer to a group, element, or detach- command the gun and should not be dis- ment selected from a larger unit. counted as a powerful deterrent signal to for- 5. In the early 1990s, the PLA Army only eign observers of the PLA’s progress and the scope of its ambition. had about 100 helicopters, none of which were attack helicopters. At pre- Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army sent, the PLA Army has over 1,000 heli- (Retired), is a former U.S. army attaché to Beijing copters in at least 14 operational bri- and Hong Kong and author of The Chinese gades in all group armies and the Xin- Army Today (Routledge, 2012). jiang Military District, and is half the size

of the PLA Army in the early 1990s (Ne- Elsa Kania is an analyst focused on the PLA’s stra- tegic thinking on and advances in emerging tech- tEase). For comparison, the U.S. Army, at nologies. Her professional experience has in- 465,000 personnel, less than half the size cluded working at the Department of Defense, the of the PLA Army, has roughly 4,000 heli- Long Term Strategy Group, FireEye, Inc., Har- copters and has been conducting air as- vard’s Belfer Center, and the Carnegie-Tsinghua sault operations in combat since the Center for Global Policy. She is fluent in Mandarin mid-1960s (DOD, May 31). See: The Mili- Chinese. tary Balance 2017, International Institute

Stephen Armitage is a former DOD analyst, US for Strategic Studies, London, pp. 46, 48. expat and researcher primarily focused on Chi- 6. Please note that all details on missile nese information operations and emerging tech. ranges are taken from the Department of Defense’s Report, “Military and Secu- Notes: rity Developments Involving the People’s

Republic of China 2017,” 1. The terms fangdui and tidui are used al- https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Doc- most exclusively for parades and are not uments/pubs/2017_China_Mili- operationally significant. tary_Power_Report.PDF?ver=2017-06- 2. For a full listing of formations in the pa- 06-141328-770. rade see: PLA Daily, August 1 and related 7. Note that although the DF-31 was in- official media coverage. cluded in the 1999 parade, it was not 3. The coverage of the parade refers to the until 2006 that the U.S. Department of Type-08 infantry fighting vehicle. How- Defense declared it had achieved “initial ever, previously that eight-wheeled vehi- threat availability.” (See: DoD Report to cle was called the Type-09, ZBD09, or Congress 2007, p. I.) The status of the ZBL-09. DF-31AG has not been confirmed at this point.

9 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 Counterintelligence Remains China’s operations but are unable to act effec- tively. The problem is worsened because the Weakness in Taiwan’s (KMT) and the Democratic Progres- Defense sive Party (DPP) struggle to find common ground despite their shared interest in not al- By Peter Mattis lowing Beijing to decide Taiwan's future.

On July 6, Taiwanese authorities charged re- Chinese Intelligence Presses Onward cently-graduated Chinese student Zhou Hongxu with espionage, roughly four months after he In addition to Zhou, two other major Chinese es- was first detained on suspicion of spying for Bei- pionage cases struck Taiwan in earlier this year jing (Central News Agency [Taiwan], July 6). The that penetrated the most sensitive areas of na- young man, who attended National Cheng-chi tional security. The first is Wang Hung-ju, Vice University, allegedly attempted to pay a junior President Annette Lu’s former bodyguard, who Foreign Ministry official with cash and travel for was arrested because of his connections to an classified government papers ( Times, espionage case cracked in 2010 (Taiwan News, March 11). In 2009 then-President Ma Ying-jeou March 16). The second is the former commander opened the flow of people and business across of the Air Defense Command, Hsieh Chia-kang, the strait without consulting security officials on who may have begun spying as early as 2009 or how to mitigate the risks. Zhou’s case is one of 2010 (China Post, May 12). the first public espionage cases of Beijing ex- ploiting the ability to send intelligence opera- The Wang Hung-ju case probably is the more tives directly to the island enabled by that law. important of the two cases, because of his con- Zhou’s arrest highlights the challenges President nections to Taiwan’s intelligence agencies and Tsai Ing-wen faces—not only from increasingly leadership protection details. Wang was a for- aggressive Chinese intelligence and influence mer official in the Special Service Command operations—but also in developing more effec- Center in the National Security Bureau. Mr. tive countermeasures absent a clear consensus Wang served for a short period as the body- of the China threat inside and outside her party. guard for Vice President Annette Lu before retir-

ing in 2003 (Taipei Times, March 17). After his Despite Beijing’s relentless and sometimes fruit- retirement, he traveled to China where he was ful efforts to penetrate the most sensitive parts recruited by the Tianjin State Security Bureau in of Taiwan’s national security institutions and so- 2009. [1] Wang attempted to recruit two friends ciety, Taiwan’s leaders have not been able to into his intelligence network, including an officer push forward a stronger legal foundation for in the Military Police Command (United Daily counterintelligence. In March, Tsai’s cabinet ve- News, May 12). The links between Wang’s case toed new security regulations over legitimate and Taiwanese businessman Ho Chih-chiang’s concerns about overreach, and the failure of the are unclear, but Taiwanese press repeatedly re- Legislative Yuan to push forward new legislation ported that Wang was uncovered as part of the leave Taiwan vulnerable. Without such tools, the Ho investigation. Chinese intelligence, possibly island’s counterintelligence professionals can the Tianjin State Security Bureau, recruited Ho in observe the change in scope and intensity of

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2007 and used him to approach Taiwanese in- degree in 2016. He returned to China after com- telligence officials. Ho’s case officers empow- pleting his degree in July 2016 but came back to ered him to offer money and other inducements Taiwan in February on a business visa to work for to recruit serving officials (Focus Taiwan, April Taiwanese firm. In addition to attempting to ply 15, 2010). Such intermediaries are typical of Tai- a Taiwanese diplomat with cash and an all-ex- wan’s espionage cases, especially when they in- pense paid trip to Japan, prosecutors alleged volve the military, and their discovery may lead Zhou attempted to conduct intelligence work to multiple Chinese spies as the authorities work while an NCCU student, and he built a network back on a case (China Brief, November 7, 2014). of contacts that may have touched senior Kuo- mintang figures (Taipei Times, March 11; United In May, Taiwanese authorities detained a serving Daily News, March 11). Zhou’s exact role remains major general, Hsieh Chia-kang, and a retired out of the public view. His attempted recruit- colonel, Hsin Peng-sheng, for selling secrets to ment of a MOFA official suggests that he is an China. At the time, Hsieh was serving as the dep- intelligence officer. However, many Chinese in- uty commander of the Matsu Defense Com- telligence operations involve a case officer in- mand and had overseen the Air Defense Com- side China and a principal agent outside China, mand. In the latter position, he would have had like Ho Chih-chiang or Hsin, recruiting and han- access to the specifications for the U.S.-made dling sources (China Brief, November 7, 2014). Patriot missiles as well as the Taiwanese Tien- kung III and Hsiung-feng 2E cruise missiles. Chi- Such operations also are well-known to U.S. nese intelligence recruited Hsin while he was counterintelligence and would not be unusual. A leading a Taiwanese tour group in China. Hsin recent criminal affidavit related to the arrest of allegedly recruited Hsieh with whom he had State Department secretary Candace Claiborne served years before. According to the prosecu- noted that Chinese intelligence employed “cut- tors, Hsieh traveled to Malaysia and Thailand to out” or “co-optees.” According to the FBI, these meet his handlers, and his travel suggests he are: may have been working for Chinese intelligence since 2009 or 2010. Both men agreed to assist mutually trusted person[s] or mecha- Chinese intelligence in identifying and recruiting nism[s] used to create a compartment other sources (Liberty Times, May 10; Taipei between members of an operation to en- Times, May 11; China Post, May 12). able them to pass material and/or mes- sages securely. A cut-out or co-optee can While these two cases represent traditional operate under a variety of covers, posing methods of Chinese intelligence, Zhou Hongxu’s as diplomats, journalists, academics, or case is different in that he is part of the large business people both at home and group of mainlanders able to visit Taiwan after abroad. These individuals are tasked with 2009. Zhou originally came to Taiwan in 2009 as spotting, assessing, targeting, collecting, an exchange student from Zhejiang University and running sources (U.S. Department of and returned to the island in 2012 for graduate Justice, March 29). studies in business administration at National Cheng-chi University (NCCU), where he earned a

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Using cut-outs and co-optees may have been Although the DPP cabinet vetoed the law before the typical Chinese approach, Taiwanese report- releasing any details, the draft generated con- ing on China’s intelligence operations suggests troversy because it resurrected policies from the change may be in the air. If Zhou was an intelli- Martial Law Era. The law would have authorized gence officer, then the case suggests Chinese in- the establishment of security offices at all levels telligence is moving toward a more proactive of government, an additional security agency approach to collection rather than just exploit- with overlapping authorities with existing or- ing Taiwanese who come to China. Meetings in ganizations, and easier access to suspected Southeast Asia, including Singapore, are appar- spies’ private background information (Taipei ently more common, and the Zhou case shows Times, March 17). Japan is also considered an acceptable third- country meeting site. Using third-country meet- According to administration spokesman Alex ing sites can hide the China connection once Huang, the Tsai administration had “already typical of Taiwan’s espionage cases, making it taken measures to evaluate the national intelli- more difficult for Taiwanese counterintelligence gence security situation and has established (Taiwan News, March 16; China Brief, July 1, mechanisms to oversee security improvements” 2011). (Taipei Times, October 2, 2016). Some of those measures are necessarily secret and cannot be Speaking to Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan in March, confirmed. One of the few public measures en- National Security Bureau director Peng Sheng- acted by the present administration extended chu said “China will employ all methods [of es- the time for which retired government officials pionage], and the issue [of Chinese infiltration] needed to report their foreign travel, especially is more serious than ever” (Taipei Times, March to China. In early March, the Cabinet revised the 10). It might be easy to read Peng’s remarks as a regulations governing cross-strait interaction, standard warning, but the author’s recent dis- banning political appointees and senior military cussions in Taiwan indicate that covert Chinese officials from traveling to China for three years activities have increased in scope, sophistication, after retirement (Focus Taiwan, March 3). The and intensity. For the first time in many years, Tsai administration has taken two major steps to Taiwan’s national security officials see change strengthen Taiwan’s organizational capacity for rather than continuity as a hallmark of Beijing’s cybersecurity: establishing a department for cy- intelligence and subversive operations. What is bersecurity within the Executive Yuan in August not clear is whether they have the political sup- 2016 and creating the Information, Communica- port to counter such Chinese operations effec- tions, and Electronic Force Command on June tively. 29. Both organizations have far-reaching re- sponsibilities across the government and should Breakdown on Counterintelligence Bill provide better information controls as well as Leaves Gaps the capacity for new secure network infrastruc- ture (Executive Yuan, April 28; Taiwan Today, July The most significant proposal put forward to ad- 3). Other legislative measures, such as revising dress the Chinese espionage and infiltration the National Security Act to increase the punish- threat collapsed amid valid concerns of execu- ment for spying, are still being considered (Fo- tive overreach and intrusions on civil liberties. cus Taiwan, March 16). The public measures also

12 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 hint at internal administrative changes to better toward the island. Not everyone shares the clar- handle and improve secu- ity exhibited by rity reviews of officials holding clearances. Alt- Katharine Chang when she told Legislative Yuan hough such changes improve counterintelli- members that there are no Chinese hawks or gence, they do little to address the threat of Bei- doves in dealing with Taiwan (Taipei Times, jing’s subversion. March 11). Significant groups within both the DPP and KMT choose to hide behind dangerous The challenge for Taiwan, however, is as much illusions of the Chinese intentions toward Tai- about discretion and awareness as dealing more wan, based in part on recent conversations in effectively with China’s efforts to penetrate Tai- Taipei. wan’s democratic institutions and society. Many retired Taiwanese generals travel to China, at- Many in the DPP appear to think China’s threat tending political events and allowing themselves to Taiwan can be mitigated by reducing the is- to be used as political props. Even within KMT land’s economic dependence on the People’s circles, such visits have been controversial with Republic or that preserving Taiwan’s interna- former KMT Premier and Taiwan’s longest serv- tional space will be enough. Although such ing Chief of the General Staff Hau Pei-tsun call- measures as exemplified in Tsai’s “Going South” ing for generals to be stripped of their pensions policy may benefit Taiwan, Southeast Asia can (South China Morning Post, August 28, 2015). never provide the political or economic counter- The most recent uproar over such travel oc- weight to China. DPP leadership also seems will- curred after 32 generals traveled to China to at- ing to allow the party’s distrust of the national tend an event commemorating Sun Yat-sen pre- security apparatus—rightfully developed be- sided over by Xi Jinping, but such public appear- cause of persecution during the KMT’s dictator- ances have troubled Taiwan for years (China ship—to undermine the interactions between Post, November 18, 2016; China Brief, October the political and professional staffs. This may be 14, 2011). In another case of poor judgment, the first time that Taiwan’s National Security Bu- DPP legislators raised concerns about National reau has not had a senior official assigned to the Defense University professor Chang Ching has National Security Council. A lack of regular con- become a regular guest on Chinese military tact or trusted intermediaries serves no one well. shows while still holding a security clearance As Enoch Wu, a Taiwanese think tank scholar, without immediate consequence (Taipei Times, wrote earlier this year, Taiwan’s political leader- July 29). Taiwan’s premier, Lin Chuan, said it well ship on both sides has sapped military readiness, when he observed that former officials “are under-staffed national security, and lowered high-profile figures in society and their deeds morale (New York Times, May 18). and words must not compromise the national interest” (Focus Taiwan, March 3). The KMT’s answer to the Chinese threat runs through Beijing, based on the belief that a stable No Consensus on Looming China Threat relationship will protect Taiwan. In March, KMT mouthpieces criticized the DPP for manufactur- Strangely, Taiwan continues to debate the kind ing the Zhou case to destabilize the cross-strait of threat Beijing poses and Chinese intentions relationship, move the two sides further apart,

13 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 and consolidate a “green terror” with the coun- that China has been active in disseminating dis- terespionage bill (United Daily News, March 10; information about the Tsai administration’s con- United Daily News, March 11; Taipei Times, troversial pension reform plans through the March 17). Little mention was made of the fact popular LINE messaging app and content farm that China’s intelligence operations never websites (Liberty Times, July 18). Beijing also abated during the Ma years. Between 2008 and supports China Unification Promotion Party 2016, Taiwanese authorities publicly uncovered (CUPP) led by former organized crime figure more than 50 cases of espionage and, according Chang An-Lo, also known as the “White Wolf” ( to an anonymous official, many more have not 白狼). The CUPP has been one of the significant been prosecuted (Taipei Times, March 11; Liberty forces in organizing the pension reform protests Times, March 13). and organizing demonstrations when President Tsai travels around Taiwan in an effort to dis- Foreign Pressure and Influence Operations credit the DPP administration. Chang also has acknowledged cooperating with China’s United The absence of strategic clarity and consensus is Front Work Department, which rallies the Chi- striking in the face of Chinese activities against nese Communist Party’s friends at home and the island across a broad front. Beijing continues abroad to exert influence (Taiwan Foundation its campaign to erase the name “Republic of for Democracy Bulletin, July 18; China Brief, July China” from international politics. China contin- 6; Reuters, November 26, 2014). Concerns about ues to entice countries that recognize Taiwan, these and other Chinese activities are pervasive and Panama switched diplomatic recognition to across Taiwan’s government, but countermeas- Beijing in June. Taiwanese arrested overseas in ures are largely being left to the national security places like Cambodia, Kenya, and Spain have agencies themselves within their existing au- been extradited or deported to China rather thorities and restrictions. than returned to Taiwan (Liberty Times, June 14, 2016; Taipei Times, August 6, 2016; China Post, Conclusion February 19). Chinese pressure forced Taiwan’s representative offices in Nigeria remove “Re- While Taiwan faces an espionage and subver- public of China” from their name, and Beijing sion challenge from China at a scale that no also placed pressure on Dubai and Ecuador modern democracy has faced, its leading politi- (Central News Agency, June 14). None of these cal parties struggle to address the problem. De- things are new, but illustrate that Beijing’s pres- spite the stark divide between the DPP and sure has never relented. KMT’s visions of Taiwan’s future, both sides share concerns that China is attempting to force Accompanying the rise in espionage operations an accommodation on Beijing’s rather than Tai- against the island, Beijing’s effort to shape or pei’s terms. Yet, neither side seems to trust the even destabilize Taiwanese society itself through other enough to see the need for effective dem- work is intensifying. The aim, ac- ocratic controls over counterintelligence or cording to several Taiwanese interlocutors, is to build a consensus on how to address Chinese create a “fake civil society” that can be used subversion. As China helps build a “fake civil so- against Taiwan’s democratic system. Taiwan’s ciety,” any Taiwanese government, whether DPP national security authorities recently revealed or KMT, will face Chinese pressure from within

14 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 and without. The absence of a strong legal Disruption Under the Radar: framework and a political consensus exacer- bates the challenge of counterintelligence and Chinese Advances in countering covert influence in a democratic so- Quantum Sensing ciety. The stakes are not trivial spy-vs-spy games Elsa B. Kania and Stephen Armitage but the integrity of Taiwan’s democracy, and the weakness is every bit as crippling as an ill- This piece builds upon prior research and analy- equipped or poorly-prepared military. sis on Chinese advances in quantum information

science and quantum technologies, previously Note: featured in China Brief in the series “China’s

Quantum Leap,” parts one and two. 1. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is a

sprawling organization centered on a Today, technologies that harness the “spooky” ministerial headquarters in Beijing with properties of quantum phenomena, once purely provincial departments and municipal or science fiction, are fast becoming a reality. county bureaus. MSS units at every level Backed by the Chinese leadership at the highest run domestic intelligence and internal se- levels, Chinese scientists are achieving rapid curity operations. Several of the larger, progress in a variety of different applications, in- more sophisticated provincial-level de- cluding quantum encryption—which creates partments, such as the Guangdong State uncrackable communication—and quantum Security Department, Tianjin State Secu- computing, which will enable tremendous com- rity Bureau, and the Shanghai State Secu- puting power that could render most modern rity Bureau, also conduct foreign intelli- forms of encryption obsolete. While each of gence operations against external tar- these technologies could rewrite the rules of gets. how information can be used and processed,

quantum sensing—the use of quantum entan- Peter Mattis is a Fellow in the China Program at glement to enable extremely precise measure- The Jamestown Foundation, where he served as ment—could most fundamentally alter opera- editor China Brief from 2011 to 2013. He is the tional realities of future conflict. author of Analyzing the Chinese Military: A Re- view Essay and Resource Guide on the People’s Quantum sensing could be used in a number of Liberation Army (2015). technologies with direct military applications. In

particular, quantum radar can be used to detect *** targets that cannot be discerned through con-

ventional radar, and quantum navigation simi-

larly leverages quantum properties to create a

precise form of positioning system that may

eventually replace GPS. Together, such technol-

ogies could be critical to China’s future military

capabilities and might become a key focus of U.S.-China technological competition.

15 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017

Context for China’s Advances in Quantum Information Science ● Of note, the PLA’s Equipment Develop- ment Department is supporting research China has undertaken a massive national cam- in quantum technologies through the paign to become a world leader in quantum in- National Defense Key Laboratories Fund ( formation science. Driven by concerns about po- 国防重点实验室基金), which has pro- tential adversaries’ signals intelligence capabili- vided funding for several relevant pro- ties, the Chinese leadership sees quantum tech- jects under the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan nologies as both a means of security and a stra- (Equipment Development Department, tegic enabler to bridge the gap between its mil- May 19). itary capabilities and those of its potential ad- versaries. As such, quantum information science These programs have started to enable signifi- programs have been backed by significant state cant advances in quantum communication and funding across a variety of laboratories and re- quantum computing. In 2016, China launched search institutes. Of note, the Chinese Academy the world’s first quantum satellite, Micius, which of Sciences recently established the Quantum could become the first piece of a global quan- Information and Quantum Science and Technol- tum network for uncrackable communications ogy Innovation Research Institute (中国科学院量 (Science Mag, June 2017). In March, Chinese sci- 子信息与量子科技创新研究院), and China also entists succeeded in entangling 10 supercon- plans to establish a national quantum infor- ducting qubits, an important step towards future mation science laboratory (CAC, July 12). Alt- quantum computing (Physics World, April 2017). hough it is difficult to quantify the full amount In early August, Chinese scientists announced of funding that has been devoted to these ef- their success in experiments involving Micius, forts, anecdotally, Chinese research in this do- not only demonstrating successful ultra-long- main is said to receive virtually “unlimited” fund- distance quantum teleportation, a key step to- ing due to its high-level prioritization. wards a global “quantum ,” but also suc- ceeding in the first-ever realization of space-to- ● The new National Key Research and De- ground quantum key distribution, a milestone velopment Plan (国家重点研发计划) in- for quantum communication (Nature, August 9, cludes basic research on quantum control 2017; Nature, August 9, 2017; Xinhua, August 10, and quantum information among its pri- 2017). While these developments have received oritized projects (MoST, February 16, considerable attention in official Chinese and in- 2016). The available guidance (指南) for ternational media, Chinese scientists have also this project in 2016 and 2017 included actively pursued advances in quantum sensing, quantum precision measurement (量子精 which have often remained below the radar. 密测量) (MoST, August 1, 2016) Ongoing Research and Development Efforts ● The Thirteenth Five-Year Science and in Quantum Radar and Navigation Technology Innovation Plan as a new mega-project highlights quantum To date, details about China’s progress in quan- navigation (量子导航) (State Council, Au- tum sensing has been relatively limited, likely gust 8, 2016) . because of its more obvious and direct military

16 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 applications. Despite these constraints, it is pos- dates back to at least 2014 (CQVIP, Janu- sible to evaluate initial advances in quantum ra- ary 2014). dar and quantum navigation. Of particular note, China’s apparent success in the development of ● CETC’s 27th Research Institute was also quantum radar was prominently featured in involved in the quantum radar prototype, September 2016, when Chinese scientists an- while CETC’s 38th Research Institute has nounced their creation of a single-photon quan- written on and may also be pursuing re- tum radar, which takes advantage of entangle- search on quantum imaging and quan- ment between photon pairs, capable of detect- tum radar and their development to ena- ing targets up to 100 kilometers away with high ble remote sensing (CQVIP, January accuracy (PLA Daily, September 13, 2016; CETC, 2014). September 18, 2016). Reportedly, the range of this quantum radar was five times that of a la- ● This quantum radar prototype was devel- boratory prototype jointly created in 2015 by an oped in collaboration with leading Chi- international team of researchers (Phys.org, Feb- nese quantum physicist Pan Jianwei and ruary 26, 2015). This test appeared to constitute his colleagues at the University of Science a notable advance and an indication that Chi- and Technology of China (USTC), which, nese research in quantum sensing has already under Pan’s leadership, has become a progressed considerably. driving force behind China’s quantum ad- vances and hosts the Chinese Academy Despite the limitations of the available infor- of Sciences Key Laboratory of Quantum mation, it is nonetheless feasible to gauge ad- Information. vances to date in quantum radar and quantum navigation based on a review of ongoing re- ● The China Aerospace Science and Tech- search and development efforts in these techno- nology Corporation (CASC) Second logical domains. Although this listing is not Academy has received funding through comprehensive, it provides an initial overview of the National Defense Key Laboratories the scope and scale of these efforts. Fund for a project that examines the characteristics of light scattering and ra- Quantum Radar diation under quantum detection (All- Military Weapons and Equipment Pro- ● The quantum radar prototype reported curement Information Network, June 19) last fall was developed by the China Elec- tronics Technology Group Corporation ● The CASC 5th Academy’s 508 Research (CETC) 14th Research Institute (中国电子 Institute established a Quantum Sensing 量子遥感实验室 科技集团第 14 研究所) Intelligent Sensing Laboratory ( ) in 2012 Technology Key Laboratory (智能感知技 (China Space News, July 26, 2012).

术重点实验室) (CETC 14th Research Insti- ● The CASC 9th Academy’s 13th Research tute, September 7, 2016). Earlier papers Institute has been engaged in research published by the same group indicates on quantum imaging, which involves the that their research on quantum radar use of quantum correlations for a new

17 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017

form of remote sensing (CASC, August search on quantum navigation and posi- 20, 2015). tioning technology, as well as also quan- tum sensing and perception technologies ● The Xi’an University of Electronic Science (Shanghai Jiaotong University). and Technology has received funding through the National Defense Key Labor- ● The PLA’s Equipment Development De- atories Fund (重点实验室基金) to lever- partment is funding a project on the ex- age quantum effects to enhance the per- ploration of precision guidance systems formance of radar systems’ detection, im- that leverage new concepts, new princi- aging, and identification capabilities (All- ples, and new technologies, including Military Weapons and Equipment Pro- quantum correlation imaging and detec- curement Information Network, June 19). tion (All-Military Weapons and Equip- ment Procurement Information Network, ● The Equipment Development Depart- August 1, 2016). ment is funding two projects each on mi- crowave quantum radar technology and The number of research institutes pursuing foundational research for quantum radar quantum radar and navigation, as well as the systems. Each project will receive 500,000 funding available through national science and RMB (about $75,000) in funding (All-Mil- technology plans, hint at a state-driven national itary Weapons and Equipment Procure- push to advance these technologies. The reports ment Information Network, April 11). of prototypes and apparent advances also indi- cate that Chinese researchers may be making Quantum Navigation: real strides toward the operationalization of these quantum capabilities. ● The Beijing Automation and Equipment Control Research Institute (北京自动化控 Patents Point to Progress 制设备研究所) reportedly achieved a breakthrough in quantum navigation in a To date, Chinese scientists and research insti- project that pursued key technologies as- tutes have filed a number of patents related to sociated with a magnetic resonance spin quantum radar and quantum navigation. Over- gyroscope (Xinhua, April 2, 2016). This all, the number of Chinese patent filings in quan- advance used the quantum property of tum information science tend to rank first in the spin to enable inertial navigation and re- world or second to the U.S. (The Economist). portedly established a foundation for fu- While the ecosystem for research and develop- ture developments in quantum naviga- ment described above indicates the scope and tion in China. scale of these efforts, available patent filings are perhaps a better gauge of real progress: ● The Shanghai Jiaotong University Quan- tum Sensing and Information Processing Quantum Radar Research Center (量子感知与信息处理研究 中心), established in 2001, has pursued re- ● Since 2010, several scientists have filed quantum radar-related patents, including

18 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017

researchers affiliated with Zhejiang indication that these research efforts have University, who filed for a patent on laser reached a point such that future applications radar based on strongly correlated quan- and intellectual property has become a concern. tum imaging ( Patents, May 7, 2010). In 2012, a researcher filed for a pa- The Military Applications and Strategic Im- tent of a quantum entanglement radar plications of Quantum Sensing design (Google Patents, June 15, 2012). China’s rapid advances in quantum information ● In 2014, a researcher from the Air Force science and the associated technological appli- Early Warning Institute who had previ- cations demonstrate its ambitions to lead global ously published several articles on quan- innovation in such strategic frontier (战略前沿) tum radar filed a patent for quantum ra- technologies. Relative to quantum computing dar and target detection methods with and quantum encryption, quantum sensing has intended utility in strategic early warning the most direct and impactful military applica- (Google Patents, October 22, 2014). tions. As the electromagnetic spectrum be- comes increasingly crowded in times of peace Quantum Navigation and contested in times of war, the ability to en- sure trust in sensors and operate independently ● In 2010, researchers from the Xi’an Uni- of the spectrum’s limitations will be critical. Cer- versity of Electronics Science and Tech- tain applications of quantum sensing, including nology filed a patent for a new method of quantum radar, imaging, and navigation, could high-precision navigation and position- change the dynamic and use of the spectrum in ing based on quantum properties ways that could be highly disruptive in future (Google Patents, July 30, 2010). warfare.

● In 2011, researchers with the Chinese Potentially, quantum radar could nullify stealth Academy of Sciences’ Xi’an Optics and technologies and advanced forms of radar jam- Fine Mechanics Research Institute filed a ming. In this regard, the realization of quantum patent for leveraging quantum entangle- radar could enable the PLA to overcome supe- ment to improve the positional accuracy rior U.S. stealth capabilities, undermining this of Beidou (Google Patents, August 25, critical pillar of U.S. military power. Indeed, com- 2011) mentary in PLA media at the time the test of a prototype quantum radar was announced high- ● In 2016, researchers with the PLA Air lighted quantum radar as the “nemesis” of to- Force Engineering University filed a pa- day’s stealth fighter planes with “remarkable po- tent for a navigation method based on tential” on the future battlefield (PLA Daily, Sep- quantum-entangled microwaves (Google tember 22, 2016). In addition, more theoretical Patents, October 28, 2016). descriptions of quantum radar suggest that it could be able to defeat radar jamming tech- Although it is difficult to evaluate the maturity of niques, such as digital radio frequency memory this research from the information provided, (DRFM) jammers, which spoof a radar’s broad- several of these patents serve as at least a rough

19 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 casted signal to conceal an aircraft’s true loca- realization of quantum navigation could allow tion. Either application would nullify or for a “new generation of inertial navigation,” en- significant limit the use of both passive (stealth) abling high-precision navigation without GPS, as and active (DRFM jamming) electronic counter- researchers from the National University of De- measures in enemy space. fense Technology have noted (CNKI). This so- called “quantum compass” would be particularly In any potential conflict with China, the use of useful for submarines and other maritime plat- stealth would be a strategic imperative for the forms for which it could enable the pinpointing U.S., critical to enable naval vessels to come of their position with high levels of accuracy. within striking distance of the Chinese mainland Quantum navigation could thus potentially lib- and for aircraft to penetrate Chinese airspace to erate Chinese operational platforms from de- hold Chinese operational assets at risk. There- pendence on space-based positioning systems, fore, quantum radar would be massive disrup- which can be easily jammed, while the PLA con- tive force—an “offset technology”—within the currently becomes ever more able to hold U.S. PLA’s suite of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) or space systems at risk through advancing its “counter-intervention” capabilities. If operation- counterspace capabilities. alized, quantum radar could not only undermine the U.S. advantage in stealth but also inherently Quantum Uncertainties and Future increase the potential costs of war, forcing the Developments United States to accept higher operational risk and nullifying billions of dollars spent on stealth Could China surpass the U.S. in quantum coating for platforms operating in the Western sensing? Certainly, active Chinese efforts to pur- Pacific. sue advances in quantum radar and navigation, supported and accelerated by the ample fund- Looking forward, quantum technology could ing devoted to quantum information science, have major implications for multiple aspects of demonstrate the PLA’s focus on the pursuit of future military operations. The U.S. Air Force Sci- innovation in emerging technologies with highly entific Advisory Board noted in a recent report disruptive applications. Since research and de- that quantum clocks and quantum sensors velopment appear to remain at the prototype would merit further investment, since enhanced stage for the time being, the potential and timing precision could enhance Air Force mis- timeframe for their realization on the battlefield sions and capabilities, including SIGINT, coun- remain uncertain at this point. While technolo- ter-DRFM, electronic warfare (EW), and also gies like quantum computing and encryption more robust communications (AFSAB, 2016). would offer relatively balanced, though disrup- The same report noted that quantum magne- tive, capabilities, the likely asymmetries in oper- tometers, which enable quantum navigation, ations for China and the U.S. creates conditions could be “an important part of achieving GPS- such that quantum sensing, and quantum radar denied advantage,” including because quantum in particular, could give China a much greater inertial sensing is not susceptible to jamming. advantage at the expense of core aspects of U.S. military power, such as stealth. Considering the Similar logic about the utility of quantum navi- disruptive potential of quantum radar and navi- gation is evidently at play in PLA thinking. The

20 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 gation, the PLA’s progress in these quantum ca- The phrases "social management", and the more pabilities reflect an integral aspect of its efforts recent version "social governance", may seem to compete with the U.S. in technological and like pseudo-scientific jargon, but in fact, are defense innovation. given clear importance by China’s top leaders. [2] In 2016, General Party Secretary Xi Jinping Elsa Kania is an analyst focused on the PLA's stra- highlighted the concept, noting: "people work- tegic thinking on and advances in emerging tech- ing in political and legal affairs and comprehen- nologies. Her professional experience has in- sive social governance have focused on dealing cluded working at the Department of Defense, the with outstanding problems and innovating so- Long Term Strategy Group, FireEye, Inc., Har- cial governance methods in recent years, achiev- vard’s Belfer Center, and the Carnegie-Tsinghua ing greater results,” (Xinhua, October 12, 2016). Center for Global Policy. She is fluent in Mandarin Elsewhere, the Party has clearly explained that it Chinese. sees operationalizing social management as its blueprint for maintaining power. Far from being Stephen Armitage is a former DOD analyst, US a narrow, isolated political concept, “social man- expat and researcher primarily focused on Chi- agement” gives cohesion to an array of concepts nese information operations and emerging tech. ranging from Hu Jintao’s signature “Scientific Development” to Xi’s push for military-civil inte- gration, as part of this power maintenance pro- *** cess (People.com.cn, April 17).

Social Management Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance and the Social managements’ roots are in the core ide- ology of the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP CCP’s Plan for China defines itself as the “vanguard of the people”— By Samantha Hoffman the Leninist idea that a small group of scientifi- cally guided and educated cadres can lead the On July 20, the Chinese government released its people in the direction of social equality and Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Develop- prosperity. Mao Zedong’s organizational guide, ment Plan. [1] The plan has gained significant the “mass line” describes the same concept. The media attention in part because it links AI with CCP leadership is explicitly at the top of this hi- another topic that has drawn a considerable erarchical mass line system. It takes the “scat- amount of attention, China’s “social credit sys- tered and unsystematic ideas of the masses” and tem” (社会信用体系). Social credit uses big-data forms them into “concentrated and systematic collection and analysis, to monitor, shape and rate in- ideas” before taking them back to the masses to dividual’s behavior. While advances in artificial “propagate and explain these ideas until the intelligence, and the growth of the surveillance masses embrace them as their own”—Meaning state are all noteworthy on their own, China’s so- management along scientific principles. [3] cial credit program explicitly links them as parts of a broader political control process known as “social management” (社会管理).

21 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017

Social management describes a “scientific” Len- demands. Social management must efficiently inist machinery for shaping, managing, and re- solve problems to succeed. Such problems in- sponding. It is best summarized as a complex clude: allocation of public resources, preventing systems management process through which and controlling risks associated with man-made the Party leadership attempts to manage the and natural disasters, stopping dissent, and pre- Party itself, and through which Party leadership empting and managing social conflict. The pro- attempts to manage the Party’s interactions with cess involves both coercive and co-optative tac- society as a whole. Social management is aimed tics, constantly acting together, to force individ- at ensuring China’s “holistic” or “comprehen- uals and to incentivize individuals to participate sive” state security (国家安全). This holistic state in social management. security concept is not fundamentally new under Xi Jinping. It includes the western “national se- For the social management process to succeed, curity” concept, but, more significantly, is fo- particularly when in a crisis response mode, an cused on two internal security dimensions. First, automation of the interactions between the managing the Party itself, and second is manag- state and society, as well as the interactions ing social order (Xinhua, April 15, 2014; Qiushi, within the Party itself, is required. The modern- April 15, 2017; PLA Daily [archive], December 13, day “grid management” (网格化管理) and the 2000). “social credit system” (社会信用体系) are unique compared to previous versions of similar social Social management itself is not a new concept control mechanisms because they employ mod- and dates to the PRC’s founding in 1949, when ern technology. They represent the attempted it was first integrated into the CCP’s discussion automation of social management. of law and social order. The concept became in- creasingly prominent in the Party leadership’s The concept of automating social management rhetoric between the late 1990s and early 2000s. is not new under Xi Jinping (2012-Present) or his When the 12th Five-Year Plan for National and predecessor Hu Jintao (2002-2012). In fact, the Social Development was released in March 2011, concept emerged in the late 1970s when “social social management was enshrined as a key ob- management” was directly connected to com- jective (China.com.cn, March 16, 2011). In the plex systems theories the Party-State’s theorists plan, the Party set targets for speeding up the were drawing from to design a Leninist govern- construction of a social management system ance system to recover power after Mao and the that combined governance measures to address . The basic ideas originated problems at their source, dynamic management, around 1957 when Qian Xuesen (“father of Chi- and emergency response—while adhering to nese rocketry”) called on the Chinese Academy the core leadership of the Party. of Social Sciences to take the concept seriously as a way of solving social problems [People’s In its ideal form, the social management process Daily [archive], 28 May 1957]. By the 1970s and optimizes interactions vertically (within the throughout the 1980s complex systems thinking Party), horizontally (between agencies), and ho- [largely via Qian Xuesen’s promotion of engi- listically, between the Party and society. At every neering cybernetics] was clearly tied to “social linkage, the goal is to improve governance ca- management”. For example, one report from pacity to shape, manage, and respond to social 1984, “On the New Technological Revolution”

22 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017

(新技术革命) said: The first major step in the technological devel- Leaps and bounds in science and tech- opment of social management’s automation nology [since the 1940s have] influenced was the implementation of grid management ( or given rise to transformations in the 网格化管理). Structurally, it advanced what has way social management agencies work. been described as a multilateral “vertical and The theory and practice, perspective and horizontal integration” (纵横结合) of resources, method of systems engineering were people and agencies involved in social manage- born and developed from these ment. The political-legal and public security ap- changes.” It elaborated that it is impossi- paratus, including neighborhood and street- ble to manage effectively through indi- level committees, largely responsible for the viduals or a small number of people, and, technical side of its day-to-day implementation. “only if we fully grasp [the concepts of] Grid management enabled the organization of information, data, systems analysis, and data to generate better situational awareness decision modeling, can we truly possess and predictive capacity, as well as enhanced 'foresight and sagacity', and generate the tracking and monitoring of individuals (People’s courage and a bold vision consistent with Daily, October 15, 2006). the flow of history. [4] The first modern grid(-ized) (网格化) policing The report further laid out what steps were was implemented between 2001 and 2002 in cit- needed to implement systems engineering in ies like Shanghai (People’s Daily [archive], Au- the “social domain”. It included, among other gust 3, 2001; China File, August 10, 2016). It or- things, defining what targets systems manage- ganizes information gathering by dividing an ur- ment should reach, establishing facilities to en- ban space into grids, each of these grid spaces sure information flow, and planning and is assigned grid managers who help to collect developing methods and procedures for sys- data and pre-empt and solve problems within tems analysis. This explains why systems think- their grid. The modern informatized grid enables ing is key to understanding not only how social faster emergency response and improved pre- credit fits into social management, but overall vention and control. The photographs and vid- how the social management system is being de- eos police take at the scene of almost every pro- signed. test are one example of the kind of data fed into the grid system. System Construction Grid management’s application to social man- Rather than being relatively new conceptions, agement was significantly expanded between modern surveillance techniques and social credit 2002–2012 under the direction of Zhou are merely the newest developments in realizing Yongkang, first as minister of Public Security and the automated social management objective. later as head of the Central Political-Legal Affairs Advances in AI and big data management fur- Committee. Advances in integrated e-govern- ther improve their function, from a technical ment resources in the internal security appa- perspective. These advances describe what the ratus, namely the Golden Shield Project, greatly Party refers to social management “innovation”. enabled grid management. The Golden Shield

23 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017

Project is not an internet monitoring project up- is explained more by improved technical capac- dating the . Rather it is an e-gov- ity than by changing policy objectives. ernment project creating an organizational net- work connecting the Ministry of Public Security The social credit system relies on the technology with its local-level bureaus, which was already enabling and the organizational capacity cre- being employed at provincial and city levels by ated through the grid management system. Ef- 2002 (China Brief, June 3, 2011; People’s Daily fectively “social credit” is the technological mar- [Archive], April 26, 2002). The “Shield” was part riage of individual “responsibility” mechanisms of an expanded series of systems engineering and social control methodologies. Responsibility projects, originally initiated in 1993 and later ex- is a concept underlying the social management panded as “Golden Projects”. Each of the Golden process, and it implies that the entire Party and Projects were e-government projects designed all of society are responsible for upholding the to build and streamline information systems, Communist Party’s leadership. This is also why and connect agencies to improve their opera- individual responsibility is a key theme of all ma- tional capacity. jor state security-relevant legislation passed un- der Xi Jinping (IISS Voices, May 26; The National This eventually included the Interest, May 17, 2016). Enabled multi-phase Golden Shield pro- Effectively “social credit” is the through the same resources and ject, which was being imple- technological marriage of technology found in grid man- mented under the guidance of individual “responsibility” agement, social credit creates a mechanisms and social control the State Informatization Leading simultaneous co-optative and methodologies. Small Group by the late 1990s coercive responsibility systems and early 2000s. [5] For public security bureaus, function, and when fully implemented compre- it improved both efficiency and surveillance. hensively covers all of society. Society is co- Software applications were developed to inte- opted to participate because the same technol- grate data by requiring “real name” registration ogy is directly linked to conveniences that im- for travel booking, telecom services, and other prove everyday life, for instance electronic pay- services, information from hotel check-in and at ment. Society is coerced to participate, for in- customs clearance could be linked to law en- stance by self-censoring online, because in- forcement databases. The major contribution of creasingly technology systems are improving the Golden Shield Project to the overall social the government’s capacity to enforce “responsi- management program was that it created a ca- bility” to the party-state. Not participating could pacity to automate information sharing. Osten- have consequences not only for the individual sibly, the Golden Projects were the technological but also their personal networks. These func- starting point for building the social credit sys- tions will only become further advanced through tem, and perhaps social credit was an end goal plans such as “Internet Plus”, as the same tech- much earlier in the process. E-government in nology applications used to provide social and China has always been designed to improve commercial services feed directly into govern- governance capacity and operate as a feedback ment information gathering and sharing pro- loop with social management functions. The cesses (Gov.cn, February 1). timing of social credit implementation probably

24 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017

Automated Social Management? ‘three evil forces’ of splittism, terrorism and ex- tremism, and often specifically are related to Ti- In the construction of the social credit system, bet, Xinjiang and . Because these are current research and development is largely fo- described as threats that have domestic and in- cused on areas such as big data analysis and in- ternational connectivity, cooperation between tegration to support the collection of infor- domestic departments, intelligence, and foreign mation and ensure its effective use for intelli- affairs is required for operational success [6]. It gence. This is one of many areas where advances is particularly applicable in massive multi- in artificial intelligence would help streamline agency operations such as “Operation Skynet”, social management processes and, perhaps ide- tracking down fugitives from the Party-state ally, even automate them. Two major problems, (SCMP, March 26, 2015). however, confront this automated version of so- cial management. Both problems are explanations for structural changes that put Xi Jinping in charge of leading The first is the struggle for power within the groups on State Security, Cyber Security, and so Party. The Party members in charge of day-to- on. Using the example of the Central State Secu- day implementation of social management are rity Commission, there are now local govern- also responsible to the Party. As the systems ment-level iterations in the form of state security were being enabled in the early 2000s, these work small leading groups in nearly every prov- agencies had a large amount of relatively unreg- ince, as well as the counties and cities within ulated power. The age-old problem of an au- them. All are led by the relevant party secretary thoritarian system is that security services re- of the locality, and, where data is available, their quire substantial power in order to secure the membership appears to include (but is not lim- leadership’s authority. The same resources ena- ited to) the heads of Political-Legal Affairs Com- bling management of the Party-society relation- mittees, Ministry of State Security bureaus, ship can be abused by Party members and used Armed Police, and Propaganda departments. against other within the Party (War on the Rocks, Similar committees have been set up to mirror July 18, 2016). This appears to be the case with other new central leading groups. The member- Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, and others ahead of ship overlaps significantly. Such leading groups the 18th Party Congress. The problem will not are not new, but the evidence points to the sys- disappear in a Leninist system, which not subject tem being utilized not only to re-center power to external checks and balances. And it is why away from the Central Political-Legal Affairs ensuring loyalty is a major part of the manage- Committee (CPLC) and local versions, but also to ment of the party side of “state security”. develop a more effective system for mobilizing the social management process. For as much as The second probably is a symptom of the first: the changes may be geared toward re-centering disaggregated security agencies. In an ideal internal security power, the changes probably form, agencies tasked with different aspects of serve a dual purpose of creating a capacity for social management can cooperate to address departments to function like a holistic “system state security problems that have “integrated” of systems”. It would address problems by is- characteristics. Usually such threats involve the sue—rather than as separate systems address- ing overlapping problems.

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Conclusion power and ensuring the effectiveness of the social management process, than ac- Chinese information technology research and tual conceptual change. Hoffman, Sa- development, including the priorities outlined in mantha. "Portents of Change in China’s the artificial intelligence plan, are interesting on Social Management." China Brief 12, no. their own because they mark advances in im- 15 (2012): pp. 5-8; Hoffman, Samantha, portant research areas. But, as the language of and Peter Mattis. "China’s Proposed the AI development plan indicates, these ad- “State Security Council”: Social Govern- vances cannot be separated from Beijing's social ance under Xi Jinping," China Policy Insti- management and state security policy. Applied tute: Analysis, 21 November 2013. ac- to the social management process, they are cessed via China Policy Institute. aimed at improving governance capacity—auto- 3. Heath, Timothy. "Xi’s Mass Line Cam- mating the “carrot” and “stick” processes that paign: Realigning Party Politics to New ensure the Party-state’s power. Senior CCP lead- Realities." China Brief 13, no. 16 (2013): 3- ership hopes that through automation the Party 6. Mao, Zedong. "Some Questions Con- will be able to more effectively anticipate and re- cerning Methods of Leadership " Marx- act to emerging problems, pre-empting a crisis ists.org, 1 June 1943, https://www.marx- before they become serious threats to stability. ists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected- works/volume-3/mswv3_13.htm. Samantha Hoffman is an independent consult- 4. The People’s Daily [archive], September ant. She is currently finalizing her Ph.D.: “Pro- 13, 1984 gramming China: The Communist Party’s Auto- 5. Zhou, Hongren, Hongyuan Xu, Yuxian nomic Approach to Managing State Security”. She Zhang, Changsheng Wang, and Xinhong tweets @he_shumei Zhang. China E-Government Develop- ment Report No. 1 (中国电子政务发展报 Notes: 告) Blue Book of Electronic Development ( 电子政务蓝皮书). 2003. 1. A translation of the plan, completed by 6. UIR Center for International Strategy and Graham Webster, Paul Triolo, Elsa Kania Security Studies (中国关系学院国际战略 and Rogier Creemers, is available at China 与安全研究中心), Annual Report on Chi- Copyright and Media : na's National Security Studies 2014 (中国 https://chinacopyrightandmedia.word- 国家安全研究报告 2014), Blue Book of press.com/2017/07/20/a-next-genera- National Security (Beijing: Social Sciences tion-artificial-intelligence-development- Academic Press (China), 2014), p.133. plan/ 2. Social management (社会管理) and social *** *** *** governance (社会治理) are two phrases that, in practice, have the same definition China Brief is a bi-weekly journal of information and are implementing exactly the same and analysis covering in Eurasia. process, but the shift from “social man- agement” to “social governance” under Xi China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown Jinping has more to do with political Foundation, a private non-profit organization

26 ChinaBrief August 17, 2017 based in Washington D.C. and is edited by Peter Wood.

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