The War in the Gulf of St. Lawrence

THE WAR IN THE GULF OF ST. LAWRENCE:

ITS IMPACT ON CANADIAN TRADE

by Captain(N) RobertH. Thomas

Durins the SecondWorld War GermanU-boats caried out a Elaborateemergency plans for the defenceof the East number-of operational patrols in the Gulf of St. lawrence, Coastand the GulI of St. lawrence had, in fact,been developed proceeding upriver to within 175 miles oI Quebec City. The by theJointStaJf Comnittee a yearbefore the war,callingfoithe matority of theseincursions took placein 1942,when 22 ships commitmentof themajorityof the etsting fleet.The outbreak of were torDedoed, of which 21 were sunk. Much has been written the war, however, saw th€ RCN ships placed irnnediately under about th-esinkines and related naval and air operations', but lit- RN control and vhtually all emphasis placed on patrolling and tle attentionhas6een Daid to their imDacton the vital Canadian rudimentary Atlantic convoy escort, anticipating a German sur- trade in suppolt of thi Allied war efiort, In fact, hastv and ill- faceraider threat.The Gulf was euardedthroush 1940and 1941 advisedCanidian resDonsesto the German successeiand the by a sma.llcollection of armed yacits, fitted *ith;dy sintle guns failure to assesstheir implications deprived the United Kingdom of indeterminate vintage and, in somecases, with depth cha€es. of goodsequivalent to the averageyearly lossesexperienced in None had ASDIC, Fortunatelv U-boatactivitv wasconcentlat- the Battle of the Atlantic.

Early Plans for Defence of Tiade From the earliestdavs of European settlement in North Ame ca the Si.. I-awrence was a trade lifeline, first to France,and late! to England. By 1930 Canada was the fourth leading trading nation in the world with half its foreisn trade going by sea.'?Monheal was t[e busiest port in the country, handling mole carso than all the Atlantic coast ports corn'bined,'Atthe startofthe Se- iond World War the importance of the river ports and theL trade was recog- nized bv Naval ServiceHeadouarters (NSHQj, and som€ of the country's vety scatce naval resoutces wete allocatedto the defenceof this traffic.

Captrin (N) Robert H. Thom is on secondnent to rhe CanadiaA Institute lor Intffiano^al Pea@and S.Mitv. He wi ra\e up a posinon on the StalI oI the Nation;, Defence coneqe in J uly. Remainsof a Germantorpedothat ran aground near St. Yvon, Quebec in September 1942

l2 CanadianDefence Quarterly ed in the EasternAtlantic,saving the minusculeand ineffectual Western Movement of the U-Boats forcefrom having to countemcta real and capablethreat. Dudng 1941the submarine war spread slowly westwaadto the Thefi-rst formal plan fordefence ofshippingin the GuU(Plan mid-Atlantic in search of easier targett hastened by improved CL) was developedin Ap l 1940."This complel.plan involved anti-submarine oDerations bv the RN and RAF in home watels. sevenphases of control, ranging from individual routing of ships This expansion highlighted the organizational deficiencies and to complete closure of the Gulf, and called upon the armed shortageof escortswhich plagued the North Atlantic. These yachts aswell as other forces which did not exist to carry out the prcblems were, in part, dealt with in fte Anglo-American Agree- searchand escorttasks. A Combined Operations Room would be ment (ABC-1), with shategic control of the Western Atlantic be- established at Gasp6, with command of the St. Lawrence falling ing assignedto the United Statesin September'1941..- under the Commandirg Officer Atlantic Coastin cooperation With the entry of the United Statesinto the war in December with the Air Officer CommandineEasteln A Command. 1941"U-boat activities, although delayedby Hitler-ordercd diver- PIanGL wasrevised dnd updated d yearlater.'lt was simpli- sions into Mediterranean and Norwegian waters, moved iapidly fied into four phases,concentrating on convoyopeiations, and to the American coast,The United StatesNalywas, in the words calling for six armed yachts, up to nine corvettesand seven of S.E. Morrison, "woefully unprepared, materially and mental- minesweepers,as well asMIBs and other support cralt, ases- ly''. The use of convoy was disregarded, in equal parts due to lack corts. This commitment continued to be well bevond the capabil- ofescots and a reluctanceto learn from the British experience. ityofthe RCN,but therewasnolocal enemyactivity tlrough 1941 The resulting losseswere horrendous. BetweenJanuary and to revealthe weaknessof the plan and its supporting elements. March 194, eight U-boats sank 44 ships off the American coast. The second'Happy Time' followed and, although there were never more than 12 U-boats on station, approximately 35Q000 tons of shipping was sunk in the American sector, half being tankers.' The westward movement of the U-boats and the events to the south were noted by the Canadian Naval Staff. The threat to the GulI was discussed extensively at four consecutive Naval Stajf meetings in mid-March 1942.CommanderH.N. lay, Director of Opentions Division, prepared an Appreciation of Situation in River arld GulJ of St. Iawrence for the Naval StaIf meetins on 23 March."This remarkabledocument reviewed the irnpaciof the relativelv limited oDerationsh American waters and their- dispropotionate success.It forecastthat, with the opening of navigation, U-boat incursions could be expectedin the GulJ of St. lawrence and, possibly, in the River itself. The importance of keeping th€ Si. lawrence open to ocear-going shipping was em- phasized in ordel to relieve the presswe on the rail links to Hali- iax, St. John and Portland, Maine. It was also essential to ensure the supply of raw materials to the aluminum plant at Aruida and the movement of new construction shipping and warships from the Great Iakes to the Atlantic. It was recosnized that the defen- siveforces available were inadequate ard t6at, beyonda sma.lles- coriforce of Bangorclass minesweepers,armed yachts and Fai- mrles, reliance would have to be placed on new construction of warships for escort duties on their fust trip down-river. Based on the Appreciation, plans for the defence of the Gulf were revised and re-issued on 1April19tl2 as Plan GL2. In addi- tion to the provision of escortsard the institution of convoy operations in the event of U-boat incursions, arangements were made for the transfer of three Catalina flyirg boats ftom Sydney Faimleson patrolinthe GulfoiSt. Lawrence to Gasp6orMontJoliat such time.

U-Boat Activitie8 in the Gulf Through 1940and 1941haffic thrcugh the major eastem Cana- The test of Plan GL2 camequickly. Starting with U-553sinking dian ports grew steadily,with Halifax and St. John almost tripling tlvo merchantmenon 12May, 22 ships were torpedoed in the Gulf theii tonnageof foreign-going ca€o. The Canadian National Rajl- during the 1912active shipping season,21 of them being sunl. way had inboduced a systemcalled Central Traffic Control, oper- The U-553 sinkings took place within 50 miles of Gasp6. Plan ating from Moncton, which dispatch€d as many as 100trains per GL2 was implemented, with all shipping beint stopped until day.This systemmaximized the utilization of rolling stock and al- convoys cou.ldbe established, and additional warships were as- lowed the rail svstemto copewith the increasedwar tlaffic. The sisned, i-to the.. GulJ.^..n- - The matterwas raised in the HouseoI Com- portt howevet were strainid to the limit. 'Crew troublesi lack of mons, with the Minister being aggressivelychallenged over the adequatelabour, inadequate supplies of coal due to strikes tr the failure of the Naly to prevent the sinkings. Angus L. MacDonald Sydney mines, lack of sulficient berths and the naval demands refused to be drawn out on detailg explaining that he did not on the portsall conbibutedto asmany as8Tshipsbeingdelayed want to be in the position of providing potentially useful informa- or missinsconvovs at one time.' tion to the enemy. This bitter exchangewas only the prelude to a

April1992 13 series of questions dealing with madtime defence in home from successiveSydney-Greenland convoys. They then moved waters.both in Parliamentand the Dress.rr independently hto the GulJ, paholling between Anticosti Island MacDonaldhadgood reasonto b; lessthan forthcoming.De- and Gasp6, where U-517sank a tanker on 3 September During mands for escortsin every theater were out-stripping the allnost- the night of 5/7 September,U-165 sank a freighter and the armed completed building programs ard few additional ships would be yacht, HMCS Raccoon. U-5V followed the sameconvoy and, in available belore 1943.At the same time, the devastation on the one spectacularattack, sank three ships with three torpedoes. American coast had led to the institution of Canadian convoys She then sank-F[.4CSCha ottetownonll SeDtemberand,four between Halilax and Trinidad/Aruba to protect the vital oil suD- dayslater,sank two more shipsfuom withinaheavily defended plies.A iotal of sevencorvetteswerewiih-d-rawn from the HaliIir. convoy.U-165 attacked the sameconvoy the next day, sinking one EscortForce at various times throueh the summer to escortL3 ship and dama8inganother' convoys.l! This series of sinking severelychallenged the Gulf defenders. The next U-boatincursion camewhen U-132sanl two ships Threebomber souadronsand a Cansodetachment were hans- and fataly damageda third on 6July,and torpedoeda fourth hvo fered to Mont Joii and Gasp6, but it was virtually impossible to weeks later. Once again all river sailings were halted, more naval augment the sudace forces. As noted above, since Mat up to assetswere assignedto Gasp6and a substantialIorce was formed sevencorvettes drawn ftom the Halifax Escort Forcehad been as- to patro-lthe River between Bic Island (near Rimouski) and signed to escorttanker convoysfrom the Caribbean to Halifax. In Gasp6.'There was anotherfurore in the House of Commons, Autust a further seven coryettes wele assigned to the Com- with MacDonald being savagely attacked again over the failure mandet Eastern SeaFrontier, to escort convoys between Guan- of the Na1,yto adequatelyprotect the GulJ. This resulted in an ex- tanamq Cuba and New York City. l,ate in the same month, tiaordinary secretsession being held in the House, devoted to the NSHQ was advised of another lolthcoming request for the loan questionof coastaldefence." The sinkingshad a particularly sober- ing effecton the Quebec membert in part placated by the subsequent assignment of troops to Gasp6 for coastaldefence. Through this period the Govem- ment waspreoccupied with other, more pressing, matters. Coinci- dent with the Gulf problems were contuoversiesfollowingtheplebis- cite on conscription on 27 Aprr] and the releaseof the Report of the LossoI nong I\ong on + June. The Hong Kong controvers, repletewith chargesand counter- charges between George Drew and Kh& occupied the House until it recessedfor six months on 1 August. The sinkings in May and July had only a modest immediateef- fect on overseastrade. Traffic was stopped and convoysinstituted for a brief period, resulting in some slight drop in tonnage shipped. The only effect of any specfic con- sequencewas the doublhg of the Therailyard atSaintJohn, NewBrunswlck, June 1941 War Risk Insurance rate to three percenton voyageswithin the Gulf.'" oI escortsin support of the assaultforces for Operation- Torch, Shipowners were seriously concemed about convoy protection scheduledlor 8 Novemberin North Africa.1'q in the Gulf and werc considering the options of re-routing haIfic to other eastem ports and shipping goods by rail. Shippers were Closure of the Gulf lessenthusiastic, citing additionalcosts, lost time and potential MacDonald reported to the Cabinet War Conmittee on 9 Sep- unemplolrnent. At the sametime, within the Bdtish Ministry of tember that the Naval Staff had conduded that 17corvettes (over War Transport (lvIWT), bypassing the Gulf completely in 19,13 a quarter of those operationalat that time) could be sparedfor was considered in order to reduce turn-around time and reduce Torchard ihat the imDortarce of the Dlamed invasion warraated plessure on the merchant fleet. The N,IWI had been in touch with the risk of weakenins escort forceJin coastal waters. Five cor- NSHQ on the matter of convoying and had gained the impres- vettes could be releaied from the West Coastas the Japanese sion that the RCN would favour a drastic curtailment of traJfic in threat had diminished following the Battle of Midway in June. the River in 1943,as the shortage of escorts would continue.' The remaining 12corvettes would be provided at the expenseof After a six week hiatus the U-boat attacksin the GulJ resumed. closing the Gulf of St. lawrence to overseasshippiag and replac- On the night of 2228 August, U-165and U-517sank two ships ing cowettes with rninesweepersas esco*s for coastalconvoys.

l4 CanadianDefence Quarterly The Admiralty was inlormed of their decision the next day.m The seastraffic of closing the Gulf. Following disossion of the report MWT was advised that future sailings from the United Kingdom in Rbruary, and approval by the Naval Staff in early March, men- should be directedto the Atlantic ports and the trans-Atlantic tion of the St. Iawrence essentially disappeared from the Naval convoyschedule was expandedfrom sevento eight days. StaJfmin u tesfor the ne\t six months With little more than two months left in the shipping season the decision to ceaseoverseas shipping through the St. Iawrence The Impact of the Closure seemedtobe a Drudent one. Convovscontinued for about two Public criticism of the defence of the Gulf occurred in both the weeks to clear ;hips aheady in the Rivel and coastal convoys Quebec Legislature and the House of Commons. J.S. Roy were continued with whatever protection might be available. It (Gasp6),who had led the cdticism the previous yeal, retu rned to was assumedthat Halifax and St. Johnwould be ableto pick up the attack. This tirne, however, he addressed the impact of the the shipping slack,particularly asthe assemblyportfor the HX 1942sinkingr noting that: the people thin* that if the St. convoys was transferred from Halilax to New York in mid- Iawrence protection had been better organized last yeat and ii September,as75 percentofthe shipsfor theseconvoyswere be- befterWtection had beengivento ow shipsfor the maintenance ing loadedin NewYork or southernports.'' of that water route, there would not have been so much darnage U-boat activitiespersisted in the Gulf with three sinkings in done to the Harbours ol Montreal and Quebec. They claim that October Two causedconsiderable public concern-the sinking the sinde-tuackrailroad gohg to Halilax hasbeen ovetloaded because of all the materials which have to be transoorted. Thev daim this water route deseryesto be betterprotected , that il is the cheapestrcute, the shortestone, and the one-with lhe greatestca- pacity for transporting materials overseas.' Despitethe accumcyof Roy'scharges, MacDonald did not re- ply to the specfic concemsabout the impact of the closue on the raihoad and on overseasshipping.

Missed Signals The lack of effective analysis of the closing of the Gulf is hard to comprehend. There were three readily available indicators which demonstrated that the capability of Canada to supply the United Kingdom was being impaired. Fi$t starting in June 1942, the monthly totals of Canadian goods going to the United King- dom via all routes changed from a trend of monthly growth, and for the rest of the yeai fell to levelsbelow 1941,not recoveringuntil the summer of 1943.' The second indicator was the record of cargo loadhgs of the maior East Coast ports. \A4rileHalifax ard 9t. Johnexperienced a steadyincrease in tonnageloaded each The rallyardat Hallfax vear from 1939to 1943,Montreal had an enormous decreasein 1942and 1943which, in no wa, was compensated for by the in- creasesin the Malitime ports (seeTable 1).' The declin6 is even of the Caroius only 175 miles from Quebec City, and of the more &amatic iI one notes that Monheal had only a swen month Sydney-PortAux Basquesferry, Canbou, on 14October with the season as compared to the year-round operations in the loss oI 137lives.The last Germanoperation of the yearwas the Maritimes. landingof an alrnostcomically inept agent, WemervonJanowski, near New Carlisle.He was qu ickly captuJed.- The situationin the Culf was reviewedlate in 1942in NSHQ.' Thble1 Captair lay, the newly-promoted Dlector of Operations, noted TotalForeign-going Cargo (Tons) the essential coastal haffic, particularly coal from Sydney and Lon ore ftom Wabana, but made no mention of the tralfic from Year H!lilEr $.Join I[onlErl ouehft lioisBlviaras QuebectoGooseBayin support of the new American air base. Neither was there an anal'sis of the importance of overs€ashade. 1939 690,345 1,096,450 3,144,189 158,039 445,390 He recommendedthat all oceanshipping be ercludedfrom the CuIf fo r th e 1943shipping season,ignoring the obsewation of th e 1940 1375,n2 1,848,4173,975.177 3fi,029 633,916 NCSO Sydney, that such action would overtax the railways.ra The Chiefs of Stalf Committee was concerned and formed a 1941 2,329,753 2,408,599 4,078,207 320,263 472,626 comrnittee to carry out a comDrehensivereview of the defenceof - the St. Lawrence.lts report, issuedin January,1943, examined 1942 3,0r2149 2,666,r06 1,6m,935 142,308 306,360 all activities in the area since the beginning of the war. Future operationswere basedon the anticipation of shipping in the Guff 1943 3,364,S89 3,227,49 1,0€9,447 162,243 320,728 being limited to essentialcoastal traffic. This was no small amount - the TradeDivision forecast 1223voyages and 3.695mil- 1944 3,472,020 2,658,481 2,291,525 237,433 316,707 lion tons of cargo.The only exceptionswould be for 22 ships per month to enter the Gulf in support of the timber trade." There 1945 2,683,160 2 721,266 4,904,744 544,280 871,455 was no mention of the capabilit of the rail system to cope with the diversion of trade and, again, no analysisof the effecton over- Sourca:National Harbours BoardAnnual ReDons. 1939-45

April1992 l5 Thethird indicatoris perhapsthe most revealing.In the early asthe U-boatthreatremained hish and the escortsituationwas stagesof the wai a small amount of cargowas shipped to overseas still critical, in part due to the tithdrawal of CanadianEscort destinations through the United States,primarily through Port- Groups from t6e Atlantic for training." A further letter in early land, Maine. This was irritially constrained by American neutlal- summerurged the continuedreliance on Halifaxand St.John to ity but, following her entry hto hostilities, the amount oI Cana- the maximum extentpossible because of their geographicposi- dian trade going through the United Statesgrew lapidly. In 1943 tions, but noted that the labour situationat both ports was ?x- 21.57percent of Canadianhade to the United Kingdom wasgo- tremely unsati,sfactoq/ and that sending a few ships to Montreal int through the United States.While the Canadianports might 'might haveagood psychologicaleffect on the labour.'- not havebeen able to handlethe recordvolume of foreim trade By July 1943the shategicsituation had easedsomewhat ard U- in anyevent, erport through the United Stateshad an enormous boatoperations in North Ameican watershad decrcased.There imDacton Canadianrailtransoort. wereno lossesin the St. la\arence,the or yU-boatsentering in Iiy March 1943,permits weie being sought to ship 10114car futile attempts to rescueescaping POWs, and the escort situation loadsof lumber through EastCoast Americanports. Lumber ex- hadimprovedwith the retum of the 24corvettesassignedtothe polts thlough the Statesaveraged between 40 and 60thousand Guantanamoconvoys and the forcfi landings.With theseships tons per month. Flour was also being exportedin substantial availableand additional air resourcesstationed in Newfound- quantities,usingports asfar south asThmpa, Florida. The ulti- land, NSHQ wasnow preparedto considerlimited haJficin the St. lawrence, agleeingon 7 Julyto 15ships per month, depend- ine onthe U-boatsituation." In Septembel, the Admimlty requestedthat ships destined for the United Kijrgdombe permitted to sail independently in the St. Iawrence. This was agreedto by the Naval Staff as a meansof speedingup the turn-around of the grain and timber ships - a clearindication that the Maritime ports could not copewith the volume oftralfic." It was too latein the seasonto signilicantlyalter ships'sched- ules. The total cargoshipped through Monheal for 19€ was bare- Iy a quarter of shipped ir 1941and Hatfax and St. John had been unable to make up the difference. Nonetheless, the MWT seemedto be at odds with the Admialty as, while the latter southt to re-exploitthe St. lawrence ports, the lvfwT could not seethe advantage,advising the Trade Division:. The advantages of loadine in the St. kwrence are so slender and debatable that il there ii any delay at the rendez-vous when the ships arewest- bound walthg for convoy,or at the loadinq ports when the ships arc east-bound, . . . .it is doubtful if we are justified in making any changeat all frcm lastyeals arrangements,frcm the strictly shipping point of view." Restrictionson use of the GulI were effectivelvrescinded bv the end of 1943.yet little traJfichad returned.No U-boatattack had occurred in the Gulf to induce such caution. Trade had not switched to the Maritime ports as anticipated,but had largely gone to the EastCoast Amedcan portt putting a considerable strainon Canadianrail capabilities.

Re-openingof ththe Gulf Germantorpedo h ls HMCSMagog in the St. Lawrence, October 1944. In 1944the Trade Division establishedaplanfor the shipping season,permitting ar matimum of 48 ships per month to proceed mateeffectwas noted in early 1945when shipping though the upriver."uDriver-" EarlyEarlv in the seasonconvoysconvovs from SvdnevSydneywwere rein- Statesresulted in a debitbalanceof 15,000box carswith respect stituted to permitoermit fast refriseratorrefrigerator shjpsships to proceedto Montreal as to the United States, requiin€ their rationin8 throughout the the delaysin shipping by rail to the Maritimes, necessitatedby the whole Canadianrail system.'u requirement to stop for ice, were more than the rail systemcould The railroad capacity was severelychallenged. Rolling stockfor handle. Labour difficulties in the Maritime ports persisted, exert- all the railroadshad declinedthrough the war and, in almostall ingmoiepressure onthe rail car situation,and the RCN was fi- categorieswas at a lower levelin 1945than in 1938.31The15000 nally convinced to fully re-open the Gulf in August. The number missingboxcarsrepresented almost 13 percent oI the Canadian ofships enteringthe St. lawrence increasedsteadily for the rest inventory.No-one appearedto recognizethe magnitude ofthe of the season, eventually reachint 80 to 90 per month . ProDrem. Between Septemberand Novembet, 1944,sil U-boatsoperated in and around the Gull. HMCS Shawinigan was sunk, FIMCS The Situation in 1943 Magog anda fteighterwere damaged but;apart from diversion- That is not to saythat the dosure of the GulI por:tswas not ques- ary routing, little reactionoccurred. By this time the focusof the tioned. The MWT in early March 1943,proposed that 12ships warwas on the landbattle inEurope. per monthbe clearedfor Gulf and Newfoundland ports to load In planning forthe 1945shipping season,the use o{ the Gulf Iumber"The RCN was not DreDaredtoreconsider the decision was still in dispute.The Minister was still concernedabout the

l6 Canadan DefenceQuarterV strain on escortresources,3e but the risk was acceptedby the 3. Government of Canada, Annnal Report of the National Harbours Board, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1936-45). Cabinet War Committee. By the time the shippinj seasonar- 'Defence rived, however,the war with Germany was in iis final weeks. ful- 4. PAC RG 24 Bor I"124 file 501-9-3, of Shipping - GUI of St. Iawrence' 29 April 1940. lowing VE-Day, the GulJ haffic quickly returned to its peacetime - pattern oI commercialoperations. 5. DHIST NHS 165G239/16,Defence of Shipping GulJ of St. lawrence'. NS 104848-22,25 April1941. 6. DHIST NHS 82/520i8280 Box 18280B. Vol.2, Outline Historv oI Trade Conclusion Division, 193945.p. l8 The war in the Gulf of St. Iawrence was, in rcality only a small Z CdrWG.D Lund,'TheRoyalCanadianNalysQuestforAutonomy sideshow to the Battle of the Atlantic. The losses there were few in the North-West Atla^lic: 791'1-43",The Naval War College Review compared to the werall lossesin the war at sea,but their impact, (May-June 1980),p. 75. reflected in the decision to closethe Gulf and River ports to over- 8. Captain SJ^I'Roskill,Thewat at Sea 7939-7945Uol. II, (LD don Het seasshipping, wasout of all proportion. Majesrys StationeryOftu e,1956),p.94-5. NSHQ had an inadequate strategic outlook. The constant 9. PAC RG Box 396 NSS 1048-48-3v 1, Appreciation of Situation in problem of provision of sufficient escorts and the focus of the River and Gulf of St. Iawrence', 21 March 1942. 10. DH1STNSS 1550-239,]!6B,Notth AIr.erican WaEs Operations (Rher Trade Division on control of shipping tended to obscurethe fun- atd Gulf of St. Iawrence), Attacks, Sinkings and Counter Action St. damental importance of hade to winning the war. Any possible Iawrence Gulf and River, 1942',(Weekly Report to Minister), 14May understanding was frustrated by the fragmented civilian ad- 19,O,hereafter referred to as WR/M. ministration which almost guaranteedthat operational decisions 77. The Toronto Globe and Mail , 15May 1942, would be basedon incomplete information and parochial in- 72. History of TradeDivision , p.35. terpretations. Lost in the turmoil was the u€ency of maximizing L3. I4.R/M,9Iny 1942. the amount of war material reaching Euope. 14. Hansard,1&luly 1942,p.4376. The decision to close the GulJ in 1942was cetainlv iustiJiable 15. J.W Pickersgil, Ihe Mackenzie King Record VoJ.l (Toronto: Univer- in theshort term, but thefailure to reviewthedecision sity of TorontoPress, 1960), p.2,64403. and ana- 16. Globe and Mail,l6May 1942. lyze its implications is surprising. Neiihe! the Maritime ports or A. DHIST, Milaer Papers, l€tter G.D. Huband to Dtuector-General, the railroads were capableof coping with the diversion of materi- Ministry of War Tlansport, london, England,3oltiy 1942. -10 al. Foreigntrade thrcugh easternCanadian ports &opped by 18. llR/M , and,77Seetember 1942. alnost two million tons in 19rPand remained below the 1941level 19. Govemment of Canai a, Documentson Canadian Exwnal Relations, until the end of the war. Considering that U-boatssanl 14554000 16l. t (Ottawa, Queen'sItintet 1980).ktter Ilime Minister of Great gross tons in the entte war, and notwithstandint diversions Britain to Prime Minister, p.353. through the American ports, the cloEurecould well be judged to 20. PACRG 24 Box 6789NSS 8280166/16Vol. I Message 10September, havecost the Allies asmuch aswas lost in a yea/s war at sea. 1942,NSHQ to Admtalty. The Americans and the British saw the closing of the GulI as a n. Outline History of TradeDivision, p.38. 22. Hadley, U-boats Againsf Canada, provides a detailed account. matter of little consequence. Following the entry of the United 23. DHIST NHS 165G239/16,Memorandurn NavalAspect of the Defence Statesinto the wa4 they becamethe key sourceof supply and, as of the GulI and River St- tawrencei 15December 19,12. describedby C.P.Stacey, Canada was almostenthely excluded 24.Irid, Memorandum NCSO Sydney to NOIC Sydney, 15 October from the Allied organization for the higher diection of the war. 7942. The Outline Histoty of theTtade Division perhaps summadzed 25. DHIST 193.00%(Dl5),General Review and Repott Upon Defencesin the situation most effectively in hindsight. In its conclusion it the Gulf and Riwr St, Iawrence Areas by a Committee hmed Un- states: der Dbection of the Chiets of StaIf Cotunittee, 30 January 1943. It is aheady become clear that dufing this war the general 26. PACRG Bo( [692File H 1002-1.8\61.1, Minutes ofst, LawrenceOper- movenent of Trade pafticulaiy in Canada, would have been ation ConfercnceHeld in Oftawa kbruarv 22nd-24th, 1943.n kbrr- ary 7943. more efficiently and economically ananged had there been some n. Hansard, ]5MaIch7943, p.1n0. sort of coordinating committee or board which surveyed the 28. Govemment of Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Trade 01 whole broad fieLd. Canada: Analysis and Summar',, Ottawa: Kingb Printer, 1939-46. Thisis not to say that there was any lackof cooperationbefween 29. Goverrurrent of Carad,a, National Hatbours Board Annual Reports, the various authorities concerned but in attempting to digest the (Ottawa: King's Printea 1939-45). lessons oI the wat it does seem that the higher policy for the 30 PACRG Bo( ,91" Correspondence Reqarding Flour and Lumber at US movement of shipping as related to nil facilities, the geogaph- Ports, I€tter, Tnnsport Controller, Montreal to Chief of Transporta- ic situation of the Canadhn ports, and the escort available was tion, Army Service Forces,Washington, 12 March, 1945. not kept as continually under rcview as it might have been. 37. CanadaYear dook,1947, p.660-67. 32. PACRG 12 Bo( 421op, cif. , Ietter MWT to Trade Division, 10March hr instance, it was not until August, 1944,that a dear briel 1943. showing the absolute necessity for the ful| use of the St. 33. For a detailed discussion, see Marc Milnel, North Atlantic Run, laterence ports in seasonwa6 given to the Naty. Up t/J that time, (Torcnto: University of Toronto Press, 1985)chapters 7 and 8. the policy for the useof the St , Iawtence had been a matter of ar- 34. PAC RG Box 5789NSS 8280-155Vol. 4 l€tter (undated) G. Ropner, rangement on too low a plane seeing that high political consider- NWT to CaotainE.S. Brdnd. Trade Division. ations and the overall emplovment of the available Naval escorts 35. Ihid., I€ ei Captain Brand to MWL T JuIy 1943. were considerably involved,ao n 36. DHIST NSS, Naval Staf! Minutes,l3september 7943, 32 PACRG Box 6739,op. cif-, I€tter Ropne4 MWf, to Trade Division, 27 NO'TES December 1943. 38, Outline History of TradeDivision, pA9. 1. SeeMichael L. Hadley,U-k)aE Against Canada, (Kingson: McGill- 39. DHIST NSS 1650-239/14Memorandum for file 10 March 1945pro- Quee s Unive$ityftess, 1985, ior tlrc definitiveco!€!:age of theseel,€nb. vides an extlact from the minutes of the CabinetWar Committee meet- 2. Governmentof Canada, House of CommonsDebates (Hansard),26 ine of 7 March 1945. April 1939,p.3235. +U.VUtUne msmryOl tfaae ulwston. D,5t.

Aprl1992 l7