The War in the Gulf of St. Lawrence
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THE WAR IN THE GULF OF ST. LAWRENCE: ITS IMPACT ON CANADIAN TRADE by Captain(N) RobertH. Thomas Durins the SecondWorld War GermanU-boats caried out a Elaborateemergency plans for the defenceof the East number-of operational patrols in the Gulf of St. lawrence, Coastand the GulI of St. lawrence had, in fact,been developed proceeding upriver to within 175 miles oI Quebec City. The by theJointStaJf Comnittee a yearbefore the war,callingfoithe matority of theseincursions took placein 1942,when 22 ships commitmentof themajorityof the etsting fleet.The outbreak of were torDedoed, of which 21 were sunk. Much has been written the war, however, saw th€ RCN ships placed irnnediately under about th-esinkines and related naval and air operations', but lit- RN control and vhtually all emphasis placed on patrolling and tle attentionhas6een Daid to their imDacton the vital Canadian rudimentary Atlantic convoy escort, anticipating a German sur- trade in suppolt of thi Allied war efiort, In fact, hastv and ill- faceraider threat.The Gulf was euardedthroush 1940and 1941 advisedCanidian resDonsesto the German successeiand the by a sma.llcollection of armed yacits, fitted *ith;dy sintle guns failure to assesstheir implications deprived the United Kingdom of indeterminate vintage and, in somecases, with depth cha€es. of goodsequivalent to the averageyearly lossesexperienced in None had ASDIC, Fortunatelv U-boatactivitv wasconcentlat- the Battle of the Atlantic. Early Plans for Defence of Tiade From the earliestdavs of European settlement in North Ame ca the Si.. I-awrence was a trade lifeline, first to France,and late! to England. By 1930 Canada was the fourth leading trading nation in the world with half its foreisn trade going by sea.'?Monheal was t[e busiest port in the country, handling mole carso than all the Atlantic coast ports corn'bined,'Atthe startofthe Se- iond World War the importance of the river ports and theL trade was recog- nized bv Naval ServiceHeadouarters (NSHQj, and som€ of the country's vety scatce naval resoutces wete allocatedto the defenceof this traffic. Captrin (N) Robert H. Thom is on secondnent to rhe CanadiaA Institute lor Intffiano^al Pea@and S.Mitv. He wi ra\e up a posinon on the StalI oI the Nation;, Defence coneqe in J uly. Remainsof a Germantorpedothat ran aground near St. Yvon, Quebec in September 1942 l2 CanadianDefence Quarterly ed in the EasternAtlantic,saving the minusculeand ineffectual Western Movement of the U-Boats forcefrom having to countemcta real and capablethreat. Dudng 1941the submarine war spread slowly westwaadto the Thefi-rst formal plan fordefence ofshippingin the GuU(Plan mid-Atlantic in search of easier targett hastened by improved CL) was developedin Ap l 1940."This complel.plan involved anti-submarine oDerations bv the RN and RAF in home watels. sevenphases of control, ranging from individual routing of ships This expansion highlighted the organizational deficiencies and to complete closure of the Gulf, and called upon the armed shortageof escortswhich plagued the North Atlantic. These yachts aswell as other forces which did not exist to carry out the prcblems were, in part, dealt with in fte Anglo-American Agree- searchand escorttasks. A Combined Operations Room would be ment (ABC-1), with shategic control of the Western Atlantic be- established at Gasp6, with command of the St. Lawrence falling ing assignedto the United Statesin September'1941..- under the Commandirg Officer Atlantic Coastin cooperation With the entry of the United Statesinto the war in December with the Air Officer CommandineEasteln A Command. 1941"U-boat activities, although delayedby Hitler-ordercd diver- PIanGL wasrevised dnd updated d yearlater.'lt was simpli- sions into Mediterranean and Norwegian waters, moved iapidly fied into four phases,concentrating on convoyopeiations, and to the American coast,The United StatesNalywas, in the words calling for six armed yachts, up to nine corvettesand seven of S.E. Morrison, "woefully unprepared, materially and mental- minesweepers,as well asMIBs and other support cralt, ases- ly''. The use of convoy was disregarded, in equal parts due to lack corts. This commitment continued to be well bevond the capabil- ofescots and a reluctanceto learn from the British experience. ityofthe RCN,but therewasnolocal enemyactivity tlrough 1941 The resulting losseswere horrendous. BetweenJanuary and to revealthe weaknessof the plan and its supporting elements. March 194, eight U-boats sank 44 ships off the American coast. The second'Happy Time' followed and, although there were never more than 12 U-boats on station, approximately 35Q000 tons of shipping was sunk in the American sector, half being tankers.' The westward movement of the U-boats and the events to the south were noted by the Canadian Naval Staff. The threat to the GulI was discussed extensively at four consecutive Naval Stajf meetings in mid-March 1942.CommanderH.N. lay, Director of Opentions Division, prepared an Appreciation of Situation in River arld GulJ of St. Iawrence for the Naval StaIf meetins on 23 March."This remarkabledocument reviewed the irnpaciof the relativelv limited oDerationsh American waters and their- dispropotionate success.It forecastthat, with the opening of navigation, U-boat incursions could be expectedin the GulJ of St. lawrence and, possibly, in the River itself. The importance of keeping th€ Si. lawrence open to ocear-going shipping was em- phasized in ordel to relieve the presswe on the rail links to Hali- iax, St. John and Portland, Maine. It was also essential to ensure the supply of raw materials to the aluminum plant at Aruida and the movement of new construction shipping and warships from the Great Iakes to the Atlantic. It was recosnized that the defen- siveforces available were inadequate ard t6at, beyonda sma.lles- coriforce of Bangorclass minesweepers,armed yachts and Fai- mrles, reliance would have to be placed on new construction of warships for escort duties on their fust trip down-river. Based on the Appreciation, plans for the defence of the Gulf were revised and re-issued on 1April19tl2 as Plan GL2. In addi- tion to the provision of escortsard the institution of convoy oper- ations in the event of U-boat incursions, arangements were made for the transfer of three Catalina flyirg boats ftom Sydney Faimleson patrolinthe GulfoiSt. Lawrence to Gasp6orMontJoliat such time. U-Boat Activitie8 in the Gulf Through 1940and 1941haffic thrcugh the major eastem Cana- The test of Plan GL2 camequickly. Starting with U-553sinking dian ports grew steadily,with Halifax and St. John almost tripling tlvo merchantmenon 12May, 22 ships were torpedoed in the Gulf theii tonnageof foreign-going ca€o. The Canadian National Rajl- during the 1912active shipping season,21 of them being sunl. way had inboduced a systemcalled Central Traffic Control, oper- The U-553 sinkings took place within 50 miles of Gasp6. Plan ating from Moncton, which dispatch€d as many as 100trains per GL2 was implemented, with all shipping beint stopped until day.This systemmaximized the utilization of rolling stock and al- convoys cou.ldbe established, and additional warships were as- lowed the rail svstemto copewith the increasedwar tlaffic. The sisned, i-to the.. GulJ.^..n- - The matterwas raised in the HouseoI Com- portt howevet were strainid to the limit. 'Crew troublesi lack of mons, with the Minister being aggressivelychallenged over the adequatelabour, inadequate supplies of coal due to strikes tr the failure of the Naly to prevent the sinkings. Angus L. MacDonald Sydney mines, lack of sulficient berths and the naval demands refused to be drawn out on detailg explaining that he did not on the portsall conbibutedto asmany as8Tshipsbeingdelayed want to be in the position of providing potentially useful informa- or missinsconvovs at one time.' tion to the enemy. This bitter exchangewas only the prelude to a April1992 13 series of questions dealing with madtime defence in home from successiveSydney-Greenland convoys. They then moved waters.both in Parliamentand the Dress.rr independently hto the GulJ, paholling between Anticosti Island MacDonaldhadgood reasonto b; lessthan forthcoming.De- and Gasp6, where U-517sank a tanker on 3 September During mands for escortsin every theater were out-stripping the allnost- the night of 5/7 September,U-165 sank a freighter and the armed completed building programs ard few additional ships would be yacht, HMCS Raccoon. U-5V followed the sameconvoy and, in available belore 1943.At the same time, the devastation on the one spectacularattack, sank three ships with three torpedoes. American coast had led to the institution of Canadian convoys She then sank-F[.4CSCha ottetownonll SeDtemberand,four between Halilax and Trinidad/Aruba to protect the vital oil suD- dayslater,sank two more shipsfuom withinaheavily defended plies.A iotal of sevencorvetteswerewiih-d-rawn from the HaliIir. convoy.U-165 attacked the sameconvoy the next day, sinking one EscortForce at various times throueh the summer to escortL3 ship and dama8inganother' convoys.l! This series of sinking severelychallenged the Gulf defenders. The next U-boatincursion camewhen U-132sanl two ships Threebomber souadronsand a Cansodetachment were hans- and fataly damageda third on 6July,and torpedoeda fourth hvo fered to Mont Joii and Gasp6, but it was virtually impossible to weeks later. Once again all river sailings were halted, more naval augment the sudace forces. As noted above, since Mat up to assetswere assignedto Gasp6and a substantialIorce was formed sevencorvettes drawn ftom the Halifax Escort Forcehad been as- to patro-lthe River between Bic Island (near Rimouski) and signed to escorttanker convoysfrom the Caribbean to Halifax. In Gasp6.'There was anotherfurore in the House of Commons, Autust a further seven coryettes wele assigned to the Com- with MacDonald being savagely attacked again over the failure mandet Eastern SeaFrontier, to escort convoys between Guan- of the Na1,yto adequatelyprotect the GulJ. This resulted in an ex- tanamq Cuba and New York City.