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Public Redacted Annex A ICC-01/04-02/06-633-AnxA-Red 09-06-2015 1/7 NM T Public Redacted Annex A ICC-01/04-02/06-633-AnxA-Red 09-06-2015 2/7 NM T . CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS AGREED FACTS RELATING TO CONTEXT 1. Ituri is a district within the Province Orientale of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”). Bunia is its capital. 2. Ituri borders Uganda to the East, and the Republic of South Sudan to the North. 3. Ituri is divided into territories, which are sub-divided into collectivités, themselves divided into groupements. 4. Banyali-Kilo and Walendu-Djatsi are collectivités in Djugu territory, Ituri district. 5. Kilo is located in Banyali-Kilo collectivité. 6. Mongbwalu is located in Banyali-Kilo collectivité. 7. Nzebi is located in Banyali-Kilo collectivité. 8. Pluto is located in Banyali-Kilo collectivité. 9. Sayo is located in Banyali-Kilo collectivité. 10. Avetso is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 11. Bambu is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 12. Buli is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 13. Camp P.M. is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 14. Dhepka is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 15. Djuba is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 16. Dyalo is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 17. Gogo is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 18. Gola is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 19. Goy is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 20. Gutsi is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 21. Jitchu is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. ICC-01/04-02/06-633-AnxA-Red 09-06-2015 3/7 NM T AGREED FACTS RELATING TO CONTEXT 22. Katho is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 23. Kobu is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 24. Langa is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 25. Lipri is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 26. Mindjo is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 27. Mpetsi/Petsi is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 28. Ndalo is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 29. Ngabuli is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 30. Ngaru is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 31. Ngongo is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 32. Nyangaray is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 33. Pili is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 34. Sangi is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 35. Thali is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 36. Tsili is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 37. Wadda is located in Walendu-Djatsi collectivité. 38. The people perceived as being outsiders in Ituri, because they were not born there, are referred to as “non- originaires”. They are also referred to as “jajambo”. 39. The Nande are an ethnic group originally from North Kivu. The Nande were viewed as “non-originaires” during the period of the charges. 40. The former President of the RCD-K/ML, Mbusa NYAMWISI, is of Nande ethnicity. ICC-01/04-02/06-633-AnxA-Red 09-06-2015 4/7 NM T AGREED FACTS RELATING TO CONTEXT 41. UPC is an acronym for the “Union des Patriotes Congolais”. 42. FPLC is an acronym for the "Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo". 43. The FPLC was the armed wing of the UPC. 44. UPC-RP is an acronym for "Union des Patriotes Congolais- pour la Réconciliation et la Paix”. 45. FNI is an acronym for the "Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes". 46. FRPI is an acronym for the “Front de Résistance Patriotique de l’Ituri". 47. RCD-K/ML and RCD-Kis/ML are acronyms for the "Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie- Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération". 48. APC is an acronym for the “Armée du Peuple Congolais”. 49. The APC was the armed wing of the RCD-K/ML. 50. PUSIC is an acronym for the "Parti pour l’unité et la sauvegarde de l’intégrité du Congo". 51. FAPC is an acronym for the “Forces armées du peuple congolais”. 52. MLC is an acronym for the “Mouvement de Libération du Congo”. 53. RCD-N is an acronym for the “Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/National”. 54. The then Governor of Ituri, Molondo LOMPONDO, and the APC forces, were ousted from Bunia on or about 9 August 2002. 55. The UPC/FPLC took part in the hostilities in Bunia on or about 6 March 2003. 56. The governments of Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe signed the Ceasefire Agreement in Lusaka, Zambia, on 10 July 1999, on the cessation of hostilities in the DRC. 57. The DRC government, the MLC, the RCD-ML, the RCD-N, the Mayi Mayi, the political opposition and civil society representatives reached an agreement “pour la gestion consensuelle de la transition” at Sun City, South Africa, on 19 April 2002. ICC-01/04-02/06-633-AnxA-Red 09-06-2015 5/7 NM T AGREED FACTS RELATING TO CONTEXT 58. The DRC and Rwanda governments signed the Pretoria Agreement in Pretoria, South Africa, on 30 July 2002, on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC. 59. The Uganda and DRC governments signed the Luanda Agreement in Luanda, Angola, on 6 September 2002, setting a timetable for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the DRC and establishing the Ituri Pacification Commission (“IPC”, “CPI” in French). 60. The DRC government, the RCD, the MLC, the RCD-ML, the RCD-N, the Mayi Mayi, civil society and the political opposition signed the Global and Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria, South Africa, on 16 December 2002, providing the foundations for the political transition in DRC. 61. The MLC, the RCD-N and the RCD-ML signed a ceasefire agreement in Gbadolite on or about 31 December 2002. 62. The Uganda and DRC governments signed an amendment to the Luanda Agreement on 10 February 2003 at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, establishing a new framework for the Ituri Pacification Commission. 63. The FRPI, PUSIC, the FNI, the FPDC, the RCD-ML and the FAPC signed an agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Ituri on 18 March 2003 in Bunia. 64. The DRC government, the MLC, the RCD/ML-K, the RCD-N and others signed the Final Act of the Inter- Congolese Dialogue in Sun City, South Africa, on 2 April 2003, establishing a national government for the DRC. 65. PUSIC, the FNI, the FPDC, FAPC and the UPC signed an agreement on the re-engagement of the Ituri peace process on 16 May 2003 in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. 66. The Interim Multinational Emergency Force (“IMEF”), known as “Artemis”, was deployed in Bunia between June and September 2003. The deployment of Artemis was authorised by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003. 67. MONUC’s “Ituri Brigade” took over from Artemis on 1 September 2003. 68. UPDF is an acronym for the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces. 69. Rwanda provided weapons and ammunition to the UPC/FPLC beginning in July 2002. ICC-01/04-02/06-633-AnxA-Red 09-06-2015 6/7 NM T AGREED FACTS RELATING TO CONTEXT 70. Rwanda provided military training to about 100 UPC/FPLC soldiers in Gabiro, Rwanda, between on or about mid- September and mid-November 2002. AGREED FACTS RELATING TO BOSCO NTAGANDA’S BACKGROUND 71. Bosco NTAGANDA was born on 5 November 1973 in Rwanda. 72. Bosco NTAGANDA holds Congolese nationality. 73. Bosco NTAGANDA belongs to the Tutsi ethnic group. 74. Bosco NTAGANDA was in Rwandan military formations between 1991 and 1996. 75. Bosco NTAGANDA was a military instructor in the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo- Zaire (“AFDL”). 76. While he was in Uganda for military training, Bosco NTAGANDA was arrested by the Ugandan authorities. AGREED FACTS RELATING TO THE UPC/FPLC1 77. LUBANGA formed a UPC-controlled government in September 2002. The seat of the UPC government was Bunia, Ituri district, Orientale Province, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 78. In early September 2002, LUBANGA appointed Bosco NTAGANDA as Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of Operations and Organisation. 1 All facts are understood to relate to the period of the charges unless a specific date is provided in the fact. ICC-01/04-02/06-633-AnxA-Red 09-06-2015 7/7 NM T OTHER AGREED FACTS2 79. Bosco NTAGANDA held the position of Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of Operations and Organisation in the FPLC between 2 or 3 September 2002 and December 2003. 80. Bosco NTAGANDA’s used the call sign “Tango Romeo”. 81. The UPC/FPLC retained control of Mongbwalu until at least February 2003. AGREED FACTS RELATING TO PROSECUTION WITNESSES 82. [REDACTED] 2 All facts are understood to relate to the period of the charges unless a specific date is provided in the fact..
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