EU NON-PROLIFERATION CONSORTIUM The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks NON-PROLIFERATION PAPERS No. 41 December 2014
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE IN THE 2015 NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CYCLE
jenny nielsen and marianne hanson
I. INTRODUCTION SUMMARY
Since the inclusion of the ‘deep concern at the The humanitarian initiative has gained signifi cant catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of momentum and seen broad engagement since the nuclear weapons’ in the Final Document of the 2010 humanitarian dimension was fi rst included in the Final Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference Document of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The initiative is supported by an increasing (RevCon), the humanitarian initiative addressing number of states wishing to highlight and address the the disarmament pillar of the 1968 NPT has gained catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear momentum and is consolidating a discourse within weapons. The discernible nuances of this support and the the non-proliferation regime, including within the various aims of the initiative require closer analysis. Of 1 NPT review process. The initiative is supported particular signifi cance is the variation in support within by an increasing number of states concerned by the European Union (EU), where 22 of its 28 member states the consequences of possession and use of nuclear are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty weapons. Many of these states remain frustrated that Organization. This paper identifi es three groups of states the NPT has been unable to move the nuclear weapon within the EU with regard to the humanitarian initiative: states (NWS) more quickly towards disarmament, (a) drivers of disarmament, (b) guarded supporters, and and this is an ongoing issue in disarmament and (c) nuclear weapon states. It shows that just as this non-proliferation debates. Yet the humanitarian divergence has precluded a strong and unifi ed EU position initiative, while not ignoring the need for disarmament, on nuclear disarmament, so too has it delimited any unifi ed EU support for the initiative. The paper concludes by is a process that goes beyond this long-standing assessing the merits of the humanitarian initiative and its frustration in order to highlight the reality of the implications for EU states, noting the diffi culty of death and devastation that would be incurred in the reconciling strong support for the initiative with a event of a nuclear detonation, whether by accident, continued reliance on nuclear deterrence. miscalculation or design. Stressing the inherent risks and ‘unacceptable humanitarian consequences’ that ABOUT THE AUTHORS would be caused by the ‘immense, uncontrollable Jenny Nielsen is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the destructive capability and indiscriminate nature of School of Political Science and International Studies, these weapons’, the states supporting and engaging University of Queensland. with this initiative are addressing what has been a relatively neglected aspect of nuclear weapons, in a Marianne Hanson is Associate Professor of International 2 number of multilateral diplomatic forums. Relations at the University of Queensland.
1 2010 NPT Review Conference, Final Document, NPT/ CONF.2010/50 (vol. I),
With the initiative’s increasing momentum and society involvement in security debates—has found sophistication, the humanitarian discourse has application in a variety of forums concerned with been placed fi rmly on the non-proliferation and human rights, the responsibility to protect against disarmament agenda through the NPT review process, mass atrocities and war crimes, and broader notions the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First of global justice. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Committee and international conferences sponsored nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime has by key drivers of the initiative (Austria, Mexico now been subjected to examination under this lens. and Norway). However, despite the growth of the Together with the strengthening of international law humanitarian initiative, the states engaged in its and expectations of ‘good governance’, this has meant activities have discernible nuances and varied aims, that the scrutiny of state actions has intensifi ed, and and these require closer analysis. The envisaged that a greater accountability is now placed on states for pathways, the pace of change and the ultimate aims the actions that they take. of the initiative vary among its supporters. This paper Although humanitarian and legal arguments about provides an empirical assessment of the engagement to weapons—fi rst made in 1868 with the St Petersburg date by various European Union (EU) member states Declaration prohibiting the use of exploding bullets, and an analysis of their divergent postures in driving and followed by provisions in the 1899 and 1907 Hague the initiative. It explores the potential strains between Conventions and the 1925 Geneva Protocol—lay mostly states supporting the initiative within the EU and the dormant for several decades, various governments and likely implications of these nuanced postures for the civil society actors have since attempted to incorporate shared vision of nuclear disarmament. humanitarian restrictions more closely into debates on Section II of this paper looks at the origins of the the use of certain weapons.3 These attempts gathered humanitarian initiative and suggests four reasons pace in the 1990s and 2000s. In 2004, for example, the why it has arisen in relation to nuclear weapons at this United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research time. It also provides an overview of recent activities (UNIDIR) launched a project on Disarmament within the initiative. Section III examines the various as Humanitarian Action: Making Multilateral positions taken by EU states. Section IV presents some Negotiations Work.4 The publications that resulted concluding thoughts on the humanitarian initiative and positioned ongoing debates fi rmly within a human an analysis of the views among EU states, suggesting security framework and helped to reorient thinking the likely impact that these will have at the upcoming about these issues in a more grounded and humane 2015 NPT RevCon and for the initiative’s future. way. Today, creative and innovative approaches are being sought to the problems of arms control and II. THE HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE disarmament—long dominated by the more orthodox, zero-sum methods evident during the cold war. Following the 2010 NPT RevCon, the humanitarian Second, there has been a huge increase in civil dimension of nuclear weapon use has been translated society activity within international politics over the into more concrete terms and has drawn support past two decades. Various civil society actors, such from a rapidly growing number of concerned states. as professional groups of scientists, lawyers, and There are four key factors that help to explain why the humanitarian initiative has arisen. 3 The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of First, there has been a more general rise in references Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively to human rights, humanitarianism and human Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Eff ects (CCW Convention, or security issues within international politics. Although ‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention) and its 5 protocols was an attempt to insert elements of humanity into weapon control, but this found not new ideas, it can be argued that concerns about little resonance in international politics at the time and was relatively human rights and humanitarianism have only been ineff ective. It was not until the early 1990s and the clear expression of expressed strongly in the past 25 years or so. This new the taboo against chemical weapons that these considerations emerged attention—from states and driven strongly by civil again strongly. United Nations Treaty Collection,
medical practitioners working in non-governmental also the immediate and long-term implications for the organizations (NGOs), have been a driving force behind environment, socio-economic development, and the the new humanitarian initiative. These actors have economies and health of future generations.8 Instead of made deliberate eff orts to extend the humanitarian focusing on military security issues and calculations— framework—successful in bringing about the 1997 which have typically dominated strategic deterrence Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, assessments—they highlighted human security issues, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and including the inability of states and health authorities on their Destruction (APM Convention) and the 2008 to respond adequately to aff ected populations, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)—to other impacts on food, water and resource security. These areas of debate.5 and subsequent reports suggest that, in addition to the Third, a much wider group of states has been involved many millions dead from initial causes, up to 2 billion in arms control negotiations and decision making than people worldwide would starve as a result of climate was the case during the cold war, when these vital change brought about by even a limited nuclear war. decisions were reserved for the two superpowers, the While it has long been known that nuclear strikes Soviet Union and the United States. The end of the would have catastrophic eff ects, these newer fi ndings cold war period allowed for a more inclusive process of grounded the results in undeniably human terms, negotiations, involving not just the large and powerful driving the humanitarian initiative forward and also states but also small states and many that considered becoming a reinforcing power behind it. themselves activist ‘middle powers’, all now able to The overall conclusions drawn from these reports take their place in multilateral forums. These states and the conferences to date can be summarized as have helped in broadening traditional security debates follows. from predominantly Soviet–US bilateral arms control concerns to a more global focus. This framework was 1. It would be ‘unlikely that any state or international an element in forging the APM Convention and the body could address the immediate humanitarian CCM and was also a factor in building support for emergency’ caused by a nuclear strike ‘in an adequate an Arms Trade Treaty in 2013.6 While these treaties manner and provide suffi cient assistance to those remain limited, with numerous states not yet willing aff ected’. to be constrained by their terms, they do nevertheless 2. The ‘historical experience from the use and testing refl ect a normative input into what were previously of nuclear weapons has demonstrated their devastating restricted dialogues, which had a strategic rather than immediate and long-term eff ects’. humanitarian focus. 3. The ‘eff ects of a nuclear weapon detonation, Fourth, the humanitarian initiative against nuclear irrespective of cause, will not be constrained by weapons has been assisted by the emergence of a national borders, and will aff ect states and people in body of respected scientifi c information on the likely signifi cant ways, regionally as well as globally’.9 environmental, agricultural and health impacts of 8 nuclear weapon use. While some research had been These included Fihn, B. (ed.), Unspeakable Suff ering: The conducted in the 1980s on the eff ects of a ‘nuclear Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (Reaching Critical Will: winter’, and had signalled grim results, from around Geneva, 2013); Helfand, I., International Physicians for the Prevention 2005 new modelling capabilities and the use of highly of Nuclear War (IPPNW), ‘The wider impact: long term eff ects on health, environment and development’, Presentation for the specialized technical measurements resulted in International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), Oslo, forecasts that were more specifi c and detailed than 4 Mar. 2013,
Post-2010 activities boycotted the Oslo conference, there were concerted eff orts to encourage their participation in Nayarit. After the 2010 NPT RevCon there was a concerted Despite this, however, no offi cials from these states and sophisticated eff ort to drive forward the attended. Again, two of the four non-NPT nuclear- humanitarian—rather than the strategic—imperative armed states—India and Pakistan—participated. (It in multilateral discussions on nuclear weapon policy. should be noted that participation and attendance at At the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), these conferences is separate from formal support of a statement stressing the humanitarian dimension the initiative’s joint statements to the NPT and UNGA of nuclear disarmament, led by Switzerland, was First Committee meetings.) backed by 16 states; shortly after that, a statement by The non-participation of the fi ve NPT NWS in these the 2012 UNGA First Committee was supported by 34 conferences has resulted in considerable criticism. Yet states.10 At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, a statement led by these states have expressed the view that a process South Africa gained support from 80 states parties; separated from the NPT would undermine the nuclear and at the 2013 UNGA First Committee, a statement non-proliferation regime, claiming that a focus on led by New Zealand was co-sponsored by 125 states, humanitarianism ‘will divert discussion away from a signifi cant increase from the initial 16 states just practical steps to create conditions for further nuclear a year earlier.11 Notably, a group of 17 states, led by reductions’.13 Russia noted that it already understood Australia, submitted a separate joint statement on the consequences of nuclear detonation and in a the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, statement to the 2014 Conference on Disarmament reaffi rming the New Zealand-led statement but also (CD) its ambassador said that ‘the catastrophic stating that ‘banning nuclear weapons by itself will character and unacceptability of any use of nuclear not guarantee their elimination without engaging weapons is self-evident and requires no further substantively and constructively those states with discussions’.14 Russia further warned that ‘we should nuclear weapons, and recognising both the security not be distracted by the discussion of humanitarian and humanitarian dimensions of the nuclear weapons consequences from the primary goal of creating debate’. 12 This is indicative of the variation in support due conditions for further nuclear reductions’.15 for the humanitarian initiative and the diffi cult Notwithstanding these justifi cations, there has been balancing act faced by supporters of disarmament that considerable disappointment among the non-nuclear nevertheless continue to rely on alliances with the USA weapon states (NNWS) that the NWS have chosen, and extended nuclear deterrence. thus far, to dismiss the humanitarian initiative. The March 2013 Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Oslo, Norway, drew III. EUROPEAN UNION NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT participation from 128 states (including 2 non-NPT AND THE HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE nuclear-armed states, India and Pakistan), and 146 states attended the second Conference on the The engagement of EU member states with the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Nayarit, humanitarian initiative is largely conditioned by the Mexico, in February 2014. As the fi ve NPT NWS had fact that the organization does not have a common policy on nuclear weapon possession and use. Although 10 the EU has a non-proliferation strategy—the 2003 United Nations, General Assembly, First Committee, 67th session, ‘Joint Statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament’, Delivered by Ambassador Benno Laggner of Switzerland, 13 22 Oct. 2012,
EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of why member states engage with the direction that the Mass Destruction—there is no common disarmament humanitarian initiative is taking. position other than a general commitment to ‘the 16 pursuit of nuclear disarmament’. Most activities focus An overview of EU member state engagement overwhelmingly on non-proliferation, rather than on disarmament. Stephen Pullinger and Gerrard Quille EU member state engagement with the humanitarian have argued that nuclear disarmament within the EU initiative has increased since 2012, including through is ‘neglected, presumably to avoid confrontations with the formal support of joint statements at the UNGA the UK and France and to allow the broader agenda First Committee, NPT PrepComs and participation in to move forward’.17 This is not notably diff erent from the initiative’s conferences. Nevertheless, signifi cant other areas where EU states seek to achieve a common divisions remain in terms of support for, and foreign and security policy but often fall short of identifi cation with, the humanitarian initiative. achieving their goal. One analyst observed, over a Table 1 provides an overview of EU member states’ decade ago, that ‘consensus has so far been reached by engagement with the humanitarian initiative’s sidelining the question of disarmament’, making the activities. Out of 28 EU member states, 20 participated EU’s non-proliferation policy ‘partial or even “one- in the Nayarit conference. The 2013 UNGA First sided”’. 18 As in many areas of security, the national, Committee joint statement on the humanitarian rather than the supranational, views prevail. consequences of nuclear weapons, which was Moreover, the signifi cant expansion of the EU in supported by 125 states, included support from the past 10 years has brought a large number of North only 5 EU member states. In contrast, the alternate Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members into its joint statement led by Australia, which affi rmed the fold. In 2003 the EU had 11 NATO members—including importance of both security and humanitarian issues, 2 NWS and 4 states that host NATO’s nuclear included support from 13 EU member states (all of weapons.19 In 2014 the EU has 22 states that are also them NATO members).21 The joint statement to the NATO members and therefore under its nuclear 2013 NPT PrepCom, which was supported by 80 NPT umbrella. This fact alone makes a common and states parties, included support from 6 EU member concerted push for disarmament unlikely to emerge states. The March 2013 Oslo conference, which was from the EU. Additionally, while in 2003 there were 4 attended by 128 states, included participation by 23 EU ‘highly disarmament-minded’ states (Austria, Finland, member states. The 2012 UNGA First Committee joint Ireland and Sweden), these have since been reduced to statement, which was supported by 34 states, included only 2 (Austria and Ireland)—with the other 2 taking support from 4 EU member states. The joint statement a less active role in disarmament in recent years.20 to the 2012 NPT PrepCom, which was supported by These diff erences within the EU clearly aff ect how and 16 NPT states parties, included support from 3 EU member states. The national statements of EU member states to the 16 Bylica, J., Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for Non- NPT review process meetings highlight the nuanced Proliferation and Disarmament, European External Action Service, spectrum of views regarding the humanitarian ‘EU Statement at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for initiative and nuclear disarmament. In contrast to the 2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the the rather bland EU joint statement to the NPT’s Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, United Nations, New York, 29 Apr. 2014. This phrase constituted one reference to disarmament Cluster I discussion, some of the individual statements in the statement. Council of the European Union, ‘Fight against the from EU member states have stressed the urgency proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: EU Strategy against of further progress on the implementation of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 15708/03, 10 Dec. 2003,
Table 1. The humanitarian initiative: EU member state engagement and participation UNGA UNGA NPT UNGA NPT Nayarit 68th 68th PrepCom Oslo 67th PrepCom Event conference session session 2013 conference session 2012 Date of event/ 13–14 Feb. 21 Oct. 21 Oct. 24 Apr. 4–5 Mar. 22 Oct. 2 May statement 2014 2013 2013 2013 2013 2012 2012 Conference host/ New South lead sponsor Mexico Australia Zealand Africa Norway Switzerland Switzerland Statement by Peter Dell Abdul S. Benno Benno Ambassador — Woolcott Higgie Minty — Laggner Laggner Total no. of states engaging/ supporting 146 17 125 80 128 34 16
No. of EU member states engaging/ supporting 20 13 5 6 23 4 3 AustriaX X XXXX Belgiuma XX X Bulgariaa X Croatiaa X Cyprus X X Czech Republica X X Denmarka X X X X X X Estoniaa X X Finland X X X Francea d Germanya c XX X Greecea XX Hungarya XX Irelandb X XXXXX Italya XX X Latviaa XX Lithuaniaa XX Luxembourga XX XX Malta X X X Netherlandsa c XX X Polanda c XX X Portugala XX Romaniaa XX Slovakiaa XX X Sloveniaa XX Spaina XX X Sweden X X X United Kingdoma d aNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bNew Agenda Coalition (NAC) cNon-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) dNon-Proliferation Treaty nuclear weapon state (NPT NWS) the eu and the humanitarian initiative in the 2015 npt review cycle 7
Additional groupings ‘help lower the risk of inadvertent use’.24 The NPDI also stressed that nuclear weapon modernization Some EU member states are also associated with other programmes ‘developing new missions for nuclear groupings within the nuclear non-proliferation regime weapons’ and any ‘further build-up of nuclear arsenals’ that address Article VI issues, including the New would run ‘counter to the obligations under the Agenda Coalition (NAC), the Non-Proliferation and action plan and article VI’.25 Despite this declaratory Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and the NWS. statement criticizing nuclear modernization plans Only one EU member state, Ireland, remains a by the NWS, NATO members of the NPDI and member of the NAC. At the 2014 NPT PrepCom, the Japan continue to ascribe value to extended nuclear NAC submitted a working paper suggesting four deterrence and assurances through their respective options for elaborating a legally binding framework security alliances. There is a clear disconnect and for achieving nuclear disarmament: (a) a nuclear inconsistency between the declaratory NPDI group weapon convention, (b) a nuclear weapon ban treaty, statement in the NPT forums and the individual (c) a framework arrangement of mutually supporting national defence and alliance postures. instruments, or (d) a hybrid arrangement, including all 22 or any of the above options or new elements. Diverging postures Three EU member states—Germany, the Netherlands and Poland—are members of the NPDI. The NPDI Given the varied perspectives on the strategic value submitted a joint working paper to the 2014 NPT of nuclear weapons among EU member states, their PrepCom, emphasizing the issue of de-alerting postures regarding the humanitarian initiative can be nuclear forces and arguing that ‘a lowered operational broadly split into three groups within the EU. readiness for nuclear weapons systems would demonstrate a commitment to reducing the role of 1. Drivers of disarmament. This group contains the nuclear weapons in security and defence doctrines’. 23 more active proponents of the initiative, who seek to The NPDI believes that ‘de-alerting may provide a reaffi rm their abhorrence of nuclear weapons. This much-needed boost to the disarmament eff orts’ and, in group is likely to favour the delegitimization of nuclear line with the humanitarian initiative’s broad aims (and weapons, in the same way that chemical and biological the 2010 NPT Action Plan), stresses that de-alerting weapons have been delegitimized. may ‘help to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons’. 2. Guarded supporters. This group contains the While de-alerting is generally supported by EU more cautious observers of the broad objectives of and NATO member states, progress on this issue has the initiative. They also aim to raise awareness of been relatively slow. Relevant to the humanitarian the consequences of nuclear weapons and wish to initiative, the NPDI highlighted its 2013 ministerial downgrade the salience of nuclear weapons in security statement urging all nuclear-armed states (including doctrines. However, many of these states remain bound those outside the NPT framework) to take steps to US alliances and thus face a diffi cult balancing act towards de-alerting their nuclear forces, as this would in managing their calls for disarmament with their perceived security interests. This group includes four NATO states that formally support the humanitarian 22 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons, initiative’s statements at the multilateral forums. It ‘Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, also includes other NATO states that do not support Working paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.18, 2 Apr. 2014, p. 9,
the initiative’s statements explicitly but do engage with conference in an inclusive manner, building upon the the initiative’s activities, including participation in fi ndings and experience of the conferences held in Oslo the conferences. The group does not believe that the and Nayarit’ because ‘facts-based discussions at the initiative undermines existing multilateral or bilateral international conferences can assist States, together disarmament mechanisms, but it is nevertheless with civil society, in achieving this important result reluctant to be seen as placing undue pressure on its and the goal of the Treaty’.29 NWS allies. Austria has expressed the belief that the 3. Nuclear weapon states. This group contains the humanitarian initiative ‘is essential to change critics of the initiative, the EU NWS, France and the the discourse on nuclear weapons and to move us United Kingdom. forward’.30 At the 2014 NPT PrepCom, it noted that developments, including modernization of nuclear Drivers of disarmament arsenals, were ‘deeply troubling’ and ‘appear to be Among EU member states, Austria and Ireland are indicative of intent by states possessing nuclear currently the two main drivers and active proponents weapons to retain them indefi nitely’.31 Yet Austria of the humanitarian initiative. These states reject contends that the discussions during the Oslo and any strategic value or relevance of nuclear weapons Nayarit conferences ‘underscore a growing support in today’s security environment and consider them to fi rmly anchor the humanitarian imperative in existential threats. the discussions about nuclear weapons and nuclear Scheduled for December 2014, the Austrian disarmament’.32 Government is hosting the Vienna Conference on Ireland, a founding member of the NAC, is another the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (the driver of the humanitarian initiative. In response to initiative’s third international conference). The critics, Ireland has argued that the initiative is ‘fully Austrian Foreign Aff airs Minister, Sebastian Kurz, has compatible with and supportive’ of the NPT. 33 At the stated that ‘nuclear disarmament is a global task and CD, Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister, Eamon Gilmore, a collective responsibility’ and that ‘as a member state argued that the consequences of nuclear detonation committed to the . . . NPT, Austria wants to do its share would be ‘calamitous, unmanageable and immoral’ to achieve the goals of this treaty’.26 Kurz argues that and that ‘the only rational response . . . is prevention, ‘reliance on nuclear weapons is an outdated approach through the elimination of all nuclear weapons’. 34 to security’ and that ‘a concept that is based on the total Further, Gilmore reaffi rmed the ‘consistent position destruction of the planet should have no place in the of successive Irish Governments that nuclear weapons 21st century’.27 can never and will never guarantee the security At the 2014 NPT PrepCom, Austria stressed that of any nation’ and ‘their very existence threatens ‘better awareness of the devastating humanitarian international security’.35 impact and consequences of nuclear weapons builds momentum for the urgency of achieving nuclear 29 disarmament and results in greater understanding NPT Preparatory Committee, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.30 28 of the need to eliminate this risk’. Austria has also (note 28), p. 2, paras 5, 7. 30 explained that it ‘will prepare the third international NPT Preparatory Committee, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.30 (note 28). 31 Kmentt, A., Delegation of Austria, Statement at the Third Session 26 Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of Aff airs, ‘Kurz: “paradigm shift in nuclear disarmament is overdue”, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 13 Feb. 2014,
On behalf of the NAC at the 2014 NPT PrepCom, can accommodate inclusive and urgent discussions for Ireland argued that ‘the bargain at the heart of meeting Article VI’s demand for eff ective measures for the NPT compact is not being honoured’ and disarmament’.42 lamented the ‘continued collective inaction on Guarded supporters nuclear disarmament’.36 The NAC’s working paper off ered various options for ‘eff ective measures’ The guarded supporters of the humanitarian initiative and frameworks to implement Article VI for the among the EU member states broadly and cautiously consideration of all states parties.37 In doing so, engage with the initiative’s activities but maintain the NAC argued that ‘all States, NPT and non-NPT that there are both humanitarian and security States alike, could engage with and join the “eff ective considerations surrounding nuclear weapon policy. measures”’ and ‘the NAC has taken care not to At the 2014 NPT PrepCom, 20 NPT states parties prescribe any one outcome over the others’ as ‘that submitted a joint working paper outlining ‘building is a matter for States to discuss and decide’. 38 This blocks for a world without nuclear weapons’. 43 Of reiterates the fact that the NAC does not believe the those 20 NPT states parties, 15 were EU member humanitarian initiative runs counter to, or in place states.44 The working paper outlined the shared vision of, any existing non-proliferation and disarmament and practical measures for progress towards nuclear measures. However, it has warned that the ‘stalled disarmament. These building-block measures and the pace of nuclear disarmament is placing the NPT under individual national statements made at the PrepCom increasing and intolerable pressure’.39 promote a pragmatic approach to implementing Article Ireland has rhetorically questioned whether VI. The 15 EU member states argue that ‘there will ‘the NPT [is] to become a blueprint for wholesale be no quick fi xes if our goal is eff ective, verifi able and weaponisation or one for achieving and maintaining a irreversible nuclear disarmament’.45 Cognizant of the world without nuclear weapons’, arguing that ‘it is not simmering discontent within the regime and ‘to avoid logical to assert that certain states should be permitted fragmentation of the international community’, these to retain nuclear weapons on the basis of what they say states aim to promote an inclusive process of ‘practical, are legitimate security concerns while simultaneously eff ective and confi dence-building measures’.46 Longer claiming that others cannot cite the same concerns term, the states also acknowledge that a fi nal building as a reason for seeking the weapons’.40 It warns that block in the shape of a disarmament framework this ‘has led to considerable frustration in the wider or a nuclear weapons convention might have to be international community’ and that ‘we cannot simply considered, but that will always be reliant on ‘the keep agreeing plans of action which have no prospect of prevailing environment of trust and confi dence’.47 being implemented’.41 Ireland believes that ‘discussions Broadly consistent with the building-block approach must take place’, although ‘it is not evident . . . how NPT and priorities, 11 of these 15 EU member states were review process mechanisms, as structured at present, also co-sponsors of the alternative statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to the 36 O’Brien, P., Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Ireland 42 to the United Nations, ‘Statement on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition O’Reilly (note 38). 43 at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons, New York, 30 Apr. 2014,
2013 UNGA First Committee.48 The 13 (the 11 states It considers the initiative to be one of ‘a number above plus Latvia and Luxembourg) EU member of encouraging developments’, arguing that ‘the states supporting the alternative joint statement (led discussion on the humanitarian consequences by Australia) argued that nuclear disarmament ‘will . . . can invigorate the drive towards global zero’.54 It require high-level political will by all countries but also expressed the hope that ‘the conference . . . in expectations fall most heavily on the nuclear armed Vienna later this year will strengthen international states’.49 Notably, in this joint statement, the cluster cooperation’.55 of 17 states (including the 13 EU member states) At the 2014 NPT PrepCom, Finland made explicit encouraged all states to participate in the Nayarit reference to the NAC’s working paper that had outlined conference. various frameworks towards disarmament, including a Among the guarded supporters of the initiative, convention, a ban and a hybrid arrangement.56 Finland slight nuances are evident in national statements made stated that it ‘is open to these and other possible options at multilateral forums. Hungary, for example, stated to move towards a world without nuclear weapons’ but that the elimination of nuclear weapons ‘is not a single warned that ‘none of them would bring much added act but has to be a step-by-step, comprehensive process, value if States that actually possess nuclear weapons which fully engages the nuclear weapons states, and, are not involved from the beginning’.57 It believes that at the same time, preserves the integrity of the NPT’. 50 ‘the NPT is well placed to address the humanitarian In doing so, it noted that the ‘devastating humanitarian impact issue’ and argues that states parties ‘should impact of nuclear weapons has to be addressed in aim at enforcing the NPT non-proliferation and this fashion as well’.51 The Czech Republic similarly disarmament regime’.58 Finland reaffi rmed the merit noted that ‘it is important that on the way to achieving and value of the humanitarian initiative’s activities, the fi nal goal of a world free of nuclear weapons the and welcomed statements on the issue to ‘serve as humanitarian dimension has been recognised as set out discussion points forward’.59 Although it noted that in the Action Plan’.52 The Netherlands also highlighted ‘some contributions to the debate . . . show that diff erent the ‘great importance for the NPT process’ of the goals and discourses are not exclusive’, Finland upholds humanitarian dimension, stressing that ‘together that ‘through dialogue and with open mind we will with the security dimension, the humanitarian issue extend the common ground’.60 underpins all our practical and sustained eff orts aimed At the Nayarit conference, Germany stressed that at achieving the shared goal’ of nuclear disarmament.53 ‘everything should be done to further strengthen the “nuclear taboo”’.61 Cautioning that ‘implementing
48 . . . [the 2010 NPT] Action Plan is not done overnight’, The 11 co-sponsor states were Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, it stressed that ‘progress requires maintaining a Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. dialogue with the Nuclear Weapon States’ and that 49 See table 1. United Nations (note 12), p. 1. ‘as important as the humanitarian dimension is, there 50 Molnar, G., Director General for Security Policy and Non- is also a security dimension to nuclear weapons’.62 proliferation, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, ‘Statement at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Germany also observed that nuclear weapons ‘have Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, New York, 2 May 2014,
greatly contributed to preventing armed confl ict unilateral’.69 Relevant to such reinforcing eff orts, it between the NATO-Alliance and the Warsaw Pact’ and noted that ‘a focus on such an approach foresees the argued that the analogy between a nuclear weapon possibility of parallel and simultaneous measures’.70 convention and the Ottawa process on banning Slovenia’s more critical view of the initiative argued landmines ‘is not a convincing one’, because landmines, that ‘the rhetoric on the immediate and categorical ‘unlike nuclear weapons, never played a central role ban of nuclear weapons or weapons linked to nuclear in the international system’.63 Germany did concede technology is not constructive and will not bring us any that ‘at some point in time on the way down to Zero closer to nuclear disarmament’.71 a Nuclear Weapons Convention will be negotiated’, Spain, for its part, suggested that ‘the best way but cautioned that ‘pressing forward without the to obtain real progress’ was ‘to negotiate within Nuclear Weapon States today is not the best strategy the multilateral framework of the United Nations’, for tangible progress’.64 Furthermore, it warned although it is not clear exactly what this might entail or that ‘it might rather antagonize important players how it diff ers from the existing NPT process.72 and thereby, against our best intentions, negatively Sweden—characterized as a ‘champion of impinge on the implementation of the NPT, the NPT disarmament in decline’—supported the alternative Action Plan and on the [RevCon]’.65 At the 2014 NPT joint statement at the 2013 NPT PrepCom. It has PrepCom, Germany stated that while it remains ‘fi rmly been noted that in Sweden ‘since the center-right committed to its obligations as a member of [NATO] government took offi ce in 2006, advocacy of nuclear . . . it is resolved to help create the conditions for a world disarmament has paled in comparison with non- without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals proliferation eff orts’. 73 Furthermore, analysts have of the NPT’.66 suggested that ‘whereas in the past Sweden acted Slovakia has stressed that the ‘humanitarian as an advocate for the non-aligned states, joining in dimension certainly underpins the Treaty and their call for the elimination of nuclear weapons and adds to reasons why we need to move the NPT a balanced interpretation of NPT norms, nowadays process forward’, as ‘an important element of Sweden focuses on preventing W[eapons of] M[ass] complex discourse on nuclear disarmament and D[estruction] proliferation jointly with its EU non-proliferation which includes humanitarian and partners’.74 Given its strong legacy of promoting security considerations’.67 However, it maintained that nuclear disarmament in the NPT review process (as ‘a substantive and constructive engagement of nuclear a member of the NAC in the 2000 NPT review cycle), armed states’ is required and that ‘their participation some suggest that Swedish ‘disarmament idealism has is crucial . . . as the ban itself may not guarantee given way to pragmatism’.75 Consistent with this policy elimination of nuclear arsenals’.68 Reiterating shift, Sweden left the NAC in 2013. However, it did support for the NPT building-block joint working associate itself with the NPDI working paper on non- paper, Slovakia argued that ‘eff ective disarmament will require mutually reinforcing building blocks 69 Ružička (note 67), p. 1. 70 that are multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral as well as Ružička (note 67), p. 1. 71 Logar, A., Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the 63 Germany (note 61). Republic of Slovenia to the United Nations, ‘Statement at the Third 64 Germany (note 61). Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference 65 Germany (note 61). of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 66 Biontino, M., Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Weapons’, New York, 2 May 2014,
strategic nuclear weapons at the 2013 NPT PrepCom.76 ‘the solution is self-evident: a world without nuclear Sweden, a non-NATO state, is ‘one of the few EU states weapons’, in line with its pragmatic posture it argued persistently calling for the disarmament of tactical that ‘however much we may wish to make short-cuts nuclear weapons on European soil’.77 It also raised this on that route, there are none’.83 Furthermore, it issue at the 2014 NPT PrepCom and called on the NWS cautioned that ‘the road ahead will be cumbersome’ to ‘make further deeper reduction in their arsenals and ‘countries that possess nuclear weapons will need of nuclear weapons—strategic and non-strategic, to come to the conclusion that national, regional and deployed and non-deployed—in order to fulfi l their international security will be better served without obligations under the NPT’.78 nuclear weapons’.84 (Following the 2014 Swedish Following the 2013 NPT PrepCom, Swedish Foreign general election and a new Social Democratic-led Minister Carl Bildt was criticized by civil society coalition government, Sweden’s posture towards the groups for reportedly dismissing the joint statement humanitarian initiative is likely to shift to one of strong on the humanitarian initiative by referring to it as support.) ‘no big deal’ and to the 80 co-sponsors as ‘not really Cyprus, Denmark and Malta have formally supported serious states’.79 Bildt also claimed that a ban on the joint statements of the humanitarian initiative nuclear weapons at this time was unrealistic ‘placard in the NPT review process and at the UNGA First politics’ that ‘will not get any response by the serious Committee. Denmark is the only EU member state that powers’, arguing that ‘we strive for a world free from has continuously supported all of the joint statements nuclear weapons but that world is relatively far away, of the initiative (NPT PrepCom and UNGA First therefore we need to achieve what is achievable’.80 Committee, 2012 and 2013).85 In its statement to the At the 2014 NPT PrepCom, Sweden reiterated this 2014 NPT PrepCom, Denmark warned that ‘we should position, stressing that ‘negotiations on nuclear never lose sight of the catastrophic and unacceptable disarmament, in order to be eff ective, have to include humanitarian consequences should nuclear weapons those countries that possess nuclear weapons’ and that ever be used’.86 Although it has supported the ‘it also seems necessary that such negotiations address initiative’s statements to date, Denmark was one of 20 both humanitarian and security-related aspects’.81 It states also supporting the building-block joint working noted that ‘old postures and alert levels largely remain paper.87 Luxembourg displayed a less consistent as they did during the Cold War, as does the reliance pattern of support for the humanitarian initiative. on nuclear deterrence’.82 While Sweden agreed that While it supported the initiative’s statement at the 2013 NPT PrepCom, Luxembourg did not support the
76 initiative’s statement later that year at the UNGA First Hultgård, A. M., Deputy Director-General and Acting Head of the Committee, preferring instead to join the alternative Department for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Swedish Ministry 88 for Foreign Aff airs, ‘Statement by Sweden at the Second Session of the statement led by Australia. Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference to the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, Geneva, 22 Nuclear weapon states Apr. 2013,
NPT NWS in the EU, France and the UK, continue to humanitarian initiative is relevant and applicable to all state that the humanitarian initiative’s activities are a NWS, regardless of NPT membership.) diversion ‘from the practical steps required to create At the 2014 NPT PrepCom, France similarly stressed the conditions for further nuclear weapons reductions’ that the gradual step-by-step pathway to disarmament and criticize the initiative as a departure from the ‘is the only eff ective approach, and it is the approach Action Plan.89 In March 2013 the UK expressed refl ected in the 2010 Action Plan, which was adopted concern ‘that the Oslo event will divert attention and by consensus’. 95 It argued that ‘some recent initiatives discussion away from what has been proven to be the disregard the real strategic context; they turn away most eff ective means of reducing nuclear dangers—a from concrete measures; they focus on dogmatic practical, step-by-step approach that includes all those approaches and create parallel forums for discussion’, who hold nuclear weapons’, arguing that ‘only in this which ‘merely undermine the Action Plan and the way could we realistically achieve a world without NPT review process’.96 Highlighting the strategic nuclear weapons’.90 Furthermore, the UK warned that value of nuclear weapons, France further explained ‘we are half way through the fi ve-year cycle but some that ‘it applied the principle of strict suffi ciency, i.e. appear already to have abandoned the Action Plan, it maintains its arsenal at the lowest possible level convening alternative processes which will divide the compatible with the strategic context’.97 international community’.91 The UK, meanwhile, stressed that it is ‘deeply At the September 2013 UN High Level Meeting on concerned at the humanitarian consequences which Nuclear Disarmament, a joint statement by three NPT could result from the use of nuclear weapons’ and that NWS—France, the UK and the USA—further confi rmed it would continue to do its ‘utmost to prevent their these views on the humanitarian initiative. 92 The joint use’.98 Nevertheless, at the 2014 NPT PrepCom, the statement lamented that ‘while we are encouraged UK voiced its concern about the initiative’s aim to by the increased energy and enthusiasm around the delegitimize nuclear weapons’ possession and clearly nuclear disarmament debate, we regret that this did not want to see a ban on nuclear weapons. It energy is being directed toward initiatives such as the articulated that High-Level Meeting, the humanitarian consequences campaign, the Open-Ended Working Group and the much of the humanitarian initiative has not, push for a Nuclear Weapons Convention’.93 The three however, been focused on the consequences of NWS argued that ‘this energy would have much the use of nuclear weapons. It is focused instead better eff ect if channeled toward existing processes, on asserting that nuclear weapons per se are helping to tackle blockages and making progress in inherently unacceptable, a view we do not share. the practical, step-by-step approach that includes all We consider that nuclear weapons have helped to states that possess nuclear weapons’.94 (It should be guarantee our security, and that of our allies, for noted, however, that not all states that possess nuclear decades. We want a world without them, but we weapons are subject to the step-by-step approach: need to proceed to it carefully. The right political India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan, as non-NPT NWS, are problematic in this regard. In contrast, the
95 Simon-Michel, J.-H., Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, Head of the French 89 Burt (note 13). Delegation, ‘Statement at the Third Session of the Preparatory 90 Adamson, J., British Permanent Representative to the Conference Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the on Disarmament, ‘Statement on nuclear disarmament’, Geneva, 5 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, New York, 2 Mar. 2013,
and security conditions for an outright ban on The humanitarian initiative provides an important nuclear weapons do not yet exist.99 additional forum for discussion
In the context of mounting discontent among NPT IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 2015 NPT REVCON AND states parties regarding the lack of fulfi lment of BEYOND disarmament commitments, the humanitarian initiative— with careful management—could channel This paper has addressed a number of points this discontent into a positive forum for engagement concerning the impact and evolution of the and dialogue. A clear benefi t to many states supporting humanitarian initiative in general, and the EU position the initiative is that it provides a voice for those states in particular. This section summarizes the key points that do not rely on nuclear weapons for their security. and outlines the implications for the 2015 NPT RevCon For these states, the humanitarian initiative’s focus and the future of the initiative. detaches emphasis from the strategic construct and discourse that surrounds deterrence policy The humanitarian initiative is not competing with the and doctrines on nuclear weapons. To the cautious NPT process supporters, however, the extent to which this discussion can fully detach itself from the security The present authors believe that, on balance, the considerations and value ascribed to nuclear weapons humanitarian initiative is a positive development in in today’s security environment remains problematic. the search for a safer world. This initiative is not a The initiative is useful as cross-regional and competing process or a diversion from the existing cross-grouping support for humanitarian concerns disarmament (step-by-step ‘P5 process’) and arms within both the NPT review process and the broader control (bilateral USA–Russia strategic reduction non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. With process) eff orts.100 the deadlock at the CD, the conferences on the The initiative’s activities can coexist as a layered humanitarian initiative can serve as discussion approach to complement progress on the disarmament forums for participating states and provide useful non- pillar of the NPT and the broader regime. Similar to binding settings for dialogue on these salient issues. the multilayered approach to the non-proliferation Importantly, the initiative’s associated conferences to pillar and its aims, which include the Nuclear Security date have shown that it is possible to engage at least two Summit process, the Proliferation Security Initiative of the non-NPT states (India and Pakistan) in dialogue (PSI), UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and UN on nuclear weapons, away from the formal confi nes sanctions, the regime’s disarmament goal can be and political stages of the CD and the UNGA First complemented with the addition of humanitarian Committee. concerns and the corresponding determination to avoid Moreover, the humanitarian initiative is applicable to a nuclear strike. the causes of both disarmament and non-proliferation. The initiative seeks to facilitate dialogue among In fact, there is no reason why the humanitarian participants and should not be seen as a competitor to arguments could not also be marshalled in support the existing NPT process. Even the main proponents of the nuclear safety and nuclear security summits of the initiative do not suggest that the NPT should currently under way and led by the USA. The formal be downgraded or neglected. This fi rm adherence to declarations and affi rmations by states parties in the the goals and spirit of the NPT will be an important NPT review process and in the UNGA First Committee element in the search for a nuclear weapon-free world. could serve as confi dence-building measures, confi rming the declaratory views of states with regard to nuclear weapon use, as well as reaffi rming the urgent need to prevent unauthorized or accidental detonations.
99 Rowland (note 98), para. 8. 100 The P5 are the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council. the eu and the humanitarian initiative in the 2015 npt review cycle 15
The humanitarian initiative is evolving as a mechanism delegitimized or ‘outlawed’ (while many states still for delegitimizing nuclear weapons possessed them), it is hoped that a legal codifi cation would establish a customary norm to help move states The process of attempting to delegitimize nuclear towards a nuclear weapon-free world. weapons has been under way for at least two decades A nuclear weapon convention, on the other hand, and the humanitarian initiative is just one way of is seen as a much more distant goal. It would be an consolidating these eff orts. Various NGOs have instrument that required the active participation been instrumental in this regard, sparking concern, of the NWS and would entail clear monitoring and especially among the NWS, about the participation verifi cation processes. At the point when the NWS by civil society groups (which tend to advocate a ban agreed to move to elimination, such a convention on nuclear weapons) at the international conferences. would serve as the legal mechanism associated with Many civil society organizations and disarmament disarmament. advocacy groups envisage the conferences as well as The issue of a ban treaty is likely to be a signifi cant the broader humanitarian initiative as a fast track one for the future of the humanitarian initiative. to delegitimizing nuclear weapon possession. Some The drivers of disarmament might welcome it, but it states are concerned by this powerful and passionate might not be well received by the cautious supporters marketing—and arguably re-branding—of the (although it might yet prove palatable to some, given initiative. that it does not entail the conditions of a nuclear Nevertheless, considering the rapid growth of state weapon convention). If the humanitarian initiative support for the humanitarian initiative, and given is seen to be pushing an agenda for a nuclear weapon the level of frustration felt at the slow progress on convention, it is unlikely to receive widespread support, disarmament made by the NWS in their step-by-step if only for the fact that most believe—correctly—that process, it is possible that some supporters of the a convention would require the active involvement of humanitarian initiative would favour a nuclear the NWS. However, it would appear that proponents weapon ban treaty. Many NPT states supporting and of the humanitarian initiative are well aware of driving the momentum of the humanitarian initiative this distinction. At the Nayarit conference, the agree with the aims of delegitimizing and eventually Chair stated that ‘in the past, weapons have been banning nuclear weapons—this development appears eliminated after they have been outlawed’.101 More to be comfortably housed within the initiative. A ban controversially, he suggested that the discussion on treaty is seen not only as practically achievable, but the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should also as something that should not necessarily ‘ruffl e ‘lead to the commitment of States and civil society to the feathers’ of the NWS and their allies (although it reach new international standards and norms, through is likely still to be resisted by them). It is thus looking a legally binding instrument’, which ‘should comprise like a plausible development that would perform a clear a specifi c timeframe . . . and a clear and substantive legal delegitimization of nuclear weapons—something framework’.102 that does not yet exist explicitly within international Whatever the intention, clarity about future law. directions can only help in the process of seeking A ban treaty should not, however, be confused with a world without nuclear weapons. Given the wide a nuclear weapon convention—something less likely spectrum of aims and perspectives and the evolving to gain support. A ban treaty aims to codify nuclear nature of the initiative, the external messaging and weapons as unacceptable weapons in warfare—in the communications have caused some misperceptions same way that chemical weapons were stigmatized and ambiguity. Whether the initiative is perceived from the 1920s and that landmines and cluster to be leaning towards a nuclear weapon ban or munitions have been delegitimized. A ban treaty convention is likely to be a factor when states decide on would call for an end to the production, stockpiling participation in the upcoming Vienna conference, the and transfer of nuclear weapons. It would be open to any state that agreed with this view and function to strengthen the existing taboo against nuclear weapons 101 Chair’s Summary, Second Conference on the Humanitarian and their use. Crucially, it would not require the NWS Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Nayarit, Mexico, 14 Feb. 2014,
initiative’s future activities and formal statements at disarmament threaten the integrity of the NPT.104 the multilateral forums. Furthermore, it is possible that the 2015 NPT RevCon could become the moment when the constructive Engagement by the NWS could contribute to ambiguities, as some see them, on nuclear disarmament facilitating a harmonious 2015 NPT RevCon from previous review conferences’ fi nal documents are replaced with clarity: that nuclear weapon The NPT NWS decided, collectively, not to attend states are not prepared to accept the non-nuclear either the Oslo conference or the Nayarit conference. weapon states’ view of the urgency and necessity of While it was predictable that the NWS would resist this nuclear disarmament and will continue to argue for a initiative, given the importance of the upcoming 2015 so-called step-by-step approach, irrespective of how NPT RevCon and the charged atmosphere likely to unpromising or implausible this approach may be.105 prevail there, these states are losing an opportunity to Indeed, as Ireland (and other NNWS) recently voiced exercise constructive diplomacy and be seen as willing at the 2014 NPT PrepCom, patience is wearing thin partners in a global commitment to the eradication of and the credibility of the regime is in question. Even nuclear weapons. By using dismissive terms to describe as the NWS have chosen to take refuge in the Action the initiative, such as ‘distracting’, and by insisting on Plan, urging states to focus on that process rather than what they term ‘realistic priorities’, the image they on the humanitarian one, to date they themselves have collectively portray is one of scepticism and distance. shown only limited compliance with the requirements This, in turn, has only served to convince many NNWS of the plan. Nevertheless, while many NNWS have that the NWS are not taking their disarmament warned that they would not be happy with a simple obligations seriously. Their aloof response, and also ‘rolling over’ of the 2010 Action Plan in 2015, there their absence at the Open-Ended Working Group, seems little else that they can do to force a move suggests a concern that the initiative will gain further towards disarmament. Notwithstanding this, pressure momentum and become the formal start of a process to lies on the NWS to engage—or at least be perceived delegitimize nuclear weapons. as engaging—more genuinely with the demands of Clearly, the NWS prefer to manage the direction and the NNWS and with civil society. Some warn that ‘if focus of disarmament within their own self-designated nuclear-weapon states want to halt an erosion of the ‘P5 process’.103 Nevertheless, their bloc behaviour and treaty, they need to take the views and expectations of apparent NWS solidarity in resisting the humanitarian non-nuclear-weapon states on nuclear disarmament initiative is unhelpful in setting a positive tone for much more seriously’, and that ‘the tactics of playing multilateral diplomacy. It has led to criticism by some for time . . . will not work for much longer’.106 NNWS and adds fuel to the more hard-line arguments In order to improve the atmosphere of the promoted by civil society. The NWS could, for example, disarmament and non-proliferation regime, it would be readily contribute to humanitarian impact discussions benefi cial if the NWS (or any one of them) participate at the initiative’s conferences by sharing their research in the December 2014 Vienna conference in some and insights on emergency and disaster response capacity. The most detrimental behaviour would be a preparedness and capacity, or even on disarmament bloc approach to decision making on participation by verifi cation. However, they might fi nd it diffi cult to the NWS—as witnessed for the 2013 Oslo conference. participate in conferences that lead to ‘uncomfortable’ Such NWS solidarity would almost certainly have conclusions about the inability of states or institutions negative implications for the 2015 NPT RevCon. If the to address the consequences of nuclear use and the NWS decide not to participate—which may be likely— associated risks of possession. they could try to mitigate the discontent through other It has been argued that the divergent and confl icting gestures ahead of the 2015 NPT RevCon. views on the urgency and pathways to nuclear The sixth P5 conference, to be hosted in London in 2015, will probably need to fi nd a strategy for addressing the frustration of the NNWS and the
103 US Department of State, ‘Joint Statement on the P5 Beijing 104 Kmentt, A. ‘How divergent views on nuclear disarmament Conference: Enhancing Strategic Confi dence and Working Together to threaten the NPT’, Arms Control Today, vol. 43, no. 10 (Dec. 2013). Implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Outcomes’, 15 Apr. 105 Kmentt (note 104). 2014,
perceived credibility defi cit relating to Article assessment, the EU still does not have a common VI commitments ahead of the RevCon. Further nuclear disarmament strategy. transparency in the form of NWS reporting on This has resulted in what Francesca Giovannini implementation and the release of updated information has called ‘modest positions, timid decisions and on nuclear weapon stockpiles (as off ered by the USA compromised policies’, due to ‘both institutional in 2012 and 2014) are positive measures. Establishing defi ciencies and acute political disagreements among a conference on the Middle East WMD-free zone [EU] member-states’.109 Somewhat more disturbing is proposal would also be benefi cial. However, whether the 1998 claim that expanded membership in the EU such steps by the NWS are conducive enough to has, with a few exceptions, ‘come to mean embracing foster consensus building for the adoption of a Final NATO’s pro-nuclear posture’, resulting in ‘the NATO- Document at the 2015 RevCon, in light of the voiced ization of EU foreign and defence policies’.110 Certainly, discontent by many NNWS, remains debatable. NATO’s nuclear posture has been amended since Additionally, whether a 2015 RevCon Final Document these claims were made, but it remains true that the would include language on the humanitarian enlargement of both the EU and NATO has resulted in consequences of nuclear weapons—and to what more states within the EU that, at best, are ‘guarded extent—is uncertain. supporters’ of disarmament—mindful of NATO alliance The humanitarian initiative has been described constraints. as a train on which the NWS are not on board.107 To Without a common position on nuclear disarmament, take this analogy further, the train could be described the EU is unlikely to be able to act as a cohesive and as having two carriages, one holding the drivers of eff ective negotiating bloc within the NPT review disarmament and the other the cautious supporters. process. Although the EU genuinely aspires to be such Broad support is one of the initiative’s key strengths, a bloc at the NPT conferences, developments during but if nuances are not carefully managed, the carriages the crucial fi nal stages outpace the EU machinery’s might separate. It is also important that the NWS show capacity, resulting in what are, ultimately, national that they are willing to board this train; by failing to positions on the Final Document. Presenting an EU engage with the humanitarian initiative, these states common position on the various NPT issues seems are sending a negative message to the rest of the to be most eff ective during the fi rst two weeks of the regime. RevCons, during the General Debate and Cluster discussions, when joint statements are delivered What are the implications for the EU? (together with the very distinct national statements). However, the end result tends to be that competing The EU has never had a unifi ed policy on nuclear views among member states lead to severely disarmament, other than a general commitment compromised joint EU statements or that national towards this goal. In 2003 Clara Portela warned that statements are issued which eff ectively negate the joint the EU needed to ‘devise a credible strategy to promote statements—or both. nuclear disarmament’, because ‘in the mid-term, It has been argued that, given the diversity of getting serious about non-proliferation while putting membership, the EU can be a useful microcosm for disarmament aside will diminish the credibility of the consensus negotiations in the NPT review process. EU and even accentuate the perception of Western Camille Grand has notably contended that the EU “nuclear hypocrisy” among Third World countries’.108 acts as a ‘laboratory for consensus’, eff ectively laying Although the two EU NWS, France and the UK, have ‘the fi rst stone of this consensus-building process’ made progress and practical contributions towards and can ‘provide a lot of the ideas and language’ for a implementing arsenal reductions since Portela’s Final Document. 111 Ahead of the 2010 NPT RevCon, he
109 Giovannini, F. ‘A soon-to-be global nuclear leader? The European 107 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Nuclear Union in global nuclear politics’, FSI News, Stanford University, 19 Disarmament (Multilateral, bilateral and humanitarian initiative)’, Feb. 2013,
argued that the EU ‘can certainly achieve a reasonable any push to delegitimize nuclear weapons will have degree of common understanding of where it wants to implications for the 22 of its member states that are also go and play a role in leading the conference towards a members of NATO. Some NNWS, including the EU’s successful outcome’.112 Furthermore, Grand noted that guarded supporters, would not be willing to go that ‘the bitter intra-EU debates and the real divisions that far—not yet, at least. Bearing in mind that some of the will remain should not prevent the EU from playing an states formally supporting the humanitarian initiative active role’, emphasizing that ‘EU countries do share are NATO member states, and that nuclear weapons 95 percent of the agenda even when it comes to the remain ‘a core component’ of the alliance’s ‘overall details’.113 capabilities for deterrence and defense’, this could have It has been noted that ‘individual members a considerable impact.119 The 2012 NATO Chicago dissatisfi ed with EU compromises on disarmament Summit reaffi rmed the results of NATO’s Deterrence have, by contrast, pursued national justice claims and Defence Posture Review, stating that the alliance through stronger demands for disarmament is ‘committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of measures in other groupings in parallel with their nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities EU engagement, notably Ireland and Sweden in the for deterrence and defence’.120 If the humanitarian New Agenda Coalition in 2000 and 2010’. 114 This has initiative is to have longevity and continued broad continued to be the case in the 2015 review cycle. support from NATO states—and to gain support from Nevertheless, the EU has been involved in placing ‘sub- other states that are under extended nuclear deterrence strategic’ (theatre) nuclear weapons in the NPT review arrangements—it will have to resolve the incongruity process discourse. This occurred in 2000, when the of advocating that ‘nuclear weapons are never used Final Document incorporated language from the EU’s again, under any circumstances’, while at the same Common Position.115 It was repeated in 2010, when a time living under a nuclear umbrella.121 Proponents of request for including theatre nuclear weapons in the the humanitarian initiative will also have to carefully arms reductions process was indirectly recognized in manage its external messaging and communications the Final Document, as ‘nuclear weapons of all types strategy in order to avoid any blurred lines or and locations’.116 Recent joint statements by the EU, misperceptions regarding the initiative’s aims. such as to the 2013 UN High Level Meeting on Nuclear Second, the uneven EU position on the humanitarian Disarmament, continue to stress the issue of theatre initiative could have signifi cant eff ects on its role as a nuclear weapons in Europe and a commitment to ‘norm entrepreneur’. This is where the EU is perceived treaty-based disarmament.117 The EU joint statement as wielding ‘soft’ negotiating and mediation power to this meeting affi rmed the ‘P5 process’ meetings and being able to engage in international politics and encouraged Russia and the USA to ‘include non- with other states, groupings and regions as a more strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of their ‘honest broker’ than large states, such as the USA. bilateral nuclear arms reduction’.118 Intergovernmental organizations, such as the EU, can There are two key ways in which the mixed act as norm entrepreneurs, but it has been argued that interaction of EU member states with the humanitarian ‘diff ering organizational structures and mandates initiative could have important ramifi cations. First, and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of their membership decide to what degree they can realize this potential’.122 Assessing the EU’s contribution as a norm Conference, Chaillot Paper 120 (Institute for Security Studies: Paris, 2010), p. 24. entrepreneur, scholars have concluded that ‘nuclear 112 Grand (note 111). policy is the hard card’, particularly ‘heterogeneity 113 Grand (note 111). 114 (NWS versus NNWS, NATO members versus neutral Müller, H., Below, A. and Wisotzki, S., ‘Beyond the state: nongovernmental organizations, the European Union, and the United parties) . . . yet norm entrepreneurship remains visible Nations’, eds Müller and Wunderlich (note 73), p. 313. 115 119 Müller, Below and Wisotzki (note 114), p. 312. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Deterrence and Defence 116 Müller, Below and Wisotzki (note 114), p. 312. Posture Review’, Press release, 20 May 2012,
and, occasionally, eff ective’.123 It has been noted that support for and engagement with the initiative—one of in the NPT review process, ‘agreeing on a Common its credibility factors—will be tested. Position in the run-up to the 2005 NPT RevCon was 124 diffi cult . . . but nevertheless possible’. Harald Müller, ABBREVIATIONS Alexis Below and Simone Wisotzki have argued that the EU’s performance ‘was mixed at best’, as ‘the CD Conference on Disarmament internal divisions of the EU mirrored the diff erences CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy on the global stage’. According to them, the result was EEAS European External Action Service that ‘the EU appeared less dynamic and weak as an NAC New Agenda Coalition actor’, with France, especially, ‘pursuing its interests NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a nuclear weapons state, while other EU members NGO Non-governmental organization remained passive’.125 With many non-Western states NNWS Non-nuclear weapon state(s) looking to the EU to provide a more sympathetic ear to NPDI Non-Proliferation and Disarmament their grievances than the USA, for example, there is an Initiative expectation that the EU can provide the forcefulness NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty of a unifi ed approach to disarmament. The reality of NWS Nuclear weapon state(s) the uneven approach by EU member states leads to PrepCom Preparatory Committee disappointment and creates tension, particularly for RevCon Review Conference states from the Non-Aligned Movement and the NAC. UNGA United Nations General Assembly Given the spectrum of interests and views that prevail, it is unlikely that the EU can show a common posture on the humanitarian initiative in the NPT forum. Any consensus on the initiative would probably be reduced to a reference merely acknowledging the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. In terms of supporting the humanitarian initiative and nuclear disarmament, therefore, the EU remains weak in comparison to other regional and cross-regional groupings operating in the NPT review process. Whatever support is present is subject to the shifts in domestic governments’ policies towards these issues (e.g. as seen in Norway and Sweden). Yet most important is the simple fact that the diverse composition of the EU precludes a strong, unifi ed support base for the humanitarian initiative. The initiative’s aims and activities, and how these are managed, will undoubtedly have implications for how states will engage with it in the 2020 NPT review process. As these aims and activities further evolve and formalize, those states that rely on extended nuclear deterrence through security alliances or bilateral security assurances will eventually have to assess the compatibility of such defence postures and engagement with the initiative. At that point, the broad and diverse
123 Müller, Below and Wisotzki (note 114), p. 325. 124 Müller, Below and Wisotzki (note 114), p. 311–12. 125 Müller, Below and Wisotzki (note 114), p. 311–12. EU NON-PROLIFERATION CONSORTIUM The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks
A EUROPEAN NETWORK
In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to create a network bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centres from across the EU to FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH encourage political and security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to combat the FRS is an independent research centre and the leading proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and French think tank on defence and security issues. Its team of their delivery systems. experts in a variety of fi elds contributes to the strategic debate in France and abroad, and provides unique expertise STRUCTURE across the board of defence and security studies. http://www.frstrategie.org The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium is managed jointly by four institutes entrusted with the project, in close cooperation with the representative of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy. The four institutes are the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) in Paris, the Peace Research PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN FRANKFURT Institute in Frankfurt (PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and Stockholm PRIF is the largest as well as the oldest peace research International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The institute in Germany. PRIF’s work is directed towards Consortium began its work in January 2011 and forms the carrying out research on peace and confl ict, with a special core of a wider network of European non-proliferation emphasis on issues of arms control, non-proliferation and think tanks and research centres which will be closely disarmament. associated with the activities of the Consortium. http://www.hsfk.de
MISSION
The main aim of the network of independent non- proliferation think tanks is to encourage discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC destruction and their delivery systems within civil society, STUDIES particularly among experts, researchers and academics. The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to IISS is an independent centre for research, information and conventional weapons. The fruits of the network debate on the problems of confl ict, however caused, that discussions can be submitted in the form of reports and have, or potentially have, an important military content. It recommendations to the responsible offi cials within the aims to provide the best possible analysis on strategic trends European Union. and to facilitate contacts. It is expected that this network will support EU action to http://www.iiss.org/ counter proliferation. To that end, the network can also establish cooperation with specialized institutions and research centres in third countries, in particular in those with which the EU is conducting specifi c non-proliferation dialogues. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL http://www.nonproliferation.eu PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into confl ict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. http://www.sipri.org/
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