The Struggle Over the Future of Iraq

2 33 ed ed orts to turn the on the army and -Abadi proclaimed slamic State, many ing the efforts that ritorial integrity and including Mosul, the e attacks in the capital capital the in attacks e rop in the number of adi, has entered “the and after many forecasts forecasts many after and y 2018 has already risen in in risen already has 2018 y Beyond the achievement 1 ation of parts of the country country the of parts of ation

Eldad Shavit and Beyond Against this background, military operations conduct operations military background, this Against 3 | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq: of Iraq: the Future Struggle over The Looking to the Parliamentary Elections the Parliamentary to Looking Yet notwithstanding Yet the territorial defeat of the I The Iraqi leadership can now focus on advancing eff

ategic Assessment ategic

Background Background OnIraqi DecemberPrime 9,Minister 2017, Haider al liber the following State, Islamic the over victory that hadsince been2014 held by the organization, country’s second largest city. Iraq, declared al-Ab stage after the victory over the Islamic State.” State, Islamic the over victory this by represented credited be can al-Abadi state, Iraqi the of dissolution and collapse the of with success, both inside and outside Iraq, in lead have made it possible to maintain the country’s ter strengthen Iraqi state frameworks, with an emphasis other security elements. within and and without Iraq continue to support the group ideologically, weakening the to due Although threat. viable a remains terrorism Islamic of the Islamic State,witnessed 2017 a 50 percent d people killed in terrorist attacks throughout Iraq in comparison to 2016, Januar in attacks in killed civilians of number the thes of many with month, previous the to comparison Baghdad. of city held strongholds additional cleanse to Iraq throughout forces security by by the Islamic State continue unabated. while directing attention and resources to page and begin a new chapter, INSS. at fellow is a research Shavit Eldad (res.) Col. S

5 ) to run together in in together run to ) displaced persons raditional internal 6 led for May 12, 2018 2018 12, May for led cautious optimism in Iraq and analyzing analyzing and Iraq in rted by leading Shiite Shiite leading by rted genda that takes into ion (who in practice belong belong practice in (who

date). Rather, it surveys it Rather, date). 7 n polls conducted in Iraq Iraq in conducted polls n d by internal division and and division internal by d coalition that will advance advance will that coalition s. In previous months, the the months, previous In s. he ability of Shiite, Sunni, Sunni, Shiite, of ability he ring the extensive damage damage extensive the ring e nature of Iranian and US US and Iranian of nature e resident and former Prime Prime former and resident and reducing the inﬂuence of 4 | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ

LDAD SHAVIT E This article does not presume to predict the outcome of the elections The general parliamentary elections that are schedu are that elections parliamentary general The Prime Minister al-Abadi failed in his attempt to lead the Shiite parties Shiite the lead to attempt his in failed al-Abadi Minister Prime

overcome the numerous challenges before them. First and foremost, this foremost, and First them. before challenges numerous the overcome gaps significant the of light in integration internal strengthening includes and conflicts that exist both within and among the different sectoral and ethnic elements (including the problem of the many repai homes), their to returned not still have that to the country’s civilian infrastructure, external forces. Iraq’s on impact direct a have will processes political subsequent the and opinio Public stability. state achieving of chances and interviews with decision makers there indicate the overcome to ability current state’s the regarding skepticism alongside deterioration. conditions that have previously resulted in scheduled their on held fact in are they (assuming developments influencing currently elements main the their possible implications. of Iraq Shape the Face to Attempt The the Islamic State: After characterize is which Iraq, in system political The election for preparing is intricacies, considerable a form to efforts continued have power with forces T elections. the after day the on aspirations their and Kurdish elements to ultimately overcome their t divisions and join forces in promoting a national a th as well as sectors, the all of needs the account of chances the on impact decisive a have will process, the in involvement bringing about the desired change. populat the of percent 60 than more constitute (who P Vice leaders, Shiite rival two The elections. the al-Abadi Minister Prime and al-Malaki Nuri Minister to the Dawa party and ran together in the last elections) have announced the and Coalition Law of State (the lists separate two on run will they that will elections the in running list Another respectively). VictoryCoalition, suppo is which Party, Communist Iraqi the encompass who leader initially Muqtada threatened al-Sadr, to boycott the elections if reforms were not made to the electoral system.

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minister. minister. partnerships with the the Shiite 9

the split within the Shiite the Shiite split within the 8 identity of the next prime camp creates uncertainty, uncertainty, camp creates which could result in new result which could As in the previous elections, elections, in the previous As potential to completely turn completely to potential the tables with regard to the to regard with tables the ions, the refugees who ud Barzani’s failure failure Barzani’s ud weakened status and and status weakened y, which y, could result empt to postpone the l divisions. Moreover,

, appears to continue to to continue to appears , t that cuts across ethnic ethnic across cuts that t ajority, and one of their their of one and ajority, nly give the impression impression the give nly 12 d al government regarding regarding government al if his list ultimately ends ends ultimately list his if ve ve to to ision in Iraq will continue continue will Iraq in ision ted ted sing sing ns, has a has 10 But it is still still is it But 11 | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ

LDAD SHAVIT E Al-Abadi has sought to cultivate the image of a lis a of image the cultivate to sought has Al-Abadi The consensus is that even after the upcoming elect and sectoral divisions. In practice, however, even even however, practice, In divisions. sectoral and o will this elements, Kurdish or Sunni including up div political sectoral and partnership, sectoral of their expand to ability Sunnis’ The well. as elections 2018 the after exist to political influence remains extremely limited, inter alia due to their lack of leadership and the large number of Sunnis among have not yet returned to their homes, and their att to ability whose Kurds, The Court. Supreme the by rejected was elections Maso to due weakened significantly been has maneuver wake the in elections the entering also are independence, to them lead to of military defeat and plagued by internal politica Iranians the by encouraged al-Abadi, Minister Prime Their independence. Kurdish of signs all undermine centr the with agreements reaching of difficulty the economic issues are likely to make it difficult for them to maintain their political status and their piece of the regime’s economic pie. m parliamentary a maintain to continue will parties ser and coalition a forming in succeed will leaders has who al-Abadi, Minister Prime minister. prime as an determined a as himself positioning in succeeded interests, state promoting leader dependable addition in bloc: Shiite the leading of chance good credi was he State, Islamic the against success his Barzani by attempts thwarting in determination with region, Kurdish the of independence the promote to including the successful military operation to take Kurds. the from Kirkuk of city the back increa of chances al-Malaki’s out rule to early too electio previous the in as event, any In power. his the split within the Shiite camp creates uncertaint with tables the turn completely to potential the with partnerships new in regard to the identity of next prime minister. Militias Role of the Shiite The the influence undoubtedly will Minister Prime of title the holds Whoever future of the It country. is even more important, to however, analyze the

s y adr adr heir heir orces orces the militias with directly involved in in involved directly tedly that the Quds by the United States States United the by of the Shiite militias militias Shiite the of f Iraq, which can be an – to integrate into the other hand. Since cant power element in Iran in its effort to exert exert to effort its in Iran t between those who are are who those between t itics and to join his party party his join to and itics oy large scale economic ieved victory nor regained regained nor victory ieved that have served as Iranian Iranian as served have that among the Shiite elements elements Shiite the among In addition, the Shiite militias that that militias Shiite the addition, In 13 14 | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ proxies in Iraq and Syria. Still, the bulk of the f the of bulk the Still, Syria. and Iraq in proxies alread are which of some elements, Iraqi of consist active in the political sphere. Their political power t whereas Iraqis, are they that fact the from stems B the Today, Iran. by provided is capacity military enjoys already al-Amiri Hadi by headed organization parliamentary representation and has a minister al-Abadi’ of member a as serving auspices its under government. It was former Iraqi Prime Minister al- impelled encouragement, Iranian with who, Malaki

LDAD SHAVIT More than anything else, the question of the future the of question the else, anything than More A number of studies of the past few years on the Shiite militias have regarding months recent in Iraq in underway been has that debate The

dynamics that currently characterize relations among the Shiite elements Shiite the among relations characterize currently that dynamics themselves, particularly regarding the significance of the decision of the Shiite of framework overarching the – (PMU) Units Mobilization Popular militias in Iraq, some of which are supported by Ir the Iraqi political arena. in Iraq reflects the struggle over the orientation is o debate The elections. the after peak to expected of intervention external the by shaped themselves, led elements Western and hand, one the on influence and its Sunni allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, on the Shiite2014, militias have constituted a signifi Iraq, and were the most powerful force to fight alongside the Iraqi army involvement the without that agreed widely is It State. Islamic the against ach have neither would Iraq militias, Shiite the of control over the territory it had lost. emphasized that the strongest groups among them are close ties As to a Tehran. result of this allegiance, demonstrated through the defense of Iran’s interests, these militias enj and military aid. Moreover, it has been shown repea been have Soleimani Qassem commander its and Force militias. the of actions the influencing groups small of number a include Iran to loyal are pol Iraqi into themselves integrate to groups these elections. on the eve of 2014 disagreemen reflected has militias the of future the | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 April | 1 No. | 21 Volume | ¤ § § §¨© ¥¦¤ £¤

It is widely agreed that that It is widely agreed without the involvement militias, of the Shiite neither have Iraq would victoryachieved nor the over control regained territory it had lost.

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15 this context was d as an ally of al- itary arm and their en the military and le in the victory over onetheless, it is not at at not is it onetheless, ted in being identified identified being in ted nd could take part in and influence in the er it was announced, was it er point. Still, the basic mic State. Some of the the of Some State. mic adi al-Amiri, leader of , most likely brokered the resulting reduction reduction resulting the into politics, the key to onstellation developing eligious leader Ayatollah Ayatollah leader eligious eement that was reached reached was that eement he country, in light of the the of light in country, he o turn over their weapons weapons their over turn o frameworks – apparently apparently – frameworks uired special consideration consideration special uired he assertion by an element element an by assertion he | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ

LDAD SHAVIT The militias’ intention to run in the elections req elections the in run to intention militias’ The Prime appointed was who al-Abadi, that appears it foremost, and First in favor of the militias’ complete disarmament and and disarmament complete militias’ the of favor in advantage take to sought have who those and Iraq, in influence Iranian in of their popularity stemming from their decisive ro the Islamic State, in order to increase their power Iraqi parliament. A prominent aspect of the public debate has to do with mid-December In militias. the by held currently weapons the of future the r Shiite senior joined al-Abadi Minister Prime 2017 t in weapons the all collect to demand a in Sistani Isla the against war the of end the of announcement t willingness their announce to quick were militias original their with ties cut and government the to because Iraqi law prohibits elements within the military or other armed N elections. parliamentary in running from elements running those all that guarantee can authorities Iraqi the whether clear all in the elections did in fact turn over their weapons before their lists were authorized to run. The question of separation betwe political elements will need to be clarified at some this if even militarypower, retain to be will militias the of most of interest requires an element of separation between their mil political arm that would be elected to parliament a the future governing coalition. among the other major Shiite elements. Prominent in Prime Minister al-Abadi’s unexpected declaration, made in late January, regarding the establishment of a political alliance by Iran, with the pro-Iranian militias, including H the Badr organization, who was previously recognize agr the Although al-Abadi. of rival a as and Malaki aft day one collapsed al-Amiri and al-Abadi between the motivations underlying alliance appear to have remained intact. own his lacked who and coalition a form to failed al-Malaki after Minister political basis, understood that in the political c in Iraq with the Iranian-affiliated militias’ entry survival lay in allying himself with these forces, even if until now he had interes not was who someone of image the maintained t was context this in Prominent Iran. of ally an as within the coalition that the alliance had collapsed for technical reasons,

17 19 of military and existed for many The fundamental th al-Abadi would the Revolutionary 18 order to establish an an establish to order e coalition, and that f the principles of the the of principles the f es, the great diversity diversity great the es, certain that the Shiites Shiites the that certain a future coalition that ith Iran as a precondition precondition a as Iran ith aqi army and stipulating the country are all factors factors all are country the ovide itself with space for for space with itself ovide issued an order specifying specifying order an issued The prevailing assessment prevailing The te’s entry into the governing governing the into entry te’s 16 | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ

LDAD SHAVIT Iranian involvement in Iraq is nothing having new, The Iranian effort to this end is based on a number

implying that the failure did not stem from ideological disagreement. The disagreement. ideological from stem not did failure the that implying same element also made it clear that cooperation wi indeed be possible after the elections, as part of Baghdad. in government the establish would recently al-Abadi context, this In representatives. the Shiite militias’ full incorporation into the Ir that their economic rights be equal to those of Iraqi military personnel. Role Iranian The Iran’s meddling in Iraq by using the Quds Force of in Soleimani Qassem of leadership the under Guards immense Iran’s of indicative is militias the and al-Abadi between alliance results. election the influencing in practice, in and, intervening in interest Its aim in doing so is to ensure that the coalition that is established after the elections serves its interests. Iran views unity within the Shiite camp make to action take will and important extremely as enjoy representation as broad as possible within th w cooperation view future the in leader Iraqi every for political survival. In this framework, Iran does not rely on one single pr to action takes rather but personality political it. suits that agenda an dictate to it enable will that maneuvering political years. Iran, which long shares border a with 1,500-km Iraq, regards Iraqi its From security. its to threat potential a and backyard own its as territory perspective, the ability to control developments within Iraq effectively is o influence the expanding for condition important an revolution in the religious, ideological, and military realms of additional strategic regions, such as Syria and Lebanon. expand to efforts great made has Iran years, recent in and realms, civilian its economic, cultural, and religious influence in Iraq. Sta Islamic the Iraq, of characteristic instability forc US of withdrawal the from resulted that vacuum in dominance Shiite the and Iraq, in sectors the of that have enabled Iran to solidify its hegemony in large parts of Iraq. is that the militias will continue to hold significant political and security power after the elections, unrelated to the actual number of their elected

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20 l and al-Abadi’s as followed by a s announcement formulate practical practical formulate tance not only with regarding US policy term in January 2017. 2017. January in term come of the elections ards to take advantage advantage take to ards ng of extensive political political extensive of ng appears to be continuing continuing be to appears ed, the US Secretary of and a goal that President President that goal a and as the primary arm of the the of arm primary the as of inﬂuence that contributes contributes that inﬂuence of | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ

LDAD SHAVIT Even if the leading Shiite elements in Iraq include some who oppose to need the of aware is administration American The States United the elections, 2018 the of eve the On or are trying to distance themselves from Iran, in recent years the Iranian the years recent in Iran, from themselves tryingdistance are to or leadership has succeeded in using the Republican Gu Republican the using in succeeded has leadership militarythe realm, in primarily militias, the provided aid extensive the of in force fighting effective most and armed best the into them transform to serves force this perspective, Tehran’s From Iraq. currently militias Shiite the that estimated been has It Iraq. in Force Quds 50,000 approximately with fighters, 122,000 and 110,000 between number direct influence. affiliated with groups that are under the Quds Force’s Allies and its Arab States of the United Involvement The The United States welcomed Prime Minister al-Abadi’ on the defeat of the Islamic State, as vanquishing the group has been the 2014 since States United the facing challenge main his of outset the from repeatedly emphasized Trump A few months have passed since the conquest of Mosu subsequent declaration, and questions still remain and strategy of formulation The State. Islamic the after day the on Iraq in its translation into practical measures holds impor but Iraq, in stationed forces US the of future the of question the to regard the by made mistakes the from learn to ability the for primarily, and also, States after the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011. United position a it ensure will that policy effective and the consideration into takes state, democratic a as establishment Iraq’s to resources. of division equal an effect to works and sectors, its all of needs This joins the need to prevent the return of radical Islamic forces and to sphere Iraqi the of control seize to efforts accelerated Iran’s with contend and create a situation in Iraq similar to that in Lebanon and Syria, where forces operating in the service of Iran (such as Hezbollah) leverage their military ability to accrue political strength. Inde Defense recently acknowledged that the administration has information indicating that Iran is working to influence the out in Iraq. Trump’s President al-Abadi. Minister Prime on Iraq in policy its center to meeting with him at the White House in Marchw 2017 furtheri “the regarding leaders both by declaration 22 o believed that al- es have refused to pable of achieving t the establishment di Arabia. Previous have an alternative clare independence, tend to allocate funds funds allocate to tend ” Al-Abadi is perceived perceived is Al-Abadi ” tration’s aim of reducing reducing of aim tration’s the coalition to establish establish to coalition the measures that will result result will that measures ups. In practice, the Iraqi Iraqi the practice, In ups. ate additional investment investment additional ate erception of al-Malaki, and and al-Malaki, of erception ure within the framework of of framework the within ure In the past year, efforts by Saudi Saudi by efforts year, past the In 23 | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ At a conference held in Kuwait in February 2018, 2018, February in Kuwait in held conference a At 21

LDAD SHAVIT At the same time, the United States continues its efforts to bring Iraq The United States’ reliance on al-Abadi – who in actuality is the only In practice, the ongoing discussion between the Iraqi Prime Minister

and economic cooperation between the two countries. two the between cooperation economic and advancing of capable is who with work to ﬁgure a as gro ethno-religious different Iraq’s among unity in the with relations good maintain to care taken indeed has Minister Prime based in part on West, the understanding that his government is in need of massive resources in order to rehabilitate the country’s infrastructure most of and which economy, is expected to come from the United States and European countries. US administrations have als Abadi both wants to and is capable of bringing abou of closer relations with their Sunni allies on the one hand, and reducing its ties with Iran on the other hand. card they currently hold – as a mover and shaker ca governing. his of nature the by test the to put being now is aims American At this point, the United States does not appear to to or Kurds, the and Sunnis the to closer al-Abadi bring would that policy Moreover, Iraq. in involvement Iranian oppose who elements Shiite other United States opposition to the Kurds’ desire to de silence its of light in allies its betrayed countryhas a that as image its and regarding the military offensive initiated by al-Abadi to conquer the city of Kirkuk, has greatly weakened the Kurds. and senior members of the US administration continues. In tandem, the militaryits forces withdraw to started has it that stated has States United that are currently deployed in Iraq as part of an agreement with the Iraqi coordin to action taking is it that and government, adminis Trump the of product a as However, Iraq. in in not does States United the investments, American infrastruct Iraqi of reconstruction the to directly by implemented currently efforts international the country. the in stability closer to its Sunni allies, with an emphasis on Sau US administrations have tried, but the Arab countri p their to due Iraq with relations closer establish lackey. Iranian an as al-Abadi, subsequently coalition members succeeded in raising only $30 billion of the $90 billion $90 the of billion $30 only raising in succeeded members coalition in aid that Iraq has said it needs order to rebuild its infrastructure.

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the state. At the 25 to maintain the unity maintain to of In of reality the complex Islamic terrorist elements, elements, Islamic terrorist the United States and Iran States the United there is an interest in both is an interest there power relations in Iraq and relations power State activists and/or other State arliamentary the risk of a return of Islamic the risk of a return teering committee committee teering easures, culminating culminating easures, Iran to maintain the y its stability and ensure ensure and stability its y ns in Iraq and the risk of of risk the and Iraq in ns g which, in the presence presence the in which, g le le to have increased. In the the In increased. have to spects are contingent on on contingent are spects to to Iran, will have signiﬁcant signiﬁcant have will Iran, ng and complicated list of of list complicated and ng y that that y | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ

LDAD SHAVIT The Saudis are also checking the possibility of expanding their expanding of possibility the checking also are Saudis The 24 Although al-Abadi has an advantage leading up to to up leading advantage an has al-Abadi Although same time, immediately following his visit to Saudi Arabia, al-Abadi was al-Abadi Arabia, Saudi to visit his following immediately time, same for meetings with the Iranian leadership. quick to visit Tehran investments in Iraq as part of efforts to increase their influence. of his identification as an opponent of Iran, appear Iran, of opponent an as identification his of m such of number a took Arabia Saudi 2017 of course durin Riyadh, to visit al-Abadi’s Minister Prime in s a up set countries two the State, of Secretary US the of and Arabia Saudi by shared border The relations. mutual their oversee to Iraq was opened recently after having been closed for decades. And, for the first time Saudi since Arabia 1990, has opened a consulate in the city Basra. of Implications The defeat of the Islamic Stateelections have, for the first time in many andyears, increased Iraq’s chances the impending solidif p will that processes further implementing of pro these However, state. unified a as existence its lo a with contend to ability leadership’s Iraqi the relatio power of reality complex the In challenges. elements, terrorist Islamic other and/or activists State Islamic of return a there is an interest in both the United States and appear countries both Moreover, state. the of unity figure right the as al-Abadi Minister Prime view to lead Iraq in a manner that will serve their interests after the elections as well. He himself continues to take care to maintain good relations with both the American administration and Iran, after many years of successfully establishing a dialogue and countries. both of leaderships the with cooperation majorit a win to ability party’s his elections, the will enable it to form a coalition is not guaranteed. ro major a play will militias Shiite the Presumably these Moreover, minister. prime next Iraq’s of identity the determining in with affiliated directly are which of some militias, government. its of direction the on and Iraq of character the on influence Arabia, in conjunction with the United Arab Emirates, to establish closer establish to Emirates, Arab United the with conjunction in Arabia, light in al-Sadr, Muqtada with and al-Abadi Minister Prime with relations n to to ar. ar. the the Iran Iran it must take into ountries) to take an such an investment nvolved in building ce in Iraq is a critical ain and expand their rimarily on the actions actions the on rimarily re, has also prompted of its security interests, interests, security its of ’s perspective, the need need the perspective, ’s part, are implementing implementing are part, round for the growth of arena, and especially the the especially and arena, by the US administration administration US the by late their aims into actions actions into aims their late n the past year he appears appears he year past the n as a focal point of external external of point focal a as q, Iran has thus far enjoyed enjoyed far thus has Iran q, ention or the motivation to to motivation the or ention y of Iran and Hezbollah to | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ act in the region, in Syria and Lebanon in particul in Lebanon and Syria in region, the in act on focused be must context this in efforts Israel’s willingness its on particularly administration, US remain active in Iraq, especially with regard to the building of, and influence on, its military force, i to ties close with militias Shiite prevent to order

LDAD SHAVIT The United States continues to base its interests p interests its base to continues States United The Ira of control the for struggle the in practice, In Israel has no direct inﬂuence on Iraq. Nonetheless, The future of Iraq will likely have signiﬁcance for Israeli interests, as

of Prime Minister al-Abadi, despite the fact that i that fact the despite al-Abadi, Minister Prime of actions addition, In Iran. to closer moved have to att the have not does it suggest year past the over their for Iranians, The measures. Iranian the resist order in dimensions of number a in and broadly Iraq vis-à-vis policy their Tehran From levels. all on influence their ensure to core the serves Iraq in hegemony Iranian ensure to including its interest in ensuring a corridor to the Mediterranean Sea. the upper hand. Even if all the sides wish to maint influence, their success in doing so likely depends first and foremost on trans to resources and energy invest to willingness on the ground. As such, whoever is willing to make Iraqi The influence. an with party the be to stands business opportunities presented by the processes i a military force and rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructu additional countries (Russia, China, and European c interest in expanding their investments the country. its importance as a functioning independent country lies not only in the fact that in recent years it has provided fertile g capacity its in also but elements, Islamic radical influence. Therefore, attention must be paid to the regional implications it on exercised influence of degree the and location geographical Iraq’s of by external parties. Israel’s on impact direct a have countrywill the of future the that account ability to realize its goals of limiting the abilit from seizing control of these bodies. At the same time, as part of Israel’s Arabia Saudi with and states, Sunni the with Iran vis-à-vis interest shared in particular, the Sunni efforts at expanded influen | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 April | 1 No. | 21 Volume | ¤ § § §¨© ¥¦¤ £¤

In the struggle for the In the struggle for Iran of Iraq, has thus control the upper hand. far enjoyed

, ” , The No. 1008, January No. 1008, Wall Street Journal Wall INSS Insight , Central Intelligence Agency, , Central Intelligence Agency, , December 24, 2017, https:// , December 24, 2017, , April 20, 2017. , April 20, 2017. Haaretz No. 984, October 23, 2017. No. 984, October 23, 2017. Walla World Fact Book Fact World | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ , December 9, 2017. , December 9, 2017. INSS Insight

LDAD SHAVIT " Carnegie Middle East Center, April 2017. April 2017. Carnegie Middle East Center,

New York Times New York , January 2, 2018. , January 2, 2018. , January 15, 2018. , January 15, Eldad Shavit and Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Baghdad Regains Control of Kirkuk: of Control Regains “Baghdad Lindenstrauss, Gallia and Shavit Eldad Strategic Implications,” “Iraqi Militias and PM Abadi to Contest General Election Separately,” “Iraqi Militias and PM Abadi to Contest General Election Separately,” New Arab Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Mobilization Forces “The Popular A. Jabar, Renad Mansour and Faleh Iraq’s Future,” Ronen Zeidel and Idan Barir, “We’ll Fight IS and Repulse Iran: The Least “We’ll Ronen Zeidel and Idan Barir, Leader in the Middle East,” Valued Ibid. The last parliamentary elections were held on April 30, 2014. The party of The last parliamentary elections were held on April 30, 2014. the then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki earned 92 of the 328 seats. Given and achievements of the Islamic State in Iraq, opposition to al-Maliki grew, under pressure from Iran, al-Abadi was appointed Prime four months later, and since then al-Maliki has served as Vice President. Minister, In contrast to other states in the region, elections Iraq recent years in are considered relatively democratic, and their results not known is made up of 328 members, who are elected for a advance. Parliament a four-year term. The head of the largest party is charged with forming government that must be approved by the parliament. Zvi Barel, “Kurdish Spring or Winter,” Barel, “Kurdish Spring or Winter,” Zvi al-Monitor Hamdi Malik, “Pro-Iran PMU Factions Prepare for Electoral Battle in Iraq Hamdi Malik, “Pro-Iran PMU Factions www.haaretz.co.il/news/zvibarel/.premium-1.4840477. www.haaretz.co.il/news/zvibarel/.premium-1.4840477. Margaret Coker and Falih Hassan, “Iraq Prime Minister Declares VictoryMargaret Coker and Falih Over ISIS,” Aviad Mendelboim and Yoram Schweitzer, “Report on Suicide Attacks in Schweitzer, Mendelboim and Yoram Aviad Bombers,” Attacks, More Women Fewer 2017: As of the beginning of 2018, the World Bank assessed the damage to the World As of the beginning 2018, infrastructure caused by the war against Islamic State at $45.7 billion. See Michael R. Gordon and Isabel Coles, “Defeat of ISIS in Iraq Caused $45.7 Billion in Damage to Infrastructure, Study Finds,” United Nations Iraq, “UN Casualty Figures for Iraq the Month of JanuaryUnited https://bit.ly/2GeS9bK. 2018, 1, February 2018,” 7, 2018; United Nations Iraq, “UN Casualty Figures for Iraq the Month of United 2018; 7, https://bit.ly/2pJd5AE. December 2017,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html. “The Middle East: Iraq,” in the “The Middle East: Iraq,” Renad Mansour, “Iraq After the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State,” of ISIS: The Struggle for the State,” “Iraq After the Fall Renad Mansour, Chatham House, July 2017. February 11, 2018. 2018. 11, February

11 15 13 10 14 12 9 8 7 aim from Israel’s perspective. Therefore, Israel would do well to conduct a dialogue with the Sunni states on subject. Notes 1 2 4 3 6 5 ,

Strategic Policy Notes Policy , 8, February al-Arabiya Reuters , March 10, 2018. 2018. , March 10, , August 18, 2017. 2017. , August 18, Iraqi News | THE | STRUGGLE OVERTHE FUTURE OF IRAQ , February 14, 2018. 14, , February 15, no. 3 (2012): 39-48. no. 3 (2012): 15, The Guardian

LDAD SHAVIT " , July 15, 2017. 2017. , July 15, 13, no. 4 (2011): 85-100. 85-100. no. 4 (2011): 13, The York Times The York 2018. 2018. Billion to Rebuild, Iraq Got Less Than a “Hoping for $100 Margaret Coker, Third,” February 12, 2018. 2018. 12, February over Alliance to Rebuild Iraq and ‘Return it Martin Chulov, “Saudis in Talks to the Arab Fold,’” Yoel Guzansky, “Iraq and the Arabs following the American Withdrawal,” “Iraq and the Arabs following American Withdrawal,” Guzansky, Yoel Strategic Assessment Consulate to Re-Open in Basra, Iraq,” Mariam al-Jaber,”Saudi Jonathan Landay and Yara Bayoum, “U.S. Not Planning to Contribute toNot Planning Bayoum, “U.S. Landay and Yara Jonathan Conference – Ofﬁcials,” at Iraq Reconstruction Money pubs/PolicyNote46-Ghaddar.pdf. Malik, “Pro-Iran PMU Factions Prepare for Electoral Battle in Iraq.” Malik, “Pro-Iran PMU Factions Mohamed Mostafa, “Iraqi PM: Incorporation of Mobilization Forces Mohamed Mostafa, “Iraqi PM: Incorporation of Mobilization Forces Preserves Security Service,” Assessment Yoel Guzansky, “‘Made in Iran’: The Iranian Involvement in Iraq,” “‘Made in Iran’: The Iranian Involvement Iraq,” Guzansky, Yoel Tim Arango,”Iran Dominates in Iraq after U.S. ‘Handed the Country Over,’” ‘Handed the Country Dominates in Iraq after U.S. Over,’” Tim Arango,”Iran Times New York Hanin Ghaddar, “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Impac t of Shia’s Militias on “Iran’s Foreign Hanin Ghaddar, Institute for Near East Policy, Washington Policy,” Foreign U.S. 46, January 2018, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/ January46, 2018,

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