DOCSLIB.ORG

Bulletin Du CEREDAF

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Bulletin Du CEREDAF Bulletin du CEREDAF Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Documentaires sur l'Afghanistan CN° 387 – Octobre 2020 (Nouvelles de septembre 2020) Mensuel 3 eurose SOMMAIRE 10- Nature, Environnement p. 19 11- Culture, Histoire, Patrimoine p. 19 En bref p. 2 12- Vie quotidienne, Société, Faits divers, Sport p. 19 1- Vie politique p. 3 Publications récentes p.20 2- Sécurité, victimes p.3 3- Vers des pourparlers de paix p. 8 4- Scène internationale p. 11 5- Pays limitrophes p. 13 6- Reconstruction, Economie p. 14 CEREDAF 7- Drogue p. 17 16, passage de la Main d'or - 75011 PARIS 8- Education, Santé, ONG p.17 email : [email protected] 9- Réfugiés, Droits de l’homme, Justice p. 18 ISSN 09906053 En bref Sécurité : Le mois de septembre fût meurtrier pour l’Afghanistan. Plusieurs attaques ont eu lieu contre la police et l’armée afghanes. Des attentats des Tâlebân ont fait beaucoup de victimes parmi les civils. Les Tâlebân eux-mêmes ont entegistré un nombre important de morts. Ces combats ont entraîné plusieurs déplacements de populations. Dans les pro- vinces de Nangarhâr, Koundouz, Orouzgân, Hérat et Kandahar les populations sont bloquées sans accès aux services ali- mentaires et médicaux. Les vallées de Pandjchir et de Bâmiyân absentes des combats ces derniers temps, ont connu ré- cemment des attaques. (voir pp.4 à 8). Pourparlers de paix : Salahudin Rabâni (ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères), Golbudin Hekmatyâr (chef du Hezb- e islâmi) et Hâmed Karzaï (ancien Président d’Afghanistan) ont refusé tous les trois de participer aux pourparlers de paix. - Le gouvernement afghan, souhaitant tourner la page des années de guerre, a accepté de libérer les derniers Tâlebân, em- prisonnés pour graves accusations. Les 7 prisonniers ayant tués des Français et des Australiens ont été transférés au Qatar. Quant aux Tâlebân libérés, selon Foreign Policy, la plupart d’entre eux auraient repris les armes pour combattre les forces afghanes (voir encadré p. 8). Le 12 septembre, le gouvernement afghan et les Tâlebân ont commencé à Doha (Qatar) les négociations de paix, dites « historiques », en présence du Secrétaire d’Etat américain Mike Pompeo et des représentants des pays comme la Norgège, le Turkménistan, la Chine, l’Indonésie, l’Ouzbékistan, la Turquie, l’Allemagne, le Pakistan, l’Inde, l’Iran, l’Espagne, la Fin- lande, le Royaume-Uni, le Japon ainsi que l’ONU et l’OTAN. A signaler l’absence de la France. L’Allemagne, par contre a proposé d’accueillir la prochaine réunion entre Kaboul et les Tâlebân. - Le 13 septembre au soir, le porte-parole des Tâlebân Naïm Wardak a dit qu’à l’ordre du jour des négociations il sera ques- tion de la mise en place d’un gouvernement islamique et de la libération de 7 000 prisonnier tâlebân. -Le 15 septembre au soir, le chef de l’équipe du gouvernement afghan, Massoum Stanekzaï a souligné l’importance du système démocratique actuel du pays tout en le maintenant dans le cadre d’une république islamique. Les désaccords étant nombreux entre les deux parties, les discussions ont repris le 23 septembre après une interruption. Le 26 septembre, un membre des Tâlebân a déclaré que le principal point de discode est que le gouvernement afghan refuse de traiter les pour- parlers dans le cadre de l’accord signé entre les Tâlebân et les Etats-Unis. L’autre point de discorde est entre les Sunnites et les Chiites pour lesquels le système jurique n’est pas le même. Les Chiites demandant que la jurisprudence ne soit pas fon- dée uniquement sur le système hanafite. Un autre aspect de ces pourparlers, relevé par Le Monde du 28 septembre, est que ces négociations se déroulent à huis-clos entre les Tâlebân et le gouvernement afghan (voir encadré p. 11). Les finances des Tâlebân : Un rapport confidentiel commandé par l’OTAN explique la puissance des Tâlebân. Pour l’assistance externe des Tâlebân et leurs partenaires (Pakistan, Russie, Iran, pays du Golfe, Arabie Saoudite, Emirats arabes et Qatar voir encadré p.12. Scène internationale : Le 22 septembre, à l’occasion du 75e anniversaire des Nations unies, le président afghan A. Ghani a souligné les cinq maux qui mènent l’Afghanistan dans une situation chaotique : la COVID-19, la guerre non con- ventionnelle, le terrorisme mondial, le changement climatique et l’explosion des inégalités. Economie : . Points faibles : le mauvais état des routes dû à la mauvaise qualité des revêtements et à la surcharge des camions, le désé- quilibre entre les importantions iraniennes vers l’Afghanistan et les exportations afghanes vers l’Iran (pour l’Afghanistan 2,5 milliards de dollars/an pour les marchandises iraniennes alors que les exportations afghanes vers l’Iran ne s’élèvent qu’à 14 millions de dollars (voir encadré p.16). Points forts : - La production extraordinaire du safran (24 tonnes cette année), des dattes (150 tonnes/an) et de grenades (28 tonnes/an) . La bonne production fruitière de la « Ferme du Canal » (Nangarhâr). Cette région à l’est du pays, fertile et irriguée, ren- force l’économie agricole afghane avec l’exportation de ses produits. - Les barrages : celui de la province de Nimrouz est achevé à 86% (voir p. 15), celui de Faïzabâd sur la rivière Koktcha doit se terminer dans trois mois (voir p. 16). - Quatre projets d’énergie solaire et éolienne, financés par l’USAID, aideront à soutenir le secteur agricole afghan. Culture du pavot : Face à la guerre et à la pandémie et malgrè les programmes d’erradication menés depuis des années, de nombreux agriculteurs se remettent à la culture du pavot. L’Afghanistan produit 84% de l’opium mondial et génère 2 milliards de dollars de chiffre d’affaire annuels (voir encadré p.17). COVID-19 : au 30 septembre : personnes testées 110 095, cas confirmés 39 268, guéris 32 789, morts 1 458. Education : Selon le ministère de l’Education, au moins 7 000 écoles sont sans bâtiment. Cela est dû à la croissance de la population et aussi au retour des réfugiés. Réfugiés : Face à l’Etat islamique, les Sikhs d’Afghanistan fuient le pays et se réfugient en Inde. V. M. ~ 3 ~ 1- VIE POLITIQUE - Le comité des législations du gouvernement a approuvé le présentation des ministres nominés pour un vote de confiance. projet du Département national des statistiques et de l’infor- (Pajhwok Afghan News 16/09) mation concernant l’inclusion du nom de la mère sur les car- - Achraf Ghani, dans un décret, a approuvé l’inclusion du tes d’identité nationales. (Pajhwok Afghan News 01/09) nom de la mère sur Tazkira (carte d’identité nationale), y - Douze nouveaux diplomates (dont une femme) ont été nom- compris d’autres renseignements personnels sur le titulaire de la més dans les missions étrangères de l’Afghanistan (Autriche, carte. (Khaama Press 18/09) Turquie, Russie, Iran, Azerbaidjan, Grande-Bretagne, Italie, Alle- - L'ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères Salahuddin Rab- magne, Kyrgizistan, Pakistan, Inde, Turkménistan) conformé- bani a critiqué le président Achraf Ghani l’accusant de con- ment au décret présidentiel. L’ambassadeur en Australie main- centration de pouvoir et d’ingérence dans les affaires des institu- tient son poste. Achraf Ghani avait approuvé les 12 ambassadeurs tions étatiques. (Pajhwok Afghan News 19/09) que lui avait présentés Abullah Abdullah. (Pajhwok Afghan News 03/09) - Le 20 septembre, Achraf Ghani s'est rendu à Bâmiyân (centre) pour assister à une importante réunion de sécurité. - Le 3 septembre, Sayed Sadat Mansour Naderi a été officiel- (Pajhwok Afghan News 20/09) lement présenté comme ministre d'État aux affaires de paix. Il a été ministre du Développement urbain et du Logement. (Tolo - Le 27 septembre, des sénateurs ont accusé certains membres News 03/09) parlementaires de l’Assemblée nationale (Wolesi Djirga) de s’entendre avec des candidats ministériels en vue du vote de - Le 3 septembre, le président Achraf Ghani, en déplacement confiance. (Pajhwok Afghan News 27/09) dans la province de Parwân, s'est engagé à restaurer les in- frastructures dans les zones de la province endommagées par - Le 28 septembre, des parlementaires ont accusés le gouver- les récentes inondations. (Tolo News 03/09) nement de créer des départements parallèles non légaux et ont averti de ne pas allouer de budget à ces départements indépen- - Le 7 septembre, lors de la première session du parlement afghan dants tant que le problème ne serait pas résolu. (Pajhwok Afghan après les vacances d'été, des législateurs ont accusé le gouver- News 28/09) nement d'essayer d'armer au moins 30 000 personnes dans diverses provinces, dans le cadre du plan de «charte de la sécuri- - Le 28 septembre, Achraf Ghani a déclaré aux parlementaires té» affirmant qu'une telle mesure n'aiderait pas la situation sécuri- que les nominations dans les services des douanes et des im- taire dans le pays. pôts devraient être fondées sur le mérite et par concours. Ac- Les députés ont appelé au soutien des forces afghanes et ont tuellement, 50% des agents des douanes ont été recrutés par 47 déclaré que la formation d'une milice n'était pas dans le meilleur parlementaires. (Khaama Press 28/09) intérêt de l'Afghanistan. - Le 29 septembre, Achraf Ghani a limogé 17 de ses conseil- Mais le premier vice-président Amrullah Saleh avait déclaré la lers. (Pajhwok Afghan News 29/09) veille que le gouvernement n'avait pas l'intention de former une - Le 29 septembre, quelque 2 000 jeunes ont assisté à un ras- milice. De son côté, le ministère de l'Intérieur a déclaré que semblement à Kaboul en vue de la formation d'un haut con- personne ne recevait d'armes ou d'argent dans le cadre du plan de seil des jeunes.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Habiba SARABI Governor of Bamiyan, Afghanistan Dr
    Habiba SARABI Governor of Bamiyan, Afghanistan Dr. Habiba Sarabi (born 1956) is a hematologist, politician, and reformer of the post-Taliban reconstruction of Afghanistan. In 2005, she was appointed as governor of Bamyan Province by President Hamid Karzai, becoming the first woman to ever be a governor of any province in the country. She previously served in Karzai's government as Minister of Women's Affairs as well as Minister of Culture and Education. Sarabi has been instrumental in promoting women's rights and representation and environment issues. She belongs to the ethnic Hazara people of Afghanistan. Her last name is sometimes spelled Sarobi. Sarabi was born in Mazari Sharif and spent her youth traveling around the country with her father. She later moved to Kabul to attend high school and study medicine at university. After graduating, she was awarded a fellowship by the World Health Organization and moved to India to complete her studies in hematology. During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, Dr. Habiba and her children fled to Peshawar, Pakistan, but returned frequently in secret. Her husband stayed behind in Kabul to care for his family. She also worked underground as a teacher for girls, both secretly in Afghanistan and in refugee camps in Pakistan for Afghan refugees. In 1998, she joined the Afghan Institute of Learning and eventually became the General Manager of the entire organization. She was also the Vice President of Humanitarian Assistance for the Women and Children of Afghanistan. As governor, she has announced one of her focuses will be on tourism as a source of income.
    [Show full text]
  • From Hidden Struggles Towards Political Participation
    From hidden struggles towards political participation Afghan women’s perspectives on peace and security beyond transition The Heinrich Böll Stiftung (hbs) is a German foundation and part of the Green political movement that has developed worldwide as a response to the traditional politics of socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. Our main tenets are ecology and sustainability, democracy and human rights, self-determination and justice. We place particular emphasis on gender democracy, meaning social emancipation and equal rights for women and men. We are also committed to equal rights for cultural and ethnic minorities. Finally, we promote non-violence and proactive peace policies. In Afghanistan we have established our work since 2003 and are currently focusing on the fields of democracy, ecology as well as peace and security policies. For detailed information on our work and our partners in Afghanistan, please visit: www.af.boell.org, to contact us please write to [email protected]. Rahe Madanyat (Civilization Way Weekly Magazine) is a non- partisan and independent weekly magazine established in 2012 by a group of young talented journalists, writers and university lecturers in Afghanistan. The magazine aims to promote rule of law, citizen’s rights, civilized values and social relations and concentrates on gender equality and social acceptance of women. Rahe Madanyat has been working with the Heinrich Böll Stiftung since mid 2012 and has become well known throughout Afghanistan for the project of publishing portraits of women and their role in strengthening peace and security in Afghanistan. For more information visit http://www. rahemadanyat.com or contact at [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • Special Report No
    SPECIAL REPORT NO. 444 | MARCH 2019 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org How Peace Was Made: An Inside Account of Talks between the Afghan Government and Hezb-e Islami By Qaseem Ludin Contents Background ...................................3 Talks Begin ................................... 5 Internal Consensus and Divisions .................................7 Components of the Peace Deal ....................................8 Sealing the Deal ......................... 12 Implementation of the Agreement ............................ 13 Lessons for Negotiations with the Taliban ........................... 14 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar addresses supporters in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in March 2018. (Photo by Ghulamullah Habibi/EPA-EFE/ Shutterstock) Summary • For more than four decades, Afghan- • Peacemaking is a difficult process, the challenges and divisions that istan has been in a state of war and but often the most difficult part is had to be overcome in order to violent conflict that has destroyed how to start peace talks. Thus, the make the September 2016 peace much of the country’s physical and experience of negotiating peace agreement possible. social infrastructure and prevent- between the Afghan government • After the peace accord with ed the formation of a state stable and the Hezb-e Islami insurgent Hezb-e Islami, Afghans have an- enough to establish law and order. group offers unique insights on other historic chance to bring an • Although several internal and exter- peacemaking in the modern era. end to years of conflict with the nal factors contributed to the conflict • This report, based on the author’s Taliban. The Afghan government’s and its current political and security experience working as a negoti- negotiations with Hezb-e Islami environment, a key factor has been ator during talks between the Af- provide important lessons that can weak Afghan leadership, exacerbat- ghan government and Hezb-e Isla- be applied to future peace negoti- ed by political frictions among elites.
    [Show full text]
  • April 08, 2019 4
    4 April 08, 2019 (1) Govt Concerned... ment,” said Naeem Ayubzada, head • Hasina Safi, Acting Minister of In- the plane and has blamed the French The crowd on Saturday booed Micho- of Transparent Election Foundation of formation and Culture government for turning a blind eye to acan Gov. Silvano Aureoles, who ap- and consider them as national assets, Afghanistan. • Suraya Dalil, former Minister of the genocide. peared alongside López Obrador. (AP) he added. The former members of the election Public Health On Friday, French President Emmanu- Danish termed smuggling and illegal (16) EU, China... commissions were removed from their • Ghezal Haris, member of Indepen- el Macron ordered a government study mining of natural resources as a chal- posts late in February and their cases dent Commission for Overseeing the into the country’s role in Rwanda be- EU Council President Donald Tusk has lenge and stressed protection of natu- were sent to the Attorney General’s Of- Implementation of the Constitution fore and during its 1994 genocide. Ma- told member states they should reject ral resources. fice to probe allegations lodged against • A civil society representative cron ordered a commission of research- a draft summit statement, a source Ambassador Pierre Mayaudon, the them. • Khan Jan Alokozai, the private sec- ers and historians to investigate the told AFP, “given that China has not European Union Head of Delegation “The election commissioners have been tor representative “role and involvement of France” in delivered on key EU expectations and to Afghanistan, said the EU supported subjected to daily attendance and they • A youths representative Rwanda from 1990-1994.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Laws and Ethnic Accommodation: Why Cross-Ethnic Coalitions Have Failed to Institutionalize in Afghanistan
    Political Laws and Ethnic Accommodation: Why Cross-Ethnic Coalitions Have Failed to Institutionalize in Afghanistan Mohammad Bashir Mobasher A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2017 Reading Committee: Robert Pekannen, Chair Jonathan Eddy, Co-Chair James Long Scott Radnitz Leigh Anderson Program Authorized to Offer Degree: School of Law © Copyright 2017 Mohammad Bashir Mobasher University of Washington ABSTRACT Political Laws and Ethnic Accommodation: Why Cross-Ethnic Coalitions Have Failed to Institutionalize in Afghanistan Mohammad Bashir Mobasher Chairs of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Robert Pekannen – Jackson School of International Studies Professor Jonathan Eddy – School of Law Afghanistan suffers from an ethnic-based and fragmented party system. Although some cross-ethnic coalitions have emerged, especially during the presidential elections, these coalitions have failed to survive across elections and branches of government. As for what explains the failure of the consolidation of coalitions, some scholars pointed to the SNTV system and others to the presidential system. This study examines all related institutional designs, including the SNTV system for parliamentary elections, the runoff system for presidential elections, the presidential system, dual vice presidency, and party qualification thresholds. These systems and institutions are designed by three bodies of political laws: the Constitution, electoral laws, and party laws. Analyzing these laws and institutional designs, this study makes three observations. First, the failure of coalitions to institutionalize in Afghanistan is not due to a single political law or institutional design but due to the influence of a number of them. Second, for cross-ethnic coalitions to institutionalize, all related institutional designs must act cohesively or else they fail to incentivize coalition-building, as is the case in Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan Assessment
    AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY REPORT April 2005 Country Information & Policy Unit IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, UNITED KINGDOM Afghanistan April 2005 CONTENTS 1 Scope Of Document 1.1 - 1.12 2 Geography General 2.1 – 2.2 Languages/Main ethnic groups/Religions 2.3 - 2.5 3.Economy 3.1 - 3.8 4 History Overview to December 2001 4.1 Post Taliban 4.2 – 4.13 January 2004 – December 2004 4.14 – 4.59 January 2005 onwards 4.60 – 4.66 5.State Structures The Constitution 5.1 - 5.8 The Constitutional Loya Jirga 5.9 – 5.13 Citizenship and Nationality 5.14 – 5.16 Political System Overview 5.17 – 5.26 Elections: - General 5.27 – 5.29 - Presidential Election 5.30 – 5.40 - Presidential Election Results 5.41 – 5.42 - Lead up to Parliamentary Elections 5.43 – 5.47 Political Situation in Herat 5.48 – 5.50 Judiciary 5.51 – 5.64 Land Court 5.65 – 5.66 Legal Rights/Detention 5.67 - 5.83 Death Penalty 5.84 - 5.86 Internal Security Developments following 11 September 2001 5.87 - 5.90 Security Sector Reform (SSR) 5.91 - 5.94 General security situation 5.95 – 5.112 Security situation in different regions: - Kabul 5.113 – 5.116 - Central 5.117 - South and Southeast 5.118 - 5.122 - North 5.123 – 5.124 Internal Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Provincial Reconstruction 5.125 – 5.150 Teams (PRTs) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DDR) 5.151 – 5.166 National Security Directorate (Amniat) 5.167 – 5.170 Army 5.171 – 5.174 Police 5.175 – 5.184 Prisons and Prison Conditions 5.185 - 5.208 Military Service 5.209 - 5.212 Medical Services
    [Show full text]
  • Country Advice Afghanistan Afghanistan – AFG36160 – Haji Abdul – Nasr Party – Hazaras – Shia Muslims – Land Disputes 16 February 2010
    Country Advice Afghanistan Afghanistan – AFG36160 – Haji Abdul – Nasr Party – Hazaras – Shia Muslims – Land disputes 16 February 2010 1 Is there any information on Haji Abdul or Haj Abdul, and who he is and what his background is? Is he a powerful warlord in Afghanistan? A search of the sources consulted did not locate specific information on a powerful warlord in Afghanistan named Haji Abdul or Haj Abdul. Reference was found to a warlord in Jalalabad named Haj Abdul Qadir.1 However, sources referred to in an RRT research response dated 16 September 2005 indicate that Haji Abdul Qadir, who had become the Minister of Public Works, was assassinated in 2002.2 A UNHCR district profile dated 24 February 2003 refers to a Commander Abdul Hakim Nassiri from the Nasr faction, affiliated to Hezb-e-Wahdat (Khalili), being in the Malistan district of Ghazni province at that time.3 Ghazni province adjoins Wardak province.4 2 [Deleted.] 3 Please provide general information about what the Nasr Party is, what they stand for, and who they are affiliated with. Do they have anything to do with the Taliban? The following RRT research responses provide background information on the Sazman-e Nasr in Afghanistan: RRT Country Research 2003, Research Response AFG15791, 3 March.5 RRT Country Research 2003, Research Response AFG23184, 22 December.6 RRT Country Research 2004, Research Response AFG17045, 25 October.7 RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response AFG17439, 5 August.8 1 Suyono, S.J. & Qudsy, Z. 2001, ‗After the Taliban, Old Dangers Resurface – The Rise of Warlords, Tempo, 2 December, Worldpress.org website http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/392.cfm – Accessed 1 September 2005 – Attachment 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan May 2008
    COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT AFGHANISTAN 20 MAY 2008 UK Border Agency COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE AFGHANISTAN 20 MAY 2008 Contents Latest News EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN FROM 1 MAY TO 20 MAY 2008 REPORTS ON AFGHANISTAN PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED SINCE 1 MAY 2008 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY........................................................................................1.01 Maps .............................................................................................. 1.08 2. ECONOMY............................................................................................ 2.01 3. HISTORY.............................................................................................. 3.01 Overview to December 2001........................................................ 3.01 Post-Taliban.................................................................................. 3.02 Presidential election 9 October 2004 and the new Cabinet...... 3.08 Parliamentary and provincial elections 18 September 2005 .... 3.10 Afghanistan Compact 31 January 2006...................................... 3.14 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................... 4.01 5. CONSTITUTION..................................................................................... 5.01 6. POLITICAL SYSTEM .............................................................................. 6.01 Overview ....................................................................................... 6.01 The Executive Branch.................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding Ethnic-Electoral Dynamics: How Ethnic Politics Affect Electoral Laws and Election Outcomes in Afghanistan
    MOBASHER 4/18/2016 3:11 PM UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC-ELECTORAL DYNAMICS: HOW ETHNIC POLITICS AFFECT ELECTORAL LAWS AND ELECTION OUTCOMES IN AFGHANISTAN *Mohammad Bashir Mobasher After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan began transitioning toward democracy. The democratization, which began with the Bonn Agreement, was very promising for all ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement provided that Afghanistan must establish “broad based, gender sensitive, multi- ethnic and fully representative government.”1 As a part of this agreement, Afghanistan adopted a new Constitution in 2004, which established elections as the foundation for representative government and guaranteed that the elections be inclusive, fair, and representative of all groups and regions. Despite this progress in the laws, Afghanistan has not been able to reduce ethnic tensions. In fact, this article shows that ethnic tensions tend to intensify during elections, a result that belies the vision of the Bonn Agreement. After presenting a statistical and qualitative analysis of voting practices across three presidential elections and 26 provinces, this article makes several observations about the role of ethnicity in Afghan presidential elections. These observations are: (1) people of an ethnic community are more likely to vote for a candidate of their own ethnic group; (2) voters from one ethnic group are likely to vote for a candidate from another ethnic group only when they do not have a candidate of their own; (3) cross ethnic voting is more likely to occur in blocs and in exchange for patronage to the elites of voting groups; and (4) candidates and ethno-political elites tend to prioritize their electoral campaigns by ethnic mobilization, manipulation of laws and political bargains rather than by policy development in order to generate votes.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan Fighting Undeclared War: Gen. Rahman
    Eye on the News [email protected] Truthful, Factual and Unbiased Vol:XI Issue No:146 Price: Afs.20 www.afghanistantimes.af www.facebook.com/ afghanistantimeswww.twitter.com/ afghanistantimes MONDAY. DECEMBER 26. 2016 -Jadi 06, 1395 HS Bomb blast kills Afghanistan fighting two civilians in undeclared war: Laghman AT News Report Gen. Rahman KABUL: At least two civilians AT Monitoring Desk IEC to finalize were killed in a roadside bomb in KABUL: Afghanistan has been eastern Laghman province, local facing an undeclared war, but there list of candidates official said Sunday. is no doubt that Afghan security Provincial governor spokes- forces have the capability to bat- for its secretariat man, Sarhadi Zwak, said that the tle against it, a senior security of- blast took place early morning in ficial said the other day. “The candidates will be shortlist- the Shrine area of Mehtarlam city, ed by Wednesday and then they the provincial capital. Deputy Interior Minister, will be interviewed," the IEC Gen. Abdul Rahman Rahman said However, he did not provide spokesman said. more information regarding the in- this in Nangarhar province during At least 76 candidates have ty does recognize that the Af- a change of command ceremony cident. KABUL: The U.S. forces in Af- applied for the Independent Elec- No group has claimed respon- ghanistan continue its offensive ghans have made progress, but that saw Col. Mohammad Ayub tion Commission’s (IEC) secretar- they still have a ways to go, and Hussainkhel swearing in as a new iat from which three of the appli- sibility for the attack, but it is be- against Islamic State – Khorasan lieved to have been carried out by (ISK) province and Al Qaeda, of- therefore, we need to remain en- border police commander in the cants will be introduced to Presi- gaged, and we do remain — and east.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-Taliban State-Building in Afghanistan
    Post-Taliban State-Building in Afghanistan The State Governmental Design at the National Level and the Role of Democratic Provincial Councils in Decentrali- zation at the Sub-National Level Haqmal Daudzai Dissertation completed in fulfilment of the requirement for the de- gree of a Doctor of Social Sciences (Dr. rer. Pol) from the Faculty of Law, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Erfurt. 25.11.2019 First Reader: Prof. Dr. Frank Ettrich Second Reader: Dr. habil. Christian Wagner urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-201900273 1 Erklärung “Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzuläs- sige Hilfe Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe; die aus fremden Quellen wörtlich oder inhaltlich übernommenen Stellen habe ich kenntlich gemacht, bei Verwendung eigener Vorarbeiten (Veröffentlichungen und Qualifi- kationsarbeiten) habe ich auf diese hingewiesen. Bei der Auswahl und Auswertung des Materials sowie be der Her- stellung des Manuskripts habe ich Unterstützungsleistungen von folgenden Personen erhalten: 1. Frau Anna Willman 2. Frau Parwana Khogiani 3. Herr Muneer Ahmad Daudzai Weitere Personen waren an der geistigen Herstellung der vorliegen- den Arbeit nicht beteiligt. Insbesondere habe ich nicht die Hilfe ei- nes Promotionsberaters in Anspruch genommen. Dritte haben von mir weder unmittelbar noch mittelbar geldwerte Leistungen für Ar- beiten erhalten, die im Zusammenhang mit dem Inhalt der vorge- legten Dissertation stehen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher weder im Inland noch im Ausland in glei- cher oder ähnlicher Form einer anderen Prüfungsbehörde als Dis- sertation vorgelegt.“ „Ich erkläre hiermit, dass die Dissertation in der vorligenden oder einer ähnlichen Fassung oder ein Teil hieraus keiner anderen Hoch- schule zu Erlangung des Doktorgrads vorgelegen hat, und dass sie oder Teile daraus nicht bereits Gegenstand eines sons- tigen Prüfungsverfahrens waren“ dass sie bzw.
    [Show full text]
  • Provincial Governors in Afghan Politics
    UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org SPECIAL REPORT 2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Dipali Mukhopadhyay This report analyzes the role of the Afghan provincial governor during Hamid Karzai’s presidency and how it might develop under the new coalition government. Drawing on interviews conducted in Kabul in the spring of 2014 as well as previous research and published work by the author, the report is part Provincial Governors in of the broader work being done by the United States Institute of Peace on Afghanistan’s ongoing political transition. Afghan Politics ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dipali Mukhopadhyay is an assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and a member of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. Summary The author of Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan, she made her first trip to Afghanistan in 2004 • In post-2001 Afghanistan, the president’s prerogative to shape (or dictate) provincial and has been conducting research there since 2007. appointments was a vital tool for managing competition, resources, and conflict in Kabul and the provinces. A provincial governor’s primary value was, thus, not in governing a province. Foreign-led state-building and counterinsurgency efforts operating under the assumption that subnational governance was about “governing” were bound to fail before they even started. • Absent clearly defined terms of reference, governors ranged from heavy-handed strongmen to forward-looking technocrats. The position was vaguely defined and limited on paper but could be radically augmented in various informal and unofficial ways.
    [Show full text]