The Macedonian Expeditionary Corps in Asia Minor (336–335 BC)
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Klio 2018; 100(2): 407–446 Maxim М. Kholod* The Macedonian Expeditionary Corps in Asia Minor (336–335 BC) https://doi.org/10.1515/klio-2018-0102 Summary: The article deals with a complex of issues connected with the cam- paign waged by the Macedonian expeditionary corps in Asia Minor in 336–335 BC. The author clears up the aims set for the advance-guard, its command structure, strength and composition. He also describes the relevant military operations and reveals the reasons both for the Macedonians’ successes in 336 and their failures in 335. The idea is argued that despite the final failures, it is hardly possible to say that the campaign the expeditionary corps conducted ended in its total defeat. Besides, it is noted that those military operations had major significance for Alex- ander’s campaign in Asia Minor in 334, because a number of preconditions for its full success had been created right in their course. Keywords: Philip II, Alexander the Great, Darius III, Asia Minor, Greek Cities of Asia Minor In the spring of 336,1 a Macedonian expeditionary corps numbering several thou- sand soldiers landed on the western coast of Asia Minor. It was an advance-guard of the army that under command of Philip II, the king of Macedonia and hegemon of Greece, had to invade the Persian kingdom some time later (Diod. 16.1.5; 92.2; Iust. 9.5.8; Pomp. Trog. 9). Thus the war against the Achaemenid Empire – declared on Philip’s initiative most likely at the first regular meeting of the Pan- hellenic League’s synedrion, taking place in Corinth in the summer of 3372 – was launched, the war that was resolutely continued by Philip’s son Alexander in 334 and that, as is well-known, ended with the destruction of the Persian kingdom and the creation, in place of it, of the new world Empire, the Empire of Alexander the Great. 1 All dates are BC/BCE. 2 For the „military“ meeting and for the date of its beginning, see Wilcken 1917, 20–28; 1929, 309–310, whose relevant judgments I follow. Thus too: Frolov 1974, 450–452; Hammond 1994, 160. Cf. Ellis 1976, 204, 208; Jehne 1994, 152, 156–157; Worthington 2008, 158, 160. *Corresponding author: Maxim М. Kholod, St. Petersburg State University, Institute of History, Dept. of History of Ancient Greece and Rome, St. Petersburg, Russia, E-Mail: [email protected] 408 Maxim М. Kholod It cannot be said that modern scholars wrote about the Macedonian expe- ditionary corps in Asia Minor in 336–335 rarely. Indeed, the overviews of events connected with its military activities (as a rule, brief but sometimes slightly more detailed) can be found in most general works, recording, in more or less detail, the history of Philip and Alexander and in papers dealing with the relations between these monarchs and the Greeks of Asia Minor.3 Besides, a number of studies examine also particular aspects of the theme as well as adjacent subjects that allow to get a more complete picture of it.4 At the same time, it has to be admitted that there is no work in scholarship so far, to my knowledge, which is specially devoted to the Macedonian advance-guard in Asia Minor in 336–335 and, consequently, considers thoroughly the whole complex of issues relevant to this theme. The present essay aims to fill this gap and thereby to contribute to our knowledge of the events and circumstances of the beginning of the military con- flict between Macedonia and Persia. In addition, I believe that the material dis- cussed in the essay can be useful when turning to a number of issues connected with Alexander’s campaign in Asia Minor in 334 and for better understanding of this campaign as a whole. To begin with, let us try to answer the following question: why did Philip decide not to invade Asia Minor right away with his full army, but at first sent an advance-guard there? For that, it is necessary to clarify those aims that the king intended to achieve by this force’s activities. Unfortunately, apart from Diodorus, our sources are silent in this regard. However, even Diodorus’ statement that Philip ordered to his generals heading the expeditionary corps „to liberate the Greek cities“ (ἐλευϑεροῦν τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις) (16.91.2; cf. Diod. 16.1.5), i. e. the Greek cities in Asia Minor which after the King’s Peace (387/386) had become part of the Achaemenid Empire again, can be regarded merely as a reflection of the campaign’s official objective: it is obvious that in this case we are faced with one of the Panhellenic slogans (the liberation of the Greeks of Asia from the barbarian yoke) that Philip and then Alexander used for the justification of their war against 3 Such an overview is contained already in: Droysen 1952, 69, 120–121. Of the respective over- views in later scholarship, see, in particular, the following: Judeich 1892, 302–306; Beloch 1922, III 1 602–604, 619–620; Olmstead 1948, 490–491; Badian 1966, 39–43; Ellis 1976, 219–222; Burn 1985, 390–391; Bosworth 1988, 34–35; Green 1991, 98, 138–140; Hammond 1994, 167–169; Ashley 1998, 160–162 (containing a number of very doubtful statements); Debord 1999, 421–426; Briant 2002, 817–818; Barceló 2007, 67–68, 86; Worthington 2008, 180–181; Nawotka 2010, 71–73. 4 Among such studies, see, for example, a series of works by S. Ruzicka who analyses in them the political situation in western Asia Minor on the eve and partly after the Macedonian advance- guard’s landing there (Ruzicka 1985, 84–95; 1992, 127–134; in addition, see Ruzicka 2010, 3–11) as well as offers the reconstruction of events related to Chababash’s revolt in Egypt (Ruzicka 2012, 199–205) (for this revolt, see below). Macedonian Expeditionary Corps in Asia Minor (336–335 BC) 409 the Persian Empire. Note that another slogan of such a kind was the revenge against the Persians for their profanation of sanctuaries in Greece during the Persian wars.5 These slogans, above all the former for the Greeks of Asia Minor, had to ensure that the war against the Persian kingdom would become popular in the Greek world, including its Anatolian part, thus helping to gain, in the case of the communities of Asia Minor, the actual support of their citizens (at least partly) for the Macedonian army in general and its advance-guard in particular. As to the true aims that Philip intended to achieve by sending this advance-guard, they appear to have been primarily military in character: the expeditionary corps probably had to at least capture (and retain) a bridgehead on the Asian coast of the Hellespont in order to facilitate the crossing of the main invading army in the future, and at the most, to win (and retain) as many cities and territories in western Asia Minor as possible; also, the Macedonians needed to take firm control over the nearby islands in order not only to free the main army from the necessity to make the effort of seizing them afterwards, but also to deprive the Persian fleet of at least a considerable number, if not all, of their bases in the Aegean, a point that was very important for achieving success in the further struggle against the Persians for the whole Anatolian peninsula.6 It has to be pointed out that by the spring of 336, i. e. by the moment of sending the expeditionary corps, Philip, as it seems, had every reason to believe those troops to be able to achieve with success not only the „minimal“ aim but, to a considerable degree, also the „maximal“ one. Indeed, Persia had a hard time then. Apparently in the autumn of 338, the Persian king Artaxerxes III Ochus died; he was poisoned by his doctor on the order of the eunuch Bagoas, the king’s favourite. Bagoas put Arses (Artaxerxes IV)on the throne, the youngest son of Artaxerxes III, and eliminated his brothers who had reached adulthood. Then, less than two years later, the eunuch killed Arses together with his children. This time – it appears in the summer of 336 – Bagoas selected Artashata/Codoman- nus (Darius III) as king, who belonged to a collateral line of the royal house. But several months later Darius himself ordered to poison Bagoas and thus could rule in his own right most likely by the autumn of 336 (Diod. 17.5.3–6; cf. Arr. 5 On the date and circumstances of the emergence of the concept of „the Greeks of Asia“ and the appearance of the political slogan „the freedom of the Greeks of Asia“, see Seager – Tuplin 1980, 141–154. On the theme of revenge in Greek ideology and culture, see Bellen 1974, 43–67; Gehrke 1987, 121–149. For the use of both these slogans in Philip’s and Alexander’s politics and propa- ganda during the war against Persia, see Seager 1981, 106–107; Seibert 1998, 5–58; Flower 2000, 96–135; Squillace 2004, 60–71; Rung 2016, 166–179 (each work contains references to sources and modern literature on the issue). 6 For the aims of sending the expeditionary corps into Asia Minor, cf. Ellis 1976, 219–220; Green 1991, 98, 139; Hammond 1994, 167–168; McQueen 1995, 172; Worthington 2008, 180; 2014, 111. 410 Maxim М. Kholod an. 3.14.5; Just. 10.3.5).7 The weakening of the central government in view of the dynastic confusion at the Persian court, surely accompanied by the execution or removal of a number of high-ranking court officials,8 caused, as it had often happened in the Achaemenid Empire, the partial paralysis of governance and the uprising of rebellious moods and even revolts in the kingdom.