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This Thesis Has Been Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for a Postgraduate Degree (E.G This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. The quest for coherence: a comparative analysis of EU crisis management in Africa Nicole Koenig PhD – University of Edinburgh and University of Cologne – 2014 Contents List of tables ................................................................................................................. i List of Figures ............................................................................................................. ii Declaration ................................................................................................................. iii Abstract ...................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... v List of abbreviations ................................................................................................ vii Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................ 1 1.1 The quest for coherence .................................................................................. 2 1.2 The broadening notion of EU crisis management ......................................... 12 1.3 Identifying the gap ........................................................................................ 21 1.4 Thesis outline ................................................................................................ 31 Chapter 2: Theorising coherence in EU crisis management ................................ 33 2.1 Coherence for EU crisis management ........................................................... 34 2.2 Liberal intergovernmentalism: a rational game ............................................ 41 2.3 Sociological institutionalism: a norm game .................................................. 49 2.4 A game of interests and norms ...................................................................... 55 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 65 Chapter 3: Measuring coherence and its causes ................................................... 67 3.1 Degrees of coherence .................................................................................... 67 3.2 Interests, norms, and behaviour .................................................................... 74 3.3 Crisis responses: cases and players ............................................................... 81 3.4 Analysing and collecting data ....................................................................... 89 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 96 Chapter 4: Libya – the first test for post-Lisbon crisis management .................. 98 4.1 Libya, the crisis, and the EU’s response ....................................................... 99 4.2 A low degree of coherence .......................................................................... 106 4.3 The ‘Big Three’: diverging interests and norms ......................................... 113 4.4 Institutional overlaps and tensions .............................................................. 124 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 129 Chapter 5: Somalia – coherent crisis management and collective interests ..... 132 5.1 Conflict causes, symptoms, and reactions ................................................... 133 5.2 A relatively high degree of coherence ......................................................... 143 5.3 The ‘Big Three’: concurrent interests and compromised norms ................. 148 5.4 Institutions and bottom-up coordination ..................................................... 155 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 159 Chapter 6: Mali – between collective strategy and individual action ............... 162 6.1 Malian crises and international responses ................................................... 163 6.2 An intermediate degree of coherence .......................................................... 172 6.3 The ‘Big Three’: French interests and loyal partners .................................. 178 6.4 Institutions: between tensions and French leadership ................................. 186 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 190 Chapter 7: Comparing crisis responses and explaining variation ..................... 193 7.1 When domestic interests trump norms ........................................................ 194 7.2 Intergovernmental competition and cooperation ......................................... 201 7.3 EU institutions: limited impact and divisions ............................................. 205 7.4 EU players: converging and diverging ....................................................... 212 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 220 Chapter 8: Conclusion ........................................................................................... 223 8.1 Linking theory and evidence ....................................................................... 223 8.2 Coherence and its trade-offs ........................................................................ 233 8.3 The EU’s future as a security actor ............................................................. 239 8.4 Limitations and future avenues of research ................................................. 246 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 251 Appendix 1: Initial coding scheme ........................................................................ 252 Appendix 2: List of interviews .............................................................................. 257 Appendix 3: Sample interview questionnaire ...................................................... 260 Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 262 List of tables Table 1: CSDP missions and operations (2003-2009) ............................................... 16 Table 2: Causes of (in)coherence in the literature ..................................................... 22 Table 3: Consistency and coherence: key differences ............................................... 36 Table 4: Categories of coherence in EU crisis management ...................................... 40 Table 5: Core theoretical components of the ‘rational game’ .................................... 49 Table 6: Core theoretical components of the ‘norm game’ ........................................ 55 Table 7: Summary of hypotheses ............................................................................... 66 Table 8: Policy outputs by issue area ......................................................................... 70 Table 9: Ordinal scale for the measurement of coherence ......................................... 73 Table 10: Relevant opinion polling institutes ............................................................ 75 Table 11: Embedded norms in the ‘Big Three’ .......................................................... 78 Table 12: Formal coordination mechanisms for EU crisis management ................... 79 Table 13: Cases and their variation on relevant dimensions ...................................... 85 Table 14: Combined power of the ‘Big Three’ in numbers ....................................... 87 Table 15: Key players at the horizontal level ............................................................. 88 Table 16: Questions for structured focused comparison ............................................ 92 Table 17: Three modes of case comparison ............................................................... 93 Table 18: Data collection – national parliamentary debates ...................................... 94 Table 19: Libyan crisis and EU response ................................................................. 105 Table 20: Pirate attacks in Somali waters (January 2008 - December 2013) .......... 139 Table 21: Somali crisis and EU response (2008-2012) ............................................ 142 Table 22: Malian crises and EU response ................................................................ 170 Table 23: The Sahel Strategy at a glance ................................................................
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