SECURITY ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DECENTRALISATION IN UKRAINE: VISIONS, REALITIES, AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
PHILIPP FLURI, VALENTYN BADRACK PHILIPP FLURI, VALENTYN BADRACK
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications
GENEVA – KYIV, 2017 УДК 323.172(477) Ф73
ISBN 978-617-7533-24-4
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications. – Сenter for Army, Conversion and Disarma- ment Studies, Kyiv, 2017. – 56 p.
Editors: Philipp Fluri, Valentyn Badrack Project coordinators: Volodymyr Kopchak, Leonid Polyakov, Mykhailo Samus Translation: “MOVA SERVICE” Computer design: Valeriya Chumak
The publication of this book has been funded by the Directo- rate for Security Policy (SIPOL) – Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports
© Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2017 © Сenter for Аrmy, Сonversion and Disarmament Studies, 2017 Content
Foreword Philipp Fluri 4
Foreword Valentyn Badrack 5 Introduction 6 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation 8 1.1 Legislative Basis for the Decentralisation Reform 8 1.2 The Status of the Decentralisation Reform: Current Achievements, Problems, and Open Questions 11 1.3 Security Aspects of the Decentralisation: Achievements and the Challenges and Risks to Overcome During the Reform Implementation 15 1.4 The Prefect Institution as a Safeguard against the Weakening of Central Power in the Security Sector 22 1.5 Current Challenges and Risks of the Decentralisation Process, and Ways of Their Prevention 24 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements 28 2.1 “Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine” 28 2.2 Minsk I 29 2.3 The Law “On Special Order for Local Self-Governance in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts” 30 2.4 Minsk II 36 2.5 Implementation of “Decentralisation” within the Minsk Process 41 2.6 “Freezing” of Minsk Agreements. Accumulation of Ukraine’s Own Decentralisation Experience. New Model for De-Occupation and Reintegration of CDDLR 48 General Conclusions 51 Appendix. A List of measures to fulfil the Minsk Agreement. February 12, 2015 54 Foreword
Dr Philipp Fluri Assistant Director Head Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, Central Asia Division Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
This study seeks to offer an analysis of security aspects of two approaches to the definition of “Decentralisation” currently existing in Ukraine. One is stipulated by the Minsk agreement, particularly Article 11 of A List of Measures to Fulfill the Minsk Agreement, 12.02.2015, and refers to the ‘particular districts of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts’. The other is stipulated by a number of amended laws of Ukraine on decentralisation (see: http://decentralization.gov.ua/en). The latter type of decentralisation is already in the process of initial implementation on the territory of Ukraine (except for the ‘particular districts of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts’ not under control of the national government). The former is still waiting for the establishment of an appropriate political and security environment in the region of military conflict. However, even if, or when, the appropriate conditions are in place, uncertainties still exist about the implications of this form of ‘decentralisation’ which under the Minsk agreement calls for ‘participation of local self-government in the appointment of the heads of prosecutors’ offices and courts; cross-border cooperation of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts with regions of the Russian Federation; and the freedom to create people’s militia units by decision of local councils’. Based on the analysis of legal documents, declared intentions of the key players, and current trends in the situation on the ground this study is aimed at clarifying the security aspects of the two existing approaches to ‘decentralisation’ in Ukraine – lessons already learned and possible implications for regional and international security.
Geneva, October 2017 Foreword
Dr Valentyn Badrack Director, Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies
Today, decentralization reform in Ukraine is one of the most progressive and successful transformation projects of the state functioning system aimed at increasing the efficiency of local self-government and the creation of a full-fledged civil society. Decentralization in Ukraine is realized taking into account the best European practices in this area, and it is a key basis for Kyiv’s straightforward commitment to the pro-European course of the state. During the period of 2014-2017, all necessary measures for voluntary association of communities were adopted, the basic legislation was implemented, intergovernmental fiscal reform was implemented as well, and decentralization was assured in the sphere of providing administrative services. The legislation on state regional policy and financing of regional development were formed not on the basis of lobbying and loyalty to the ruling party, but on the basis of the formula and approaches corresponding to the best practices of the European Union. At the same time, this reform is carried out in times of an armed conflict, initiated by the Russian Federation, which has occupied and annexed Crimea. After the crash in implementing the Moscow’s plan for the total destruction of Ukraine through the creation of the so-called «Novorossiya», Russia occupied part of Donbass. Besides, in accordance with the «Minsk agreements» agreed upon under pressure from Moscow in «separate districts of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts of Ukraine», a very different approach to decentralization is foreseen in these «separate districts», rather than determined by the legislation of Ukraine. In presenting the study of two approaches to decentralization, prepared by experts from the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, I would particularly like to emphasize the high level of partnership with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Trust and responsibility in implementing projects have already become a real characteristic feature of our fruitful cooperation.
Kyiv, October 2017 Introduction
ollowing the advent of Because at the very same development where the com- the new, pro-European moment, within the tempo- munity-building process takes F government in 2014 in rarily occupied territories of into due consideration each the aftermath of the Revolu- Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts, region’s historical, natural, tion of Dignity, Ukraine had Russia is using the term “de- cultural and other specifics. initiated one of the fundamen- centralisation” as a cover for Addressing the issues of local tal strategic projects for state the different governance sys- self-government had truly be- reformation: a reform of local tem it is trying to create. That come one of the key challeng- self-government and territo- system would be de jure inside es for the new Ukrainian gov- rial reorganization of the gov- Ukraine, while de facto be- ernment. Reform of Ukraine’s ernment on the principles of ing a military dictatorship of territorial-administrative sys- decentralisation. the Kremlin’s puppet govern- tem has been long overdue, The concept of this reform, ments. It is in that shape that because in its state as of early among other things, envisag- Russia is attempting to force 2014 it was still de facto inher- es creating brand new security these territories back into the ited from the Soviet Union and aspects at the basic level of the body of the Ukrainian state as did not meet the modern-day community [hromada], as well part of the Minsk process, not requirements of a progressive as a new and effective model for dissimilarly to its 2002-2003 European state. Even though monitoring and supervising the attempts to do the same vis- the principles of local self-gov- legality of actions of the new a-vis the unrecognized Pridn- ernment were developed local self-government bodies. estrovian Moldavian Republic and formalized in the legisla- Analysing the implementation (PMR) within Moldova through tion between 1996 and 2014, of these initiatives is particularly the so-called Kozak Memoran- Ukraine’s decentralisation re- relevant right now, due to the dum. form had been kept in a state unique historic circumstances Against this backdrop, of suspended animation, as a for this reform’s implementation Ukraine is building a full- number of initiatives remained in Ukraine: namely, decentrali- fledged system of local gov- unimplemented. sation against the backdrop of ernment, by creating con- Today, Ukraine’s decentrali- Russia’s “hybrid” aggression. ditions to facilitate regional sation is one of its most pro-Eu-
6 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Introduction
ropean reforms. It does not en- formation is the effectiveness mentation of all planned stag- tail a reform within a separate of the resulting system. In this es of the reform is understood sector, but rather, a compre- situation, the centre’s func- as improvement of national hensive transformation of the tions revolve around monitor- resilience. state mechanism, aiming to ing and oversight: preventing Due to the occupation of increase the efficiency of local abuse, corruption, violation of Crimea and certain districts self-government and create a the Constitution and laws of of the Donetsk and Lugansk true civic society. Ukraine, etc. oblasts (CDDLR) by the Rus- Under the Ukrainian style The beginning of Ukraine’s sian Federation, the state-wide of decentralisation, the major- decentralisation reform co- decentralisation reform does ity of powers in the socioeco- incided with the surge of not apply to the aforemen- nomic sphere would be trans- Russia’s armed aggression tioned temporarily occupied ferred from the centre to the against Ukraine, during a pe- territories. Ukraine is forced regions, with the appropriate riod where a large portion of to implement the reform in redistribution of financial re- the civic society was involved parallel with a different “de- sources. The European Char- in repelling the aggressor centralisation” format that re- ter of Local Self-Government (through volunteer action lates to crisis resolution in the refers to this as the subsidiary in both military and civil- zone of the Russian-Ukrainian principle. This principle pos- ian fields). On one hand, the conflict.2 Thus, the external tulates that all socioeconom- government’s move towards aggression factor is one of the ic and security services must decentralisation in wartime main hindrances to the state- be in maximum proximity to conditions may appear illog- wide decentralisation reform, their final consumer, the citi- ical, given the increased cen- including in the context of its zen or the community. Prac- trifugal processes in the state. ultimate recognition in the tical decentralisation experi- On the other, decentralisation Constitution. Experts of the ence in a number of European today may be the only one CACDS, with support from the countries shows that this prin- of Ukraine’s reforms that has Geneva Centre for Democratic ciple also remains relevant for a clear platform and a prov- Control of Armed Forces, have a number of national security en record of accomplishment carried out a comparison of aspects.1 The main perfor- over the past three years. the two decentralisation op- mance criterion of the trans- Meanwhile, successful imple- tions.
1 This refers primarily to the practices of France and Poland, whose modern-day experience of state development has been taken into consideration by the Ukrainian reform concept. 2 For an in-depth analysis of the problems surrounding “decentralisation” under the Minsk Agreements, see Section 2 of this paper.
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 7 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
problems that have plagued tralisation reforms in Ukraine’s 1 Legislative Ukrainian local self-govern- partner states, including the 1. Basis for the ment ever since the declara- USA, Switzerland, Poland, Can- tion of Ukraine’s independ- ada, France, Germany, Sweden, Decentralisation ence. At the same time, even Norway, and others.3 at the start of the reform it As of late 2017, Ukraine had Reform had become obvious that its created a fundamental legis- Ukraine’s decentralisation success in Ukraine hinges on lative framework for the de- reform is often informally re- unified and coordinated effort centralisation reform. Its main ferred to as the “government of all state authorities, bodies components can be classified reform,” because its primary of local self-government, and based on the reform entity driver was the Cabinet of Min- civic society institutions, with (from the legislative initiative isters. By approving the “Con- support from international or- point of view), and the “func- cept of the Reform of Local ganizations and drawing on tional” principle. Self-Government and Territo- the global best practices in this From the legislative ini- rial Organization of Govern- field. tiative standpoint, the main ment in Ukraine” on April 2014, The reformation processes entities of the decentralisa- it had launched a reform that are carried out with support of tion reform are the Verkhovna aimed to transform commu- the Council of Europe, the EU, Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of nity theory into local self-gov- and the UN; and draw on the Ministers of Ukraine, and the ernment practice in Ukraine, practical experience of local Ministry for Regional Develop- and to resolve a number of self-government and decen- ment.4 In terms of the “func-
3 Vladyslav Fedorenko. Local Self-Government Reform in Independent Ukraine: Concepts, Priorities, Prospects / The Ukrainian Chronicle of Constitutional Law, http://www.constjournal.com/2016-1/reforma-mistsevogo-samovry- aduvannya-v-nezalezhnij-ukrayini-ponyattya-priorytety-perspektyvy 4 The Ministry of Regional Development, Building and Housing of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as “Ministry of Regional Development”) is the relevant Ukrainian ministry pertaining to the state-wide decentralisation reform.
8 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
tional” classification of the leg- structural potentials, as well as It was the implementation islation, there are three distinct of resources required to exer- of this Concept that had initiat- thematic groups: “Community cise said authority at that level.”7 ed the reform of local self-gov- Consolidation,” “Financial De- According to the Con- ernment rooted in the princi- centralisation,” and “Communi- cept, Ukraine’s decentralisa- ples of decentralisation and ty Cooperation.”5 tion would not entail a formal subsidiarity. On June 17, 2014, The fundamental provisions transfer of power and resourc- the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the government’s “Concept es to local self-government adopted the Law of Ukraine of the Reform of Local Self-Gov- bodies (e.g. village and city “On Cooperation of Territorial ernment and Territorial Or- councils), but rather a creation Communities,” which deter- ganization of Government in of “capable” territorial com- mines the organizational and Ukraine” (hereinafter referred to munities that would be able legal principles, forms, and as “Concept”) are in clear corre- to effectively exercise the au- mechanisms for cooperation lation with the European Char- thority granted to them. The among local communities, as ter of Local Self-Government. Concept, among other things, well as the principles, forms Thus, according to Article 9 of became the first fundamental and mechanisms for incentiv- the European Charter of Local document to clearly recognize izing, financing, and supervis- Self-Government, “…local au- that local self-government sys- ing such cooperation.8 Essen- thorities shall be entitled, with- tem existing as of early 2014 tially, this Law legitimized the in national economic policy, was untenable. First of all, the entire toolbox for cooperation to adequate financial resourc- document recognizes the inef- among territorial communities es of their own, of which they fectiveness of providing con- and stimulated their further may dispose freely within the tinuous financial support to consolidation. framework of their powers.”6 small territorial communities The year 2015 in Ukrain- In Ukraine’s Concept, the sub- from district budgets through ian politics was a landmark sidiary principle provides that, the equalization grant system. year for the decentralisation “The state grants authority to The latter, on one hand, bur- reform. It saw the adoption the bodies of local self-govern- dens the State Budget, and on of legislative acts crucial for ment, which act at the level of the other, hampers develop- the reform’s implementation, the administrative-territorial ment of small cities and town- as well as consolidated effort system where exercising such ships. Thus, the Concept had towards the reform by the authority is both possible and laid down the foundations for government’s legislative and feasible, from the standpoints “financial decentralisation” as executive branches. Essential- of staffing, financial and infra- part of the general reform. ly, the decentralisation reform
5 Decentralisation of Power. Legislation, http://decentralisation.gov.ua/legislationn 6 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Strasbourg, October 15, 1985. Official translation to Ukrainian http:// zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/994_036 7 On Approval of the Concept of the Reform of Local Self-Government and Territorial Organization of Government in Ukraine: Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of April 1, 2014. N 333-rp, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/333-2014-%D1%80 8 On Cooperation of Territorial Communities: Law of Ukraine of June 17, 2014 N 1508-VII, http://zakon2.rada.gov. ua/laws/show/ru/1508-18
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 9 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
rose above political infighting: ister, not even his opponents • creating capable territorial a situation rather unique for doubt his achievements in communities whose main the recent history of Ukraini- terms of the decentralisation task is to better serve the an statehood, and for 2015 in reform. Hennadiy Zubko, Dep- needs of the public, pro- particular, as tensions ran very uty Prime Minister for Regional vide the public with quick high that year (due to the sig- Development, Construction and high-quality social and nificant escalation at the front and Housing of Ukraine was administrative services, line). The only exception to this head of the relevant ministry improve the conditions for was the upheaval surrounding for the decentralisation reform sustainable development the Draft Law “On Amending in Yatsenyuk’s government of relevant territories, and the Constitution of Ukraine as and retained his position in use budget funds and oth- to Decentralisation of Power.” Groysman’s new cabinet. That er resources with greater Both the Kremlin and Ukraine’s is a clear example of succes- efficiency; Western partners had pressed sion and consistency within • creating the prerequisites for unifying the state-wide the implementation of this to improve the system of reform with the conflict reso- critically important reform, local self-government bod- lution process in the combat and evidence that the decen- ies in appropriate territo- zone and within Ukrainian ter- tralisation issue has been tak- ries.10 ritories temporarily occupied en outside any political bar- The period between 2014- by the Russian Federation – gaining and speculation. 2017 saw the completion of namely, to combine the de- The key objective of the such tasks as: adopting of centralisation reform with the Law of Ukraine “On Voluntary all fundamental legislation Minsk process, which includes Consolidation of Territorial necessary for voluntary con- a separate decentralisation an- Communities” was to establish solidation of communities; gle.9 a procedure for the consolida- reform of inter-budgetary The decentralisation re- tion of the territorial commu- relations; decentralisation in form was the top priority both nities of villages, townships the sphere of construction for the two governments of Ar- and cities, and for the granting control and administrative seniy Yatsenyuk (27.02.2014 – of state support to the consol- services; and creation of leg- 14.04.2016) and for that of idated territorial communities; islation that would regulate Volodymyr Groysman (since as well as to create legal foun- Ukraine’s regional policy and 14.04.2016; the latter had be- dations and opportunities for: regional development financ- come the Prime Minister after • agglomeration through ing based on the formulas and serving as the Head of the Con- voluntary consolidation approaches that correspond stitutional Commission for the of territorial communities, to the best EU practices, not Decentralisation Reform). De- with an increased role of on lobbying and any given re- spite the mixed assessments of such agglomeration in re- gion’s loyalty towards the rul- Yatsenyuk’s stint as Prime Min- solving local issues; ing party.
9 The Draft Law “On Amending the Constitution of Ukraine as to Decentralisation of Power” is reviewed separately in further sections of this paper. For an in-depth analysis of the problems surrounding “decentralisation” under the Minsk Agreements, see Part 2 of this paper. 10 Ibid.
10 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
ation of ATCs in 2017, the rate the early stages of community 1.2 The Status of of voluntary agglomeration of agglomeration. In 2017, the the Decentralisation basic local self-government procedure for amending pro- entities can be cautiously as- spective plans became stricter, Reform: Current sessed as positive. due to an increasing number By the end of 2017, each of very small communities be- Achievements, oblast has its Prospective Plan ing created (some 2,000-3,000 Problems, and Open for the Formation of Commu- people). Objectively, it would nity Territories, an expert doc- be very difficult for small com- Questions ument drafted by oblast-lev- munities to effectively develop Of all the reforms current- el and district-level working or even survive. According to ly underway in Ukraine, de- groups together with experts, the estimates of Ukrainian and centralisation is objectively heads of city councils and oth- European experts, a more-or- considered among the most er contributors. This document less capable community must successful ones. It has borne serves to answer the main include at least 8,000-10,000 concrete results and a number question: how to create “capa- members, while European ex- of success stories, primarily in ble” communities that would perts actually lean towards the sphere of financial decen- provide for their own needs 20,000-30,000 as a preferred tralisation and the transforma- with maximum regard for the number.11 Because of this, tion of local self-government interests of their public. The Ukraine takes a very thorough bodies into associations of ter- expert document is subject to approach to any amendment ritorial communities (ATC). approval, among others, by a of the prospective plans. First: Ukraine is creating session of the oblast council (in Second: a division of a territorial basis for local most oblasts that was done in authority is underway be- self-government bodies and 2015). Simultaneously with the tween different levels of local executive authorities. Upon drafting, approval and imple- self-government bodies. The the reform’s completion, the mentation of the expert docu- most vital powers (including new three-tier administra- ment, voluntary consolidation certain powers in the sphere tive-territorial system would into ATCs continues. All com- of defense, where a brand include 27 regions (within the munities are consolidating vol- new civil defence/protection existing 24 oblasts, the Auton- untarily. However, in order to system is being created) are omous Republic of Crimea, receive financial preferences handed over to the govern- and Kyiv and Sevastopol as and additional financing, ATCs ment level that is closest to cities with special status), 120- must be created according to the public. Going forward, the 150 districts, and approximate- each oblast’s approved Pro- power must be divided be- ly 1,500 communities. As of spective Plan. This eliminates tween the self-government late May 2017, 413 ATCs have the risk of chaotic creation of and the executive branch, already been created. Despite ATCs and creates a supervi- where the latter retain the a certain slowdown in the cre- sion system that works even at functions of control, supervi-
11 Diana Barynova, Director of the Kharkiv Center for Development of Local Self-Government, on Viddzerkalennya [Reflection], ATN TV channel, May 25, 2017. – Accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LM0Ya1eE6Z4
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 11 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
sion, and coordination. After their problems. Appropriate the quality of medical services. appropriate amendments are changes have been made to The community now employs made to the Constitution, the the Budget and Tax Code of their own emergency physi- central government represent- Ukraine to this end.13 Namely, cian, radiologist, and paedia- ative will be called a “Prefect”,12 financial decentralisation pro- trician, and is funding the ed- and they will have the author- vides that a certain number of ucation of three more medical ity to stop any illegal action of local taxes be levied at the lo- specialists.14 local self-government bodies, cal, community level. In addi- Thus, the effectiveness of coordinate the work of the law tion to that, targeted medical ATC creation and operation enforcement, and control the and educational subsidies are is measured by the results of implementation of state-wide granted directly to the local budget decentralisation that programs (following the prin- level, without an oblast-level allowed to more than double ciple of “oversee, not direct”). intermediary. In education, the local budget revenues of con- At the same time, the imple- project is already underway to solidated territorial communi- mentation of local and region- ensure that flagship schools ties in 2016. In May 2016, the al programs will fully depend within ATCs are well-equipped. Ministry for Regional Devel- on the local government. Thus, In the sphere of medicine, lo- opment, with assistance from decentralisation does not cal reforms are slowed down the Swiss-Ukrainian project only grant the latter increased by the delayed start of the “Decentralisation Support of power, but also expands their national medical reform. To- Ukraine” (DESPRO) and the scope of responsibility. day, the most that commu- Swedish-Ukrainian project Third: to this end, the re- nities can do on their level is “Support to Decentralisation form envisages an update of to purchase equipment and in Ukraine,” had conducted an the budget system. In other carry out repairs at hospitals overview of the financial capa- words, bodies of local self-gov- and first-aid/obstetric offices. bility of consolidated territorial ernment will be forming their However, even in these con- communities,15 for those ATCs budgets on their own, and ditions, those who are willing that held their first local elec- will be able to join efforts to succeed can succeed. For tions on October 25, 2015 and and finances. Thus, they will example, the Bashtanka ATC had direct inter-budgetary re- gain access to resources re- (Mykolaiv oblast) has placed lations with the state budget quired to develop and resolve the emphasis on improving in 2016. According to the over-
12 The term “prefect” and the respective amendments to the Constitution are further explained in Section 1.3 of this paper: Security Aspects of the Decentralisation: Achievements and the Challenges and Risks to Overcome During Reform Implementation. 13 On Amending the Budget Code of Ukraine as to the Reform of Inter-Budgetary Relations: Law of Ukraine of De- cember 28, 2014 N 79-VIII – Accessed at: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/79-19; On Amending the Tax Code of Ukraine and Several Legislative Act of Ukraine as to the Tax Reform: Law of Ukraine of December 28, 2014N 71- VIII – Accessed at: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/71-19 14 “Bashtanka ATC focuses on village development and improved medical service (Mykolayiv oblast),” Decentralisa- tion of Power. Success Stories – Accessed at: http://decentralisation.gov.ua/success/item/id/1199 15 Decentralisation. Local Budgets of 159 Consolidated Territorial Communities. 2015 — 2016 (forecast), Ministry of Regional Development – Accessed at: http://www.minregion.gov.ua/decentralisation/presentation/finanso- va-detsentralizatsiya-v-diyi/
12 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
view, the total approved gen- switched to direct relations tals and kindergartens within eral fund revenue of the local with the state budget starting community territories – for budgets of Ukrainian ATCs January 1, 2017, and had only the first time in the 26 years in 2016, including transfers operated for one year, a look of Ukrainian independence. from the state budget, was at their financial indicators Hennadiy Zubko, one of the UAH 4,553 million [USD 173 shows that their own finan- initiators of the local self-gov- million], which was almost 5 cial revenues had doubled or ernment in Ukraine and the times the combined adjust- even tripled, while their total Deputy Prime Minister for ed total of local budgets (that budgets had increased five- to Regional Development, Con- were included in ATCs) for seven-fold due to educational struction and Housing, says 2015. Thanks to the amend- and medical subsidies. Thus, that, “this is real decentralisa- ments to the tax and budget financial decentralisationtion in action, which cannot be legislation in the decentralisa- speaks for itself. According to denied or ignored.”17 tion context, revenues of the Diana Barynova, Director of As of September 2017, local budgets of consolidated the Kharkiv Center for Devel- only the first stage of the local communities had almost dou- opment of Local Self-Govern- self-government reform is un- bled compared to 2015 (a dif- ment, “…decentralisation is derway within the general de- ference of UAH 1,046 million Ukrainian rural community’s centralisation reform: namely, [USD 40 million]: from UAH only chance to overhaul itself, creating ATCs, the fundamen- 827 million [USD 31.5 million] a chance that will not come tal level of local self-govern- to UAH 1,873 million [USD 71.5 again. We can see how true this ment. The existing adminis- million]). is, when we visit the consoli- trative district boundaries are Kharkiv oblast presents an dated territorial communities, preserved at this time, but interesting example of decen- those that had already func- consolidation of districts is to tralisation practices. Accord- tioned for a year. .. The positive follow as the second stage of ing to the oblast’s prospective change dynamic is tangible for the reform. The need for ag- plan, 57 consolidated terri- every citizen because most of glomeration of districts will, in- torial communities are to be the funds remain at the local deed, arise with time, because formed in the region, with an level. … The main thing about if the population of all admin- emphasis on creating power- this reform is that all important istrative-territorial units of a ful ATCs with strict adherence decisions are made closer to certain district joins into com- to the “capability” factor. The the people.” 16 munities, all powers would be process has not been perfect- Infrastructural subsidies transferred to the level of these ly smooth, and only 6 ATCs are an important budget inno- newly-created ATCs, leaving have been created in Kharkiv vation for consolidated com- essentially nothing at the dis- oblast as of mid-2017. Howev- munities. Because of them, we trict level. As a result, there is er, even though the newly-cre- see construction of roads and no sense in maintaining a dis- ated communities had only renovation of schools, hospi- trict council, because the issue
16 Viddzerkalennya [Reflection], ATN TV channel, May 25, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LM0Ya1eE6Z4 17 Hennadiy Zubko. The Reform in Numbers and Actions, Livyi Bereg, http://blogs.lb.ua/gennadiy_zubko/341309_ reforma_tsifrah_i_diyah_.html
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 13 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
of shared joint property is also ries to suit their own interests will have to resort to consoli- eliminated. Relevant legisla- (often, in cooperation with vil- dating “from the top down” in tion (involving amendments lage/township heads), which order to accelerate the reform. to a number of laws) is current- does not correspond to the Sooner or later, different parts ly being drafted to regulate the Prospective Plan and the “ca- of Ukraine will be living under relations that arise in this case pability” requirements. These different sets of local self-gov- and to determine the format people do their share of fear ernment principles, which is of district agglomeration. This mongering among the public, unacceptable from the finan- second stage of the reform will spreading myths like “they’ll cial point of view, among other directly rely on the effective take your land,” “they’ll close reasons. The local government implementation/completion hospitals and schools,” etc. For reform may become suspend- of the crucial community crea- another example of how the ed in an uncertain state. There- tion stage in accordance with human factor presents a prob- fore, it would be reasonable to the Prospective Plans. lem: heads of village councils expect the Cabinet of Ministers Next to the successes and keep arguing among them- to pass resolutions with rele- achievements described above, selves, as to who would be the vant decisions, and the Parlia- the process also has a number head of the new ATC, and who ment to amend certain laws of objective problems and hin- will have to settle for being and legislative acts that would drances caused by such factors “just” a local foreman [starosta]. provide for the option of di- as: 1) lack of statutory deadlines Personal ambitions take front rective-based consolidation for ATC creation; 2) slowdown of and centre, combined with a of communities under certain the reform by heads of village/ lack of understanding for the conditions. Experts believe township councils under the old reform’s actual paradigm. that consolidation of commu- administrative-territorial format There are reasons to be- nities “from the top down” can (largely due to their unwilling- lieve that these problems will be expected as early as in 2018. ness to be responsible to their be resolved through evolu- Hennadiy Zubko, the relevant citizens); 3) staffing issues; 4) dif- tion. Examples of real improve- minister, is more conservative ficulties with carrying out suc- ments of the quality of life in in his estimates: “Starting from cessful financial decentralisation the newly-created ATCs, ap- 2019, Ukraine will delegate in the presence of factor (1). propriate efforts by the media authority to the communities The experts are unanimous and the civic society, quality on an administrative basis. … in their opinion that the main work of former heads of village The year of 2018 will be crucial hindrance for ATC creation lies and township councils in their in the community consolida- with the current heads of the positions of ATC heads and tion process. Next year, we will existing districts, villages and foremen – all these factors will determine the administrative townships, who fear losing have an appropriate impact, centres, and a year later, make their influence. Local business including dispelling the myths administrative decisions. We figures also introduce a degree and old stereotypes. are approaching mandatory of chaos into the process as It also merits pointing out delegation of authority to the they try to “cut up” the territo- that at a certain stage, Ukraine communities.” 18
18 Ibid.
14 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
It must be understood of education and medicine). will also result in a more ac- that if most communities Another indication of the re- tive political process, democ- were to consolidate (indicat- form’s degree of success is ratization of the society ing a certain degree of the re- the high level of confidence through public involvement form’s success), then the dis- towards local self-govern- in decision-making, and in- trict council and the district ment, which sometimes ex- creased public trust towards administration would not be ceeds 50% and is among the the government authorities. retained for the sake of the highest levels of confidence one or two village councils found in Ukraine, exceeded that refused consolidation. only by those of the army 1.3 Security At the same time, a small vil- and the church. Among the Aspects of the lage council covering 600- positive changes noted, 1000 persons will not be able changes in the fields of in- Decentralisation: to exercise the necessary au- frastructure, municipal ser- thority to govern education, vices, and transport are the Achievements and medicine, culture, municipal most frequently pointed out. the Challenges and services, etc. These spheres are the pri- Thus, Ukraine is current- mary recipients of finances Risks to Overcome ly following a progressive within the newly-created and civilized path towards ATCs. They are followed by During the Reform creating the conditions for elementary, secondary and Implementation the decentralisation reform, alternative education facili- and the subsequent “top- ties, cultural institutions, the Reform fundamentals down” consolidation of com- medical system, and others. aimed at strengthening the se- munities in the future will At the same time, in ad- curity sector be viewed as the call of the dition to its purely econom- Before assessing the securi- time. ic aspects, decentralisation ty aspects of Ukraine’s decen- Overall, according to positively affects civil socie- tralisation, one must clearly the expert estimates of the ty development. For exam- identify the reform stages and Center for Army, Conversion ple, experts note that new- their implementation status, and Disarmament Studies ly-elected ATC heads are namely: (CACDS), where the decen- attempting to be more open • “financial decentralisa- tralisation reform is in the with their constituents. Offi- tion” – essentially imple- focus of regional studies as cials of some ATCs strive to mented; part of the “Security Sector make their work as transpar- • creation of ATCs, with the of Ukraine” project, it can ent as possible, publicizing formation of security cen- be stated that the reform their agenda and decisions tres “from the bottom up” itself and the practical ex- on their respective websites. at the level of local self-gov- perience of the ATCs consti- Therefore, a well-devel- ernment bodies (LSGB); tute a positive achievement. oped and properly imple- • transformation of the exec- Furthermore, ATC residents mented decentralisation re- utive power vertical / crea- view other reforms in a more form will not only improve tion of a new system for su- positive light as well (par- the quality of our public’s life pervision and control over ticularly those in the spheres outside of large cities, but the new LSGB – currently at
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 15 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
the stage of constitutional township. There is no increase truly democratic state follow- recognition). in authority at the oblast lev- ing the best European exam- The decentralisation for- el, thus precluding trends ples (and drawing on the most mat described above creates towards regionalization/fed- progressive European practic- foundations for a number of eralization. The central gov- es). On one hand, the reform positive moves towards im- ernment retains and, in some has already created economic proving the national security cases, increases its key role in incentives for the new volun- sector. First of all, this means the sphere of national security, tarily created communities to creating municipal and civic primarily in the entire range of develop new production fa- organizations that would assist defense issues, foreign policy, cilities, and provided natural the state authorities in the pa- supremacy of law, and protec- deterrents to corruption by triotic education of the public tion of human rights and free- eliminating artificial barriers (especially the youth), provid- doms. In fact, from the security to business, such as excessive ing disaster relief, issues of civil point of view, implementation permits and undue control. On defence, teaching first aid skills of the prefect institution will the other hand, given the con- to the public, etc. “Bottom-up” facilitate “financial decentrali- stant threat of escalation at the initiatives are meant to notably sation” and completion of the front, the reform is creating a improve public safety against ATC creation process. (Prefects, new environment in which the armed attacks, as well as natu- appointed by the President, national defence sector can be ral and man-made disasters. In will monitor adherence to the strengthened “from the bot- addition, which is particularly laws and the Constitution of tom up,” in combination with important at the current point Ukraine at the oblast level. If the reformation and strength- in history, they are meant to necessary, they will be author- ening of the Armed Forces of create sustainable safeguards ized to suspend decisions of lo- Ukraine, the National Guard against separatist trends and cal councils, and the President of Ukraine, and other power the influence of the Russian may dissolve local councils by agencies. agent network aimed at dest- prefect’s suggestion.)19 3) The reform stimulates abilization from within. 2) Ukraine’s experience in comprehensive development In terms of the security sec- carrying out a decentralisation of communities, as it treats tor, the decentralisation pro- reform is unique because its every citizen of Ukraine as a cess in Ukraine has the follow- implementation coincides in full-fledged master of their ing characteristics: time with the Kremlin’s exter- own land. This lays the founda- 1) According to the best Eu- nal “hybrid” aggression. The tion for “de-oligarchizing” the ropean practices, the Ukrain- occupation of Crimea and of Ukrainian economy and other ian style of decentralisation certain districts of Donetsk spheres of public life, by creat- entails handing over a signifi- and Lugansk oblasts did not ing a situation in which com- cant amount of power to the put a stop to the state-wide munities put pressure on local local community level – in this decentralisation processes, deputies, demanding profes- case, the level of city, village or which are crucial for building a sional and transparent work.
19 The issues related to “prefects” are discussed in Section 1.4 of this paper: The Prefect Institution as a Safeguard against the Weakening of Central Power in the Security Sector.
16 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
In the future, these aspects of processes, and a recognition sisting local law enforcement the reform will become the of Kyiv’s agency, both in terms bodies, creating volunteer fire- key factor for Ukraine’s victo- of the decentralisation process fighting brigades, providing ry in the so-called “war of dif- and in reference to Ukraine’s disaster relief (supervised by ferent social worlds” – a pro- demands and disposition in its the State Emergency Service gressive European world with fight for territorial integrity. of Ukraine /SES/), increasing emphasis on the welfare and In adapting the national the effectiveness of the cen- protection of each citizen, vs. security system during the de- tralized territorial defence sys- Kremlin-imposed puppet dic- centralisation reform, Ukraine tem, and other tasks. This, one tatorship held together ex- is placing emphasis on ensur- might say, network strategy clusively by Russia’s weapons. ing comprehensive and syn- for local departments will help That is what must ensure suc- ergetic effort: by each citizen, in filling the law enforcement cessful resolution of Kyiv’s cru- the civil society, and the state and emergency rescue vacu- cial security issue: to have the government. The best tool um during the decentralisa- territories currently occupied in creating a comprehensive tion process, and facilitate the by Russia peacefully returned, system for national defence use of new regional configu- and to prevent the conflict lies in each citizen’s realization rations as territorial communi- from being frozen, similarly to of their responsibility to en- ties are being created. the scenarios played out by sure the safety of their village, Implementing a compre- the Kremlin puppet masters in township, city, region, and hensive approach to the secu- Transnistria, and in Abkhazia country. If every Ukrainian vil- rity system: strengthening se- and South Ossetia.20 lage or city resident clearly un- curity at the level of new local 4) One must also bear in derstands the steps to follow self-government bodies mind an important foreign in any emergency situation At this stage of the decen- policy aspect of the reform, (an armed attack, or a natural tralisation reform, it bears mer- whereby by pursuing decen- or manmade disaster), disas- it to identify the following di- tralisation (in both legislation ter mitigation and relief will be rections for strengthening the and practice), Kyiv shows con- highly effective, and the con- security sector at the level of sistent and strict observance sequences for the public and new LSGB: of Ukraine’s pro-European the infrastructure, minimal. • placing the civil defence/ course, and fulfilment of its Instead of a security and protection system under relevant obligations despite defence model based on the control of local communi- the objective difficulty in“top-down” government verti- ties, by adopting and im- this turbulent period result- cal, a comprehensive approach plementing the “Reform ing from external aggression. is more effective in a decentral- Strategy of the State Emer- Thus, Ukraine has grounds to ized environment, where the gency Service”; demand from its Western part- civic society within the new- • implementing pilot pro- ners similar consistency, deep ly-created territorial commu- jects of modern fire depart- understanding of the ongoing nities is widely involved in as- ments in the newly-created
20 For an analysis of the risk of Kremlin’s Transnistrian/Abkhazian-South-Ossetian scenario for Ukraine, see Part 2 of this paper.
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 17 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
ATCs, following the above; Strong cooperation of • identifying and explaining • implementing in practice a ATCs with SES representatives ATCs’ powers in the sphere comprehensive approach will be a crucial factor for the of civil protection; to the creation of public effectiveness of this branch of • organizing and operating safety centres within com- the reform. This process is al- a civil protection unit (ap- munities; ready underway. Namely, the pointing an official to that • developing the concept SES, together with the Insti- effect); of the municipal guard as tute of Public Administration • creating system for threat a local authority charged in the Sphere of Civil Protec- and emergency alerts and with ensuring civil order tion, has developed the Prac- civil protection informa- within the community and tical Guide on implementing tion; strengthening the territori- the main civil protection ef- • organizing public evacua- al defence system. forts during the reform of lo- tion; An important aspect here is cal government and territorial • sheltering the public in pro- the fact that the decentralisa- organization of government tective structures in case of tion process involves reform- in Ukraine.22 This document, an emergency; ing both the civil protection which has been distributed • creating and operating lo- system (as part of the commu- among the newly-created cal fire departments; nity consolidation process) and ATCs, includes samples of typ- • providing for operation of as the State Emergency Service ical documents, action plans, volunteer fire brigades; overall, as per the needs of the and decision options for local • financial support for the reform. The resolution of the councils and executive bod- costs incurred in relation to Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ies in relation to the main civil the exercise of authority by of January 25, 2017 approved protection tasks of ATCs. This bodies of local self-govern- the “Reform Strategy of the is a pilot project that entails ment in the sphere of civil State Emergency Service,”21 organizing civil protection for protection. according to which the entire the population of the capable The implementation of civil civil protection system – from ATCs within the mentioned protection measures in a con- fire department equipment to Concept of the reform of local solidated territorial communi- protective structures – will be self-government and territo- ty must be organized by a civil subordinated to the commu- rial organization of govern- protection unit (department, nities. Therefore, consolidated ment in Ukraine, in order to administration, division, sub- territorial communities must assist bodies of local self-gov- division, sector) with an ap- ensure effective operation of ernment in organizing and propriate official. Such a unit the civil protection system, operating the civil protection is created (and a relevant offi- even during the early stages of system within each ATC. Work cial appointed) as part of the their creation and operation. on this project entails: ATC executive committee, with
21 On Adopting the Reform Strategy of the State Emergency Service, Resolution of the CMU N 61-r of January 25, 2017, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/61-2017-%D1%80 22 Practical Guidance on implementing the main civil protection efforts during the reform of local government and territorial organization of government in Ukraine, http://decentralisation.gov.ua/pics/attachments/Poradniik_ MPK_(1)_(1).pdf
18 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
due consideration to the man- tres for Civil Protection, Health eventually covering the entire made burden of the ATC terri- and Safety are opening up in oblast with a network of per- tory. Operation of the of civil the oblasts, together with the manent units.23 protection unit would meet respective Centres for Devel- Similar projects are being the need for timely implemen- opment of Local Self-Govern- implemented in the Poltava, tation of civil protection meas- ment. Vinnitsa, and other oblasts of ures, as envisaged by Article 19 One of the main tasks for Ukraine. An important require- of the Civil Protection Code of Ukraine’s civil protection sys- ment to volunteer fire bri- Ukraine tem is to reform the fire safety gades is the ability to arrive at The governance structure system in view of the creation the disaster site within 10-20 of the ATC civil protection of consolidated communi- minutes, thus ensuring high unit would include the local ties, where special emphasis effectiveness in firefighting as fire and rescue department as is placed on volunteer fire de- well as in other civil protection well as volunteer fire brigades partments. In 2016, the SES functions. (attached to companies and developed the Guidelines for Illustrative example can citizen groups), both types Local Self-Government Bodies found in the implementa- reporting to the ATC civil pro- on Organizing and Ensuring tion of the pilot projects for tection unit. Authority and Fire Safety within the Territo- modern fire departments in obligations would be divided ries of Consolidated Territorial the Shyshaky and Bila Tserkva in such a way that coordina- Communities. ATCs (Poltava oblast), which tion of the civil protection unit This branch of coopera- intend to provide a proper would be carried out by the tion between the SES and the level of fire safety as well as Deputy Head of Council, who newly-created ATCs is already new work places for the res- would also be the head of the bearing fruit. The first steps idents of the consolidated council’s executive committee. have been made towards cre- communities. Work is under- In this process, the primary ating local volunteer brigades, way to conduct an in-depth tasks of the SES are: providing albeit with limited functions. analysis of the natural and instruction and guidance to Since the beginning of 2017, man-made threats to the daily citizens for organizing local formation process of volunteer life of the ATC residents, and volunteer fire brigades; deter- fire brigades within the SES subsequently draft risk pass- mining optimal staff count for started. Aside from actual fire- ports, which would describe the civil protection service to fighting, these brigades would each community’s level of risk be created at the level of each carry out civil protection in cri- in terms of various natural ATC, with consideration to sis situations (such as natural and man-made disasters. De- their man-made burden; and or man-made disasters). As of sign and estimate documents organizing training sessions to this time, 32 territorial com- have been commissioned in educate the public on proper munities have been created in order to construct the Centre behaviour when faced with Zhytomyr oblast, and they are for Civil Protection and reno- an emergency. To this end, Ed- forming their own volunteer vate parts of the existing fire ucation and Instruction Cen- fire brigades, with the aim of depots in the two population
23 Mykhailo Samus. A Safe Decentralisation. CACDS, http://cacds.org.ua/ru/safe/theme/1103
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 19 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
centres included in the above At this time, work is under- munity and strengthening the ATCs. Both communities have way to finalize the legislation territorial defence system. approved the provisions and concerning the legal status In 2015, the Draft Law “On structures of the local units of of volunteer firefighters, their Municipal Guard” was adopted the Unified State Civil Protec- rights and obligations on as- as a basis in the first reading. tion System; as well as formed signments, social security, and The purpose of the draft law and staffed commissions in the other aspects. is to improve the system for issues of technogenic and en- Creating a system of civil the protection of life, health, vironmental safety and emer- protection at the ATC level will rights and freedoms of mem- gencies. The Main Department lay the foundation for creat- bers of territorial communities, of the SES in Poltava oblast ing Public Safety Centres. The as well as the property, envi- organized training sessions comprehensive approach to ronment, and interests of local for civil protection special- their creation was present- communities, against unlawful ists of consolidated territorial ed in April 2017. Public Safe- encroachment. The draft law communities, and prepared ty Centres represent a brand determines the legal and or- guidelines on organizing the new level of service provided ganizational principles for op- work of local fire departments. by the SES at the level of the eration of the municipal guard, Modern fire engines are being newly-created ATCs. Each such its main tasks and functions, purchased, with support from Centre would include a fire and its governance structure. the State Fund for Region- depot, district police officer’s The draft law suggests grant- al Development. The project office, and a first-aid/obstet- ing local councils the right to also entails equipping local ric office if necessary. This was create their municipal guard, departments with modern the approach suggested by which would be financed from respiratory protection devices the SES to the heads of oblast the respective local budget for use in environments un- state administrations. Tenta- or from the other sources not suitable for breathing. These tive financial calculations have prohibited by the legislation. development investment mac- been done as well: the cost of The municipal guard would be roprojects had garnered the a basic Safety Centre is UAH subordinated to local commu- support of the German Society 2.3 million [USD 88 thousand]; nities, and work to ensure the for International Cooperation an optimal one, UAH 3 million rule of law and order within (GIZ), while adjacent commu- [USD 114 thousand].25 the territory of the respec- nities are already discussing Simultaneously, the de- tive administrative-territorial the mechanisms for further centralisation reform is also unit.26 inter-municipal cooperation implementing the concept of The draft law defines mu- with the newly-created Eu- the municipal guard as a local nicipal guard as a body with- ropean-standard fire depart- authority charged with ensur- in the local self-government ments.24 ing civil order within the com- system, tasked with protect-
24 Decentralisation of Power. News. Pilot projects of modern fire stations implemented in the Shyshaky and Bila Tserkva ATCs, http://decentralisation.gov.ua/news/item/id/3786 25 Decentralisation of Power. News. Presentation of the Comprehensive Approach to Creating Public Safety Centres in Communities (+slideshow), http://decentralisation.gov.ua/news/item/id/5352 26 Draft Law of Ukraine “On Municipal Guard,” http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=55192
20 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
ing public order, rule of law, other sources not prohibited by new TrD system is being han- and the rights, freedoms and the legislation. It is important to dled at the legislative level. lawful interests of the public note that the MG is subordinat- On one hand, heads of within the territory that lies in ed to the territorial community, oblast state administrations the respective council’s juris- the local council, the local head, (OSA) only nominally com- diction. and the territorial internal affairs mand the TrD units at this time, The municipal guard (MG) body of Ukraine. while the latter are de facto would operate in oblast cen- We must emphasize that under state control through a tres and within ATC territories creation of MG units and com- network of military commis- (and districts, after the admin- pletion of the respective Draft sariats. However, the experi- istrative reform is complete). In Law are carried out in concert ence of Crimea and Donbas terms of its structure, MG staff with the MIA system reform. In had demonstrated that not all numbers would be approved the decentralisation context, service members connected by the local council, while the the key aspects of that reform to military enlistment offices head of the MG would be ap- are: remained loyal to their oath pointed by the head of the • creating a new service of instead of defecting to the en- community executive council. district police officers (in- emy’s side. Thus, establishing MG units would not be part of cluding staffing, training, strict central control over TrO the Ministry of Internal Affairs. and supply of equipment); units by the General Staff of The main tasks of the MG • creating KORD (Opera- Ukraine and the Ground Forc- are: tive-Sudden Action Corps) es Command is critically im- • protecting public order; units in oblasts; these are portant in the context of the • patrolling territories; special police units tasked decentralisation reform. While • crime prevention; with fighting terrorism and decentralizing politically, we • supporting the govern- gangs, and carrying out would have a centralized mili- ment’s power ministries; major police operations; tary component by increasing • protecting municipal prop- • creating a public service the control of the General Staff erty; system for the rural regions of Ukraine over TrO units; if • providing power support (a number of oblasts al- necessary, even by restricting for decisions made by bod- ready uses the brand new the powers of local state au- ies of local self-govern- “cluster” organization sys- thorities (such as oblast state ment; tem for police and rapid re- administrations, district state • providing legal assistance action missions). administrations, and military to the public. It should also be noted enlistment offices). An option As part of its cooperation that these MG initiatives at the is also being considered to with the Ministry of Internal Af- level of newly-created ATCs, subordinate TrO units to regu- fairs, the MG carries out joint along with the overall MIA re- lar brigades of the Armed Forc- protection of public order; form process, aim to achieve es of Ukraine or the National joint patrolling; information synergy in the creation of an Guard, staffed according to the exchange; joint staff training; effective territorial defence extraterritorial principle. and the use of state informa- (TrD) system that can stand Thus, strengthening na- tion registries. up to the new “hybrid” threats tional security is a hard priority Financing for the MG is pro- on the part of the Kremlin. At for security projects at the lev- vided from the local budget and this time, the issue of Ukraine’s el of new LSGB, just as it is for
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 21 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
political and economic decen- in Rostov oblast (Novocher- ministrations are eliminated.27 tralisation overall. Each decen- kassk). The concept of a “prefect,” to- tralisation initiative is viewed gether with other key aspects through the prism of security, of decentralisation are included and discarded if it has a neg- 1.4 The Prefect in the Draft Law “On Amending ative impact on the state of Institution as a the Constitution of Ukraine as Ukraine’s security and defence to Decentralisation of Power” at the national level. Safeguard against (reg. N2217а). It would also re- It is expected that the ef- place prosecutorial supervision forts of the new local author- the Weakening of of local oblast administrations ities to ensure public order Central Power in the (eliminated during the latest re- in their communities (for ex- form of the prosecutor’s office). ample, with the help of the Security Sector in the Prefects (see Box 1), being “municipal guard” explained a representatives of the central above) will strengthen nation- Presence of Russia’s government, will be granted al security “from the bottom “Hybrid” Aggression the authority to stop unlawful up,” by increasing the overall actions, coordinate the work effectiveness of the Ministry of An ongoing decentralisa- of the law enforcement, and Internal Affairs and strength- tion reform in a country that is control the implementation ening the centralized system de facto subjected to external of state-wide programs. Their of territorial defence (subordi- aggression naturally gives rise work following the principle of nation of TrO units to regional to discussions whether the pos- “oversee, not direct.” or local authorities, instead of sible weakening of the central It is worth noting that while central ones, is out of the ques- power will become the main developing the respective tion). At the same time, these threat to Ukraine’s national se- legislative base, Ukraine has units will be actually owned by curity. These discussions range analysed and taken into con- people, unlike the “people’s mi- from constructive criticism to sideration the experience of litia” of the so-called DNR/LNR political speculation. In this con- European countries with simi- [Donetsk/Lugansk People’s Re- text, it bears merit to mention lar institutions of the executive public]. The latter formations that the reform entails transfor- vertical within the local gov- are created and controlled by mation of the executive power ernment control system. In this Russian special services and vertical, in which the prefect in- respect, the following traits are used to cover the presence of stitution plays a crucial role. specific to the Ukrainian pre- Russian military servicemen Within the decentralisation fect institution: and mercenaries in Donbas reform, the prefect institution 1) Maximum incorporation as part of occupation troops will be created after decentral- of Polish and French experience under operational control of isation-related amendments to (which operate voivodeship higher military headquarters the Constitution take effect and, and prefect institutions, respec- of the Russian Armed Forces accordingly, after local state ad- tively). It appears that Kyiv’s
27 According to the Draft Law “On Prefects”, http://www.minregion.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/prefek- ti-16.11..pdf
22 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
Box 1. Aspects of the prefect institution as a key component for the transformation of the executive branch of local government as part of the decentralisation process.
Purpose: to ensure effective oversight over the compliance of local self-govern- ment bodies with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine in all their decisions. Summary: a prefect is a local body of executive power and a civil servant; prefects do not belong to any political party or office; they are not replaced upon the change of President or the Government; they are independent of local political elites. Scope of authority as relates to local self-government bodies (LSGB): • to oversee the decisions of LSGB to ensure they remain legal and constitutional; • to suspend the effect of any unlawful LSGB acts and escalate them to the court (the prefect does not make a final decision on whether any LSGB act is lawful; that power lies exclusively with the court); • to advice the local council on bringing their decisions into compliance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. Place of work: prefects operate in each district and oblast (the cities Kyiv and Sevastopol have their own prefect); prefect secretariats are created to support the prefect’s work. Staff selection process: prefects are selected through an open competition. Ap- pointment format: prefects are appointed and dismissed by the President upon rec- ommendation by the Government (the procedure is identical to the appointment pro- cedure for the current heads of state administration). Reporting and subordination: prefects are responsible to the President, subordi- nated to the Government, and provide annual reports to both. Term of office: no more than 3 years in the same oblast or district (followed by rotation). selection is a middle ground the prefect can suspend the ef- the authority to analyse all acts between the Polish voivodes fect of a LSGB decision only if adopted by local self-govern- and French prefects. In Poland, they address the court at the ment bodies. In specific cases, a voivode can independently same time, which then decides when any such acts threaten cancel acts of local self-govern- to either uphold the prefect’s the territorial integrity, state ment bodies without involving decision, or abolish it. sovereignty or national securi- the Constitutional Court (if the 2) A prefect with his own ty of Ukraine, or if they do not local self-government bodies secretariat (headquarters), be- comply with the Constitution, disagree with the voivode’s ing the state’s local representa- the prefect has the right to decision, they can address the tive, is a key figure for prevent- directly inform the President court on their own). In France, ing and rooting out federalism who, in turn, addresses the a prefect addresses the court, and separatism. This decentral- Constitutional Court or other- which issues an appropriate isation process is certainly not wise responds within the scope resolution to suspend the ef- about granting LSGB full au- of authority. This is, essentially, fect of a LSGB decision. The tonomy over local activity and a system of safeguards with re- Ukrainian option provides that financial flows. The prefect has gard to the challenges and risks
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 23 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
posed to Ukraine’s sovereignty of the executive branch.” The lat- ducing regional self-govern- and integrity by the Kremlin’s ter, rather, is subject to “de-con- ment without effective state active attempts to destabilize centration,” in order to create control results in the creation of the situation. It also follows the more flexible oversight and con- the so-called “local princedoms,” rule that “fast response trans- trol systems, which would facil- with de facto uncontrollable lates to lack of separatism.” itate provision of appropriate oblast councils. In 1996, the 3) Introducing the prefect responses to the challenges and Constitution of Ukraine provid- institution is not about simply risks faced by Ukraine’s national ed for an oversight system, but changing labels within the ex- security in the presence of Rus- failed to clearly identify the en- ecutive branch of power as part sia’s “hybrid” aggression. tity responsible for such over- of the decentralisation reform. In this context, the prefect sight. Under the old legislation, As the governance and financial institution solidifies the key re- this function fell to the prose- powers of LSGB expand, the pre- quirement of decentralisation: cutor’s office. Today, the latter fecture is created to prevent vi- clear division of executive power no longer has this function, olations at the local level and to and local self-government. The having undergone a reform. ensure a link between the gov- pending amendments to the This is exactly why the prefect ernment and local processes. Constitution determine which institution is meant to ensure 4) An emphasis on the pre- of the prefect’s acts can be void- oversight over the adherence fect as an apolitical civil serv- ed by the head of the state and of local self-government bodies ant: assignment as a prefect which, by the government: acts to the laws and Constitution of means, among other things, related to control over LSGBs lie Ukraine. Until the appropriate departure from all political within the President’s prerog- constitutional amendments parties. Competitive selection ative, while those concerning been passed, the current chal- with subsequent training is territorial executive power bod- lenges and risks arising in the meant to ensure that all pre- ies, within that of the Prime Min- course of the reform are tackled fects are professionally fit for ister. The prefect institution is through comprehensive efforts their position. The Draft Law the suggested implementation by respective power ministries. “On Prefect” specifies that a vehicle for the feedback princi- prefect is a career official that ple that is inherent to effective undergoes a complex nomina- governance systems: the prefect 1.5 Current tion procedure, and provides does not direct, but coordinates, Challenges and for prefects’ discipline, political by harmonizing the actions of neutrality, rotation, and oth- the territorial branches of min- Risks of the er safeguards against political istries and departments, while and corrupt influences. also overseeing the legality of Decentralisation Thus, on one hand, decentral- their acts. Process, and Ways of isation of power in Ukraine is one Introducing the prefect in- of the components for creating stitution is an imperative of the Their Prevention an effective administrative-ter- time. Without it, the decentral- In the context of security, ritorial system with “capable” isation would be incomplete, the key issue of the decentrali- administrative-territorial units. considering the radically new sation reform is oversight over At the same time, the Ukrainian challenges that Ukraine faces. the legality of decisions made decentralisation reform certainly Ukraine’s experience back in by the new local self-govern- does not entail “decentralisation 1993-1994 showed that intro- ment bodies.
24 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
The problems and threats importantly, contains a con- ed resolutions that blatantly that arise in the security sector troversial provision in Section exceeded their scope of au- in the course of the reform can I – Clause 18: “Specifics of Lo- thority and envisaged estab- be grouped into the following cal Self-Government in certain lishing “agreement-based di- two interconnected catego- districts of Donetsk and Lu- vision of power” between the ries: gansk oblasts are determined state and the regions, which • ambiguity of the control by a separate law.”29 On one on paper translated into “fed- over LSGB activity due to hand, this draft law, by amend- eralization” and in reality, into the constitutional conflict ing the Constitution, consol- breakdown of the Ukrainian around the prefect insti- idates and establishes all key state at the current moment tution, which creates pre- aspects of the overall decen- in history.30 It is true that conditions for separatist tralisation process, including these resolutions had been trends; financial aspects, community void and populist since the • emergence of consolidat- creation, security issues (pri- very moment of their adop- ed territorial communities marily via “de-concentration” tion. It should also be noted controlled by represent- of local executive power by that they provoked adequate atives of local large busi- introduction the prefect in- response from the SBU [Secu- nesses (local elites) and de stitution). On the other hand, rity Service of Ukraine], which facto not subordinated to including the above Clause took appropriate operation- the centre. 18 into the Constitution un- al effort. Evidence was made CACDS experts believe that der external pressure (both on public that proved Russian the key security challenge for the part of the aggressor and special services had financed Ukraine in the course of the of Ukraine’s Western partners) “artificial initiatives to feder- state-wide reform is the pre- essentially postpones proper alize Ukraine,” the creation of fect institution’s uncertain im- constitutional recognition of so-called special economic plementation timeframe. This, the decentralisation reform, zones, appointment by elec- in turn, is related to the un- for an indefinite time. tion of governors and heads certain adoption timeframe of Without the prefect insti- of regional law enforcement the Draft Law “On Amending tution and in the presence of bodies, restoration of eco- the Constitution of Ukraine as Russia’s “hybrid” aggression, nomic links with Ukraine, to Decentralisation of Power” the ambiguity of this issue granting of special status to (reg. N2217a).28 This draft law is a direct threat to Ukraine’s the Russian language, and requires a constitutional ma- national security. In 2016, so on. The Kremlin’s agent jority (and a separate voting Ukraine has already under- network pursues these goals procedure) in the Parliament in gone a turbulent period when along the two main courses: order to come into effect and, seven oblast councils adopt- at the level of individual re-
28 Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amending the Constitution of Ukraine as to Decentralisation of Power,” 2217a of July 1, 2015, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=55812 29 For an in-depth analysis of the problems surrounding “decentralisation” under the Minsk Agreements, see Part 2 of this paper. 30 On Decentralisation, Success, Risks, and the Role of the Parliament, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, January 13, 2017, https:// dt.ua/internal/pro-decentralizaciyu-uspihi-riziki-i-rol-parlamentu-_.html
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 25 Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
gions (through people’s depu- According to Article 119 of spective plans, combined with ties in oblast, city, and district the Constitution of Ukraine, the continued lack of the pre- councils) and at the national which regulates the opera- fect institution. Namely, the level (through the Verkhovna tion of state administrations:32 emergence of consolidated Rada). A number of journalis- “Local state administrations in territorial communities con- tic investigations established their respective territory shall trolled by representatives of that the aforementioned ini- ensure: 1) the execution of local large businesses (local tiatives by oblast councils had the Constitution and laws of business elites) and de facto been backed by significant Ukraine, acts of the President not subordinated to the cen- amounts of Russian money. of Ukraine, acts of the Cabinet tre. Isolated instances of this Each oblast council was al- of Ministers of Ukraine and trend are already taking place lotted USD 250 thousand in other executive power bodies; in south-eastern regions of exchange for adopting an 2) legality and legal order; the Ukraine. This process is charac- address to the President, in observance of rights and free- terized by: which they would claim it was doms of citizens.” Thus, the • close affiliation of the ATC necessary to establish agree- Constitution of Ukraine clearly heads and most coun- ment-based relations with the shows that general oversight cil deputies to a particu- centre and to appoint gov- of the legality of local acts falls lar powerful local busi- ernors by election. Reports specifically to state adminis- nessperson who sways the about this, with practically trations. As of this time, the decisions of oblast councils identical content, have been Ministry for Regional Devel- in their interests; subsequently published by opment had prepared a draft • influence of the local busi- dozens of Internet media out- law that would enable dis- nessperson on education- lets.31 trict- and oblast state admin- al and cultural institutions In order to neutralize the istrations to monitor the le- that are financially depend- risk of LSGB (especially at the gality of acts adopted by local ent on them; regional level) adopting reso- self-government bodies. (This • the risk that after switch- lutions that are unlawful and interim solution received very ing to direct budgetary sometimes actually danger- positive reaction from the relations, such commu- ous to survival of Ukraine, it Council of Europe.) Adoption nities will transform into is necessary to promptly im- of this draft law hinges on the full-fledged “feudal” units, plement Article 144, part 2 of political will of the Cabinet of where the major busi- the Constitution of Ukraine, Ministers and members of the nessperson’s total control which establishes a procedure Parliament. over the government bod- for suspending decisions of There is another potential ies and financial flows is LSGB in case such decisions consequence of the lack of a supported by their own are in conflict with the Con- statutory timeframe for ATC “army,” legalized in the form stitution or laws of Ukraine. creation according the pro- of a private security com-
31 Ihor Levchenko. Year Three of Decentralisation: Progress or Destabilization? CACDS, June 1, 2017, http://cacds.org. ua/ru/comments/1107 32 The Constitution of Ukraine. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80
26 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 1. Decentralisation as the Fundamental Reform for Ukraine’s Ongoing Transformation
pany or (more frequently) a one hand, local business elites ment bodies remains a stra- hunting ranch. 33 who control village/town- tegically critical issue within This trend is exacerbated ship and district councils can the decentralisation reform. by a number of aspects of the hamper the creation of ATCs, The prefect institution is land reform, which is being being unwilling to lose their meant to serve as the foun- implemented simultaneous- leverage. On the other, if they dation of the new system for ly. In April 2016, the Verkhov- cannot stand in the way of ATC oversight and control within na Rada adopted in the first creation, they strive to change the decentralisation reform, reading draft law N4355. Final the process into a kind of “re- but its constitutional rec- adoption of this law would gionalization,” thus securing ognition is delayed by the transfer state-owned land out- their power and the “semi-feu- fact that the Draft Law “On side of population centres into dal” state of the regions under Amending the Constitution municipal ownership of ter- their control. of Ukraine as to Decentralisa- ritorial communities (making The draft law 6636 “On the tion of Power,” contains a pro- the land a foundation of their Procedure for Creation and vision meant to regulate the income). Thus, even today, we Elimination of Districts, and local self-government system can see that local businesspeo- Change of Their Borders” aims in certain districts of Donetsk ple who own large portions of to neutralize this factor.35 This and Lugansk regions, cur- land create “custom-made” draft law aims to transform ad- rently occupied by Russia. ATCs. As a result, despite the ministrative-territorial division This provision appeared as a approved prospective plans, at the district level, resulting in result of complex processes we see ATCs that consolidate larger districts and considera- surrounding the efforts to re- lands controlled by a specific bly smaller staff of district state solve the conflict in eastern businessperson. At the ATC administrations. Ukraine, the so-called Minsk election, this “landlord” gains Thus, in the context of Agreements, which maintain control over the local council, national security, overseeing the status quo at the front and the consequences of this the legality of decisions made and contain their own flavour are described above.34 Thus, on by the new local self-govern- of “decentralisation.”
33 Example: Khrestivka ATC (Kherson oblast). Oleksiy Kopytko. “DIY Princedom: the Everyday of Decentralisation.” In- formation Resistance group, March 17, 2017, http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/knyazhestvo-svoimi-rukami-bud- ni-decentralizacii 34 Oleksiy Kopytko. Land Reform: Postponed Till “After the Election?”, CACDS, http://cacds.org.ua/ru/safe/theme/1154 35 Draft Law “On the Procedure for Creation and Elimination of Districts, and Change of Their Borders,” N 6636 of June 22, 2017. – Accessed at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=62118
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 27 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
“11. Decentralisation of the Peace Plan, “decentralisa- 1 “Peace power (through election of tion of power” had to become 2. Plan of the executive committees, protec- the main “bargaining chip” for tion of the Russian language; Ukraine in negotiations with President of Ukraine” draft amendments to the Con- the other side. We could say The first reference to “de- stitution). that in exchange for granting centralisation” in the context of 12. Approval of governor the “regional elites of Donbas” regulating the situation in Don- candidates prior to elections, extended rights and powers, bas was in the Peace Plan of the with representatives of Don- Ukraine wanted to receive President of Ukraine to Regu- bas (provided that agreement guarantees of peace and ter- late the Situation in the Eastern be reached on a candidate; in ritorial integrity. Even though Regions of Ukraine,36 present- case of any disagreements, the the Peace Plan did not clearly ed by the President of Ukraine final decision rests with the define “decentralisation,” subse- Petro Poroshenko on June 20, President). quent events and discussions 2014, during his first working 13. Early local and parlia- within the Ukrainian political trip to Donbas as President. mentary elections.”37 and civic communities indicate The Peace Plan, which con- This document represented that the process would involve, sists of 15 specific steps aimed the first concentrated attempt at least, the following: at ceasing combat in the con- to work out an option that • Amending the Constitu- flict area and moving towards would contribute to conflict tion of Ukraine to allow for stabilization and restoration of stabilization and move the bulk the creation of regions with peace in Donbas, includes the of the conflict resolution efforts a special status within a for- following: into the political field. Under mally unitary state;
36 Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine to Regulate the Situation in the Eastern Regions of Ukraine, June 20, 2014, http://www.president.gov.ua/news/petro-poroshenko-predstaviv-v-donbasi-mirnij-plan-z-vregulyu-33044 37 Ibid.
28 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
• Amending the legislation Despite the objective parts of the Ukrainian terri- of Ukraine to elaborate on and understandable desire tory, occupied by Russia. the “special” status of Don- of Ukrainian leaders to put a • The Peace Plan provided bas regions, particularly, quick stop to the combat and for negotiations with “rep- such processes as “election begin political resolution of resentatives of Donbas,” of executive committees” the conflict, the Peace Plan was even though that made and “protection of the Rus- received critically by Ukrainian no sense in the context of sian language” (namely, civic and expert communities. Russian occupation, be- how and from whom the Their assessments could be cause the so-called “repre- Russian language would be summed up as follows: sentatives of Donbas” are “protected,” with regard to • The Peace Plan failed to de facto representatives of the existing legislation); mention Russia’s aggres- the Russian occupation au- • Amending the legislation sion against Ukraine and thorities. They cannot have of Ukraine to provide for falsely implied that the their own stance – at least, the procedure of “election conflict had largely result- not one that would be fea- of executive committees” – ed from internal problems, sible to take into account that is, local executive au- including insufficient -au while resolving the conflict thorities in Donbas regions thority of the local govern- between Ukraine and Rus- with special status; ment. This approach could sia. • Amending the legislation prove disorienting for the • The Peace Plan did not of Ukraine to provide for assessment of the situa- hold Russia responsible for approval of the “governor” tion and the negotiation unleashing the conflict, nor candidates (namely, heads process, creating an im- did it provide for Russia’s of oblast administrations pression that Ukraine was participation in the nego- that would be appointed going through a domestic tiations as a party to said by, and directly subordi- conflict / civil war, rather conflict. nated to the President of than being subjected to Ukraine) with the “repre- external aggression. sentatives of Donbas” (leg- • The Peace Plan did not 2.2 Minsk I islation would also be re- mention Crimea as being As seen from the subse- quired to define who could occupied and annexed by quent events, implementation be considered a “represent- Russia, thus creating an illu- of the Peace Plan met with ative of Donbas”); sion that Crimea and Don- resistance from the Russian • Holding early local and bas had different statuses Federation, who was trying to parliamentary elections (open Russian aggression create an environment for ne- throughout the entire terri- and annexation in Crimea gotiating on their own terms. tory of Ukraine; very likely, vs. “a conflict involving rep- After a number of successful based on the new legisla- resentatives of Donbas” in offensive operations by the tion providing for the “spe- Donbas). In reality and in Armed Forces of Ukraine, the cial status” of regions of the eyes of Ukrainian law, National Guard of Ukraine and Donbas, including the sta- these two regions have es- other Ukrainian power struc- tus of their representatives sentially the same status, tures, as well as tragic events in in the Verkhovna Rada of because both Crimea and the conflict zone (such as the Ukraine. Donbas are inalienable deaths of hundreds of Ukraini-
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 29 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
an military servicemen in com- forced to accept “Certain dis- bat with Russian troops near tricts of Donetsk and Lugansk 2.3 The Law “On Ilovaisk), the leaders of the oblasts” (CDDLR) as the oth- Special Order Russian Federation realized er side of the conflict; Crimea the futility of their attempts to was left outside of the Donbas for Local Self- occupy new Ukrainian territo- conflict resolution process. ries, and consequently aban- Instead, the Protocol noted Governance in doned the “Novorossiya” pro- that Ukraine had to carry out Certain Districts of ject. Thus, September 5, 2014 a number of measures, which, saw the signing of the “Proto- if implemented, could result Donetsk and Lugansk col on the results of consulta- in significant changes to the tions of the Trilateral Contact domestic situation in Ukraine, Oblasts” Group with respect to the joint and would appear as meeting As early as September 16, steps aimed at the implemen- Russia’s demands in exchange 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of tation of the Peace Plan of the for peace: Ukraine adopted, and the Pres- President of Ukraine, P. Poro- • “3. Carry out a decentral- ident of Ukraine signed, the shenko, and the initiatives of isation of power, includ- Law of Ukraine “On Special Or- the President of Russia, V. Pu- ing by adopting the Law der for Local Self-Governance tin.”38 The Protocol had the of Ukraine “On Temporary in Certain Districts of Donetsk same aforementioned flaws as Order for Local Self-Gov- and Lugansk Oblasts.”42 This the Peace Plan: no reference ernance in Certain Districts law is a fundamental docu- to Russia as an aggressor or of Donetsk and Lugansk ment for understanding the a party to the conflict; no for- Oblasts” (the Law on Spe- concept of “decentralisation” mal responsibility assigned to cial Status)...39 in the context of resolving the Russia as part of the conflict • 7. Continue inclusive na- Russian-Ukrainian conflict. resolution process; Russia’s tionwide dialogue...40 On November 7, 2014, in status was essentially that of a • 9. Provide for early local order to clearly define the ter- process moderator, alongside elections in accordance ritories included in CDDLR, France and Germany; the em- with the Law of Ukraine the Cabinet of Ministers of phasis was placed on domes- “On Temporary Order for Ukraine adopted Resolution tic problems within Ukraine; Local Self-Governance in N1085-r “On Approving the Ukraine was charged with Certain Districts of Donetsk List of Population Centres in carrying out the main conflict and Lugansk Oblasts” (the which the State Government resolution steps; Ukraine was Law on Special Status)...41 Bodies are Temporarily Una-
38 Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group with respect to the joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of Russia, V. Putin. September 5, 2014, http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Law of Ukraine “On Special Order for Local Self-Governance in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts,” September 16, 2014, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18
30 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
ble to Exercise Their Powers Analysis of the Law of tion for legalizing the wide- (Partially or Fully).”43 Ukraine “On Special Order for spread use of the Russian The Law of Ukraine “On Spe- Local Self-Governance in Cer- language, with simultane- cial Order for Local Self-Gov- tain Districts of Donetsk and ous displacement of the ernance in Certain Districts of Lugansk Oblasts” shows that official, Ukrainian language Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts” the law indirectly grants the (it should be noted that at determines the temporary pro- occupied territories of Donbas this time, using the Ukrain- cedures for organizing local within Ukraine territorial au- ian language in occupied self-government and operating tonomy, based on: territories of Donbas is de local self-government bodies in • Special application of the facto forbidden and actu- certain districts of Donetsk and Ukrainian legislation in the ally dangerous, due to the Lugansk oblasts, in order to nor- territory of certain districts persecution of “pro-Ukrain- malize the situation as quickly as (Article 2 of the Law). ian” citizens by occupation possible, restore the rule of law, • Special language poli- authorities). restore the constitutional rights cy (Article 4 of the Law), • Special status of local and freedoms of the citizens, which entails facilitating self-government bodies as well as the rights and legiti- the use of Russian and (Article 5 of the Law). Ar- mate interests of legal entities, other languages, in verbal ticle 5 of the Law specifies create an environment allow- and written forms, in edu- that local governance in ing residents to return to their cation and media, and cre- certain districts of Donetsk forcibly abandoned places of ating prerequisites for the and Lugansk oblasts is car- permanent residence and rein- use of these languages in ried out according to the tegrate into their communities, the work of government Constitution and the laws to restore regular daily life in authorities, local self-gov- of Ukraine, by appropriate population centres in Donetsk ernment bodies, and the territorial communities, and Lugansk oblasts, and to de- judiciary, in economic and both directly and through velop their territories.44 social activities, in cultural local self-government bod- According to the Law, the events, and in other aspects ies. The Law also establish- special order for local self-gov- of society. Even though es a special appointment ernance in certain districts of this provision, as indicated procedure for the heads of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts by Article 4 of the Law, is prosecutor’s office and judi- would be established for a based on the provisions of cial bodies, which requires term of three years after the the Law of Ukraine “On the that local self-government Law comes into effect (i.e. from Principles of the State Lan- bodies be involved in the the date of its publication, Sep- guage Policy,” it obviously appointment. However, in tember 16, 2014). represents a formal founda- practice, the Law essential-
43 “On Approving the List of Population Centres in which the State Government Bodies are Temporarily Unable to Exercise Their Powers (Partially or Fully), and the List of Population Centres Located on the Contact Line,” Resolu- tion of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, November 7, 2014, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1085-2014- %D1%80 44 Law of Ukraine “On Special Order for Local Self-Governance in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts”, September 16, 2014, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18.
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 31 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
ly allows for creation and economic development administrative-territorial operation of CDDLR gov- of CDDLR, the Cabinet of units of the Russian Fed- ernment authorities, fully Ministers of Ukraine shall eration. This cooperation independent of the Centre approve a targeted state would be carried out under (central authorities) and program that establishes cross-border cooperation operating their own pros- the measures, tasks and in- agreements, concluded by ecutor’s offices and courts. dicators to facilitate: com- Ukrainian territorial com- • Special relations between prehensive and balanced munities, local self-gov- the Centre and CDDLR territorial development; ernment bodies and lo- based on special agree- restoration of the indus- cal executive authorities ments (Article 6). Namely, trial and export potential; within the competences the Law establishes that effective utilization of re- established by law. Given agreements on economic, sources and industrial po- Russia’s powerful military social, and cultural devel- tential; meeting the public and political presence in opment of certain districts demand in the respective CDDLR, this would create be concluded between territories for high-tech, prerequisites for Russia’s the Cabinet of Ministers of competitive and environ- economic dominance in Ukraine, ministries, other mentally friendly products CDDLR and the inevitable Ukrainian executive au- and high-quality servic- displacement of Ukrainian thorities on one part, and es; creating a favourable business. In the context of appropriate local self-gov- investment climate; and the effective Ukraine–Eu- ernment bodies of CDDLR increasing employment ropean Union Association on the other. These agree- rate by creating new work Agreement, CDDLR’s “in- ments are meant to ensure places. Every year, the Law dependent course” in its coordination between lo- on the State Budget of relations with Russia (the cal self-government bod- Ukraine must provide for leader and driving force of ies and central and local expense items directed to the Customs Union and the executive authorities, as state support of the social Eurasian Economic Com- they cooperate to develop and economic develop- munity) may create colli- CDDLR. The Law states that ment of CDDLR. sions during the adaptation appropriate local self-gov- • Independent “foreign poli- of Ukrainian legislation to ernment bodies would ini- cy” of CDDLR regarding the EU standards, or even block tiate these agreements on Russian Federation (Article this process. In addition, economic, social and cul- 8). The Law allows CDDLR such “independent foreign tural development of cer- to develop cross-border policy” of the CDDLR can tain districts of the Donetsk cooperation with Rus- become a significant hur- and Lugansk oblasts. sia aimed at resolving dle in any of Ukraine’s at- • A different economic re- shared development is- tempts towards further Eu- gime for business and in- sues, strengthening and ropean and Euro-Atlantic vestment activities, com- deepening neighbourly integration. The “autono- pared to the rest of Ukraine relations of [Ukrainian] ter- mous territories of CDDLR,” (Article 7). The Law states ritorial communities and which would remain under that in order to ensure local government bodies Russia’s total military, polit- sustainable social and of individual districts with ical, and economic control,
32 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
would very likely become a the creation and operation units” of CDDLR are current- “Trojan horse” playing into of people’s militia units ly represented by any armed the hands of Moscow, who through the mass media. formations (at this time, this strives to prevent Ukraine In reality, Ukrainian legis- includes Russian military con- from joining the EU and lation does not contain the tingents operating in CDDLR, NATO. concept of a “people’s militia.” namely, two army corps (1st • Regional power structures, This means that the law of AC “Donetsk,” and 2nd AC “Lu- independent from the cen- Ukraine “On Special Order for gansk”), which are part of the tral authorities (Article 9). Local Self-Governance in Cer- 8th Combined Arms Army of The Law states that certain tain Districts of Donetsk and the Russian Federation’s Armed districts of Donetsk and Lu- Lugansk Oblasts” essentially Forces, headquartered in No- gansk oblasts could adopt opens up a wide scope of au- vocherkassk).45 The Russian resolutions at the level of thority for the CDDLR “gov- media refers to the Russian city, township or village ernment” in this field. The lo- occupation troops in CDDLR councils to create “peo- cal government, which would exclusively as “people’s militia.” ple’s militia” units, which not be directly subordinated The staff of these “people’s mi- would be charged with to the Centre, would be able litia corps” is made up of local protecting public order in to create its own power struc- residents (as envisaged by the the population centres of tures, which, in practice, would Law of Ukraine “On Special Or- these districts. The respec- operate outside the control der for Local Self-Governance tive village, township or of the central government, in Certain Districts of Donetsk city head would coordinate respective power ministries and Lugansk Oblasts,”, Article these units. Volunteers, citi- of the Cabinet of Ministers of 9),46 as well as by Russian and zens of Ukraine who reside Ukraine, or the President of foreign mercenaries and units permanently in the respec- Ukraine. The notion of “pro- of regular Russian armed forces. tive population centres tecting public order” can also Namely, one person – Vic- of Donetsk and Lugansk be interpreted rather broadly tor Ageyev, military service- oblasts, would staff “Peo- and can include a number of man of the Russian Federation ple’s militia” units. While functions related to the work Armed Forces – taken captive protecting public order, of power ministries. by Ukrainian servicemen in these units would exercise However, even these rather the conflict zone on June 24, the authority granted to loose boundaries were deemed 2017, had a cover story of them by laws of Ukraine. insufficient by the separatists “serviceman of the people’s The local head would in- and their Russian supervisors. militia of the LNR [Lugansk form the local public about As a result, the “people’s militia People’s Republic].”47 Russian
45 Journalist: Russia Increases Military Presence on the Border with Donbas and Kharkiv Region CENSOR.NET, March 21, 2017, https://ua.censor.net.ua/news/432781/rosiya_zbilshuye_viyiskovu_sylu_na_kordoni_z_donbasom_i_ harkivschynoyu_jurnalist 46 Law of Ukraine “On Special Order for Local Self-Governance in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts,” September 16, 2014, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18. 47 People’s Militia: Captive Private First Class Ageyev Was Recruited by an LNR Enlistment Office. June 28, 2017, http:// www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2904079
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 33 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
servicemen Aleksandrov and 2014, the Kremlin had intend- es of Ukraine in August 2017, Yerofeyev,49 who were sen- ed to grant the 1st and 2nd the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of tenced to 14 years of impris- Army Corps of the Russian the Russian Federation Armed onment for waging aggres- occupation troops the status Forces in occupied territo- sive war against Ukraine,50 of “CDDLR people’s militia,” ries already include up to 680 had similar cover stories. With thus legalizing their presence tanks, some 1250 armed com- this in mind, it is entirely pos- in Ukrainian territory. Accord- bat vehicles, approximately sible that, as part of “decen- ing to the information made 1170 artillery systems, and up tralisation” under the Minsk public at the briefing of the to 40 thousand military ser- Agreement of September 5, General Staff of Armed Forc- vicemen.51 Figure 1. The organizational structure, combat strength, and numerical strength of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian occupation troops in Donbas (according to the Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, as of April 2016)48
48 Intelligence Services Uncovered the Structure of Russian Occupation Troops in Donbas. April 27, 2016, http:// news.liga.net/ua/news/politics/10387924-rozv_dka_rozkrila_strukturu_okupats_ynikh_v_ysk_rf_v_donbas.htm 49 Anyway, the Recon are Russians. – The Search, Trial, and Defense of Captain Yerofeyev and Sergeant Aleksandrov. April 18, 2016, https://zona.media/article/2016/18/04/erofeev-alexandrov-prigovor 50 The Trial of Aleksandrov and Yerofeyev. The Verdict. April 18, 2017, https://zona.media/online/2016/18/04/alex- androv-erofeev-27 51 How Many Russian Troops in Donbas: the General Staff Infographic. August 30, 2017, http://news.liga.net/news/politics/144811379-skolko_rossiyskikh_voysk_v_donbasse_infografika_ot_gen- shtaba.htm
34 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
Figure 2. The increase in the armaments of Russian occupation troops in Eastern Ukraine (according to the Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, as of August 2017) 52
Another possible conse- stretch of the Ukrainian-Rus- zone, while formally handed quence of the Law of Ukraine sian border within these ter- over “into Ukrainian control,” “On Special Order for Local ritories. Meanwhile, “CDDLR would still be controlled by Self-Governance in Certain local governments” would ex- “people’s militia” – that is, re- Districts of Donetsk and Lu- ercise their authority to deny main entirely at the disposal of gansk Oblasts” of September entry to these territories to the the Russian Federation, creat- 16, 2014, is the unregulated in- Armed Forces of Ukraine, the ing a de facto Russian enclave teraction between the CDDLR National Guard, the SBU, the in Ukraine. “people’s militia” and Ukraine’s State Border Service, the Na- The final provisions of the power ministries. One of the tional Police and other Ukrain- Law of Ukraine “On Special Or- possible scenarios here is that ian power ministries and law der for Local Self-Governance the “people’s militia” would be- enforcement bodies. This in Certain Districts of Donetsk come the only power structure would mean, among other and Lugansk Oblasts” (Arti- to operate in the CDDLR terri- things, that the Ukrainian-Rus- cle 10) established that early tories and, importantly, on the sian border within the conflict elections of people’s deputies
52 Ibid.
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 35 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
for district, city, city-district, September 5, 2014 Protocol ership created the necessary township and village councils, (primarily in terms of ceasefire international environment for as well as elections of village, and withdrawal of its troops another round of the Norman- township and city heads in cer- and armaments from the ter- dy Four negotiations (Germa- tain districts of Donetsk and ritory of Ukraine). Ukraine had ny, France, Ukraine, and Rus- Lugansk oblasts be held on thus refused to start prepara- sia) in order to prolong the December 7, 2014.53 However, tion for the elections in CDDLR diplomacy game aimed at cre- this requirement of the Law until the fundamental security ating a pro-Russian autonomy was not implemented, due to aspects of the Protocol were within Ukraine. By holding the the constant violation by Rus- implemented. The Kremlin, threat of hundreds of military sian occupation troops of the in turn, had unfolded a new and civilian casualties over fundamental security aspects stage of strong-arming Kyiv the heads of the President of of the Protocol dated Septem- into creating a “Russian Trojan Ukraine and European lead- ber 5, 2014 (Clause 1: “Ensure horse” inside Ukrainian territo- ers, the Kremlin had contin- immediate bilateral cessation ry. Russian combat operations ued pressing towards creating of the use of weapons;” Clause against Ukraine in the winter a Russia-controlled territorial 2: “Ensure OSCE monitoring of 2014-2015 had culminated unit within Ukraine. and verification of the non-use in the battles near the Donetsk On February 12, 2015, af- of weapons”).54 airport and Debaltseve (during ter 17 hours of negotiations the winter of 2014-2015, entire in Minsk, the leaders of Ger- units of Russian troops were many, France, Ukraine, and 2.4 Minsk II deployed to Donbas from far- Russia agreed on the List of Subsequent events ther regions of Russia; a large Measures to Implement the showed that creating a CDDLR body of evidence exists to sup- Minsk Agreements,56 which territorial autonomy within port that, including evidence was meant to inject new life Ukraine was Russia’s main ob- published by Russian media).55 into the Russian-Ukrainian jective in its strategy concern- As a result, hundreds of conflict resolution. It has to be ing Ukraine. The Ukrainian side Ukrainian military servicemen noted that country leadership had insisted it was necessary had died while mounting a he- did not sign this document. to recognize Russia as a party roic defence and preventing Instead, the List of Measures to the conflict and to make it Russian troops from moving was signed by: former Presi- responsible for implement- further into Ukraine. At the dent of Ukraine Leonid Kuch- ing the requirements of the same time, the Russian lead- ma, Russian ambassador to
53 Law of Ukraine “On Special Order for Local Self-Governance in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts,” September 16, 2014, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18 54 Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group with respect to the joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of Russia, V. Putin. September 5, 2014, http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true 55 We all knew what we were signing up for and what could happen. Interview with a Russian tank gunner who was deployed to fight for Debaltseve together with his battalion. March 4, 2015, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/ articles/2015/03/02/63264-171-my-vse-znali-na-chto-idem-i-chto-mozhet-byt-187 56 The List of Measures to Implement the Minsk Agreements. February 12, 2015, http://www.osce.org/ru/ cio/140221?download=true
36 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
Ukraine Mykhailo Zurabov, within Ukraine. fication of a territory subject to OSCE ambassador Heidi Tag- The List of Measures out- the special regime in accord- liavini, and representatives of lines the fundamental security ance with the Law of Ukraine the so-called “DNR/LNR” Olek- issues: ceasefire, withdraw- “On temporary order of local sander Zakharchenko and Igor al of heavy armaments from government in some regions Plotnitsky. The participation of the contact line, and ensuring of the Donetsk and Lugansk the latter two, leaders of illegal OSCE monitoring of these ef- regions” based on the line set armed formations classified forts – none of which can ac- in a Minsk memorandum of as terrorist organizations in tually ensure a return to the September 19, 2014.59 Ukraine, had provoked con- normal political, social and …9. Restoration of full con- siderable discontent from the economic processes in oc- trol over the state border of Ukrainian civic and political cupied territories. Following Ukraine by Ukraine’s govern- communities, and cast imme- that, it lists Ukraine’s obliga- ment throughout the whole diate doubts on the legitimacy tions in the sphere of “decen- conflict area, which should be- of the document in question. tralisation” (namely, granting gin on the first day after the lo- In essence, the List of Meas- “regional elites of Donbas” ex- cal elections and be completed ures was an expanded inter- tended rights) in exchange for after a comprehensive political pretation of the earlier Proto- guarantees of peace and terri- settlement (local elections in col (September 5, 2014), with torial integrity: individual areas of the Donetsk integrated provisions of the “...4. On the first day after and Lugansk regions on the Law of Ukraine “On Special Or- the withdrawal, to begin a basis of the Law of Ukraine, and der for Local Self-Governance dialogue on the procedures a constitutional reform) by the in Certain Districts of Donetsk for holding local elections in end of 2015, on condition of and Lugansk Oblasts.” accordance with Ukrainian implementation of paragraph The List of Measures in- law and the Law of Ukraine 11 – with consultations and in cludes a standard set of instru- “On Temporary57 [sic; original- agreement with the represent- ments traditionally used by the ly “special”58] Order for Local atives of individual areas of the international community to Self-Governance in Certain Donetsk and Lugansk regions resolve armed conflicts. How- Districts of Donetsk and Lu- in the framework of the Trilat- ever, the document presents gansk Oblasts,” as well as on eral Contact Group. their implementation proce- the future regime of these 10. The withdrawal of all dure in a way that absolves areas, according to this Act. foreign armed forces, military Russia of any responsibility Immediately, no later than 30 equipment, as well as mer- for the situation in the conflict days from the date of signing cenaries from the territory of zone, while simultaneously of this document, to adopt a Ukraine under the supervision furthering its main goal of cre- resolution of the Verkhovna of the OSCE. Disarmament of ating a pro-Russian autonomy Rada of Ukraine with the speci- all illegal groups.
57 Ibid. 58 Law of Ukraine “On Special Order for Local Self-Governance in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts.” 16.09.2014, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18 59 OSCE Publishes the Minsk Protocol. September 20, 2014, https://ukr.lb.ua/news/2014/09/20/280035_obse_obn- arodovala_minskiy_protokol.html
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 37 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
11. Conducting constitu- that took place in individu- order in individual areas of tional reform in Ukraine, with al areas of the Donetsk and the Donetsk and Lugansk the new constitution coming Lugansk regions; regions; into force by the end of 2015, • The right to self-determi- • The powers of local council providing for decentralisation nation with regard to lan- deputies and other officials as a key element (taking into guage; elected in snap elections, account the characteristics of • Participation of local gov- appointed by the Verkhov- individual areas of the Donetsk ernments in the appoint- na Rada of Ukraine accord- and Lugansk regions, agreed ment of heads of prose- ing to this law, cannot be with representatives of these cutors’ offices and courts terminated.”61 areas), as well as the adoption in individual areas of the From the point of view of the permanent legislation Donetsk and Lugansk re- of the Ukrainian civic, politi- on the special status of individ- gions; cal and expert communities, ual areas of the Donetsk and • The possibility for the cen- the most controversial part of Lugansk regions in accordance tral executive authorities the List of Measures is the ac- with the measures specified in to conclude agreements tion plan laid out in clauses 9 Note [1], until the end of 2015. with the relevant local au- through 11. Representing the (See Notes)”60 thorities on economic, so- essence of Russia’s position in Note [1] included a brief cial and cultural develop- the implementation of Minsk summary of the Law of Ukraine ment of individual areas Agreements, it means that: “On Special Order for Local of Donetsk and Lugansk • Ukraine can only start re- Self-Governance in Certain regions; suming control over its Districts of Donetsk and Lu- • The state shall support state border after the elec- gansk Oblasts” of September socio-economic develop- tions in CDDLR, and com- 16, 2014, but with stricter defi- ment of individual areas of plete it after a comprehen- nitions that, essentially, ruled Donetsk and Lugansk re- sive political reconciliation, in an autonomous status for gions; including a constitutional CDDLR: • Assistance from the central reform; “Such measures, in accord- government to cross-bor- • At the same time, the ance with the Law “On the der cooperation between constitutional reform in special order of local govern- the individual areas of the Ukraine must result in an ment in individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk re- effective constitution with Donetsk and Lugansk regions,” gions and regions of the a new key element: decen- include the following: Russian Federation; tralisation and permanent • Exemption from punish- • The creation of people’s mi- special status of CDDLR; ment, harassment and litia units [police] upon the • As specified in Clause 11, discrimination of persons decision of local councils political reconciliation associated with the events in order to maintain public (elections and the consti-
60 The List of Measures to Implement Minsk Agreements. February 12, 2015, http://www.osce.org/ru/ cio/140221?download=true 61 Ibid.
38 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
tutional reform) must be above “elections,” during decentralisation model” would carried out in consultation their consultations with the result in a “federalization” of with, and with approval of, central government; Ukraine following a Russian representatives of CDDLR; • The same approach would scenario, which would involve • Withdrawal of foreign be applied to the with- “autonomization” of parts of armed formations and mil- drawal of foreign troops Ukraine and collapse of the itary equipment from the and armaments, which contemporary Ukrainian state. territory of Ukraine (Clause would also be manipulated Sabotaging Ukraine from with- 10) will only take place af- by “representatives of CD- in, creating fault lines between ter the fulfilment of Clauses DLR.” the Centre and the regions, fos- 9 and 10 (i.e. the constitu- As an imminent result of tering internal hotbeds of con- tional reform). implementing the “9-11 for- flict and tension, modelling a Essentially, the action plan mula: “parade of sovereignties” of (“clauses 9-11 formula”) incor- • “CDDLR government” is Ukrainian regions – all of these porated into the List of Meas- legalized as a pro-Russian methods are part of the strat- ures under Russia’s logic cre- puppet government within egy traditionally employed ates the following situation: Ukraine; by Russia in the post-Soviet • Elections are held in occu- • control over the state space, in order to multiply con- pied territories – formally, border is not returned to flicts and assume control over under Ukrainian laws, but Ukraine, and foreign troops former Soviet republics. Exam- in reality, outside of the and armaments are not ples of that include conflicts Ukrainian legal field, in the withdrawn – for example, in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and presence of occupation due to “CDDLR represent- South Ossetia, and a number troops, under direction of atives” being “dissatisfied” of Russian special forces op- the puppet governments with the course of the erations in post-Soviet coun- of the so-called “DNR/LNR,” constitutional reform in tries of Central Asia. Similarly, and with no possibility for Ukraine; reintegration of occupied ter- Ukraine to control their • Russia receives a fully con- ritories into Ukraine’s political, preparation, implementa- trolled Russian enclave humanitarian and legal fields, tion, and vote count; within Ukrainian territory. while maintaining their spe- • In the course of these “elec- It should also be noted that cial status as defined by the tions,” Russia, being the oc- if the Ukrainian Constitution aggressor, aims at intensifying cupant, staffs all levels of recognizes the special status centrifugal processes in other CDDLR government with of CDDLR – individual regions parts of Ukraine, and creat- people under its control; of Ukraine that are not con- ing hurdles for the Ukrainian • Following that, an imitated trolled by the central govern- majority to exercise their will: transfer of control over the ment, with an uncontrolled which is to enter the EU and Ukrainian-Russian border section of the state border – it NATO, and to move away from begins, contingent on the would violate the principle of the oligarchical form of gov- course of the constitutional Ukraine’s unitary status and ernment. reform, which, in turn, can could trigger fragmentation of It was the same principle be blocked at any time by the state. That is also one of the that Russia had used, for in- “representatives of CDDLR” technologies of “hybrid” war- stance, in Moldova, aiming appointed through the fare. In other words, the “9-11 to completely reformat the
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 39 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
Republic of Moldova into a recognized Transnistria be state without a clear foreign federative state, which would liquidated; policy (based on the neutral- include the pro-Russian unrec- • Members of the FRM could ity clause) and without its ognized Pridnestrovian Mol- pursue their own foreign own armed forces (based on davian Republic [Transnistria]. policy, enter international the demilitarization clause), Russia’s apparent intention organizations, sign inter- but with Russian troops in its was to transform Moldova into national treaties, and open territory instead. Constant a Moscow-controlled “feder- their representative offices influence of the Russian spe- ation” that would renounce in other countries; cial services and active use of European and Euro-Atlantic • The FRM would elect a fed- corruption mechanisms could integration, instead becoming eral president and a feder- easily return in the federal au- Russia’s geopolitical strong- al parliament consisting of thorities soon under control hold at NATO’s borders. This the Senate and the House by pro-Russian representatives was meant to be achieved of Representatives; exec- of Transnistria, where Russian through the so-called Kozak utive authority would lie special services have con- Plan,62 prepared in 2003 by with the federal govern- trolled almost every aspect of Dmitry Kozak, Special Repre- ment (note that the Kozak life for the past 26 years. (Since sentative of the President of Plan mentions Transnistria the start of Russian aggression the Russian Federation in the and Gagauzia as mem- against Ukraine, Transnistria Republic of Moldova and the bers of the new federation, has become a constant source unrecognized Transnistria. while never referencing of agent staff for Russian spe- Among other things, the Ko- Moldova’s status; similar- cial services, used to imple- zak Plan entailed: ly, Moldova’s status is not ment the Kremlin’s destabiliz- • Resolving the Transnistrian mentioned in the forma- ing scenarios in Ukraine, from conflict by creating a uni- tion principles of the new the occupation of Crimea, ten- fied federative state within federal parliament, the sions in Odesa, to the creation the borders of the Moldavi- government, or any other of the so-called “DNR/LNR” in an Soviet Socialist Republic FRM authorities); occupied Donbas territory.) As as of January 1, 1990; • The official languages of a result, Russia would achieve • The Federative Republic of the FRM be Moldovan and another geopolitical victo- Moldova be built on the Russian; ry, replacing an independent principles of territorial uni- • Russian stabilizing and Moldova with a Russia-con- ty, and a united defence, peacekeeping forces (up to trolled satellite state within the customs, and currency 2,000 military servicemen) post-Soviet space. space; be stationed in the FRM ter- At the eleventh hour, in • The FRM would be a neu- ritory (for the duration of the night on November 24 to tral, demilitarized state. The the demilitarization period). November 25, 2003, the Pres- armed forces of the Repub- This action plan would ident of the Republic of Mol- lic of Moldova and the un- have turned Moldova into a dova Vladimir Voronin refused
62 Memorandum on the Fundamental Governance Principles of the Unified State (2003), https://regnum.ru/ news/458547.html
40 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
to sign the Kozak Plan,63 thus sia-oriented oligarchization ernance in Certain Districts of ruining Moscow’s intentions of the economy, blocking of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts” (due to which the Russian the European and Euro-Atlan- were to be applied, thus creat- President Vladimir Putin, who tic course, and the resulting ing safeguards against Russia’s had been planning to person- return of Ukraine to Russia’s “9-11 formula.” ally take part in the signing of sphere of influence. Namely, amendments of the “federalization plan,” can- March 17, 2015 specified that celled his visit to Chisinau). Articles 2 through 9 of the However, Russia did not cease 2.5 Implementation Law “On Special Order for Lo- its efforts with respect to Mol- of “Decentralisation” cal Self-Governance in Cer- dova. At this time, Igor Dodon, tain Districts of Donetsk and the pro-Russian President of within the Minsk Lugansk Oblasts” would take the Republic of Moldova, is effect on the day when local trying to return to the agenda Process self-government bodies in laid out in the Kozak Plan. He Given the past examples of CDDLR assumed their office, speaks in favour of federalizing Russia’s neo-Imperial gambits following the early elections. Moldova, abandoning Euro- in the post-Soviet space and Such elections had to: adhere pean integration, and joining the ongoing combat in Donbas to the Constitution of Ukraine the Eurasian Economic Com- claiming the lives of Ukrainian and the legislation of Ukraine; munity, a Moscow-controlled military and civilians every day, follow the principles of gen- organization. Ukraine was not eager to inte- eral, equal, free and transpar- This is exactly the re- grate the List of Measures to ent voting; ensure a public sult that Russia is trying to Implement the Minsk Agree- and open election process as achieve in terms of Ukraine ments (February 12, 2015) into the fundamental principle of through implementation of its legal field. electoral law (established in the Minsk Agreements: fed- On March 17, 2015, the the Constitution of Ukraine eralization (disguised as “de- Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and international treaties of centralisation”), legalization adopted, and the President Ukraine that secure the inter- of a pro-Russian enclave in of Ukraine signed, the Law nationally recognized human Ukraine, destruction of the of Ukraine “On Amendments rights standards and consti- unitary Ukrainian state, sei- to Article 10 of the Law of tute a part of the national leg- zure of the “federal” power by Ukraine “On Special Order for islation of Ukraine); as well as representatives of the pro-Rus- Local Self-Governance in Cer- adhere to the OSCE standards sian enclave, creation of an tain Districts of Donetsk and for democratic elections. The amorphous conglomerate of Lugansk Oblasts,”64 which amendments also required regions and territories, com- elaborated on how certain that elections are overseen by plete corruption of the Ukrain- provisions of the Law “On Spe- international impartial observ- ian political community, Rus- cial Order for Local Self-Gov- ers, from such organizations,
63 Moldova today: without Trasnistria, without a President, but with migrant worker money. A country out of luck. NewDayNews.Ru. RIA Novy Den, November 28, 2011, https://newdaynews.ru/inworld/360238.html 64 Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Article 10 of the Law of Ukraine “On Special Order for Local Self-Governance in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts.” March 17, 2015, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/256-viii
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 41 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
as the OSCE Office for Demo- result declaration of the lo- the elections in the presence cratic Institutions and Human cal election. of occupation troops, fol- Rights, the Congress of Local The Russian side, obviously, lowed by the constitutional re- and Regional Authorities of did not consider meeting these form, and only then, withdraw the Council of Europe, other demands as acceptable condi- troops and armaments from international organizations tions for starting conflict resolu- CDDLR. Nevertheless, the and foreign states, and other tion in Ukraine. Meeting these Ukrainian side insisted on their official observers. demands would increase the own sequence for fulfilling the The amendments to the chance for free and open elec- Minsk Agreements. In his an- Law also established the pre- tions in occupied territories, nual address to the Verkhovna requisites for elections in CD- without pressure on the part Rada of Ukraine, “On the Do- DLR: of Russian troops. This could mestic and Foreign Situation • adherence to the principles potentially render naught the of Ukraine in 2015,” delivered of political pluralism and Kremlin’s entire strategy for on June 4, 2015, the President the multi-party system, creating a pro-Russian enclave of Ukraine stated, “I would like as well as the equality of within Ukraine. The amend- to remind us all that the war rights and equal participa- ment, which had displeased was not our choice. My peace tion in the election process; Russia the most, was the one plan, presented a year ago, be- • freedom of pre-election requiring that prior to elections came the basis for the Minsk campaigning and equal in CDDLR, all illegal armed for- Agreements, which were ac- access to the media, which mations, their military equip- cepted by the entire world as would require restoring ment, as well as insurgents and the sole foundation for resolv- Ukrainian TV and radio mercenaries be removed from ing the conflict, approved by broadcasting, and the the territory of Ukraine. Name- the UN General Assembly and circulation of Ukrainian ly, the amendments to the Law Security Council, approved printed media, through- stated that elections in CDDLR by the entire world and even, out the entire territories would be held contingent to a however cynical this may of Donetsk and Lugansk number of conditions, includ- sound, approved by Russia oblasts; ing, “...to ensure: ... removal of all as well. … I would like to em- • delivering on the guaran- illegal armed formations, their phasize its three key compo- tee for free expression of military equipment, insurgents nents: withdrawal of Russian will, secret vote, and voting and mercenaries, from the terri- troops, armaments and equip- rights of the internally dis- tory of Ukraine.”65 ment from Ukraine, restoring placed persons who had This demand of Ukraine’s of Ukraine’s control over the been forced to leave their directly contravenes the Rus- border, and conducting elec- place of residence in cer- sian vision of carrying out the tions in accordance with the tain districts of the Donetsk List of Measures to Implement European and OSCE standards and Lugansk oblasts; the Minsk Agreements (the “9- as well as with the Ukrainian • transparent vote count and 11 formula”): namely, to hold legislation, to ensure that we
65 Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Article 10 of the Law of Ukraine “On Special Order for Local Self-Governance in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts.” March 17, 2015, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/256-viii
42 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
are dealing with actual repre- President Francois Hollande in self-governance in certain dis- sentatives of Donbas, and not the phone conversation with tricts of Donetsk and Lugansk terrorist leaders.”66 Volodymyr Groysman, Chair- oblasts shall be determined In mid-2015, under Russia’s man of the Verkhovna Rada of by a separate law” was moved constant threat of further con- Ukraine had allegedly insisted from the final provisions of the flict escalation, France, Germa- that the draft amendments to draft law on amendments to ny and the USA increased their the Constitution of Ukraine the Constitution to the transi- pressure on Ukrainian lead- included provisions on the tional provision of the Consti- ers, insisting on constitutional special status of certain dis- tution itself. changes related to decentrali- tricts of Donbas. When asked Furthermore, people’s dep- sation (including constitution- by DW to comment on this uties of the Verkhovna Rada al recognition of the “special statement, the public affairs of Ukraine informed Ukraini- status of CDDLR”), despite the office of the German govern- an media that Victoria Nuland, lack of progress in the funda- ment refused to either confirm Assistant Secretary of State mental security aspects and or deny the allegations, but for European and Eurasian Af- Russia’s continued refusal to they did note that the phone fairs at the United States De- withdraw its troops from Don- conversation between Merkel partment of State, had met bas and transfer border control and Groysman “…did also urge with the deputies to convince to Ukraine prior to the elec- the Ukrainian side to further them to support the latest tions in CDDLR. implement the Minsk Agree- revision of the draft law on Some members of the Ger- ments… Which, among other amendments to the Constitu- man media looked into how things, contain Clause 11 that tion as relates to Donbas. On the German, French and US specifies that decentralisa- July 16, 2015, people’s deputy governments had interfered tion must be included in the Leonid Yemets said, “I’ve been in the work of the Verkhovna reformed Constitution.”68 The contacted by the US Embas- Rada of Ukraine while push- media point out that despite sy, requesting to meet with ing for constitutional amend- the lack of direct evidence of Victoria Nuland. That meet- ments in the sphere of de- German and French pressure ing took place yesterday. We centralisation. For example, on Kyiv, the following revision discussed today’s vote on the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei- was made to the draft law on amendments to the Constitu- tung published an investiga- amendments to the Constitu- tion. Ms. Nuland insisted that tive report67 showing that on tion on July 15, 2015, one day the vote should demonstrate July 14, 2015, German Chancel- after the phone conversation: Ukraine’s commitment to the lor Angela Merkel and French the passage “specifics of local Minsk Agreements.”69 Accord-
66 Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: “On the Domestic and Foreign Situation of Ukraine in 2015.” June 4, 2015, http://www.president.gov.ua/news/shorichne-poslannya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-ver- hovnoyi-radi-u-35412 67 Constitutional Reform in Ukraine: Was There Pressure from Berlin and Paris? Deutsche Welle, August 22, 2015, http://p. dw.com/p/1GJhi 68 Ibid. 69 Deputy: the draft constitutional amendments related to Donbas’ “status” was “pushed through” by Nuland. Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, July 16, 2015, https://dt.ua/POLITICS/proekt-zmini-konstituciyi-zi-statusu-donbasu-prodavila-nuland-deputat-178985_.html
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 43 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
ing to Mr. Yemets, Ms. Nuland the Ukrainian society and state ly going on. They keep saying was insisting that support be had already undergone. At the that there is no “special status” given to the “updated version” same time, the provisions on for Donbas. But that is not the of the draft law, according to specifics of self-governance case, because there are the which the “special procedure in CDDLR, which singled out Transitional Provisions, and for self-governance” in territo- these districts among other re- their Clause 18 refers to a sepa- ries outside of Ukraine’s con- gions of Ukraine, gave ground rate law, a law that we had pro- trol is recognized not in the to suspicion that the govern- tested a year ago,” said the Svo- transitional provisions of the ment may intend to recognize boda leader Oleh Tyahnybok draft law, but in those of the CDDLR as regions with a “spe- when speaking at a rally next Constitution itself. Mr. Yemets cial” or “autonomous” status to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine says that Ms. Nuland believed inside a unitary state. This had on August 31, 2015.72 that was necessary to “demon- created powerful political ten- Meanwhile, the Samo- strate” Ukraine’s commitment sions in Ukraine, and a large pomich [Self-Reliance] party to the Minsk Agreements. part of the Ukrainian political believed that amendments to Draft Law N2217a of July 1, community, civic organiza- the Constitution of Ukraine 2015, revised July 15, 2014,70 tions and patriotic activists contained several threats, essentially combined the spoke strongly against includ- which included the granting of Ukrainian government’s (the ing any such provisions on the the “special status” to occupied President of Ukraine, the Ver- “special” status of the CDDLR Donbas, sabotage of Ukraini- khovna Rada of Ukraine, and into the Constitution. an sovereignty, amnesty and the Cabinet of Ministers of For instance, the national- legalization of pro-Russian Ukraine) approach to the de- ist Svoboda party viewed the insurgents, and their access centralisation process in the Constitutional amendments to power in Ukraine. Samo- context of the broad reform of as a “de facto surrender to the pomich members stated that, the Ukrainian state following Kremlin.” Svoboda members “…Russia had started a war the Revolution of Dignity (see strongly objected to Clause 18 against Ukraine specifically to Section 1), and the “decen- of the draft law, which referred force us to change our Consti- tralisation” issues in the con- to the Law of Ukraine “On Spe- tution. The Kremlin is trying to text of conflict resolution in cial Order for Local Self-Gov- achieve a special self-govern- the Russian-Ukrainian conflict ernance in Certain Districts of ance order for occupied terri- zone.71 That draft law meant to Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts.” tories, to use that to conquer combine all achievements in “This government, which is us from the inside. That was the sphere of decentralisation currently trying to change the why Russia had forced all our since 2014, and reflect in the Constitution, is not telling us foreign partners to agree with Constitution the changes that the truth about what is real- these amendments, which are
70 Draft Law “On Amending the Constitution of Ukraine as to Decentralisation of Power.” July 1, 2017, http://w1.c1.rada. gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=55812 71 For an in-depth analysis of the Draft Law “On Amending the Constitution of Ukraine as to Decentralisation of Power,” July 1, 2017, see Section 1 of this paper. 72 Svoboda party pickets the parliament, demanding not to surrender to the Kremlin, Svoboda, August 31, 2015, http:// svoboda.org.ua/news/events/00015038/
44 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
good for everyone except us [People’s Will] party); 87 voted sonnel. The police detailed Ukrainians. Our Western part- against; 5 abstained from the one Ihor Humenyuk, former ners, while insisting that the vote; 11 votes withheld. The to- member of the Sich battalion, constitutional amendments tal number of deputies taking who was accused of throwing are necessary as part of the part in the session was 368.75 a grenade at members of the Minsk Agreements, are failing That ruling of the parliament National Guard.77 to answer two simple ques- had opened the path to the These events near the Verk- tions. One, why should Ukraine main vote on the amendments hovna Rada of Ukraine became fulfill the Minsk Agreements to the Constitution, which re- a turning point for under- unilaterally? And two, how quired over 300 votes in favor standing the further prospects will the West respond if Russia in order to pass. of the Minsk Agreements with- continues to violate the agree- Meanwhile, during the in Ukraine. Both the govern- ments?”73 August 31 vote, several po- ment and the opposition fully The tensions had reached litical parties, including Svo- understood that further reso- their peak on August 31, 2015, boda, the Radical Party of lution of the conflict with Rus- when the Verkhovna Rada was Oleh Lyashnko, Civic Platform sia had to continue without voting on draft law N2217a. and UKROP, organized a rally external pressure, and be root- Despite the heated debates in by the walls of the Verkhov- ed in a clear understanding the parliament, the draft law na Rada, aiming to prevent a of Ukraine’s national interests. was adopted on a preliminary positive vote on amendments Acting otherwise could lead to basis.74 265 deputies voted in to the Constitution. After the internal destabilization, which, favor (115 from the Petro Po- vote, mass unrest had erupt- given the existing conflict with roshenko Bloc, 69 from the ed by the parliament, and a Russia, could have unforeseen People’s Front, 38 from the live grenade was thrown from consequences for the Ukraini- Opposition Bloc, 5 from the the crowd at members of the an state. Samopomich party, 0 from the law enforcement detail. Four The pressure from the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, servicemen of the National West, aimed to force Ukraine 0 from the Batkivshchyna [Fa- Guard of Ukraine were killed to make unilateral conces- therland] party, 11 from the as a result.76 A total of 141 peo- sions in the implementation Vidrodzhennia [Revival] party, ple were hospitalized, 131 of of the Minsk Agreements, had and 14 from the Volya Narodu them – law enforcement per- become, to a large degree,
73 7 threats behind the constitutional amendments proposed by the President, August 28, 2015, https://samopom- ich.ua/uk-7-zahroz-zaproponovanyh-prezydentom-zmin-do-konstytutsiji/ 74 Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On Preliminary Adoption of the Draft Law on Amending the Con- stitution of Ukraine as to Decentralisation of Power,” N 656-19. August 31, 2015, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/656-19 75 Roll call vote for the Resolution to adopt on a preliminary basis the Draft Law on Amending the Constitution of Ukraine as to Decentralisation of Power (N2217а/P1). August 31, 2015, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ ns_golos?g_id=3462l 76 National Guard Members Killed Near the Verkhovna Rada: the Dossier. August 31, 2016. https://ua.112.ua/statji/ zahybli-pid-verkhovnoiu-radoiu-biitsi-natshvardii-dosie-255516.html 77 Avakov: the grenade was thrown by a “Svoboda” member from the Sich battalion. Ukrainska Pravda, August 31, 2015, http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/08/31/7079662/
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 45 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
counter-productive and dest- day had aggravated the stand- French diplomat Pierre Morel, abilizing. Specialists of Stratfor, off between parliamentarywas developed by Assistant US a US private analytical agency, factions and jump-started a Secretary of State Victoria Nu- indicated that the mass unrest political crisis, which resulted land and Russian State Secre- near the Verkhovna Rada dur- in the departure of the Radical tary and Deputy Foreign Min- ing the vote on including the Party, Samopomich, and Bat- ister Grigory Karasin.80 “privileged” status of CDDLR kivshchyna from the coalition. According to the sources into the Constitution showed Under these conditions, it was of the Ukrainian publication that “…the Ukrainian govern- impossible to achieve a consti- Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, the plan en- ment is in a difficult spot, with tutional majority to back the tailed holding elections in CD- pressure from Russia and Mos- decentralisation draft law. DLR under a special law, which cow-backed separatists on Still, Ukraine’s Western would be significantly different one side and demands from partners had an erroneous from the general rules apply- far-right and ultra-national el- view of the situation, and con- ing in the rest of Ukraine. The ements on the other. The more tinued their pressure on Kyiv, plan did not require that the Kiev concedes to one, the trying to get the constitutional elections be held after meet- more it is in jeopardy of facing amendments adopted as soon ing the conditions considered blowback from the other. This as possible, based on their necessary by the Ukrainian situation will continue to com- belief that it would give a de- side, such as withdrawing the plicate not only chances of a cisive push to conflict resolu- troops, disarming the insur- settlement between Russia tion in Donbas. On September gents, and returning control and the West over the conflict 12, 2015, the Berlin summit of over the border to Ukraine.81 in eastern Ukraine, but also the Normandy Four (Germany, In Ukraine, considering the the coherence of the Ukrainian France, Ukraine, and Russia) tragic events of August 31, state as a whole.”78 saw the unveiling of the so- 2015 near the Verkhovna Rada On August 31, 2015, after called Morel Plan, which was and the general domestic ten- the draft law N2217a was ap- meant to be adopted on Oc- sion, the Morel Plan was re- proved on a preliminary basis, tober 2, 2015, at the Paris sum- ceived mainly negatively. The it was included in the agenda mit.79 President of Ukraine Petro Po- for a final vote, which would re- According to Deutsche roshenko called the plan “Mr. quire a constitutional majority Welle, the plan, offered for Morel’s own idea of the elec- in the parliament (300 votes). consideration to the working tions in Donbas.”82 Later, he al- However, the tragedy near the group on political affairs of the together denied the existence Verkhovna Rada on the same Trilateral Contact Group by the of the plan as a finished doc-
78 American Intelligence Agency Stratfor: Kyiv is Between a Rock and a Hard Place, UNIAN, September 2, 2015, https:// www.unian.ua/politics/1118061-amerikanska-rozvidka-stratfor-kijiv-opinivsya-mij-dvoh-vogniv.html 79 “Morel’s Talking Points.” S. Rakhmanin, Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, September 18, 2015, https://dt.ua/internal/morelski-tezi-_.html 80 “The Morel Plan: Will Kyiv Swallow the Bitter Pill?” October 4, 2015, http://p.dw.com/p/1GdFt 81 “Morel’s Talking Points.” S. Rakhmanin, Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, September 18, 2015, https://dt.ua/internal/morelski-te- zi-_.html 82 Poroshenko commented on the Morel Plan about elections in Donbas. lb.ua, September 21, 2015, https://ukr. lb.ua/news/2015/09/21/316497_poroshenko_prokomentuvav_plan.html
46 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
ument, and listed three of its would try to make them push Putin responded, “No, that’s points that definitely could not for Ukraine’s further “decen- not the case. Look at this, it’s be applied. “The first is the idea tralisation.” A typical example all in English, you can keep it. that the internally displaced of that is Vladimir Putin’s inter- What does it say here? Clause persons would be deprived view published in the German 9: restoring complete control of their voting rights in Don- newspaper Bild on January 11, over the state border to the bas and would vote elsewhere 2016.84 Answering the journal- government of Ukraine, based instead. The second is the ist’s questions, Putin said, “Be- on the law of Ukraine on the “transformation,” or rather, the lieve me, this is now becoming constitutional reform, before restriction for Ukrainian po- somewhat of theatre of ab- the end of 2015, contingent litical parties from taking part surd, because the bulk of the on fulfilling Clause 11, that is, in local elections in Donbas. responsibility for fulfilling the the constitutional reform. So That will not happen. Ukraini- Minsk Agreements now rests first, the constitution has to an political forces will take full with the government in Kyiv. be reformed and political pro- part in the elections in Donbas. You cannot demand from Mos- cesses started, and only then, Mr. Morel himself agreed with cow to do things that must be based on these processes, we that, and this point has been done by Kyiv. For example, the can build confidence and com- withdrawn,” said Poroshenko. most important, pivotal issues plete all processes, including “Thirdly, full-fledged operation in the [conflict] resolution pro- closing the borders.” of Ukrainian media in Donbas cess are political ones, with the Thus, Putin claims that is a necessary prerequisite constitutional reform at their the main aspect of the stabi- for democratic elections,” the core. This is Clause 11 of the lization process is not to stop President noted. He added Minsk Agreements. It clear- the armed conflict, but to that these points had been ly states that a constitutional carry out political changes in presented for discussion, were reform must be carried out – Ukraine, namely, the constitu- met with strong objection on and it’s not up to Moscow to tional reform. In other words, the part of the Ukrainian del- make those decisions! Look, according to the Kremlin’s log- egation, and subsequently it says here clearly: Ukraine is ic, should Ukraine carry out withdrawn.83 to carry out a constitutional the constitutional reform and Russia, trying to keep ten- reform, with [the new consti- the “decentralisation” (i.e. au- sions high in Ukraine during tution] to come into effect be- tonomization of the occupied the constitutional amendment fore the end of 2015. Clause territories), and turn CDDLR process, continued its informa- 11. The year 2015 is now over.” into a pro-Russian enclave tion and diplomatic attacks, When asked by the German with a special status, then Rus- combined with the unceasing journalist, “So the constitu- sia would cease aggression activity of occupation troops in tional reform must be carried against Ukraine. Besides, Putin Donbas. Exploiting the West- out after all combat activity is made a mistake by speaking ern partners’ interests, Russia ceased. Is that what it says?” – about “closing the borders.”
83 Poroshenko: There is and there will not be any “Morel Plan.” Ukrainska Pravda, October 4, 2015, http://www.prav- da.com.ua/news/2015/10/4/7083626/ 84 Interview with the German newspaper Bild. January 11, 2016, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51154
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 47 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
The Minsk Agreements talk border control; Russia still at- process, but their contents and about transferring control over tempted to force Ukraine into prescribed actions are out of the border to Ukraine from amending the Constitution touch with reality and should “representatives of CDDLR.” To and creating the prerequisites therefore be updated; amend- speak about “closing the bor- for legalizing puppet govern- ing the Constitution and laws ders” is to say that the borders ments in occupied Donbas; of Ukraine in the context of the are currently “open” on the part while Germany, France, the Minsk Agreements is unfeasi- of Russia. Therefore, Putin had USA, and the OSCE could not ble and counter-productive, admitted that Russia is in full propose a single acceptable as that may negatively impact control of the situation, able update to the Minsk Agree- Ukraine’s national interests to “close the border” at any ments that could revitalize the or, given certain conditions, moment, withdraw its troops conflict resolution process.destroy the Ukrainian state; and cease aggression against Plus, caught up in their own decentralisation is an internal Ukraine. However, it is not do- pre-election issues, Washing- state transformation process ing that, instead choosing to ton, Paris and Berlin were not and should be taken outside blackmail Ukraine and other interested in escalating the the Minsk Agreements, as the parties of the conflict resolu- events between Kyiv in Mos- latter at this time actually rep- tion. cow. Thus, while the USA and resent an obstacle to decen- Europe were undergoing po- tralisation; the Minsk Agree- litical turbulence, their stance ments will only start working 2.6 “Freezing” of on the Russia-Ukraine rela- once they recognize Russia as a Minsk Agreements. tions was to repeat the man- party to the conflict and place tra: “the Minsk Agreements are on it the responsibility for the Accumulation of the only option.” As a result, in- aggression, as well as for tak- ternational mediators did not ing specific conflict resolution Ukraine’s Own resolve an armed conflict, but steps (first of all, to withdraw Decentralisation “froze” the Minsk Agreements its troops and armaments, and instead. transfer control over the bor- Experience. New At the same time, Ukraine der to Ukraine); the key issue had completed a difficult jour- for Ukraine’s national interests Model for De- ney towards self-realization is to clearly define CDDLR as Occupation and of its national interests in the occupied territories, recog- conflict with Russia. Its do- nize Russia as the aggressor, Reintegration of mestic processes, while slow and bring all aspects of the and riddled with disputes and Russian-Ukrainian conflict in CDDLR compromises, had gradual- accordance with the interna- As of mid-2016, the ly resulted in a national con- tional law; the Crimea issue “Ukraine-Russia-West” trian- sensus on what the approach should be addressed along- gle found itself at an impasse. to resolving the conflict with side Donbas as part of the Ukraine would not agree to Russia should be. Overall, the conflict resolution process, be- further implement the Minsk approach could be summed cause from the points of view Agreements without with- up as follows: the Minsk Agree- of international and Ukrainian drawal of Russian troops from ments will remain the frame- law, Crimea and Donbas have CDDLR and the transfer of the work foundation of the peace the same legal status.
48 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
At this time, Ukraine is suc- of the National Security and temporarily occupied terri- cessfully promoting the de- Defence Council Oleksandr tories. They are subject to a centralisation reform, which Turchynov.85 In July 2017, Mr. special legal regime apply- entails comprehensive trans- Turchynov reported that the ing to occupied territories; formation of the state gov- draft law had been prepared • Ukraine’s objective is to ernance system, and is based by the NSDC, with contribu- liberate the occupied ter- on “financial” decentralisation, tions from the parliament, ritories and restore con- creation of consolidated terri- government, and experts; the stitutional order in them. torial communities with Safety draft law was introduced to Ukraine will use all possi- Centres created “from the bot- the Verkhovna Rada on Octo- bilities to protect the rights tom up,” and transformation of ber 4, 2017, after the start of and freedoms of its citizens the executive power vertical the new parliament session, residing in the temporarily with a system for overseeing and following consultations occupied territories; and controlling the new lo- with the EU and the USA.86 • The political and diplomat- cal self-government bodies. Some of the draft law pro- ic methods for restoring By using this approach and visions include: Ukraine’s territorial integ- achieving the first positive re- • Russia is recognized as an rity; sults from its own approach aggressor;87 • The President of Ukraine to decentralisation, Ukraine is • Russia is carrying out armed can declare martial law and moving towards a new mod- aggression against Ukraine adopt resolutions to de- el for determining the status using the Armed Forces ploy the Armed Forces of of the occupied Donbas ter- of the Russian Federation Ukraine and other military ritories. The latter, it appears, (regular and irregular units, formations in Donetsk and will be involved not so much mercenaries, armed gangs, Lugansk oblasts; in decentralisation, but in etc.) as well as the Russian • The forces and resources de-occupation and reintegra- occupation administration, operating to ensure na- tion processes. The essence of which had usurped power tional security and defence this model is contained in the in the occupied territories in Donetsk and Lugansk draft Law of Ukraine “On Spe- of Ukraine; oblasts are commanded by cifics of State Policy to Restore • In Donetsk and Lugansk the Joint Operation Head- Ukraine’s State Sovereignty oblasts, districts where the quarters of the Armed Forc- over the Temporarily Occu- Russian Armed Forces and es of Ukraine. The entire pied Territory of Donetsk and the Russian occupation staff of the power minis- Lugansk Oblasts of Ukraine.” administration have estab- tries and law enforcement This draft law was announced lished and exercise their bodies involved in ensur- in June 2017 by the Secretary power are recognized as ing national security and
85 Turchynov hopes that the Rada will adopt an alternative to the ATO before the recess. Ukrainska Pravda, June 14, 2017, http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/06/14/7146928/ 86 See: “Draft Law of Ukraine “On Specifics of State Policy to Restore Ukraine’s State Sovereignty over the Tempo- rarily Occupied Territory of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts of Ukraine.” http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/web- proc4_1?pf3511=62638 87 Ibid.
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 49 Part 2. Decentralisation in the Minsk Agreements
defence in Donetsk and At the same time, the in- tion to protect its sovereign- Lugansk oblasts are subor- ternational political situation ty and territorial integrity. dinated to the Head of the favours Kyiv, as neither Berlin Ukraine’s initiative in the form Joint Operation Headquar- nor Paris can suggest anything of the new Law is one of the ters of the Armed Forces of new for the conflict resolution avenues for exercising these Ukraine. process, except for repeating, rights. Obviously, this draft law “The Minsk Agreements are Ukraine’s biggest challenge has been met with strong op- the only option.” This situation in implementing this new con- position from Russia, as it fully plays into the hands of Russia, flict resolution model will be ruins Moscow’s plans to create which continues maintaining convincing its Western part- a pro-Russian enclave within a high level of tension in the ners that recognizing Russia Ukraine. As a result, the Russian conflict zone in Donbas, kill- as an aggressor and occupant leadership is likely to increase ing Ukrainian militaries and will not result in aggravation pressure on Germany and civilians while simultaneously of the conflict and collapse of France, to make them, in turn, trying to destabilize Ukraine the Minsk Agreements. One of put pressure on Ukraine and from the inside. Under these the key points here is that the prevent the adoption of the Law conditions, the Ukrainian state approach to “decentralisation” “On Specifics of State Policy to is defending itself de facto in- described in the List of Meas- Restore Ukraine’s State Sover- dependently, without much ures to Implement the Minsk eignty over the Temporarily Oc- assistance from its partners. Agreements88 is provocative cupied Territory of Donetsk and Thus, Kyiv is fully within its and counterproductive, and Lugansk Oblasts of Ukraine.” rights to act at its own discre- therefore, unrealistic.
88 The List of Measures to Implement the Minsk Agreements, February 12, 2015, http://www.osce.org/ru/ cio/140221?download=true
50 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications General Conclusions
oday, Ukraine’s decen- In Ukraine, Russia had at- this form, as the Kremlin con- tralisation reform is one tempted the same neo-Imperi- tinues to block any progress in Т of the most progressive al gambits it had already tried implementing the security and and successful state projects out in the post-Soviet state to humanitarian aspects of the for transforming the state multiply conflict and establish Minsk Agreements. governance system, aimed to control over former Soviet re- Despite all these challeng- increase the effectiveness of publics (examples: conflicts es, the preliminary results of local self-government and cre- in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and the decentralisation reform ate a full-fledged civil society. South Ossetia, as well as oper- can be assessed as positive. Decentralisation in Ukraine ations by Russian special ser- Among other things, it bears is being implemented with vices in post-Soviet countries merit to mention the “financial consideration of the best Eu- of Central Asia). decentralisation,” which entails ropean practices, and is the External aggression is cur- transferring a large share of keystone of Kyiv’s irrevoca- rently one of the greatest hur- power in the socioeconomic ble commitment to Ukraine’s dles to the state-wide decen- sphere from the center to the pro-European course. tralisation reform, including in regions, and a respective redis- At the same time, this the part of its constitutional tribution of financial resources. reform is being carried out recognition. This is due to the The progress in voluntary crea- against the background of an external pressure exerted to tion of consolidated territorial armed conflict, its initiator, force a controversial norm on communities on the funda- main driver, as well as the ob- the “specifics of local self-gov- mental level, and their opera- stacle to its resolution being ernance in entrain districts of tion so far, can also be assessed the Russian Federation, which Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts” as positive. had occupied and annexed into the Transitional Provisions The reform entails creating Crimea and, after failing to of the Constitution of Ukraine. a new system for overseeing entirely destroy Ukraine by At the current stage, it is im- and controlling the new bod- creating a so-called “Novo- possible for the Verkhovna ies of local self government: rossiya,” occupied a part of Rada of Ukraine to adopt the namely, to introduce a prefect Donbas. constitutional amendments in institution that would aim to
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 51 General Conclusions
increase security, primarily by sent the main hurdle for prop- flict with Russia, and its com- preventing separatism senti- er constitutional recognition plex internal processes had re- ments (and expressions of sep- of the decentralisation reform, sulted in a national consensus aratism) and counteracting the including the constitutional about an acceptable approach Russian agent network’s at- recognition of the prefect in- for resolving the conflict with tempts to destabilize Ukraine stitution, the new format for Russia, including its idea of from the inside. overseeing and controlling lo- “decentralisation by the 9-11 Overall, the decentrali- cal self-government bodies. formula.” sation process has already As a result, a key securi- Overall, this approach can strengthened Ukraine’s secu- ty issue remains open within be summarized as follows: rity sector through a number the state-wide decentralisa- the Minsk Agreements will re- of “low-level” projects in the tion process, for an indefinite main the framework founda- newly-created local self-gov- term: namely, controlling the tion of the peace process, but ernment bodies. This includes newly-created bodies of local their contents and prescribed an improved civil protection self-government. That creates actions are out of touch with system (with pilot projects such challenges and risks as a reality and should therefore for contemporary fire depart- favorable environment for sep- be updated; еру constitution- ments), creation and operation aratism (especially in south- al reform, including as relat- of Public Safety Centers in the eastern regions of Ukraine), ed to decentralisation, must communities, creation of new and regionalization of the be taken outside of the Minsk local authorities to protect state with local business elites process, and outside of the public order in the communi- at the core. Russian-Ukrainian conflict res- ties, and improving the territo- Thus, it would be entirely olution; the Minsk Agreements rial defense system. These pro- unacceptable to recognizing are blocking the constitution- cesses are tightly linked to the state-wide decentralisation in al reform process in Ukraine, reformation processes in the the Constitution while keep- which is unacceptable from respective power ministries ing to the Russian vision of the the point of view of Ukraine’s (SES and MIA). Minsk Agreements implemen- national interests; the Minsk Due to Russia’s aggression tation, as that would create a Agreements will only start against Ukraine, Ukraine’s real risk of the Transnistrian working once they recognize state-wide decentralisation scenario in Ukraine, that is: fed- Russia as a party to the conflict reform cannot be implement- eralization and demilitariza- and place on it the responsibil- ed in the currently occupied tion of the state, commitment ity for the aggression, as well territories of Crimea and cer- to neutrality with no European as for taking specific conflict tain districts of Donetsk and or Euro-Atlantic integration, resolution steps (first of all, to Lugansk oblasts, until they and a complete foreign policy withdraw its troops and arma- are completely liberated and and economic dictatorship of ments, and transfer control de-occupied. The Kremlin’s at- the Kremlin. All these process- over the border to Ukraine); the tempts to force Donbas territo- es are currently underway in key issue for Ukraine’s nation- ries into Ukraine on the terms the Republic of Moldova. al interests is to clearly define favorable for Moscow and un- The Ukrainian state had CDDLR as occupied territories, acceptable for Kyiv (by exert- completed a difficult journey recognize Russia as the aggres- ing pressure within the Minsk towards fully realizing its own sor, and bring all aspects of the Agreement processes) repre- national interests in the con- Russian-Ukrainian conflict in
52 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications General Conclusions
accordance with the interna- pied territories of Donbas must flict resolution in the military tional law; the Crimea issue exclude them from the decen- conflict zone would be carried should be addressed along- tralisation process, but instead out in accordance with the side Donbas as part of the provide for their de-occupation draft Law of Ukraine “On Spe- conflict resolution process, be- and reintegration processes. In cifics of State Policy to Restore cause from the points of view this context, it would be feasi- Ukraine’s State Sovereignty of international and Ukrainian ble to separate the processes of over the Temporarily Occu- law, Crimea and Donbas have the state-wide decentralisation pied Territory of Donetsk and the same legal status. reform and the de-occupation Lugansk Oblasts of Ukraine” The new model for deter- of the territories temporarily developed by the NSDC of mining the status of the occu- occupied by Russia; while con- Ukraine.89
89 As of the writing of this report, the Law was not adopted.
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 53 Appendix. A List of measures to fulfil the Minsk Agreement
February 12, 2015 14 days. The OSCE will con- 5. To provide pardons and 1. An immediate and compre- tribute to this process with amnesties by the enactment of a hensive ceasefire in individual ar- the support of the Trilateral law prohibiting prosecution and eas of the Donetsk and Lugansk Contact Group. punishment of persons with re- regions of Ukraine and its strict 3. Starting the first day of such gard to the events that took place implementation starting at 0000 withdrawal, ensuring the effec- in individual areas of the Donetsk (Kyiv time) February 15, 2015. tive monitoring and verification and Lugansk regions of Ukraine. 2. The withdrawal of all heavy by the OSCE of the ceasefire and 6. To ensure the release and weapons by both parties at the withdrawal of heavy weap- exchange of hostages and illegal- equal distances in order to create ons with the use of all necessary ly detained persons based on the at least a 50 kilometer security technical means, including satel- principle of “all for all”. This process zone for 100mm or larger caliber lites, UAVs, radar systems, etc. must be completed no later than artillery systems, a 70 kilometer 4. On the first day after the the fifth day after the withdrawal. security zone for Grad multiple withdrawal, to begin a dialogue 7. To provide secure access, rocket launcher systems and on the procedures for holding lo- delivery, storage and distribution a 140 kilometer security zone cal elections in accordance with of humanitarian aid to the needy for the Tornado-S, Uragan, and Ukrainian law and the Law of on the basis of an international Smerch multiple rocket launcher Ukraine “On a temporary order mechanism. systems and Tochka (Tochka-U) of local government in individual 8. Determination of the pro- tactical missile systems: areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk cedure for the full restoration of • for the Ukrainian troops: regions,” as well as on the future the socio-economic relations, [withdrawal] from the actu- regime of these areas, accord- including transactions of social al contact line; ing to this Act. Immediately, no payments, such as pensions and • for the military units of indi- later than 30 days from the date other payments (takings and in- vidual areas of the Donetsk of signing of this document, to come, timely payment of all utili- and Lugansk regions of adopt a resolution of the Verkhov- ty bills, renewal of taxation within Ukraine: [withdrawal] from na Rada of Ukraine with the spec- Ukraine’s legal framework). To this the contact line in accord- ification of a territory subject to end, Ukraine shall regain control ance with the Minsk mem- the special regime in accordance over the segment of its banking orandum of September 19, with the Law of Ukraine “On tem- system in conflict-affected areas, 2014 Withdrawal of afore- porary order of local government and an international mechanism mentioned heavy weap- in some regions of the Donetsk to facilitate such transfers will ons shall begin no later and Lugansk regions” based on probably be created. than the second day of the the line set in a Minsk memoran- 9. Restoration of full con- ceasefire and end within dum of September 19, 2014. trol over the state border of
54 Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications Appendix. A List of measures to fulfil the Minsk Agreement
Ukraine by Ukraine’s government al areas of Donetsk and Lugansk the relevant local authorities throughout the whole conflict regions” the questions regarding on economic, social and cul- area, which should begin on the local elections shall be discussed tural development of indi- first day after the local elections and agreed with the individual vidual areas of Donetsk and and be completed after a com- areas of the Donetsk and Lu- Lugansk regions; prehensive political settlement gansk regions in the framework • The state shall support (local elections in individual ar- of the Trilateral Contact Group. socio-economic develop- eas of the Donetsk and Lugansk Elections will be held in compli- ment of individual areas of regions on the basis of the Law ance with the relevant standards Donetsk and Lugansk re- of Ukraine, and a constitutional of the OSCE with the monitoring gions; reform) by the end of 2015, on by the OSCE ODIHR. • Assistance from the central condition of implementation of 13. To intensify the activities government to cross-border paragraph 11 – with consulta- of the Trilateral Contact Group, cooperation between the in- tions and in agreement with the including through the establish- dividual areas of the Donetsk representatives of individual ar- ment of working groups to im- and Lugansk regions and re- eas of the Donetsk and Lugansk plement the relevant aspects of gions of the Russian Federa- regions in the framework of the the Minsk Agreement. They will tion; Trilateral Contact Group. reflect the composition of the • The creation of people’s mi- 10. The withdrawal of all for- Trilateral Contact Group. litia units [police] upon the eign armed forces, military equip- Notes: decision of local councils ment, as well as mercenaries from Such measures, in accord- in order to maintain public the territory of Ukraine under the ance with the Law “On the spe- order in individual areas of supervision of the OSCE. Disar- cial order of local government in the Donetsk and Lugansk mament of all illegal groups. individual areas of the Donetsk regions; 11. Conducting constitution- and Lugansk regions,” include • The powers of local council al reform in Ukraine, with the the following: deputies and other officials new constitution coming into • Exemption from punishment, elected in snap elections, force by the end of 2015, provid- harassment and discrimina- appointed by the Verkhovna ing for decentralisation as a key tion of persons associated Rada of Ukraine according element (taking into account the with the events that took to this law, cannot be termi- characteristics of individual are- place in individual areas of the nated. as of the Donetsk and Lugansk Donetsk and Lugansk regions; regions, agreed with represent- • The right to self-determi- The document is signed by atives of these areas), as well nation with regard to lan- the members of a Trilateral Con- as the adoption of the perma- guage; tact Group: nent legislation on the special • Participation of local govern- [OSCE] Ambassador Heidi status of individual areas of the ments in the appointment Tagliavini Donetsk and Lugansk regions in of heads of prosecutors’ of- Second President of Ukraine accordance with the measures fices and courts in individu- L.D. Kuchma specified in Note [1], until the al areas of the Donetsk and The Ambassador of the Rus- end of 2015. (See Notes) Lugansk regions; sian Federation to Ukraine M.Yu. 12. On the basis of the Law • The possibility for the cen- Zurabov of Ukraine “On temporary order tral executive authorities to A. V. Zakharchenko of local government in individu- conclude agreements with I. V. Plotnitsky
Security Aspects of Political Decentralisation in Ukraine: Visions, Realities, and Possible Implications 55 PHILIPP FLURI, VALENTYN BADRACK (Eds)
SECURITY ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DECENTRALISATION IN UKRAINE: VISIONS, REALITIES, AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
Project coordinators: Volodymyr Kopchak, Leonid Polyakov, Mykhailo Samus Translation: “MOVA SERVICE” Computer design: Valeriya Chumak
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PHILIPP FLURI, VALENTYN BADRACK