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Aktuella Namn Aktuella utländska egennamn (”Snabblistan”) (1.7.2021) Nedanstående förteckning tar upp namn som kan förekomma i aktuella politiska texter och i fråga om vilka stavningen varierar, varvid detta i första hand beror på att namnen är translittererade från andra skriftsystem än det latinska alfabetet. Sven André ([email protected]) och Tobias Falk ([email protected]) ansvarar för innehållet i detta dokument (som till största delen tagits fram av Stefan Nordblom) och tar gärna emot förslag till tillägg och ändringar. Former inom parentes på engelska eller andra utländska språk i denna text anges bara i upplysningssyfte och är inte nödvändigtvis officiella eller korrekta. I den här upplagan har angivelser av typen 'f.d.' eller 'tidigare' i titlar efter personnamn strukits. Att en persons namn kompletteras med en upplysning om en titel innebär inte att personen innehar ämbetet/befattningen i dag (det kan alltså t.ex. finnas flera personer med titeln 'premiärminister' i avsnittet om ett visst land). En mer uttömmande förteckning och utredning (Utländska namn på svenska: Handbok om translitterering och alternativa geografiska namnformer av Stefan Nordblom) återfinns på EU:s publikationsbyrås webblats (https://publications.europa.eu/sv/publication-detail/-/publication/5aa51666-ebb0-11e8-b690- 01aa75ed71a1), Europeiska rådets och Europeiska unionens råds gemensamma webbplats (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37178/utl%C3%A4ndska-namn-p%C3%A5-svenska.pdf ) samt på hemsidan för Svenska avdelningen inom Översättningstjänsten vid Generalsekretariatet vid Europeiska unionens råd. En fullständig förteckning över regioner/Nuts-områden inom EU återfinns dessutom i bilaga A10 till Interinstitutionella publikationshandboken (http://publications.europa.eu/code/sv/sv-000500.htm ). Regioner som omfattar flera länder Levanten (en. the Levant; inte al-Sham, Storsyrien) – Syrien, Libanon, Israel/Palestina och Jordanien Sydkaukasien (en. South Caucasus, Transcaucasia; inte Sydkaukasus, Södra Kaukasien) – storregion omfattande Georgien, Armenien och Azerbajdzjan Den internationella arenan Personer Abdullatif (bin Rashid) al-Zayyani (inte Al Zayani) – bahrainare, generalsekreterare för Gulfstaternas samarbetsråd (GCC) Ahmad Abul Gheyt (inte Ahmed Aboul-Gheit) – libanes, generalsekreterare i Arabförbundet Ayman al-Zawahiri – egyptier, ledare för al-Qaida Ban Ki-moon – sydkorean, FN:s generalsekreterare Dalai lama (titel, inte namn; en. Dalai Lama el. ibl. the Dalai Lama, fr. le Dalaï-lama) – tibetansk religiös ledare i exil Iyad Madani – saudier, generalsekreterare i OIC Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – kuwaitier, aktivist inom al-Qaida Nabil al-Arabi (inte El Araby) – egyptier, generalsekreterare i Arabförbundet 1 Sayf al-Adil (inte Saif al-Adel; ar. eg. Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi) – egyptier, en av al-Qaidas ledare Usama bin Ladin – saudier, ledare för al-Qaida Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimeen (ar. eg. Yusuf bin Ahmad al-Othaymin) - saudier, generalsekreterare i Islamiska samarbetsorganisationen (OIC) Zeid bin Ra’ad al-Hussein – jordanier, FN:s högkommissarie för mänskliga rättigheter Organisationer m.m. al-Arabiyya – Dubaibaserad tv-kanal al-Jazira (inte Al Jazeera) – Qatarbaserad tv-kanal al-Muhajirun (inte Muhajiroun) – salafistisk terrororganisation (jfr dock al-Muhajiroun, en brittisk extremistorganisation, IATE-post 276657) al-Qaida (inte Al Qaeda) – ett nätverk av terrorister al-Sahab – al-Qaidas mediegren al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra – ett samlingsnamn för flera olika extrema islamistiska grupperingar Islamiska staten el. IS el. Isil* el. Daish* (alltefter källtextens namnval) (inte Daesh, Da'esh, Isis; ar. al-Dawla al-islamiyya; en. Islamic State m.fl. benämningar, se IATE) – väpnad islamistisk grupp Sacharovpriset (en. Sakharov Prize) för tankefrihet – pris uppkallat efter Andrej Sacharov * eg. sv. resp. ar. förkortning av det tidigare namnet Islamiska staten i Irak och Levanten (al-Dawla al-islamiyya fi Iraq wa-l-Sham). Allmänna begrepp (rörande islam och arabisk kultur) al- – arabiskans bestämda artikel, litet a även först i ny mening El- – variant av al- (se ovan) i Egypten och Maghreb hajj – vallfarten till Mekka haji (arabiska) (som hederstitel: al-Haj Xx) – person som gjort vallfarten till Mekka haji (persiska) (som hederstitel: Haj Xx) – person som gjort vallfarten till Mekka hidaya (ar. "vägledning") – bl.a. religiös term inom islam hudud – sammanfattande benämning på fem olika brott (synder) enl. Koranen kadi (inte qadi eller cadi) – domare som avgör civilrättsliga och relig. frågor Id al-fitr (inte Eid al-fitr) – islamisk högtid vid fastans upphörande madrasa (inte madrassa) – koranskola; vanlig grundskola (pl. madraser) majlis – rådet (olika sammanhang) (jfr även majles under Iran:Övrigt nedan) Maghreb – de västliga arabländerna Mashriq (inte Mashrek) – de östliga arabländerna Mawlawi/Maulavi – hederstitel för religiösa ledare inom islam (sunna) Mawlana/Maulana – hederstitel för religiösa ledare inom islam (ung. "mäster") mohareb (persiska) – person som begår "moharebeh" (ung. "gudsfiende") moharebeh (persiska) – "krig mot Gud" – ett hädelsebrott enligt islamisk lag (inte muharebeh) mojahed (persiska, pl. mojahedin) – den som deltar i "heligt krig", jfr "mujahid" 2 muharib (arabiska) – person som begår "muharaba" (ung. "gudsfiende") muharaba (arabiska) – "krig mot Gud" – ett hädelsebrott enligt islamisk lag mujahid (arabiska, pl. mujahider el. mujahidin) – den som deltar i "heligt krig" mulla – teolog inom islam (särskilt inom shia) qari – högre skriftlärd inom islam qisas – vedergällning (inom islamisk lag) Sayyid Xx (arabiska) – en titel Seyed Xx (persiska) – en titel Shaykh XX – en titel (somaliska Sheekh; svenska ibl. schejk) sunniter – personer som tillhör sunni (en riktning inom islam) shiiter – personer som tillhör shia (en riktning inom islam) tazirat – brott riktade mot samhället, enl. islamisk lag waqf – donation som innebär att avkastningen (ofta förvaltad av en islamisk religiös stiftelse) av en egendom eller fastighet tillfaller välgörande ändamål zaydiyya, zaydism – en riktning inom shia Diverse länder AFGHANISTAN Folkgrupper Alizai – en klan balucher (en. Baloch, Baluch) – ett folk i gränsområdet Iran–Afghanistan–Pakistan hazarer (en. Hazara, Hazaras) nuristaner (en. Nuristani, Nuristanis) – den största folkgruppen i Nuristan Hutak (inte Hotak, Hottak) – en klan Nurzai (inte Noorzai) – en klan pashai (en. Pashai, Pashayi) – ett bergsfolk i Hindukush pashtuner (en. Pashtuns, Pukhtuns) tadzjiker (en. Tajiks) Tukhi (inte Tokhi) – en klan uzbeker (en. Uzbeks) Personer Abdullah Abdullah – premiärminister Ahmad Moqbel Zarar – utrikesminister Akhtar Mohamad Mansur – ledare för talibanerna Ashraf Ghani – president Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – ledare för Hezb-e eslami(-Gulbuddin) Hamid Karzai – president Jalaluddin (inte Jallaloudine) Haqqani – ledare för Haqqani-nätverket Mohamad Omar (mulla Omar) – ledare för talibanerna Salahuddin Rabbani – utrikesminister Zalmay Rasul (inte Zalmai Rassoul) – utrikesminister Städer och andra geografiska namn Band-e Timur (inte Band-e-Temur) – område i distriktet Maywand Daykondi (en. Daykundi) – provins Ghor (en. =) – provins Helmand (en. =) – provins 3 Hindukush (en. Hindu Kush) – en bergskedja Jowzjan (en. =) – provins Kabul (en. =) – huvudstad och provins Kandahar (en. =) – stad och provins Khost (en. =) – stad och provins Kunar (en. =) – provins Kunduz (en. =) – stad och provins Maywand (inte Maiwand) – distrikt Mazar-e Sharif (inte Mazar-i-Sharif) – stad Meymaneh (inte Maimana) – stad Nimruz (en. =; inte Nimroz) – provins Nuristan (en. =) – provins Sar-e Pol (en. =; inte Sari Pul) – stad och provins Shahjuy (inte Shahjoi, Shah Joy) – distrikt Spin Buldak (inte Spin Boldak) – stad vid gränsen mot Pakistan Tirin Kut (inte Tirin Kot, Tarinkot) – huvudort i provinsen Uruzgan Uruzgan (en. Urozgan) – provins Wardak (en. =, Maidan Wardak, Wardag) – provins Zabol (en. Zabul) – provins Övrigt Hezb-e eslami(-Gulbuddin) (en. Hezb-e-Islami [Gulbuddin], Hezbi Islami, HIG; inte Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-i-Islami, Hezbi-Islami, Hezbi Islami Party) – islamistiskt parti Hezb-e eslami(-Khalis) (en. Hezb-e Islami Khalis, Khalis faction; inte Hezbi Islami Party) – islamistiskt parti ALBANIEN Städer och andra geografiska namn Gjirokastër (en. =; inte Gjirokastra, Gjiroskastra) – stad Korçë (en. =; inte Korça, Korutsa) – stad Tirana (en. =) – huvudstad Vlorë (en. =; inte Valona, Vlora) – hamnstad ANGOLA Städer och andra geografiska namn Lunda Norte (en. =; inte North Lunda) – provins Lunda Sul (en. = ; inte South Lunda) – provins ARMENIEN Personer Armen Sargsian (en. Armen Sargsyan; inte Sarkissian) – president Edvard Nalbandjan (en. Eduard Nalbandyan) – säkerhets- och utrikesminister Hovik Abrahamjan (en. Hovik Abrahamyan) – premiärminister Karen Karapetian (en. Karen Karapetyan) – premiärminister Levon Ter-Petrosian (en. Levon Ter-Petrosyan; inte Ter-Petrossian) – president Nikol Pasjinjan (en. Pashinyan; inte P'asjinjan) – premiärminister 4 Serzj Sargsian (en. Serzh Sargsyan; inte Serge, Serj; inte Sarkissian, Sarkissyan, Sarkisyan) – politiker Tigran Sargsian (en. Tigran Sargsyan; inte Sarkissian, Sarkissyan, Sarkisyan) – premiärminister AZERBAJDZJAN Folkgrupper azerbajdzjaner el. azerier (en. Azerbaijanis, Azeris) talysjer (en. Taleshis, Talishis, Talyshi, Talyshis) tatarer (en. Tatars) tater (en. Tats) Personer Artur Rasizadä (en. Artur Rasizade) – premiärminister Elmar Mämmädyarov (en. Elmar Mammadyarov) – utrikesminister Hilal Mämmädov (en. Hilal Mammadov) – människorättsaktivist Ilqar Mämmädov
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