Russell B. - by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description- PAS Xew $eries. v. Xl l9{O-{{, pp {O8-{28

Reprinted by Gourtesy of the Editor of the Aristotelian $ociety: 19{(D.t9{ | www;aristotel iansociety.org. uk. 108 KNOWI,EDGEBY ACQUAINTANCEAND'BY DESCRIPTION.109

But the associations and natural extensions of tho word acquaittttr,ttceare different from thoso of the wotd prasantulion, To begin with, as in most cognitive words, it is natulnl bo eoy that I am acquainted with an object even at motnents whon it \I.-KNOWLET)GE By ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOW._ is not actually before my mind, provided it has been beforc lrry LEDGE BY DDSCRIPTION. mind, and will be again whenever occasion orises. Thie iB tlro which I am said to know thst 2+2 = 4 ovott 3y Bnnruxn Russpr,r,. sarne sense in when I aur thinking of something else. In the secotttl plrtcrt, Tttu object of the following paper is to consicrerwhat it is thub the worcl acguaintanceis designed to emphasize,lnoro tltutr tlttr we lrnow in cases where we know plopositions aboul; ,, 1;he word 'presentation,the relational character of tlto fnob witlr .what so-and-so" without knowing who or the so_ancl_sois. which we are concerned. There is, to my mind, a dungor that, I'or exarnple, I knolv that the candidate who gets mosb votes in speaking of presentatiorts,we may so emphasize the ob,iecb will be elected, though I do not l

connection with self-consciousness,which we must now br.iefly knowing its constiLuents. This question, however, is not consider. imporbant for our present pur-poses,and I shall therefore nob In introspection, we seenr to be immediately arvare of discussit furbher. varying cornplexes, consisting of objecbs in various cognibive The awarenesseslve have considered so far have aII been and conative relations to ourselyes. When f see the sun, &warenessesof particular existents, and might a).I in a lalge it often happens that I am &ware of my seeing the sun, in sense be called sense-data. For, from the poinb of vierv of addigion to being aware of the sun I and when I desire food, i& theory of knowledge, introspective knowledge is exactly on often happens that I arn arvare of my desire for food. Bub it a level wibh knowledge derived from sight or heuring. Ilut, is hard to disoover any state of nrind in which f am aware of in addition to arvarenessof the above kind of objects, rvhich myself alone, as opposed to a complex of which I am a may be called awareness of particulars, we have also what constiluent. The question of the nature of self-consciousness may be called alvarenessof nr.n'fuersals.Awareness of universals is too hrge, and too slightly connected with our subjecb,to be is called conwioing,and a universal of which we ore arvare is argucd at Iength here. It is, however, very diflicult to account called a concept. Not only are we aware of particular yellorvs, for plain facts if we assurnetha0 we do not have accluaintance but if we have seen a sulficient number of yel\s and have rviblr ourselves. It is plain that we are not only acAu,aintcd sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal yellow ; with the complex " Self-acquainted-with-A," bub we also know this universal is the subject in such judgments as " yellow the proposilion " I arn acquainted wibh A." Now here the differs from blue " or " yellolv resembles blue less than green complex has been analysed, and if " I " does not stand for does." AncI the universal yeliow is the predicate in sucl-r something which js a direct object of acquaintance,rve shall judgments as " this is yellow," where " this " is a particular havc to suppose that " I " is sornething l

things,but ', anyChing." It is hard to seo how we could.know directly concernthe natter I wish to discuss. What I wish to such a fact about " before" unless we were acquaintedwith discussis the nature of our knowledge concerning objects in " before,"and nob merely with actual particular caseeof one caseswhere rve know that there is an objeci answering to given.object being before auother given object. And more a definite description,though we are not actluaitt'tetlwilh any ., directly: A judgment suchas this is beforethat,,' wherothis suchobjecb. This is a matter which is concernedexclusively judgment is derived from awarenessof a complex,aoustitut€e with d.efinitedescriptions. I shall, therefore, in the sequel, an analysis,and we should no0understand the analysis if we speaksimply of " descriptions" when I mean" definite descrip- were jot acquaintedwith the meaningof the terrnsemployed. tious." Thus a description rvill mean any;phrase of tho form Thus we musbsuppose that we &reacquaiuted with the "the so-and-Bo" in the singular. of " before,"aud nob meroly with inetancesof it. -u"oiog I shall say that an object is " known by clescriptisn" when There are thus two sorts of objectsof which we &re &ware, we know that it is " the so-and-so,"i.e- when rve know that there namely, particulare and uuiversals. Among particulars I is oneobject, and no more,having a certain property; and it include all existents,and all complexesof which one or more will generally be implietl that we do not have knowledgoof tho 'We constit.e'ts are existents,such as this-before-that,this-above- sameobject by acquaintauce. know that the man with the that, the-yellowness-of-thie.Among universalsr include all iron maskexisted, and many propositionsare known about him; objects of which no^ particular is a constituent. Thus the but we do not know who he was. We know t'hat bhe candi- datewho gets most votes will be elected,and' in this casewe arevery likely also acquainted (in the only sensein which one canbe acquaintedwith someone else)with the rnanwho is, in fact, the candidate who will get most votes, but we do not hardly be calledpercepts. (On the other hanrJ,universals wibh know which of tho canclidateshe is, i.e. we do not know any s'hich we are acquainfedmay be identified with concepts.) propositionof the form " A is the candidatewho will get most It will be seen tha0arnong the objectswith which we aro votes" whero A is one of the candidatesby name. W'e shall acquainted ar.e not included physical objects (as opposedto say that we h&r'e " mnrely descriptive knowledge" of the sense-data),nor other people'srninds. Thesething. ur" krroron so-aud-sowhen, although we know tha[ the so-and-soexists, ,, to us by what I call kuowledgeby description,',which we and although we may possibly be acquainted with the object must now consider. which is, in fact, the so-aud-so,Jret we do not know any pro- By a " description" I me&u any phrase of the form ,, a position" a is the so-&nd-so,"where a is somethingwibh which ,, so-and-so" or the so-and-so.,' A phrt se of the form wo are acquainted. 'When wo say " tho so'and-soexiste," we mean that there is just one object which is tho so-and-so. Tho proposition " a is the so-and-so" me&ns that a has the property so-and-so,and nothing else has. " Sir JosephLarmor is the Unionist candi- descrip[ion. There aro va'ious problems connectod with doto" means" Sir JosephLarmor is a Unioniet candidato,aud ambiguous descriptions,but f passthem by, sincethey clonot tto oneolge ig." " Tho Unionisbcandidate exiatg " me&ns" some H L14 BERTRANDRUsSELL. KNOWLEDGEBY ACQUAINTANCEAND BY DESCRIPTION. 115 oneis a Unionist candidate,and no one elseis." Thus,when actually in the friend.'smind is accidental. The essentialpoiat wo are acquaintedwith which an object is the so-and-so,we is that he knows that tho various descriptions all apply to tho know that the so-and-so but we exists, may know that tho sameentity, in epite of not being acquaintedwith the entiby so-and-soexists when we are not acquainted with any object in question. which we know to be the and Bo-and-so, evenwhen we are not When we, who did not know Bismarck,make a judgment acquaintedwith any objectwhich, in fact, is the so-and-so. abouthim, the description in our minds will probably be sorue Common words, proper even n&mes,are usually really nore or less vaguo mass of historical knowledgo-far rnore, descriirtions. That is to say, the thought in the mind of a in most cases,than is required to identify him. But, for the person using a proper name correctly can generally only be sake of illustration, Iet us assumethat we think of him as expressedexplicitly if we replace the proper name by a " the first Chancellorof the German Empire." Ifero aII the description. Moreover,the descriptionrequired to expressthe words are abstract except " Germ&n," Tbe word " German" thought will vary for different people, or for the same person will again have different meanings for different peopie. To at different times. The only thing constant (so long as the someii will recall travels in Germany,to sornethe look of nameis rightly used)io the object which to the name applies. Germanyon the map, and so ou. But if we are to obtain a But so long as remains particular this constant,the descripbion descriptionwhich we know to be applicable,we shall be involved usually makes no difference to the or falsehood compelled,a,t some point, to bring in a referenceto a particular of the proposition in which the name appears. with which we aro acquainted. Such reference is involved in Let us take some illustrations. Supposesome statement any mentionof past,presenb, and future (as opposedto definite made about Bismarck. Assuming that there is such a thing dates),or of here and there, or of what others have tolcl us. as direct acquaintance with oneself,Bismarck himself uright Thusit would seem that, in somew&y or other, a description have used his name directly to designatethe particula,r person known to be applicable to a particular must involve somo with whom he was acquainted. In this cese,if he made a referencoto a particular with which we are acquainted,if our judgment about himself,he himself might be a consbituentof knowledgeabout the thing describeclis not to be merely what the judgment. Here propor the namehas tbe direct usewhich follows logically from the description. For example, " tho it always wishes to have, as simply standing for a certain most long-liveclof men " is a descriptionwhich must apply object,and not for a descriptionof the object. But if a person to some man, but we can make no judgments concerning who knew Bismarck judgment made a about him, the caseis this man which involve knowledgeabout him beyond what different. What this person was acquaintetlwith were certain the descriptiongives. ff, however,we soy," the first Chancellor sense-datawhich he connected(rightly, we will suppose)with of the German Empire lilas an astute diplomatist," we c&n Bismarck's body. His body as a physical object, and still only be assured of the truth of our judgment in virtue more his mind, were only known as tho body and the mind of somebhingwith which we are acquainted- usually a connectedwith these sense-data. That is, they were known testimony heard or read. Consideredpsychologically, apart by deecription. ft is, of course,very much a matter of chance from the iuformation we conveyto others,apart from the lbct which characteristicsof a man's appearancewill come into a about the actual Bismarck, which gives impoltance to our friend's mind when he thinks of him; thus tho descriptiou judgurent,the thought we really have conboinsthe one or nloro l2 BY AOQLTAINTTINCEAND IJY DESCRIPTIONll7 116 BERTRANDRUSSELL. KNOWLEDGE '

parbiculers acquaintance with particulars, and there is a similar hierarchy involved,and. otherwise consists rvholly of concepts. All names in the region of universals. Many universa"ls,like many per- of places-London, England,Europe, ihe earth,ihe Solar ticulars, are only known to us by description. But here, as in System-similarly involve,when used,descriptions which start from the case of particulars, knowledge concerning what is hnown sorDeone or more particulars rvith which we are acquainted. by description is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning f suspect that even the Universe,as considered by what is knorvn by acquaintance. metaphysics,invorves sucrr a connectionwith particulars. rn logic, The fundamental epistemological principle in the analysis of on the contrary,where we are concerneduot mererv with what propositions containing descripbions is thisl. Euery proposition doesexist, but with whate'er mighb or could exist must be composed'wholly of constituen'ts or be, no referenceto actual particularsis involved. wltich we can tr,ndersta'nd rt with, which, we d'I'e actluainted. From what has been saicl rvould seem that, wheu we make a statement about something already, it will be plain why I advocate this principle, and how only known by description,we of.benintottd, to malre our statement, I propose to meet the case of propositions which at first sight noCin the form irrvolving the description,but about the contravene it. Let us begin with the reasons for supposing actual thing described. That is to say,when we say anything about the principle true: Bismarck, wo should like, if we could, to make judgment The chief reason for supposing the principle true is thab ib the which Bismarckalone can make, namely, the judgment seemsscarcely possible to believe that we can make a judgmenb of which he himself is a constituent. In tbis we &re necessarily or entercain a supposition without knowing what it is that we defeated,since the actual Bisrnarck is unknown to are judging or supposing about. If we make a judgment about us. But we hnow that there is an objectB called Bismarck,and (say) Julius Casar, it is plain that the acbualpelson who was that B was an astute diplomatist. We can thus d,c,sct'tbe Julius Casar is nob a constituent of the juclnment. But beforc the proposition we should like to affirm,namely, ,,8 w&s &n astute going further, it may be well to explain whac I mean rvhen I diplomatist,,,where B is the objectwhich was Bismarck. say thot this or that is a constituent of a judgment, ol of Wrat enablesus to communicatein spite of the var;'ing descriptions a proposition rvhich we understand' To begin with jud$ments : we employ is that we know there is a true proposition a judgment, &s an occurrence, I take to be a relation of a mind concerning the actual Bismarck, and that however to sevelal entities, namely, the entities which compose rvhat is we may vary the description(so long u,sthe descrip_ tion is correct), jurlgecl. If , e.g., I judge thab A love's B, the judgnrent as an the proposition describedis sbill the sam-e. This proposition, event consists in the existence, at a certain moment, of a which is desclibedand is kuown to be true, is what interests specificfour-berm relation, called'iudging, between me and A us; but we are not acquainted.with the proposition itself, ancl love arrd B. Thar is to say, at the time when I judge, there and d.o not know il, though we know it is true. is a cerlairr complex whose telms are nryself and A and lovo It will aud R, and rvhose relating relation is iutlging. (The relatiou be seen that there are various stages in tho tcrms of the relation, not us rr rela,ting removalfrom acquaintancowith particurars /oooontors 03 ouc o1'the : Lrrorois IJisrn*rck olsc- to peoplowho rolu,lion.) My rorlsonsfor this viow ltavo been sct forih krrowhim, Ilisurnrckto tlr.n, who r.rrrlykrr.u, of hir. wlrrrrrr,. |[rrrl I slrtll rr0t rr:lont tlrorn herr:. Assrttnirrg tlris- throughhistory, [ho uronwith trro ir.orruruolr, [1ru k.rrrgos!- livcd of + Eu,t't1tr Nrlturo of 'l'r'trth." men. 'rheeeoro progrcssivoryfurr,bor rornov.tl fr,rrr l'hikgophicul "'l'lto 118 I]ENTRANDRUSSELL. KNOWLEDGEBY ACQUAINTANCEAND BY DESCIIIPI'ION. 1I9 view of judgment,tho conetituentsof tlre judgment arc simply admitted that he himself is not a constituent of any judgnrent the co'stituents of the cornplexwhich is the judgment. Th;;, in which I can make. But at this point it is necessary to the abovecase, the consti0uentsare myself and A and lovo examine the view that judgments are composed of something and B and judging. But myself and judging are constituents called " ideas," and that ib is the " idea " of Julius Cesar that shared by all ruy judgments; thrrs the distinctiaeconetituents of the particularjudgment is a constituenb of my judgment. I believe the plausibility of in questionare A and love and B. ,. $is view rests upon a failure to form a right theory of descrip- Coming now to what is meant by understandinga proposi- tions. We may mean by my " idea " of Julius Casar the tion," f should say that there is auother relation po.uibl, things that I know about him, e.g., that he conquered Gaul, between me and A aud love and B, rvhich is caliecl my xuptposing was assassinatedon the Ides of March, and is a plague to that A loves B.* When we can suIry)osethat A loves ., ,, schoolboys. Now I am admittinS, and indeed contending, that B, we understandthe proposition A loaesB. Thus we in order to discover what is actually in my miud. when I judge often understanda propositionin casesrilhere we have not about Julius Cresar,we must subsbitute for the proper name a enough knowledge to make a judgment. Supposing,Iike judging, tlescription made up of sorne of the things I know about him. is a many-term relation, of which a mind l, ouu (A description which will often serve to express my thought term. The other terms of the relation are called the con- is " the man whose name was Julius C@sar." For whatever stituents of the proposition supposed. Thus the principle else I ma.y have forgotten about him, it is plain that when which I enunciated may be restated as follows : ILlur,i er I mention hirn I have not forgotten that that was his name.) a relatio*,of suTtposittgor judging occ.u,rs,tlw terms to ntlti,ch,the But although I think the theory that judgments consist of supptosittgor jtdging mind,is c.elated,by the retatiott,of su,yltosing or judging ideasmay have been suggested in some such way, yet I think nrust be term,s with, which, the mind, ,in guril;,on i, acquainted. the theory itself is fundamentally mistaken. The view seems This is merely to say that we cannot ruake a judgment to be that there is somo mental existent which may be called or a suppositionwithout knowing what it is that we are judgment the " idea " of sornething outsido the mind of the person who making our or suppositionabout. It seemsto has the idea, and that, since judgment is a mental event, me thar the truth of this principre is evident as soonas the its constituents rnust be constibuentsof the mind of the person principle is understood;I shall, therefore, in what follows, judging. But in this view ideas become a veil between us and &ssurnethe principle, and use iu as a guide in analysing judgmentsthat containdescriptions. outside things-we never really, in knowledge, attain to the things we are supposed to be l

endlessregress, since tho relation of idea to objectwill haveto Ccesac'wagassaseinabed " nray be int,erpreledae moatting" Ono be explained by supposingthat the iclea itself has an idea and only one man was called Julius Casar,and thnt one was of the object, and so on atl infinitum. f therefore see no assassinated."Ilete it is plain that there is no conetibuent reasonto believethat, when we are acquaintedwith an object, correspondingto the phrase" the man whosename w&8Ju'lius there is in us somethingwhich can be cailedthe ,.idea,, of the Cwsat'." Thus there ie no reason to regard this phrase as object. On the contrary, I hold that acquaintanceis wholly a expressinga constituent of the judgruent, and we have seen relation, not demandingany such consbicuentof the mind asis that this phrasemust be brokenup if we are to be acquainted ,. supposedby advocatesof id.eas.,,This is, of coursea large wiih all tho constituentsof the judgment. This conclusion, question,and one which wourdtake us far rrom our subject-if whichwe have reachettfrom considerationsconcerned with the it wereadequately discussed. r thereforecontent myself with theoryof knowledge,is alsoforced upon us by logical considera- tho abovsindications, and with the corollary that, iu judging, tions,which must now be briefly reviewed. the actual objects concerningwhich we judge, rather tirun ,oly It is common to distiuguish two aspects, nt'eaning and' supposed purely menbalentities, are constituentsof the complex d,enotation,in such phrasesas " the author of Waverley"' The which is the judgment. meaning will be a certain complex, consisbing(at least) of when, therefore,r say that we must substitutefor ,,Julius authorship and Waverley with some relation; the denotatiou Cesar" somo desctiptionof Julius Casar,in order to discover will be Scott. Similarly " featherlessbipeds " will have a the meaning of a judgment nominally aboubhim, f am not complexmeaning, containing as constituentsthe presenceof saying that we must substi[ute an idea. Supposeour descrip- two feet and the absenceof feathers,rvhile its denotation wiII tion is " the man whose name was Jutiw Cwsar.,,'Let our be the olassof men. Thus when we say " Scott is the author judgment be " Julius Cesar was agsassinated.,,Then ii of Waverley" or " men are the samoag featherlessbipeds," we becornes " the man whose name was Jurius cusar w&s are assertingan identity of denotation,and this assertionis assassinated." Ilere Jwlius Cusc,(,ris a noise or shape with wortb making becauseof the diversity of meaniug.* I believe which rve are acquainted,and all the other consbituentsof the that the duality of meaningand denotation,though capableof a judgment ,,was,') (neglecting the tenee in are concelttswith true interpretation, is misleading if taken as fundamental. which we are acquainted. Thus our judgment is wholly The denotation,I believe,is not a constituentof the proposi- reduced tb constituentswith which we al.e acquainted,bub tion, except in the caseof proper names,i'e' of words which do Julius cesar hirnserf has ceasedto be a constituent of our not assigna property to an object,but merely and solely name judgment. This, however,requires a proviso, to be furihsr it. AntI I should hold further t'hat, in this sense,there are explained ,,the shortly, namely, that man whose name wag only two words which are strictly proper name8of particulars, Julius Cusar" muot not, as a whole, be a cons'ituent of our namely," I" and " this." judgment, thab is to say, this phrase must uot, as a whole" One reasonfor not believing the denotationto be a cou- have rneaning a which entereinto the judgrnent. Any righi siituent of the propositionis that we may know the proposition analysis judgment, of tho therefore,must break up this phrJse, and not treat it as a subordinate complexwhich is pariof the +ThisviewhasbeenrecentlyadvocatedbyMissE.E'C.Jonea,..A judgment. The judgment l0ll' " the man whosename was Jutius New Law of Thought and its Implications," trIind, Januaryt L22 BERTRANDRUssELL. KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE Aa\D BY DESCRIPTION. 123 'oven 'When when we are not acquaintedwith the denotation. The attribute a predicate to a subject. the law is stated of proposition " the aubhor of lVaverley is a novelist,' was propositions,instead of being sbated concerning subjects and known to people who did not know that ,, the 'W'averley author of predicates,it is at once evident that propositions about the " denoted Scott. This reason has been already present King of France or the round square can form no ,sufficiently emphasised. exception,bui are jusb as incapableof being both true and ., A secondreason is that propositionsconcerning the so- false as other propositions. ,and-so" are possible .. evenwhen the so-a'd-so',has no denota- Miss Jones*a,rgues that " Scott is the author of Waverley" tion. Take,e.g.,,,the golden mountain d.oes not exist,,or ,,the assertsidentity of d.enotationbetween Scott and.'thnauthar of round square is self-conbradictory.', If we are to preserve Waaarley. But there is some difficulty in choosing &mong the duality of meaning and denotation,we have to say, with alternative meaningsof this contention. In the first place,it Meinong,that there are such objectsas the goldenmountain should be observed that th'e att'tltm of Waaerleyis not a mere ;andthe round square,although these obiects do nobhave being. name, Iiko ,Scolf. Scott is merely a noise or shapo con- w'e even have to admit thab the existent round squareis ventionallyused to desigaatea certain person; it givesus no existent, but does not exist.* Meinong doesnot regard this information about that person,and has nothing that can be as a contradiction,but I fail to see that it is not one. fndeed, calledmeaning as opposedto denotation. (I neglect the fact, ,, it seemsto me evident that the judgment there is no such consideredabove, that evenproper names, aB a rule, really stand .as object the round squa,re',does nob presupposethat there for descriptions.) But' tlw author of Wauerleyis not merely con- is suchan object. If this'is admitted,however, we are lEd to ventionallya namefor Scott ; the element'of mere convention the oonclueion that, by parity of form, no judgmentconcerning beiongshere to the separatewords, the and author and o/ and the " so-and-so" actually involves the so-and._soas a con- Waaerley. Given what these words stand f.or,the author of stituent. Waaerleyis no longer arbibrary. When it is said that Scott is 'Waverley, Miss Jonestcontends that there is rro difficulty in admitting the author of we are no stating that thesoare two cohtradictorypredicates ,,the concerning such an object as namesfor one man, as we should be if we said " $cotb is Sir Walter." A man'g nameis what he is called,but howevdr 'W'averley, much Scott had been called the author of that wouldnot have made him be the authorI it rvas necessaryfor 'W'averley, hirn actually to write which was a fact having nothingto do with D&mes. If, then, we are asserbingidentity of denotation,we must traditional form " A is not both B and not B,,, but in the form not mean by denotatioruthe mere relation of a name to the no " propositionis both true and false." The traditionarforru thing naned. In facb,it would be nearerto the truth to say only applies to certain propositions,namely, to those which that the nr,eattingof " Scobt" is the denotatiottof " the author of Woverley." The relationof " Scott" to Scottis that " Scotb" * Meinong, aeberAnnahmenr2nd, ed., Leipzig, lgl0, p. l4l. t Mind,,July, lgl0, p. 38t). * Mind,July, 1010,p, 3i0. 724 . KNOWLEDGEBY ACQUAINTANCEAND I}Y I)INH(]IIII'TI0N.I ]JI-I Ineansscott, just as the relation ,,author of " to the conceob and ib becomesimperative to fiud some other anolysis. whett whichis so ealledis that ,,author,' meansthis concept. Thus bhis analysis has been complel,ed,we shall be able to reinberplet if we distinguishnteaning and denotatiou ,,the 'Waverley," in authorof the phrase " iclentity of d'euotation," which remains obscure so we shall have to say that ,,Scott,, hasmeaning but Iong as ib is taken as fundamental. not denotation. Also when we say ,,Scott 'Waverley," is the author of The first point to observe is that, in any proposition about the nteaningof ., the author -Waverley,, 'Waverley," of is " the author of provided Scott is nob explicitly relevant to our assertion. For if the clenotationalone were nentioned, the denotation ibself, i.a. Scott, does nob occur, but relevant, any other phrase with the same denotation would only ttre concept of denotation, which will be represenbedby give the same propositiou. Thus " scobt is the author. of a variable. Supposewe say " the author of W'averley was tlre Marmion" would be the same proposition as ,, 'Waverley.', Scott is the author of Marmion," we are certainly not saying that both author of But this is plainly not the case,since were Scott-we may ltave forgotten that there was such from the first we learn that Scott 'W'e wrote Marmion and from the a person as Scotb. are saying that there is some rnan who secondwe lear.nthat ho wrote'Waverley,but the first 'Waverley Marmion' 'Waverley tells us was the author of and the author of nothing aboub and 'Waverley the second nothing abour That is to say, there is some one who rvrote and Marmion. Hence the meauingof ,,the author of W-averley,,, I\{armion, aud no one else wrote them. Thus the identity is as opposedto the denotation,is ,, certainly relevantto Scoti is that of a variable, i.e', of an indefinite subject, " somo one'" the author of 'Waverley.,, 'W'e This is why we can understand propositions about " the author have thus agreedthat ,. the author of Waverley,,is not of Waverley," without knowing who he was' When rve say " the & mere name,and thabits meauing 'Waverley is relevant in propositions. author of was a poet " we mean " one and only one man in which ic occurs. Thus if we &re 'Waverley, to Bay,as Miss Jonesdoes, wrote and he was a poet " ; when we say " the that " scol,tis the author of 'waverley " assertsan identity of author of Waverley was Scott " we mean " one ond only one rlonototion,we musCregard the denotation ,,the of authorof mau wrote Waverley, and he was Scobb." Ilere the identiby is Woverley" ag the denotationof whab ,ncant ,,the is by author bebween a variable, i.e. an indeterminate subject (" he "), and of Waverley." Let us call the meaning ,, of the author of Scott; " the author of Waverley " has been analysed away' W-averley" M. Thus M is wbat ,,the .W.averley,, aubhor of and no longer appears as a consbituent of the proposition'a means. Then ,,Scott we are to supposethat is the authorof to analyse away the phraso ,,Scott The reason why it is imperative Waverley " means is the denotation It ie of M.', But here " the author of Waverley " be stated as follows' we are explaining our proposition ,,the -ay by another of the same piain that when we say author of waverley is the author form, and thus we have macle no progresstowards a real We hovo soou also ,,The of Marmion," the is expresses identity' explanation. denotabionof ,, M,,' liko the author of that the common tlenotatiott',namely Scot't, is not a constitrrctrt Waverley,"has both meaningand denotation,on the theory we of this propositiou, while the nwanhtgs (if any) of " bho tru[ltrtr are examining. If we call its meaning (. M,, our proporibioo of waverley " and the author of Msrlnion " ore not idollticol, becomes " Scott is the denotation of M,.,, But this leadsat + which I am advocatingis eobforth fulty, wilh tho_Lrgiol' once to an endlessregress. Thus the attempt to regard The tbeory our grounclsin its favour, in I'rincipia ldathcmatha,Yol' I, Irttroduction' propositionas assertingidentity of denotation 1005' breaksdown, bhap. III I also,less fully, in ,l/rizd llctobor' L27 126 I}DNTNAND RUSSEI,L. KNO]IILEDGEBY ACQUAINTANCEAND BY DESCRIPTION'

gcen We have also thut, in any sensein which the meaning of as welbaw earlier in considering the relations of descripbion and o word ie u coneticuent of a proposition in whose verbal and acquaintance, we often wish to reach the denotation' .. such cases expression the word occurs, Scott,' n)eans the actual man and are ouly hindered by lack of acquaintance: in .,author', Scott, in the eame sense in which means a certain ,, 'Waverley ,' universal. Thus, if the author of were a eubordirrate complex in the above proposition, its meaning would have to be whab was said to be iclentical with the mea.nittgof " the author of Marmion.,, This is plainly lot the case; and the only escape is to say that ,,ihe autlior ol Waverley " does not, by itself, have a ureaning, though phrases of which it is part clo have a meaning. That is, in a right ,.the analysis of the above proposition, authol of Waverley,' order to undorstand such propositions, we need acquainbanco not need must disappear. This is pfi'ecteclwhen the above proposition with the constituents of the description, but clo ,, is analysed as meaning: Some one wrote Waverley and. no one else clid, and that some one also wrote Marmion ancl no one else did." Tlris may be more simply expressed.by saying ,, that the propositional function cr wrote Waverley and Marmion, and no one else dicl " is capable of truth, i.e. some value of a; makes it true. Thus the true subject of our judgmenb is a propositional function, i.a. a complex containing an uncletelnrinedconsbituent, and becoming a proposition as EoonoB l,his constituent is cletermined. Wo rnay now define the denotabion of a phrase. If we ,,a know that the proposition is the so-and.-so" is trne, z.a. bltat a is so-ancl-soand nothing else is, we call a the cre'otation of the phrase " the so-and-so." A very great many of the ,,the proposibionswe naturally make about so-and-eo', will renrain l,rue or remain false if we substitute a for ,,the so_and_ .,the so," where a is the deno[ation of so-&nd-so.,, Such propositions will also remain true or remain false if we sonre plopert'y substitute for " the so-and-so" any other phrase having tho when wo l