The Working Incentive of Chinese Provincial Environmental Agency
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Chinese Public Administration CPAR Review Volume 12 Issue 1, June 2021 Promotion for Performance? The working incentive of Chinese provincial environmental agency heads in pollution reduction Lei Liu*, Mingyue Li*, May Chu† * Sichuan University, China † The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Promotion is argued to be the primary working incentive for Chinese officials. Different from previous studies that focus on the provincial governors and party secretaries, this paper makes the first attempt to examine whether the career turnover of China’s provincial environmental agency heads (PEAHs) is affected by the environmental performance within their jurisdictions. The results show that the performance in reducing nationally targeted pollutants—i.e., sulfur dioxide (SO2) and chemical oxygen demand (COD)—is not necessarily correlated with political turnover, which only depends on political factors such as the age when assuming office, tenure of the office, and if they are local people. Therefore, a lack of promotion incentive is found among China’s PEAHs in local environmental management. Their working incentive is straightforward top-down control, making them merely the implementers of economy-dominated local public policy. A more robust and transparent performance management system, to connect the provincial environmental performance with the PEAH’s political career, is supposed to be beneficial for China’s environmental management. Keywords: performance management, promotion incentive, environmental governance, environmental agency head, China INTRODUCTION simplified, over-ideal, and ignoring specific career motivation of local officials (Gao, 2017; Kostka & Yu, nder China’s political system, the cadres 2015; Mei & Wang, 2017; Zheng, Kahn, Sun, & Luo, play a dominant role and exert significant 2014), promotion has still been the most prevalent Uinfluence on local governance (L. Liu, Wu, and dominant explanation of the political rules and Li, de Jong, & Sun, 2017; Yao & Zhang, 2015). incentives in China’s bureaucratic system. For this According to the public choice theory, the behavior reason, promotion as a reward for the economic of local officials is determined by their rational self- performance of local officials is regarded as one of the interest, which is shaped by their institutional context most important theories in explaining the economic (Edin, 1998). Across all external incentives to the miracle of China since reform in 1978 (Zhou, 2007). behavior of government officials, whether positive (such as bonuses and promotions) or negative (such Amidst China’s economic boom, the effects of its as demotion, inspection, filing of lawsuits, and success have been increasingly offset by its severe judgments of subordinates) (Edin, 1998), promotion environmental pollution. In fact, an estimated 0.5 to is arguably the primary factor that influences, if not 1.3 million premature deaths per year are caused by determines, the behavior of Chinese officials (Zhou, air pollution (Zhu Chen, Wang, Ma, & Zhang, 2013; 2007). In order to gain recognition from their superiors J. Liu, Han, Tang, Zhu, & Zhu, 2016). Moreover, and thereby promotion opportunities, local officials more than 80% of the water from underground wells spare no effort in improving their performances. used by farms, factories and households across the Although criticized by some studies as being over- densely populated plains in China is unsuitable Address correspondence to May Chu at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net 20 • Chinese Public Administration Review Volume 12 Issue 1, June 2021 for drinking or bathing because of contamination general cases, pollution reduction is not prioritized (Buckley & Piao, 2016). The graveness of China’s on local government agendas. So, the impact of local environmental problem is also evident in global data. leaders on pollution reduction is both critical and In the Environmental Performance Index 2016 Report limited to some degree. In contrast, for the head of the published by Yale University, China ranked 109th local environmental agency, environmental protection among 180 countries (Hsu et al., 2016). is their only duty. The local environmental agency head is the sole department cadre responsible for the In 1996, the State Council approved the “9th Five-Year making and implementation of the environmental Plan for National Environmental Protection” made by policies at the local level. Compared with local leaders, the National Environmental Protection Bureau at the the impact of the local environmental agency head on time, which proposed that all the provinces and cities pollution reduction is more direct and substantial. In should control the emissions of 12 major pollutants addition, in the eyes of the public, the environmental within a certain limit by 2000 (J. Wang et al., 2018). agencies are also principally held accountable for the In 2001, the reduction of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and declining environmental conditions. As an illustration, chemical oxygen demand (COD), excluding other “inviting the environmental agency head to swim in pollutants, was formally prescribed in the “10th the river” became an internet buzzword in 2013 when Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social the chairperson of a company in Hangzhou vowed to Development”, the highest level of China’s national offer a 200,000 RMB reward to the head of the local plans. Since 2006, the reduction of SO2 and COD environmental agency if the head would swim in a has been listed in the Five-Year Plan for the National polluted river.1 Economic and Social Development as a “binding target”, which means the pollution reduction is legally Admittedly, the role that the local environmental enforceable. To implement the pollution reduction, agency head can practically play in local environmental the national target is decomposed and assigned to management is disputable, because their administrative each province, the provinces then have the legal power still falls short of their responsibility to responsibility to fulfill the target. In 2005, an executive safeguard the local environment. On the one hand, order titled the “Decision of the State Council on the appointment of the local environmental agency Implementing the Scientific Development View and head and the operation of the environmental agency, Strengthening the Environmental Protection” stressed including personnel and budget, are controlled by the that environmental protection should be brought into local government. So, if the decision-making of the the assessment criteria for the selection, appointment, environmental agency contravenes the policy priority and award of local cadres. The system aims to rectify of the local government (e.g., economic growth and local cadres’ inaction on environmental protection by some big projects), it is likely that the environmental basing in part their career progression on their efforts decision-making must be a compromise. On the in local environmental management (L. Liu, de Jong, other hand, the current legislation only generally & Huang, 2016). However, with the continuously states the power of the environmental agency without severe pollution problem, it remains questionable detailed and specific explanations of enforcement, whether the existing public personnel system has leading to ambiguous approaches and procedures provided local cadres sufficient incentive to take in environmental regulation, thus making the pollution control seriously. environmental agency head to safeguard the local environment as expected (Lo, Liu, Li, & Wang, 2016). Officially, local leaders are responsible for the Furthermore, effective cooperation between different environmental quality in their jurisdictions. However, for local leaders, pollution reduction is only one of the 1 “The environmental protection bureau head is swimming in the public affairs in local socio-economic development, river” has become a buzzword. http://cpc.people.com.cn/pin- glun/n/2013/0221/c241220-20555932.html (Accessed August 23, 2019) and it must be coordinated with other affairs. In (in Chinese) Liu, Li, & Chu • 21 Promotion for Performance? The working incentive of Chinese provincial environmental agency heads in pollution reduction government departments, which is necessary to Therefore, this paper hypothesizes that the political environmental management given the complexity of turnover of provincial environmental agency the problem, is also hindered by the institutional design heads (PEAHs) is affected by provincial pollution where the environmental agency is parallel to other reduction. We examine the correlation with a novel relevant departments, such as land resources, water, database of China’s PEAH, which could be critical and urban management. The hierarchical bureaucratic in understanding the institutional incentive in China’s structure renders it difficult and time-consuming for local environmental management. The remaining parts the environmental agencies to coordinate their policies of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 first with other authorities (L. Liu et al., 2016). discusses the literature on government performance and its relationship with cadre promotion. Section 3 Nonetheless, this by no means implies that the presents the methodology of the study, followed by environmental agency is entirely powerless in local the empirical results in section 4 and a discussion of environmental management. Since the reform in 1978 the key findings in section 5. This paper