8 the Global Arms Trade and the Diffusion of Militarism

1 8 The global arms trade and the 2 3 diffusion of militarism 4 5 David Kinsella 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 The acquisition and use of military power are perhaps the most studied subjects 13 in the field of international relations, mainly because they have been common 14 occurrences throughout history. It is surprising, then, that the concepts of militar 15 ism and militarization are not sufficiently well defined to command a consensus 16 among scholars as to their meaning, let alone their causes and consequences. 17 And as other chapters in this volume clearly document, militarism and militari 18 zation are concepts that are relevant to social relations in realms other than 19 formal inter state relations, which has made conceptual clarity that much more 20 difficult to achieve. But my focus in this chapter is indeed inter state relations, 21 with special attention to the impact of the global arms trade on the militarization 22 of developing states and on those states’ use of military force – behaviour that 23 may, in some cases, derive from state policies fairly described as outgrowths of 24 militarism. 25 The notion that states acquire military capabilities, which are then employed 26 in hostilities against other states, or against non state actors who are perceived to 27 threaten governments from within state borders, is a straightforward and rela 28 tively uncontroversial rendition of the connection between militarization and 29 militarism. But examining the role of the global arms trade as a contributing 30 factor in both, invites further consideration of relevant social forces operating at 31 the international level. The Cold War, in particular, provided a social context 32 within which major powers formulated their arms supply policies and other 33 states, many of them newly independent, availed themselves of opportunities to 34 build and maintain military capability. Arms transfer relationships, then, can be 35 viewed as a mechanism by which states acquire, in addition to military capabil 36 ity, prevailing conceptions of statehood and national security. 37 This chapter has three main parts. In the next section, I differentiate the con 38 cepts of militarization and militarism. There is no scholarly consensus on the 39 definitional issues addressed in this section, but it is necessary for my purposes 40 to try and draw a careful distinction before moving on to consider how the con 41 cepts ought to be interpreted in relation to the global arms trade. Next is a dis 42 cussion of the value that developing states attach to capital intensive military 43 postures and the role of arms transfer relationships in shaping state preferences 44 in this regard. In the last section, I turn to the arms trade as a factor in the 45 391 08 Militarism 08.indd 104 10/5/12 11:25:44 The global arms trade 105 1 diffusion of militarism and draw attention to some pertinent findings reported in 2 the empirical literature on effects of arms transfers on military hostility between 3 and within states. I conclude with some speculative comments on the post Cold 4 War restructuring of the global arms trade and the implications for militarization 5 and militarism in the contemporary era. 6 7 Militarization and militarism 8 9 As concepts, militarism and militarization are related but distinct. ‘Militariza 10 tion’ usually refers to a process by which military capabilities are introduced 11 and/or enhanced in some social realm. As a process, militarization consists of 12 the activities or preparations taking place within a society – weapons procure 13 ment, conscription, base construction, etc. – whereby the government becomes 14 (presumably) better equipped to undertake military action against foreign or 15 domestic enemies. In this case, militarization is nearly synonymous with mili 16 tary mobilization or buildup (e.g. Ross, 1987). Or it can describe the transfor 17 mation of an ongoing relationship or interaction, especially between states, 18 such that the threat or use of military force is now a key component. That is, a 19 dispute between two states may be, or may become, ‘militarized’ (Jones et al., 20 1996). Often the term is used to suggest, explicitly or implicitly, that the dis 21 tribution of power and influence has shifted decisively to the advantage of the 22 military sector at the expense of non-military sectors within society (Thee, 23 1977; Smith, 1983; e.g. Giroux, 2008). We might say that society itself has 24 become militarized. 25 The term ‘militarism’ is commonly used to describe a disposition or pro 26 clivity to behave in a particular way, namely, to employ military over non 27 military means of conflict resolution. Thus, domestic and/or foreign policy 28 orientations and choices are characterized as ‘militaristic’, which usually 29 entails a judgement that policy makers are too quick to turn to military solu 30 tions or seek out opportunities to deploy armed force. Sociological treatments 31 frequently connect this policy disposition to the valorization of military virtues 32 in society: bravery, discipline, and loyalty, as well as authoritarianism and 33 other less redeeming manifestations of a ‘militarism of the mind’ (Skjelsbaek, 34 1979). Almost always the implication is that the praise of military virtues and 35 the reliance on military means is excessive to the point of dysfunction, that 36 militarism drives ineffective (if not unethical) policy choices and suboptimal 37 social arrangements (Mann, 1984; Kwong and Zimmer, 1995). In distinguish 38 ing militarism from the ‘military way’ – the efficient deployment of military 39 personnel and weaponry to secure specific objectives – Vagts, in a now classic 40 study, stated that militarism: 41 42 presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought 43 associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes. 44 Indeed, militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and defeat the 45 purposes of the military way. Its influence is unlimited in scope. It may 391 08 Militarism 08.indd 105 10/5/12 11:25:44 106 D. Kinsella permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and arts. Reject 1 ing the scientific character of the military way, militarism displays the quali 2 ties of caste and cult, authority and belief. 3 (Vagts, 1967: 13) 4 5 There is obviously a close relationship between militarization and militarism, not 6 only as concepts but also in the ways they are manifest in domestic and interna 7 tional society. Indeed, the probable causal connection between militarization and 8 militarism is widely, and not unreasonably, assumed by most academics, activ 9 ists, and policymakers who promote the cause of arms control and disarmament. 10 While many regard military buildup as wasteful and a misdirection of scarce 11 resources, the alleged behavioural consequences have been the greater concern. 12 Thus, early in the twentieth century, as the US was moving toward a more asser 13 tive role in world affairs, critics cautioned that the maintenance of a strong 14 standing army was at odds with the nation’s republican origins and would invari 15 ably lead to warlike policies. ‘If we continue that policy,’ lamented the Honor 16 able Carl Schurz (1899: 102), ‘militarism with its characteristic evils will be 17 inevitable.’ Unlike European states, which for geopolitical reasons were com 18 pelled to attend to the balance of power, the United States was secure and mili 19 tary preparedness could only lead to military adventurism (see also Villard, 20 1916). 21 There is almost always an explicit or implied normative statement accom 22 panying discussions of these concepts in the scholarly literature. Both terms 23 suggest excess. That is, there is an optimal or normal level of military capability 24 and presence, whether for society as a whole or some particular social realm or 25 relationship, which in the process of militarization has been surpassed. Likewise, 26 relative to some optimal mix of military and non military approaches to problem 27 solving, militarism manifests as behaviour or policies biased in favour of the 28 former. Of course, what counts as normal or optimal is almost never established, 29 and probably cannot be. This does not mean that such scholarly analyses are 30 incorrect in their conclusions; it just means that they are usually subjective. 31 At the conceptual level and when it comes to empirical investigation, it can 32 be difficult to maintain a clear distinction between militarization and militarism, 33 precisely because they appear together and are universally viewed as social ills. 34 This is as much a reflection of a complex reality as it is analytical shortcoming. 35 As Ross (1987) points out in a review of the literature appearing in the 1970s 36 and 1980s, the term militarization was used to encompass two phenomena: (1) 37 the excess growth of military capability, which Ross calls ‘military build up’, 38 and (2) a process of increasing military influence in government and society, 39 which he calls ‘process militarization’. Both can lead to militarism, but the con 40 nection between the latter and a policy orientation characterized as militarism 41 would seem to be more direct. Says Ross (1987: 564): ‘there is likely to be a 42 mutually reinforcing, reciprocal relationship between military build up and mili 43 tarism, not simply the unilinear, causal relationship [. .] in which process 44 militarization results in militarism.’ 45 391 08 Militarism 08.indd 106 10/5/12 11:25:44 The global arms trade 107 1 No particular differentiation between militarization and militarism is uni 2 formly observed in academic writing; indeed, the frequency with which the two 3 are melded in both theory and research can frustrate a search for conceptual 4 clarity.

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