J. Pouwer the Structural and Functional Approach in Cultural Anthropology
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
J. Pouwer The structural and functional approach in cultural anthropology. Theoretical reflections with reference to research in western New Guinea In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 122 (1966), no: 1, Leiden, 129-144 This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 07:54:02AM via free access THE STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY' THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO RESEARCH IN WESTERN NEW GUINEA he publication of Van Logchems doctoral dissertation presented at the University of Utrecht (discussed elsewhere in this issue) Tmarks the end of an epoch of anthropological and linguistic research undertaken by the Bureau for Native Affairs in Hollandia from 1951- 1962. In its comparatively short existence, that bureau has greatly contributed, directly and indirectly, to the broadening and deepening of our knowledge of what used to the sketehily known or unknown Papua cultures. In this connection, we may refer to the work done by Anceaux, van Baal, de Bruyn, Galis, van der Leeden, Oosterwal, Pouwer and Schoorl. The scope of this research, and of the extensive investigations carried out in Eastern New Guinea, is wider than monographs and regional ethnography. In this respect, cultural anthropology can claim a great wealth which may often have been gathered in vain. The pressing question is: what can we do with it? How can these reports benefit general theory? It is becoming more clearly and widely recognised that New Guinea material is excellently suited to the testing of the theoretical value and operational utility of concepts and methods of analysis, synthesis and comparison current especially in social anthropology. I refer to concepts such as: (complementary) filiation (Meyer Fortes), (unilineal and non- unilineal) descent, segmented society, corporate unit, lineage, ramage, kindred, deme and the various types of marriage classified according 1 I owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Erik Schwimmer, of the University of British Columbia, for his stimulating comments and especially for doing the hard job of translating this manuscript and the review article, and for doing it so well. Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 07:54:02AM via free access 130 J. POUWER. to residence rules and modalities of exchange. I refer also to the methodology underlying the determining of types of social organisation (Murdock) and the comparative-functional method (Köbben). It is characteristic of New-Guinea material that the usual labels cannot easily be applied to it and that, for this and other reasons, it does not lend itself easily to comparison. Obviously, it is always possible to classify refractory material, either by elaborating an existing typology or by refining terminology (including 'ordinary' terms such as marriage and affinity). Such as an accepted way of advancing science. There are, however, always lurking pitfalls such as being reduced to the one-man show of the private typologist, or becoming embroiled in the empirical casuistry which Leach (1961": 2) has contemptuously characterised as 'butterfly-collecting'. Typology may not be pursued for its own sake: 'a typology is for a problem' (Schneider 1965:78). Such dangers become magnified in situations to which different, indeed apparently mutually exclusive typologies and scientific terms can be applied. Should an investigator, for instance, typify a given set of phenomena as 'unilineal with bilateral discrepancies' or as 'bilateral or ambilineal with a unilineal tendency' ? According to the first typifi- cation choice of membership is in principle excluded, but the second one places option at the centre of the stage. In such situations, the investigator and others risk losing sight of the system either through the use of a one-sided and inadequate typology or else by succumbing to a casuistry of distinctions and classifications. In the former case, insufficient justice is done to the relations holding between the phenomena identified as following and not following type. In the second case, these relations tend to be hidden by the multitude of rubrics. Thus Geertz, in an otherwise meritorious study of Balinese villages, distinguishes seven "planes" of organisation without indicating clearly the relations holding between these "planes". (1959: 992). If, instead of these two methods, we use a sliding scale of gradations between two extremes, we certainly approach actuality more closely but obfuscate the relative position of the phenomena. Now I would maintain that it is above all from the relative position of the constituent elements of a thing that we learn its system. According to this view, the characteristics of a particular system must be expressed by the indication of specific regularities governing the relative position of the constituent elements. Explicit comparison of systems should proceed on the same level of abstraction, by comparing regularities in the field of relative position. Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 07:54:02AM via free access THE STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. 131 In addition to positiond regiüarities every system contained in time and space displays repetitive córrelations, co-variations, i.e. regularities in the connections between constituent elements. The latter, however great their value for our insight into socio-cultural reality, are not sufficiently specific to indicate the system deducible from this reality. If we wish to determine what relation holding between three lines makes them into a triangle, it does not suffice to establish connections between the three lines, for these may be of many kinds, and may not even be such that the lines form a figure or configuration. The system characteristic of a triangle can be deduced only from the characteristics of the angles which the lines form with one another, i.e. from the relative position of the lines. A clear recognition of the distinction and the difference in weight between these two aspects of every system, viz. relative position and connection, seems to me of fundamental importance in our approach to society and culture. This distinction and its significance often goes unappreciated. Karl Popper rightly points out in his criticism of holism (1963: 76) that the word 'whole' in recent holistic literature contains an ambiguity: It is used "to denote (a) the totality of all the properties or aspects of a thing, and especially of all the relations holding between its constituent parts". A 'whole' in this sense is thus an aggregate of connections. In addition it stands for "(b) certain special properties or aspects of the thing in question, namely those which make it appear an organised structure rather than a mere heap." A whole in that sense is an arrangement, i.e. a construction determined by the relative position of its constituent parts. While in a 'mere heap' we may find connections, we do not find structure. Wholes in sense (b) are structures, i.e. configurations, modes of arrangement.2 These have been made objects of study in Gestalt psychology, with offshoots in the substantive configurationalism of cultural anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict and in the formal struc- tural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss and his followers, even though Lévi-Strauss has been predominantly influenced by Marx, Durkheim and Mauss. Popper considers the scientific study of wholes in sense (b) possible and desirable but rightly objects to the study of wholes in sense (a). 2 Compare with Nadel: .... "structure indicates an ordered arrangement of parts, which can be treated as transposable, being relatively invariant, while the parts themselves are variable". (Theory of Social Structure, 1962, 2d. impr., p. 8). I agree with this definition save its empirical locus. Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 07:54:02AM via free access 132 J. POUWER. Since all description is necessarily selective, a description (let alone a comparison) of wholes in sense (a) is impossible and an illusion. Indeed, one cannot help noting that anthropologists such as Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown who, each in his own fashion, regarded society and culture as an organic whole in sense (a), have never described such a 'whole' themselves. Ruth Benedict who also worked selectively, should not be expected to describe and compare wholes in sense (a), for she used the term 'whole' mostly in sense (b) — even though she does not consistently distinguish between these two meanings. Köbben's view that Ruth Benedict compares only aspects of Zuni and Kwakiutl cultures is factually correct, but it is irrelevant to criticise her for disregarding her own theory, according to which only 'wholes' can be proper objects of comparison. (1964: 22-23). The author and her critic talk past each other because each uses the word 'whole' in a different sense, viz. (b) and (a) respectively. Köbben takes the culture pattern of a society to be 'the totality of interconnected ... culture traits. Also: the special character, the uniqueness of a culture'. (1964: 17). I have the impression that in his critique of Benedict, he relies on the former (functional) denotation of 'pattern', whereas Benedict's use of the terms culture pattern or conjiguration is closer to Köbben's second denotation. Boas recognised the difference in approach. In his introduction to Benedict's Patterns of Culture, he wrote the following: 'This (Benedict's, P.) treatment is distinct from the so-called functional approach to social phenomena in so far as it is concerned rather with the discovery of fundamental