BURGOS Proofs
Behavior and Philosophy, 44, 46-79 (2016). ©2016 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies MENTALISM VERSUS DUALISM: REPLIES TO COMMENTARIES José E. Burgos1 University of Guadalajara ABSTRACT: The target paper’s main point is that mentalism and, to this extent, mentalistic (e.g., cognitive) psychology can only be materialistic and, hence, cannot be dualistic. The commentaries to the paper are insightful and stimulating. A few call for corrections, the rest for further clarification. Most criticize the mind-brain identity theory. This criticism is beside the point, as I did not intend to champion this theory (or functionalism), but only use it to illustrate how mentalism commits us to materialism. Still, all the criticisms of the theory are fallacious (ad hominem attacks against philosophers of mind, commitment to a particular ontology of causation and personhood). Other commentators criticize my focus on ontology, also fallaciously, by arguing ad populum (few scientists are interested in it) and name-calling that misrepresents ontology as anti- scientific. Overall, none of the commentaries invalidates the target paper’s main point. Key words: mentalism, dualism, radical behaviorism Mentalism versus Dualism: Replies to Commentaries The commentaries to the target paper (Burgos, 2015) are insightful and stimulating. Some call for corrections to, others for further clarification of some specific claims, but none invalidates the target paper’s main point. Before my replies, it will be helpful to summarize the point: Contrary to what some radical behaviorists have claimed, mentalism (or cognitivism) is necessarily materialistic and, hence, cannot possibly be dualistic, not even “imply,” “invite,” “lead to,” or “open the door to” dualism.
[Show full text]