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Disssertation DISSERTATION Titel der Dissertation Consciousness and Cognition: A Processual Dynamical Perspective Verfasser Mehrdad Farahmand angestrebter akademischer Grad Doktor der Philosophie (Dr. phil.) Wien, im Jänner, 2011 Studienkennzahl It. Studienblatt 092 296 Dissertationgebiet It. Studienblatt Philosophie Betreuer Ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr. DI. Franz-Markus Peschl Curriculum Vitae Education: PhD, Philosophy, University of Vienna, in Progress Title: Consciousness and Cognition: A Processual and Dynamic Perspective (Currently being completed) M.D, Medicine, Medical University of Vienna, in Progress (to be completed by 07. 2011) Ms, Cognitive Sciences, University of Vienna, in Progress (Currently being completed) Title: Cognition and Consciousness: A Functionalist Approach and Critic M. A., Philosophy, California State University Los Angeles, 2003 Concentrations: Philosophy of Mind Thesis: The Odyssey of Consciousness B.S., Behavioral Neurosciences (Psychobiology), University of Southern California, 1996 Concentrations: Psychology, Special Education Honors Thesis: The Role of Alternative Splicing of mRNA in Sexual Differentiation. Experience: Lecturer University of Vienna, 2008- present Course: Philosophy, Cognitive Sciences Lecturer (Part-time Faculty), 2000 - 2004 California State University Los Angeles Course: Philosophy Part-time Faculty 2000 - 2004 Glendale Community College Courses: Philosophy Molecular Biology Research Assistant and Labor Technician 1994-1999 University of Southern California Grants and Fellowships: Howard Hughes Medical Institute Undergraduate Scholarship and Traineeship Awards and Honors: Who is Who Among America’s Teachers, Excellence in Teaching Award, 2003, 2002. California State University Regents Alumni Association Honors, 2004, 2003, 2002. California State University Academic Excellent Award, 2004, 2003, 2002. Howard Hughes Medical Institute Scholarship, 1994-1996. 2 Table of Contents Abstract 6 Abstrakt 7 1.Introduction 8 Part One 25 2. Dualism 26 2.1 The Platonic Argument for Substance Dualism 29 2.2 Classical Cartesian Interactionist Dualism 39 2.2.1 Some Objections 51 2.3 Spinoza’s substance monism: A Cartesian critique 56 2.4 Parallelism 61 2.5 Popperian Interactionist Dualism 68 3. Mentalism or Subjective Idealism 82 3.1 Locke’s Theory of Perception and Identity 82 3.2 Berkeley 87 3.3 Hume’s criticism 93 3.3.1 Hume’s theory of causality 95 3.3.2 Hume’s theory of identity 98 3.4 Further Problems and Conclusion 102 4. Reductive Materialism 104 4.1 Defining Materialism 105 4.2 What Is Reduction? 110 4.3 Classical Materialism 113 4.4 Behaviorism 114 4.4.1 Logical Behaviorism 117 4.4.2 Ontological Behaviorism 121 4.4.3 Methodological Behaviorism 122 4.5 Eliminative Materialism 124 4.6 Identity Theories 127 4.6.1 Type-type identity theory 132 3 4.6.2 Token-token identity theory 136 4.7 Functionalism: A way out? 140 5. Non-reductive Materialism 145 5.1 The Principle of Supervenience 148 5.2 Is Consciousness supervenient on the Physical? 152 5.2.1 Argument of logical possibility of a zombie world 155 5.2.2 China Brain 156 5.2.3 Chinese Room argument 157 5.2.4 The inverted spectrum argument 159 5.2.5 Epistemic asymmetry argument 160 5.2.6 The knowledge argument 161 5.2.7 The absence of analysis argument 163 5.2.8 Some Alternative Approaches 163 5.3 Epiphenomenalism 168 Part Two 173 6. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism 174 6.1 Transcendental Aesthetics 180 6.2 Transcendental Analytic and the Analytic of Concepts 184 6.3 Analytic of Principles 198 6.4 Transcendental Dialectic 201 6.5 The Bergsonian Critique 203 7. An Existential Phenomenological View 209 7.1 A Paradigm of Perception 209 7.2 The Hegelian Roots 212 7.3 Human Existence as Being-in-the-World 221 7.3.1 Intentionality 223 7.3.2 The Umwelt 230 7.3.3 The Eigenwelt 234 7.3.4 The Mitwelt 240 7.4 Dualisms Dissolved 248 8. Process Ontology and Evolutionary Emergentism 251 4 8.1 Aristotelian Notion of Substance and Causality 252 8.2 Fundamentals of Process Metaphysics 256 8.2.1 What does this say about causality? 258 8.2.2 The Nature of Process and its Interaction with Time 259 8.2.3 Process and Change 265 8.2.4 Characteristics of Processes 267 8.2.5 Processes and Universals 267 8.2.6 Processes and Dynamical Systems 273 9. Emergence, Consciousness, and Dynamic Logic 282 9.1 Emergence 282 9.2 Logic of Being and Becoming 290 9.3 Evolutionary Emergentism, and Consciousness 296 9.3.1 Appercetive consciousness 300 9.3.2 Introspective or self-consciousness 305 9.3.3 Perceptive consciousness 306 9.4 More Thoughts on Processes 309 9.5 Some concluding thoughts about the self 310 10. Concluding Remarks 317 Bibliography 321 5 Abstract In this work, I examine the traditional theories of mind and consciousness. I present the arguments that support them and the presuppositions that hold them. A critical analysis of these theories will show that they all fail for apparently different reason. I will also provide the standard arguments against them. I maintain that this failure is the result of a fundamental presupposition that they all share, namely substance ontology. The standard causality view, which presents the other source of this problem is the direct consequence of assuming a substance ontology. The result of these assumptions is to render consciousness impotent or over-determining. As a result, consciousness must be reduced to some other phenomenon, eliminated, or accepted as impotent. Moreover, theses view cannot really distinguish between mind and consciousness. The position maintained in this work is to abandon the ontological primacy of substance ontology and replace it with process ontology and add emergence, creativity, correlation, and simultaneity to our ontological world-view along with spatiality, temporality, and causality. We maintain that the world is primarily made of process, which are inherently temporal, lawful, and creative self-organizing dynamic systems. Human existence, mind, and consciousness should also be understood as embodied inherently temporal, lawful, creative self-organizing dynamic system. Consciousness should be distinguished from the mind, which can be adequately accounted for by functionalism. We should be able to account for intentionality, temporality, and phenomenology of consciousness. 6 Abstrakt In diesem Werk, ich untersuche die traditionelle Theorien von Geist und Bewußtsein. In dieser Zusamenhang ich präsentiere die unterstützende Argumente und die untermauerende Annahmen. Eine kritische Analyse von allen diesen Theorien will zeigen, daß sie alle für anscheinend vershiedene Gründe versagen. Ich werde auch die standard Argumente gegen diese Theorien präsentieren. Es ist meine Position, daß diese Theorien durch eine gemeinsame Annahme versagen nämlich Substanz Ontologie. Die standarde Theorie von Kausalität präsentiert der andere Grund fürs Versagen dieser Ansichten und sie ist genauso von Substanz Ontologie abzuleiten. Als Resultat ihre Annahmen diese Ansichten machen Bewußtsein entweder überdeterminierend, oder impotent. Danach muß man entweder Bewußtsein zu einem anderen Phänomnen reduzieren, oder eliminieren, oder dessen Impotenz akzeptieren. Ich glaube, daß der ontologische Vorrang von Substance aufgegeben werden muß und es muß mit Prozeß Ontologie ersetzt werden muß. Wir sollten Emergenz, Korrelation, Simulteneität, Kreativtät der gleiche ontologische Importanz einräumen wie Kausalität, Temporalität, und Spatialität. Wir nehmen an daß, die Welt primär aus Prozesse besteht, die gründsetzlich zeitlich, gesetztmäßig, schöpferische selbst-organisierende dynamische Systeme sind. Menschliche Existenz, Geist, und Bewußtsein sollte auch als solcher Prozeß betrachtet und verstanden werden. Unsere Ansicht unterscheidet zwischen Geist und Bewußtsein. Zusätzlich, es wird versucht die grundlegende Eigenschaften von Bewußtsein wie Intentionalität, Temporalität, und Qualität gerecht zu werden. 7 Chapter One: Introduction According to my understanding of the landscape of this topic, the traditional concept of mentality is based on four assumptions. 1) The notion of mentality is intimately linked to, and in fact inseparable from, the idea of the inner as opposed to the outer. Hence, it is deeply rooted in Cartesian dualism. 2) The idea of mentality is related to the idea of representation, which is the subject picturing the object. Here, the emphasis is on the mode of information processing as opposed to the first assumption, which emphasizes the ontological gap. 3) The traditional notion of mentality, and self, is based on substance ontology. 4) The concept of mentality is based upon a conception of time as the present, which fails to uphold the importance of past and future. This presupposition is a natural outcome of the substance ontology. A substance is necessarily an entity of the present moment moving along the medium of time, where the past once was and does not enjoy reality anymore and future, although representing the future potentialities, is not real. We reject the primacy of these assumptions and suggest the importance of understanding human existence in terms of a process as opposed to being a substantial subject, for which the world is an object. Customarily, human mentality is considered a thing, or substance, occupying a corner of the world. The mind stands in a causal relationship to other things. In other words, it is the principle of causality that relates the mind to other things. This is best illustrated by Descartes’ cogito, which relates contingently to substantia cogitians. This view
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