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Coffman, D'm. / L. Neal, Eds.: the History of Financial COFFMAN, D’M. / L. NEAL, EDS.: THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES, 4 VOLS. Volume I. The early modern paradigmatic cases 1. C. P. Kindleberger, ‘The Economic Crisis of 1619 to 1623’, Journal of Economic History, Mar. 1991, 51, 1, 149–75. 2. William A. Shaw, ‘The Monetary Movements of 1600–1621 in Holland and Germany’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (New Series), 1895, 9, 1, 189–213. 3. V. H. Jung, ‘Die Kipper-und wipperzeit und ihre Auswirkungen auf OberÖsterreich’, Jahrbuch des Oberösterreichischen Musealvereines, 1976, 121, 55–65. 4. S. Quinn and W. Roberds, ‘The Bank of Amsterdam and the Leap to Central Bank Money’, American Economic Review, May 2007, 97, 2, 262–5. 5. D. French, ‘The Dutch Monetary Environment During Tulipmania’, Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Spring 2006, 9, 1, 3– 14. 6. P. M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), pp. 1–47. 7. N. W. Posthumus, ‘The Tulip Mania in Holland in the Years 1636 and 1637’, Journal of Economic and Business History, May 1929, 1, 434–66. 8. E. A. Thompson, ‘The Tulipmania: Fact or Artifact?’, Public Choice, Jan. 2007, 130, 1–2, 99–114. 9. L. D. Neal, ‘The Integration and Efficiency of the London and Amsterdam Stock Markets in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, 1987, 47, 1, 97–115. 10. P. M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), pp. 87–126. 11. A. L. Murphy, ‘Trading Options Before Black-Scholes: A Study of the Market in Late Seventeenth-Century London’, Economic History Review, 2009, 62, 1, 8–30. 12. J. Hoppit, ‘The Myths of the South Sea Bubble’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 2002, 12, 141–65. 13. R. S. Dale, J. E. V. Johnson, and L. Tang, ‘Financial Markets Can Go Mad: Evidence of Irrational Behaviour During the South Sea Bubble’, Economic History Review, 2005, 58, 2, 233–71. 14. G. S. Shea, ‘Financial Market Analysis Can Go Mad (in the Search for Irrational Behaviour During the South Sea Bubble)’, Economic History Review, 2007, 60, 4, 742–65. 15. R. S. Dale, J. E. V. Johnson, and L. Tang, ‘Pitfalls in the Quest for South Sea Rationality’, Economic History Review, 2007, 60, 4, 766–72. 16. R. G. P. Frehen, W. N. Goetzmann, and K. G. Rouwenhorst, ‘New Evidence on the First Financial Bubbles’ (Yale International Center for Finance, Working Paper No. 09-04 (July 2012)). 17. F. Velde, ‘Was John Law’s System a Bubble? The Mississippi Bubble Revisited’, in L. D. Neal and J. Atak (eds.), The Origins and Development of Financial Markets and Institutions (Cambridge, 2009). 18. P. T. Hoffman, J.-L. Rosenthal, and G. Postel-Vinay, ‘The Crisis of Public Finance and the Law Affair, 1712–6’, Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660–1870 (Chicago, 2000). 19. Émile Levasseur, ‘Chute du Systeme’, Recherches historiques sur le système de Law (Guillaumin et cie, 1854), pp. 190–236. Volume II. The Growth of Financial Capitalism 20. Shigeru Wakita, ‘Efficiency of the DoJima Rice Futures Market in Tokugawa-Period Japan’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 2001, 25, 3, 535–54. 21. A. J. Arnold and S. McCartney, ‘Veritable Gold Mines Before the Arrival of Railway Competition: But Did Dividends Signal Rates of Return in the English Canal Industry?’, Economic History Review, 2011, 64, 214–36. 22. D. J. Cowen, ‘The First Bank of the United States and the Securities Market Crash of 1792’, Journal of Economic History, Dec. 2000, 60, 4, 1041–60. 23. L. D. Neal, ‘The Bank of England’s First Return to Gold and the Stock Market Crash of 1825’, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 1998, 79, 53–76. 24. David M. Williams and John Armstrong, ‘Promotion, Speculation and their Outcome: The «Steamship Mania» of 1824–1825’, Aslib Proceedings, 2008, 60, 6, 642–60. 25. R. Harris, ‘Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions and the Repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825’, Economic History Review, Nov. 1997, 50, 4, 675–96. 26. Peter L. Rousseau, ‘Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic of 1837’, Journal of Economic History, 2002, 62, 2, 457–88. 27. S. McCartney and A. J. Arnold, ‘The Railway Mania of 1845–1847: Market Irrationality or Collusive Swindle Based on Accounting Distortions?’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2003, 16, 5, 821–52. 28. G. Campbell, ‘Myopic Rationality in a Mania’, Explorations in Economic History, Jan. 2012, 49, 1, 75–91. 29. Charles W. Calomiris and Larry Schweikart, ‘The Panic of 1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment’, Journal of Economic History, 1991, 51, 4, 807–34. 30. Morgan Kelly and Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Market Contagion: Evidence from the Panics of 1854 and 1857’, American Economic Review, 2000, 90, 5, 1110–24. 31. James L. Huston, ‘Western Grains and the Panic of 1857’, Agricultural History, 1983, 57, 1, 14–32. 32. W. Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873), pp. 162–303. 33. Warren M. Persons, Pierson M. Tuttle, and Edwin Frickey, ‘Business and Financial Conditions Following the Civil War in the United States’, Review of Economic Statistics 2, 1920, 5–21. 34. Peter Mixon, ‘The Crisis of 1873: Perspectives from Multiple Asset Classes’, Journal of Economic History, 2008, 68, 3, 722–57. Volume III. The Gold-Standard Era 35. B. Eichengreen, ‘The Baring Crisis in a Mexican Mirror’, International Political Science Review, 1999, 20, 3, 249–70. 36. G. D. Triner and K. Wandschneider, ‘The Baring Crisis and the Brazilian Encilhamento, 1889–1891: An Early Example of Contagion Among Emerging Capital Markets’, Financial History Review, Oct. 2005, 2, 199–225. 37. J Körnert, ‘The Barings Crises of 1890 and 1895: Causes, Courses, Consequences and the Danger of Domino Effects’, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, July 2003, 13, 3, 187–209. 38. Hugh Rockoff, ‘The «Wizard of Oz» as a Monetary Allegory’, Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98, 4, 739–60. 39. C. R. Hickson and J. D. Turner, ‘Free Banking Gone Awry: The Australian Banking Crisis of 1893’, Financial History Review, Oct. 2002, 9, 2, 147–67. 40. M. Carlson, ‘Causes of Bank Suspensions in the Panic of 1893’, Explorations in Economic History, 2005, 42, 1, 56–80. 41. C. D. Ramirez, ‘Bank Fragility, «Money Under the Mattress», and Long-Run Growth: US Evidence from the «Perfect» Panic of 1893’, Journal of Banking & Finance, Dec. 2009, 33, 12, 2185–98. 42. O. M. W. Sprague, ‘The American Crisis of 1907’, Economic Journal, Sept. 1908, 18, 71, 353–72. 43. Kerry A. Odell and Marc D. Weidenmier, ‘Real Shock, Monetary Aftershock: The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and the Panic of 1907’, Journal of Economic History, 2004, 64, 4, 1002–27. 44. Gary Gorton and Lixin Huang, ‘Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 2006, 53, 7, 1613–29. 45. Jon Moen and Ellis Tallman, ‘The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role of the Trust Companies’, Journal of Economic History, 1992, 52, 3, 611–30. 46. Jon Moen and E. Tallman, ‘Liquidity Creation Without a Central Bank: Clearing House Certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907’, Journal of Financial Stability, Dec. 2012, 8, 4, 277–91. 47. Michael D. Bordo and Hugh Rockoff, ‘Not Just the Great Contraction: Friedman and Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United States 1867 to 1960’, American Economic Review, May 2013, 103, 3, 61–5. 48. B. Bernanke, ‘Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression’, American Economic Review, 1983, 73, 257–76. 49. B. Bernanke, ‘The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 1995, 27, 1–28. 50. B. Bernanke and H. James, ‘The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison’, in R. Glenn Hubbard (ed.), Financial Markets and Financial Crises (University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 33–68. 51. C. W. Calomiris, ‘Financial Factors in the Great Depression’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1993, 7, 61–85. 52. E. McGratten and E. Prescott, ‘The 1929 Stock Market: Irving Fisher was Right?’, International Economic Review, 2004, 45, 991–1009. 53. P. Rappaport and E. N. White, ‘Was There a Bubble in the 1929 Market?’, Journal of Economic History, 1993, 53, 3, 549–74. 54. Isabel Schnabel, ‘The Role of Liquidity and Implicit Guarantees in the German Twin Crisis of 1931’, Journal of International Money and Finance, Feb. 2009, 28, 1, 1–25. 55. E. N. White, ‘The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1990, 4, 67–83. 56. Joseph L. Lucia, ‘The Failure of the Bank of United States: A Reappraisal’, Explorations in Economic History, Oct. 1985, 22, 4, 402–16. 57. Y. Chen and I. Hasan, ‘Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40, 2–3, 2008, 535–546 58. William H. Janeway, ‘The 1931 Sterling Crisis and the Independence of the Bank of England’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 1995, 251–68. Volume IV. The Modern Era 59. Asher A. Blass and Richard S. Grossman, ‘Assessing Damages: The 1983 Israeli Bank Shares Crisis’, Contemporary Economic Policy, 2001, 19, 1, 49–58. 60. Carlos F. Diaz-AleJandro, Paul R. Krugman, and Jeffrey D. Sachs, ‘Latin American Debt: I Don’t Think We are in Kansas Anymore’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1984, 2, 335–403. 61. John B. Shoven, Scott B. Smart, and Joel Waldfogel, ‘Real Interest Rates and the Savings and Loan Crisis: The Moral Hazard Premium’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1992, 6, 1, 155–67.
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