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KS-4012 / May 2014 ご注文承り中! 【経済史、金融史、金融危機】 近世以降の金融危機の歴史に関する重要論文を収録 L.ニール他編 金融危機史 全 4 巻 The History of Financial Crises. 4 vols. Coffman, D'Maris / Neal, Larry (eds.), The History of Financial Crises: Critical Concepts in Finance. 4 vols. (Critical Concepts in Finance) 1736 pp. 2014:9 (Routledge, UK) <614-722> ISBN 978-0-415-63506-6 hard set 2007 年以降、グローバルな金融制度は極度の混乱を経験しています。いくつかの銀 行は甚大な損失を抱え、各国政府による桁外れの救済を必要としてきました。その上、現 在も進行しているユーロ圏の危機は、政府の規制機関・銀行・資本市場の間の機能不全の 相互作用を浮き彫りにしています。こうした昨今の金融危機を踏まえ、近年、1930 年代 の大恐慌や 1719～20 年のミシシッピ計画及び南海泡沫事件といった歴史上の様々な金融 危機との比較研究が盛んに行われています。 本書は、深刻な金融危機からの回復の成功事例を位置づけ、学び、そして重要な歴史的 コンテクストに昨今の危機を位置づけるという喫緊の必要性によって企画されました。第 1 巻「近世のパラダイムの事例」、第 2 巻「金融資本主義の成長」、第 3 巻「金本位制の時 代」、第 4 巻「現代」の全 4 巻より構成されています。本書を経済史、金融史、金融危機 に関心を持つ研究者・研究室、図書館にお薦めいたします。 〔収録論文明細〕 Volume I: The Early Modern Paradigmatic Cases 1. C. P. Kindleberger, ‘The Economic Crisis of 1619 to 1623’, 1991 2. William A. Shaw, ‘The Monetary Movements of 1600–1621 in Holland and Germany’, 1895 3. V. H. Jung, ‘Die Kipper-und wipperzeit und ihre Auswirkungen auf OberÖsterreich’, 1976 4. S. Quinn & W. Roberds, ‘The Bank of Amsterdam and the Leap to Central Bank Money’, 2007 5. D. French, ‘The Dutch Monetary Environment During Tulipmania’, 2006 6. P. M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias, 2000, pp. 1–47. 7. N. W. Posthumus, ‘The Tulip Mania in Holland in the Years 1636 and 1637’, 1929 8. E. A. Thompson, ‘The Tulipmania: Fact or Artifact?’, 2007 9. L. D. Neal, ‘The Integration and Efficiency of the London and Amsterdam Stock Markets in the Eighteenth Century’, 1987 10. P. M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias, 2000, pp. 87–126. 11. A. L. Murphy, ‘Trading Options Before Black-Scholes: A Study of the Market in Late Seventeenth-Century London’, 2009 12. J. Hoppit, ‘The Myths of the South Sea Bubble’, 2002 13. R. S. Dale, J. E. V. Johnson, & L. Tang, ‘Financial Markets Can Go Mad: Evidence of Irrational Behaviour During the South Sea Bubble’, 2005 14. G. S. Shea, ‘Financial Market Analysis Can Go Mad (in the Search for Irrational Be- haviour During the South Sea Bubble)’, 2007 15. R. S. Dale, J. E. V. Johnson, & L. Tang, ‘Pitfalls in the Quest for South Sea Rationality’, 2007 16. R. G. P. Frehen, W. N. Goetzmann, & K. G. Rouwenhorst, ‘New Evidence on the First Financial Bubbles’, 2012 17. H.-J. Voth & P. Temin, ‘Riding the South Sea Bubble’, 2004 18. F. Velde, ‘Was John Law’s System a Bubble? The Mississippi Bubble Revisited’, 2009 19. P. T. Hoffman, J.-L. Rosenthal, & G. Postel-Vinay, ‘The Crisis of Public Finance and the Law Affair, 1712–6’, 2000 20. Émile Levasseur, ‘Chute du Systeme’, 1854 Volume II: The Growth of Financial Capitalism 21. Shigeru Wakita, ‘Efficiency of the Dojima Rice Futures Market in Tokugawa-Period Japan’, 2001 22. Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, ‘Responding to a Shadow Banking Crisis: The Lessons of 1763’, 2012 23. A. J. Arnold & S. McCartney, ‘Veritable Gold Mines Before the Arrival of Railway Competition: But Did Dividends Signal Rates of Return in the English Canal Indus- try?’, 2011 24. D. J. Cowen, ‘The First Bank of the United States and the Securities Market Crash of 1792’, 2000 25. L. D. Neal, ‘The Bank of England’s First Return to Gold and the Stock Market Crash of 1825’, 1998 26. David M. Williams & John Armstrong, ‘Promotion, Speculation and their Outcome: The "Steamship Mania" of 1824–1825’, 2008 27. R. Harris, ‘Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions and the Repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825’, 1997 28. Peter L. Rousseau, ‘Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic of 1837’, 2002 29. Hasan Chen, ‘Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation’, 2008 30. S. McCartney & A. J. Arnold, ‘The Railway Mania of 1845–1847: Market Irrationality or Collusive Swindle Based on Accounting Distortions?’, 2003 31. G. Campbell, ‘Myopic Rationality in a Mania’, 2012 32. Charles W. Calomiris & Larry Schweikart, ‘The Panic of 1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment’, 1991 33. Morgan Kelly & Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Market Contagion: Evidence from the Panics of 1854 and 1857’, 2000 34. James L. Huston, ‘Western Grains and the Panic of 1857’, 1983 35. W. Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market, 1873 (株)極東書店 - 2 - KS-4012/金融危機史－金融の重要概念 36. Warren M. Persons, Pierson M. Tuttle, & Edwin Frickey, ‘Business and Financial Conditions Following the Civil War in the United States’, 1920 37. Peter Mixon, ‘The Crisis of 1873: Perspectives from Multiple Asset Classes’, 2008 Volume III: The Gold-Standard Era 38. B. Eichengreen, ‘The Baring Crisis in a Mexican Mirror’, 1999 39. G. D. Triner & K. Wandschneider, ‘The Baring Crisis and the Brazilian Encilhamento, 1889–1891: An Early Example of Contagion Among Emerging Capital Markets’, 2005 40. J Körnert, ‘The Barings Crises of 1890 and 1895: Causes, Courses, Consequences and the Danger of Domino Effects’, 2003 41. Hugh Rockoff, ‘The "Wizard of Oz" as a Monetary Allegory’, 1990 42. C. R. Hickson & J. D. Turner, ‘Free Banking Gone Awry: The Australian Banking Crisis of 1893’, 2002 43. M. Carlson, ‘Causes of Bank Suspensions in the Panic of 1893’, 2005 44. C. D. Ramirez, ‘Bank Fragility, "Money Under the Mattress", and Long-Run Growth: US Evidence from the "Perfect" Panic of 1893’, 2009 45. O. M. W. Sprague, ‘The American Crisis of 1907’, 1908 46. Kerry A. Odell & Marc D. Weidenmier, ‘Real Shock, Monetary Aftershock: The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and the Panic of 1907’, 2004 47. Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, ‘Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking’, 2006 48. Jon Moen & Ellis Tallman, ‘The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role of the Trust Companies’, 1992 49. Jon Moen & E. Tallman, ‘Liquidity Creation Without a Central Bank: Clearing House Certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907’, 2012 50. Michael D. Bordo & Hugh Rockoff, ‘Not Just the Great Contraction: Friedman and Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United States 1867 to 1960’, 2013 51. B. Bernanke, ‘Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression’, 1983 52. B. Bernanke, ‘The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Ap- proach’, 1995 53. B. Bernanke & H. James, ‘The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison’, 1991 54. C. W. Calomiris, ‘Financial Factors in the Great Depression’, 1993 55. E. McGratten & E. Prescott, ‘The 1929 Stock Market: Irving Fisher was Right?’, 2004 56. P. Rappaport & E. N. White, ‘Was There a Bubble in the 1929 Market?’, 1993 57. Isabel Schnabel, ‘The Role of Liquidity and Implicit Guarantees in the German Twin Crisis of 1931’, 2009 58. E. N. White, ‘The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited’, 1990 59. Joseph L. Lucia, ‘The Failure of the Bank of United States: A Reappraisal’, 1985 60. William H. Janeway, ‘The 1931 Sterling Crisis and the Independence of the Bank of England’, 1995 Volume IV: The Modern Era 61. Asher A. Blass & Richard S. Grossman, ‘Assessing Damages: The 1983 Israeli Bank Shares Crisis’, 2001 (株)極東書店 - 3 - KS-4012/金融危機史－金融の重要概念 62. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Paul R. Krugman, & Jeffrey D. Sachs, ‘Latin American Debt: I Don’t Think We are in Kansas Anymore’, 1984 63. John B. Shoven, Scott B. Smart, & Joel Waldfogel, ‘Real Interest Rates and the Sav- ings and Loan Crisis: The Moral Hazard Premium’, 1992 64. M. Mazen Anbari, ‘Banking on a Bailout: Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policy Exclusions in the Context of the Savings and Loan Crisis’, 1992 65. Barney Warf & Joseph C. Cox, ‘Spatial Dimensions of the Savings and Loan Crisis’, 1996 66. Mark Rubinstein, ‘Portfolio Insurance and the Market Crash’, 1988 67. J. Patrick Raines & Charles G. Leathers, ‘The New Speculative Stock Market: Why the Weak Immunizing Effect of the 1987 Crash?’, 1994 68. John J. Merrick Jr, ‘Crisis Dynamics of Implied Default Recovery Ratios: Evidence from Russia and Argentina’, 2001 69. Mardi Dungey et al., ‘Contagion in International Bond Markets During the Russian and the LTCM crises’, 2006 70. C. Perez, ‘The Double Bubble at the Turn of the Century: Technological Roots and Structural Implications’, 2009 71. William Goetzmann, Liang Peng, and Jacqueline Yen, ‘The Subprime Crisis and House Price Appreciation’, 2012 (株)極東書店 - 4 - KS-4012/金融危機史－金融の重要概念 .
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