Note for Mr. Michael Moller, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Subject: Preparations on the Group of Rio's initiative for a summit meeting on "Innovative Financial Mechanisms Designed to secure Democratic Governance and contribute to the Alleviation of Poverty"

1. At his meeting with representatives of the "Rio Group" of Latin American countries held in November in Santa Cruz, , on the occasion of the Xlllth Iberoamerican Summit, the Secretary-General offered the assistance and support of the United Nations in the convening of a high-level international meeting to address issues related to "innovative financial mechanisms designed to secure democratic governance and contribute to the alleviation of poverty".

2. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs prepared, in consultation with the Peruvian government (in its capacity as "Pro-tempore Secretary" of the Rio Group), a technical note on the subject (attached), which identifies the following five broad issues as possible elements for an agenda for the meeting: (a) definition of fiscal targets; (b) design of structural counter-cyclical measures; (c) review of debt servicing practices; (d) consideration of indexed bonds; and (e) creation of regional infrastructure authorities.

3. The Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs convened a first preparatory meeting, to discuss the technical note, as well as other aspects related to the organization of the high-level meeting, to be held on Monday 15 December 2003. In addition to the Peruvian government, the following institutions were invited: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, Andean Development Corporation and the UN Economic Commission for and the . The venue of Washington was chosen to facilitate the participation of the financial institutions located there. An offer was accepted from the Inter-American Development Bank to hold the meeting at its headquarters facilities.

4. On Saturday 13 December, the Peruvian delegation quite unexpectedly made contact with DESA officials to indicate the wish of the Peruvian government to postpone the date set for the preparatory meeting. The reason given for the request was that on Monday 15 December there would be major changes in the Peruvian Cabinet which would prevent the travel to Washington of the relevant officials, particularly from the Finance Ministry. The DESA Under-Secretary-General also spoke on the telephone with the Peruvian Foreign Minister, who insisted on the need to reschedule the meeting to a later time. DESA officials sent communications to all entities concerned, but noted to the Peruvian delegation that it would be difficult on a weekend to ensure that the news would reach all.

5. Since travel arrangements for the relevant DESA officials had already been made, the USG instructed them (Mr. Kinniburgh, Head of the Policy Planning and Development Unit and myself) to travel to Washington anyway, and hold preliminary technical conversations on the Rio Group initiative with their counterparts in the fi institutions. Two meetings were held: one with officials from the Internal Fund, and another with officials from the Inter-American Development Bank, the Andean Development Corporation and the ECLAC Washington Office. In general, there was receptivity to the relevance and importance of the elements and technical aspects of the proposal, but many questions were raised in connection to the form, opportunity and participation in the proposed high-level meeting. These was no attempt to answer these questions,since they would more properly be addressed at the meeting being rescheduled.

6. On Tuesday 16 December a meeting was convened by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General to discuss the follow-up to the Secretary-General's trip and the state of preparations on the Rio Group initiative, at which the time the information contained in this note was provided orally.

7. On Wednesday 17 December the DESA Under-Secretary-General consulted again by telephone with the (new) Foreign Minister of , and it was decided that the meeting will be set for Friday, 9 January 2004. The meeting will again be held in Washington, at the ECLAC offices. The corresponding invitation letters, to the same entities indicated above, are being sent. In addition, it was decided that, besides Peru, representatives of the governments of and will also be asked to attend the preparatory meeting.

Oscar R. de Rojas Head, DESA Financing for Development Office 17 December 2003

c.c.: Mr. Danilo Turk, Assistant Secretary-General Department of Political Affairs PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT MEETING ON "INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL MECHANISMS DESIGNED TO SECURE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY"

Note by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

/. Background

At their XVII Summit in Cuzco on 23-24 May 2003, the Heads of State and Government of the Rio Group expressed their concern that the increase in poverty caused by the prolonged period of economic stagnation in their countries posed a fundamental threat to democratic governance, the stability of national institutions and peace. The Rio Group therefore requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to organize a Summit Meeting involving their heads of state and government, other concerned national leaders and the heads of the international financial institutions (IFIs) to analyze the financial constraints that confront the members of the Group in their efforts to alleviate poverty and secure the long-term economic and social development of the region, and to propose financial mechanisms to ease these constraints.

//. Justification

All members of the Rio Group recognize that the maintenance of sustainable macroeconomic balances, especially fiscal positions, is necessary to achieve economic growth and development. Nevertheless, experience in developing countries suggests that adherence to macroeconomic policy targets is likely to exacerbate cyclical effects, especially in times of economic crisis and adjustment. Moreover, public investment levels are often significantly adversely affected during adjustment programmes, undermining long term economic growth directly as well as indirectly through the negative effect of the lack of infrastructure on private investment. The short, medium and long-term implications of corrective macroeconomic policies, particularly when they involve adhering to targets, need to be discussed with a view to devising mechanisms that reduce the burden of adjustment actions, particularly in post-crisis situations. These new mechanisms should include measures that encourage the private sector, rather than retrenching, to continue investing and financing development during a crisis and in the subsequent adjustment period. The IFIs should devise ways and means of fostering closer cooperation and association with the private sector that would contribute to this goal.

///. Issues to be discussed at the proposed Summit

1. Definition of fiscal targets

An exploration into the coverage and content of fiscal targets (as defined by the IFIs) is necessary to assess their impact on fiscal policy. There has already been a gradual move to setting targets for the government primary balance (i.e., excluding interest payments), but greater consideration should be given to the implications of other aspects of the application of different fiscal targets. In particular, given the nature of capital investment expenditures as an accumulation of assets that can offset liabilities, as well as their counter-cyclical potential during crises and adjustment, the possibility of their exclusion from fiscal targets should be considered (for example, through a move towards balance-sheet accounting). In addition, the treatment of the financial results of public enterprises should be more akin to that applied to private sector enterprises; this may imply excluding the financial results of such enterprises from fiscal targets. Common standards on these matters should be set and applied, not only within developing countries but also between developed and developing countries.

2. Design of structural counter-cyclical measures

Greater attention should be given to the structural dimensions of deficits and their measurement. Short-term measures to meet fiscal targets as currently defined may promote medium and long-term cyclically, rather than reducing it. Further analysis and discussion of the extent to which currently-prescribed domestic macroeconomic policies and practices perpetuate pro-cyclical tendencies is necessary. Such an effort should also extend to the design and implementation of automatic stabilizers, not only in the fiscal domain but also in the areas of foreign exchange reserve management, monetary policy, bank regulation and elsewhere.

3. Review of debt servicing practices

Present debt-servicing arrangements need to be reviewed from the point of view of their effect on fiscal sustainability and the budget structure. Debt service in many countries has reached the equivalent of one third or more of total government expenditures, requiring constant re-financing. There is a need to explore new possibilities, including a multilateral framework for mediation and debt-restructuring, alternative re-scheduling schemes with Paris Club creditors, refinancing arrangements that include guarantee schemes, and other mechanisms to reduce risk premiums (and hence debt-service payments).

4. Consideration of indexed bonds

Considering the unsustainable situation described above, an innovative solution to the debt sustainability problem that should be analyzed is the proposal raised by the Rio Group to issue sovereign bonds indexed to countries' capacity-to-pay. In order to share the risk involved, such bonds should be placed or guaranteed by the IFIs. Another alternative, not inconsistent with the preceding one, is to link the repayment of loans from the IFIs to the same index of capacity-to-pay. Debt-servicing related to economic activity, either to GDP growth or to an index of commodity prices, would reduce country risk through the pre- commitment to repay when the index increases, while IFI participation would assist in spreading the risk. 5. Creation of Regional Infrastructure Authorities

Investment in infrastructure is hampered by a number of obstacles, among which the following stand out: (i) the use of public funds is constrained by annual deficit targets which are critically affected by the economic cycle and are often more binding than the country's debt capacity; (ii) the participation of the private sector is limited by the dominance of public over private risk; (iii) the efficiency of project execution is affected by stop-go implementation, resulting largely from fluctuations in the availability of fiscal funds and across-the-board cut-backs, all of which result in substantial increases in construction costs, as well as in reductions in the resulting benefits, due mostly to delays in completion.

One possible mechanism to insulate investment in infrastructure from these difficulties was proposed at the Cuzco summit: the creation of Regional Infrastructure Authorities. Each of these would be a Trust administered by an Independent Trustee and would involve a mandate to match international funding (IFI as well as market), sovereign guarantees of minimum revenue, and private market opportunities in specific projects. It is expected such an initiative would result in a quantum increase in regional investment in infrastructure. For instance, the South American Infrastructure Authority (ASI) would be oriented towards the implementation of the South American Inter-country Highway System (IIRSA). Individual components of this transport network could build and/or operate as concessions, public- private partnerships or public roads, of which some could, in turn, be scheduled for later privatization.