Taking Back Our Services Rooting out Corruption in the Service Delivery Sector – Lessons for Egypt

Taking back our services Rooting out corruption in the service delivery sector – lessons for Egypt

By Rebecca Zausmer & Dixie Hawtin

Global Partners and Associates, March 2012

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 3

2. The shape of corruption in the service delivery sector ...... 4 2.1. Public service sector susceptible to corruption ...... 4 2.2. Types of corruption vary between countries and sectors ...... 4 2.3. Actors drive corruption ...... 5

3. Corruption in service delivery, the corrosive effects ...... 7 3.1. Financial costs ...... 7 3.2. Quality of services ...... 8 3.3. The gap between rich and poor ...... 8 3.4. Human development and economic growth ...... 9 3.5. Trust in government...... 9 3.6. Integrity of society ...... 10

4. Transparency and accountability in service delivery...... 11 4.1. Steps towards transparency in service delivery ...... 11 4.2. Transparency initiatives cannot happen in a void ...... 15 4.3. The case of Uganda ...... 16

6. Conclusion: the future challenges ...... 18

7. Bibliography ...... 19

1. Introduction

Before Egypt’s Revolution, promises of social equality and human development were undermined by a corrupt and powerful elite whose focus was profiteering rather than ensuring the well-being and prosperity of the Egyptian people. One of the biggest challenges facing Egypt’s new government is how to reverse this trend. The delivery of basic services – health, education and water –is often the most tangible link between citizens and their government; it forms the basis of the citizen- government compact.1 In countries like Egypt transitioning to democracy, therefore, service delivery should be a priority of any government hoping to build citizens' trust and secure future votes.

More importantly, though, providing citizens with health, education and water services is a central duty of any government. Such services are fundamental to the well-being of a population and so have an important impact on productivity. In this way, public services play a considerable role in a country's social development and economic growth. As such, the state should ensure that its citizens have universal and equal access to services by acting as financer, regulator and overseer of service delivery.2

Today, health, education and water services make up around a third of public money spent in many countries around the world.3 By its nature, however, the service delivery sector is highly susceptible to corruption and abuse. This is mainly due to the large amounts of money and the different groups of actors involved. And the poor and marginalised - being most in need of basic services - are most affected when these services are abused.

The financial costs of corruption in service delivery are striking, but the effects go far beyond these. The diversion of resources impacts the quality of services available, so undermines the health, literacy and productivity of a society. It widens the gap between rich and poor, perpetuating cycle of poverty. Corruption eats away at the integrity of a society and becomes ingrained in social and cultural norms. And it can reduce citizens' trust in their government and undermine government legitimacy.

This paper explores the types of corruption that are common in the service delivery sector worldwide, and the impact that this corruption has. Transparency and accountability initiatives have a key role to play in efforts to root out corruption in service delivery. As such, the paper goes on to outline steps which governments can take to increase transparency and accountability in service delivery, drawing on successful examples and experiences from the Global South. Finally - using the case study of the education sector in Uganda - the paper argues that transparency and accountability initiatives alone are not enough to stamp out corruption. They must take place alongside broader reforms, and their success is highly dependent on a number of related and external factors, the extent of political will. These experiences provide important lessons for Egypt during its transition phase.

1 Twaweza, 2011. "Service delivery", in The Transparency and Accountability Initiative, 2011. Opening Government, p. 73 2 Pavanello, S., and J. Darcy, 2008. Improving the provision of basic services for the poor in fragile environments, p. 7 3 Twaweza, 2011. in Transparency and Accountability Initiative, 2011, p. 73

2. The shape of corruption in the service delivery sector

2.1. Public service sector susceptible to corruption

A combination of factors makes public service delivery highly susceptible to corruption and fraud. First, large amounts of public money are involved in order to effectively service an entire population. Second, there are a number different levels and processes involved in each service delivery sector - from the policy-making level to the local government level; from allocation and distribution of grants, to procurement of Box 1: Definition of corruption equipment, to frontline provision of services for example through schools and hospitals. Third, at Corruption is defined as the abuse of each level, there is also a complex set of actors public office for personal gain. and interactions that drive the system. This combination provides infinite opportunities for actors to abuse the system for personal gain.

2.2. Types of corruption vary between countries and sectors

Part of the difficulty of rooting out corruption in service delivery lies in the fact that types of corruption vary across countries, and across sectors. Not only do factors such as the wealth or size of a country matter, but also whether a country operates using a centralised or decentralised mode of government; whether services are outsourced to the private sector; what proportion of the national budget these services make up and so on. Specific service delivery sectors differ themselves in terms of the structure, regulation, budget size, and actors involved. All of these factors at the country and sector levels create unique environments and ways in which corruption can play out.

At the general level, however, there is a common distinction in terms of the scale of corruption with ‘petty’ corruption and ‘grand’ corruption happening in most contexts. Petty corruption tends to involve small payments to facilitate what are normally routine or necessary actions. As an illustration, in the water sector this could involve getting a water connection or speeding up the process of having repairs done, or it could be an employee supplementing their own salary by helping to install illegal connections. Petty corruption tends to involve low level staff and relatively small amounts of money. When the levels of petty corruption are aggregated, however, a very different picture emerges as discussed further below. Grand corruption on the other hand involves large transactions and typically implicates those involved in management and allocation of resources: politicians, senior public officials, and contractors. It occurs mainly in relation to large contracts particularly in infrastructure projects and equipment procurement.4

4 Transparency International, 2011a. Forms and effects of corruption on the education sector in Vietnam, Transparency International, p. 8; and Gonzalez de Asis, M. et al, 2009. Improving Transparency, Integrity, and Accountability in Water Supply and Sanitation: Action, Learning, Experiences, World Bank, pp.12-14

Corruption varies between sectors Box 2: Corruption in the education sector can based on the nature of the sector itself. Box take a variety of forms 2 illustrates the types of corruption that have . Embezzlement and misappropriation of been found to exist in education sectors. budgets allocated for education: In most What emerges in education however, is very countries, education systems tend to be different from the corruption practices in state run and as such there is scope for health or water services. In the health sector substantial 'leakages' of funds because of the forms of corruption include: illegal considerable size of education budgets. prescription practices; bribes to avoid drug . Collection of illegal, extra school regulation and quality control; fraud in fees/charges: This is when parents are made product quality; absenteeism; overbilling; to pay fees for 'free' education services. illegal charges for 'free' services; unnecessary . Fraud in academic performance: This can treatments and prescriptions; corruption in include buying and selling of academic infrastructure and equipment procurement.5 marks/scores; admissions places; exam In the water sector corrupt practices involve: papers or students taking exams for other falsification of meter readings; bribes for students. illegal connections or to expedite repair; . Extra classes: Can be corrupt when teachers corruption in procurement through bidders' only teach part of the curriculum forcing cartels; political influence in contractor students to pay for extra classes to gain selection; bribery in the bidding process; or access to the rest of the curriculum. kickbacks involving engineering staff.6 . 'Ghost' teaching sessions: When teachers are registered and paid in full but do not 2.3. Actors drive corruption attend classes to teach. . Corruption in rotating and transferring Looking at who is involved in the service teachers: Where appointments are based on delivery system gives an idea about where biased or close relationships and friendships and how corruption occurs as it tends to take or bribes are paid for appointments. place during transactions between two or . Paying bribes for admittance into to more actors. favoured schools It is important to understand, however, that . Turning a deaf ear to corruption: When the line between the victim and perpetrator corruption becomes normalised and there is of corruption is often extremely blurred. a lack mechanisms for complaint, it tends to There are frequently complex dynamics at flourish. play whereby, for example, a teacher might Source: Transparency International, 2011. “Forms and be a perpetrator of corruption in a teacher- effects of corruption on the education sector in parent relationship but at the same time a Vietnam” victim of corruption in a teacher-manager relationship7. This complicates the challenge of rooting out corruption in service delivery.

In simplified terms, though, it is helpful to

5 Gonzalez de Asis et al, 2009. pp. 19-26 6 Savedoff, W.D., 2007. Transparency and Corruption in the Health Sector, p. 3 7 Transparency International, 2011a

divide the actors involved in service provision into three broad categories: 8

. Policy-makers and politicians: they determine which services are provided and the extent and quality to which they are provided on behalf of the state. . Service-providers: deliver services to citizens and include public, private and civil society actors from the Ministry of Education to a community clinic, to the frontline providers such as doctors and teachers who have direct contact with citizens. . Citizens: have an everyday need for basic services such as clean water, education and health. Citizens use services, but as voters in theory have the power to make sure that government is providing them with the services and quality of services that they need.

Again, though, if we look more closely at a specific sector the picture is more complex and a number of different actors and transactions emerge. Figure 1 portrays the scope for abuse of the system with a range of different actor relationships, influences and transactions.

Figure 1. The complex of actors and transactions involved a health system.

8 Pavanello and Darcy, 2008. p. 7

3. Corruption in service delivery, the corrosive effects

3.1. Financial costs

The financial costs of abuses in service delivery are substantial. Estimates of the aggregate amounts of public funds that have been diverted away from basic services are staggering. A public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) in Ghana revealed that 50 per cent of health funds did not actually make their way to clinics and hospitals.9 In Tanzania, a similar PETS done in 1999 found that about 57 per cent of non-wage education funds and 41 per cent of non-wage health funds were lost through corruption and fraud for personal gain.10 In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, US $28 billion is considered to be a conservative estimate of the funds diverted or stolen every year from the health sector alone.11

Furthermore, the loss of money through corruption incurs additional costs. For example, the MDG on water and sanitation is being undermined by the fact that in developing countries, corruption increases the cost of household water connections by up to 30 per cent. The cost for achieving this MDG is then inflated by more than US 48 billion.12

Petty corruption is a major contributor to these figures – although petty corruption may involve seemingly small amounts of money, it all adds up. A survey of access to electricity amongst households in Bangladesh13 found that:

. 10.4 per cent of connected households were connected illegally . 70 per cent of households that had been connected within the previous year had to pay bribes of US $20 on average. . 4.3 per cent of connected households paid an average of US$ 25 for someone to tamper with their electricity meters so that they did not have to pay the amount due

Calculations using this survey data revealed that Bangladeshi households were paying around US$37 million in bribes for electricity. An estimated $130-150 million was being paid in bribes in Bangladesh's electricity sector as a whole - taking into consideration procurement, equipment and businesses and industries - with that petty rather than grand corruption making up a significant share.14

9 Lindelow. M, et al., 2006. "Measuring corruption in the health sector", in Transparency International, 2006. 2006 Global Corruption Report, p.30 10 Kanungo. P, 2004. Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys – Application in Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana and Honduras, The World Bank, p.3 11 Savedoff, 2007 12 Transparency International, 2008. Global Corruption Report 2008: Corruption in the Water Sector, p. xxiv 13 Transparency International Bangladesh, 2005. 'Corruption in Bangladesh: A Household Survey. Executive Summary 14 Gonzalez de Asis et al, 2009.

3.2. Quality of services Box 3. Infrastructure projects divert resources away from where there is need. Beyond financial costs, corruption has severe knock-on social, economic and political Infrastructure projects are one of the most effects. The loss of resources has an obvious lucrative vehicles for corruption, because of the effect on the quality of service provision. ease with which money can be skimmed off Citizens suffer the consequences directly through kickbacks. As such health and education through poorer quality education, care, infrastructure projects are often prioritised over sanitation and services. areas where resources are genuinely needed most. In the health sector corruption can, for example, undermine the quality and availability of drugs. Regulation is important to prevent the distribution of fake or sub-therapeutic drugs which not only threaten the health of patients, but can also contribute to the development of drug resistant organisms which in turn can lead to the spread of pandemics. Thus when bribes are paid to prevent government regulation of drugs and medicines, the health of individual patients and the population as a whole is threatened. Corruption can also come in the form of theft or diversion of drugs and can lead to shortages and increased prices, which in turn impacts the level and quality of care that patients receive and the country's readiness to deal with epidemics and pandemics.15

Abuse in the education sector directly affects the quality of teaching and learning. Teacher absenteeism and poor quality text books for instance affect pass rates. In Mali primary school completion rates stood at just 40 per cent. One of the main causes was found to be an insufficient supply of textbooks.16

3.3. The gap between rich and poor

Corruption is "both a cause of poverty and a barrier to overcoming it."17 When bribery and petty corruption have become an intrinsic part of the system, citizens needing basic services resort to bribery to gain access to these services. The direct costs of bribery affect low-income households most with the poor paying relatively more of their incomes in bribes than the more wealthy.18 In Mexico in 2005, low-income homes paid 24 per cent of their household earnings in bribes.19 Bribery and corruption have become an entrenched part of service provision in many countries in the world. In East Africa more than half of people polled reported that they had paid bribes to access services that were already catered for by the taxes that they paid: 68 per cent paid bribes in Uganda, 51 per cent in Kenya and 55 per cent in Tanzania.20 In these cases, families are forced to

15 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2008. Corruption in the health sector, p. 8 16 U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre, “Corruption in the health and education sectors in Mali”, in Transparency International, 2011a, p. 8 17 Transparency International, 2011b. Mapping transparency, accountability and integrity in primary education in South Africa, Transparency International 18 Gonzalez de Asis et al, 2009. 19 Transparencia Mexicana, 2006. "Indice Nacional De Corrupcion Y Buen Gobierno", in Transparency International, Corruption Data 20 Transparency International, 2009. East African Bribery Index 2009, Transparency International Kenya,

borrow money from the family or community or sell off assets such as livestock that are crucial to their livelihoods.21

High costs mean that the poor may eventually stop seeking access to these services at all. Evidence from a review in Eastern Europe and Central Asia found that informal payments for health care not only reduced access to services, but was also a barrier to patients seeking care.22 In rural Azerbaijan, for example, high costs are charged for health facilities that are meant to be free and as such 35 per cent of births happen in the home.

Access challenges resulting from corruption also serve to entrench cycles of social inequality. Without the access to services, or services of a high quality, the poor and vulnerable are unable to use those services to pull themselves out of poverty. Without access or with access only to poor quality services, education levels remain low; water and sanitation remain poor; and health threatens the lives and livelihoods of those affected by disease and illness. In this way, corruption can perpetuate poverty and widen the gap between rich and poor.

3.4. Human development and economic growth

More recently work has been done to demonstrate the impact of corruption on population indicators. A survey of data from 71 countries, for example, showed that those countries with high corruption indices had higher levels of child and infant mortality and higher proportions of low- weight births.23 The effects of corruption in slowing human development and economic growth are also increasingly recognised.24 Services like health and education play a key role in both human development and the productivity of a population. Levels of corruption in the public sector also act as an indicator of the risks associated with investing in a country and so can deter foreign investors. The challenges to service delivery created by corruption, therefore, can undermine a society’s overall development and ultimately a country's economic growth.25

3.5. Trust in government

Corruption in basic services has a corrosive effect on citizens’ trust in the government - it reduces faith in public institutions and thus serves to undermine the legitimacy of any government. Services form the basis of a government's relationship with citizens. They are the means by which the government provides for citizens and are therefore an immediate indicator of whether the government is acting on its promises. In the case of Egypt, the initial objective of the state to increase equitable human and social development was lost as revolutionary leaders became corrupt elites and their focus changed from creating equality to power-seeking and profiteering.26

21 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2008. 22 Lewis M., 2000. Who is paying for health care in Eastern Europe and Central Asia? World Bank 23 Gupta, S., et al, 2000. Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services, IMF Working Paper 00/116, p.27 24 Chene, M. Overview of Corruption in MENA Countries, U4 Expert Answer 25 Salem, P., 2006. The Impact of Corruption on Human Development in the Arab World, The Lebanese Transparency Association 26 Salem, 2006.

In Egypt’s new democracy, a failure to stamp out corruption in services is a failure to properly govern. The continued inability of governments around the world to root out and prevent corruption in services, means that now only a quarter of people across the world would trust either the government or the media most to overcome corruption.27 Governments need to rapidly rectify this lack of trust and in the case of Egypt the government needs to win back the trust in government after the Mubarak era.

3.6. Integrity of society

Corruption also affects the very values of society. When bribery becomes an everyday necessity, it becomes normalised: a "culture of corruption" is developed. It also "directly threatens the integrity and accountability of the entire society by bringing scepticism and doubt about the fairness of social success."28 Academic fraud, for example, undermines the aspirations of younger generations by placing an emphasis on money and connections for success and career progression rather than real academic success and merit.

27 Transparency International, 2010. Global Corruption Barometer 2010 Report 28 Transparency International, 2011a, p. 8

4. Transparency and accountability in service delivery.

Transparency and accountability have a useful part to play in countering corruption and strengthening governance. There are essentially three ways in which transparency and accountability initiatives are thought to impact on corruption and poor governance:

1. They help to expose corruption for example by allowing anomalies in public accounts to be identified and highlighted, creating checks on public officials and service providers through regular audits and investigations. In this way they have a watchdog effect and - together with effective sanction or punishment mechanisms – transparency and accountability initiatives can dissuade public officials and service providers from corruption by increasing their fear of being caught. 2. They expose poor performance and lead to greater responsiveness by service providers and officials forcing them to behave more professionally and thereby improving the quality of services. 3. They lead to greater empowerment of citizens and the poor in particular. Providing citizens with accurate information about their rights encourages citizens to engage in the issues and demand that they receive their right to basic services.

4.1. Steps towards transparency in service delivery

Developing and transitioning countries face a plethora of challenges and priorities. Injecting transparency into any sector cannot happen, therefore, overnight. Instead, it is more appropriate to establish degrees or steps towards achieving transparency and accountability in the service delivery sector. The following is an adaptation of a series of steps created by the Transparency and Accountability Initiative based on international best practice and experiences. It lays out three steps, starting from basic steps that should be a minimum bar of best practice for any government, moving on to more substantial steps and then most ambitious steps.29

29 Twaweza, 2011. in The Transparency and Accountability Initiative, 2011. Opening Government, pp. 73-75

1. Governments make basic and important information about service delivery meaningful and accessible to all citizens

. Governments should make specific and popularise information - such as measurable commitments to making communications companies and civil relevant information available – such as society and faith-based organisations. service delivery policies, entitlements, . Information shared with the public should budgets and performance. E.g. 100 per be meaningful to ordinary people. Data cent of hospitals will prominently display should be disaggregated, where possible accessible information about their budget. to the individual level - e.g. x and y . Governments should take steps to services are free for each student - and distribute relevant information directly to presented in user-friendly formats. citizens in public spaces. E.g. by posting . Governments should foster and support data in public schools, libraries, water independent monitoring efforts that points and local government offices. assess the reach and quality of public . Governments should make relevant raw information dissemination. And they data available to third parties who are should respond to feedback emerging often best placed to disseminate and from these assessments.

Mexico's proactive disclosure policies In Mexico, legislation in force since 2003 requires the government to proactively disclose 17 specific categories of information to the public. The information must be disclosed online and in an accessible electronic format. Since only about 30 per cent of Mexican citizens have access to the Internet, under the law the government is also required to provide members of the public with computer access in order to view and engage with the information. A central portal, run by the Federal Institute for Access to Information, holds all of the information in one, easily searchable, online location. The portal was set up in 2007 and has been very popular with 18 million visits during its first year.30

30 Darbyshire, H., 2010. Proactive Transparency: The future of the right to information?, World Bank Institute, Governance Working Paper Series

2. Governments collect and distribute information in a useable and dynamic way to facilitate on-going monitoring of service delivery

. Governments should commit to tracking functionality. Given that access rates are and making publicly available a series of still low in developing countries, quantitative and qualitative governments should collaborate with measurements designed to monitor other mass media and mass institutions. progress of service delivery. . Governments should foster and support . Governments should make this independent monitoring efforts that information available in interactive and assess the delivery of public services and user-friendly ways which facilitate respond to feedback emerging from these comparisons between different data sets. efforts. Online and mobile platforms offer great

Results and Accountability in Public Services in Peru In 2006, in response to a lack of progress in education and health levels despite significant investment, the Government of Peru worked with parents and service delivery professionals to define clear standards for children’s development in education, health and nutrition. The standards were popularised through hard-hitting videos that explained the standards and the targets for improvement, and that demonstrated to parents and teachers how they could monitor the results. Over the past six years there has been significant improvement on a range of indicators, including chronic malnutrition and reading comprehension.31

The Huduma Project in Kenya The Huduma project aims to improve service delivery in Kenya using a crowd-sourcing model. The project – developed by the Social Development Network (SODNET) and the Kenya African Treatment Access Movement (KETAM) and launched in February 2011 – is a platform which allows citizens to report specific problems they encounter related to service delivery (for example, a lack of access to a certain medicine) through their phone. Each report is verified and sent to the relevant authorities in the private or public sector who in theory should solve the problem and inform Huduma. Huduma in turn informs the citizen who can verify whether the solution has in fact taken place and worked. In addition to this, the platform also aggregates the information into alerts for people, particularly service providers and civil society organisations, to better monitor the service delivery situation more generally.32

31 World Bank, 2010. Recurso And React Peru: Popularizing Transparent Standards to Strengthen Accountability for Social Program Outcomes 32 Mulupi, D. 2011. Kenya: Citizen Watchdogs Go Online, AudienceScapes

3. Governments foster direct citizen and civil society participation to improve service delivery

. Governments should establish a clear set ensuring that feedback is taken seriously of principles, regulations and mechanisms and responded to. that cultivate an open environment to . Funding and awards should be created to allow citizens and other actors to provide incentives for innovation and participate in service provision. The role of problem solving by civil society governments is to manage or coordinate organisations and citizens. relevant activities, and also to enable third . Mechanisms for public feedback should be parties to develop relevant initiatives - e.g. built around the tools and facilities that through the setting of incentives, and by people actually use, e.g. mobile phones, markets, schools, prayer groups.

“Raising the Water Pressure” in Tanzania The Tanzanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation has developed a national rural water supply monitoring system which maps those rural waterpoints which are functioning, and makes this information accessible to the public through a database and website. Daraja, a civil society organisation has developed the “Raising the Water Pressure” programme to build on the monitoring system, working with citizens to encourage and enable them to apply pressure to local government to respond to local water needs. The programme aims to popularise the information from the monitoring system alongside related information on national budgets and policies. An SMS-based feedback mechanism allows citizens to use their mobile phones to share information about the state of water supply to them – and this information is related back to the relevant authorities, both directly and through broader media campaigns.33

Improve sanitation in East Delhi, India The Indian government adopted a right to information law in 2001. This has proved to be an effective tool in the hands of civil society and the general public to enforce their rights. Under the law, provision of false information can lead to salary deductions for the relevant public officials creating an added incentive for officials to respond to demands made under the act. A slum in East Delhi, Sundernagari, had been struggling to get sewers laid for 20 years. In 2002, after the law was passed, an activist made an application for information about a proposed sewer system, including when it would be completed. Despite promises of a survey and tender for work, within a year no progress had been made. An additional application by another citizen resulted in him being granted access to view the files. But he was told that no such files existed and officials admitted that no work had been undertaken. The community threatened to complain that the public official had provided false information to the first request –the official responded by ensuring that the survey was conducted. Armed with this information the community was able to lobby the chief minister and funding for the system was duly approved and contracts awarded for the work.34

33 Daraja, 2009. Harnessing citizens’ agency to promote accountability 34 Gonzalez de Asis, M. et al, 2009. Improving Transparency, Integrity, and Accountability, World Bank

4.2. Transparency initiatives cannot happen in a void

The success of the previous case studies should not be taken out of context. Successful transparency initiatives are reliant on a number of related and external factors and, like all things, never happen in a void. A detailed study of the impact of transparency and accountability initiatives in service delivery found that success was down to a number of influences:35

. Context most certainly matters. Political will; the legal and policy backdrop; the strength of civil society movements; the political strength of service providers (such as syndicates); the existence of an independent media and so on all have a sway on the effectiveness of transparency initiatives. . The willingness of the public sector to improve service delivery affects how far citizen-led initiatives are able to increase accountability. This ‘willingness’ can be driven from the top down by reformists within government or through incentives or sanctions. . Collective action is stronger than individual action and results in benefits for the public good rather than the individual. It is particularly effective in giving voice to the poor and marginalised in society. . Mechanisms that can trigger strong sanctions are an effective threat and are more likely to improve responsiveness of service providers. Citizen mobilisation like the RTI campaign in India is difficult to sustain without the threat of sanctions or other traditional mechanisms such as audits and investigations. "When repeated exposure of corruption is met with inaction, continued use of public exposure as an accountability strategy will die"36. . Information is an important factor in driving transparency and accountability but is not sufficient on its own. How the information is used is shaped by a number of contextual factors, but also an 'active and independent' media has been a vital part of several initiatives. . Corruption and poor governance are interlinked. Where governance systems are poor and provide ample opportunity for corruption to thrive, wider governance and sector reforms are a crucial condition for transparency to take root effectively. What is more, unless there is increased internal capacity to respond to initiatives they tend to lead only to inaction. The most effective attempts to increase capacity have involved dialogue between users and providers about where reforms are needed: "The evidence to date suggests that there is a balancing of tensions between demanding accountability and engaging with providers to understand the constraints they face. Information, dialogue, negotiation and compromise are key elements of such engagement."37

35 Joshi, A. 2010. Service Delivery - Review of impact and effectiveness of transparency and accountability initiatives, Transparency and Accountability Initiative, p. 13 36 ibid 37 ibid

4.3. The case of Uganda

The example of Uganda provides useful insight into how most of these influences play out and the challenges that emerged after initial success.

In Uganda, corruption in the education sector was reduced significantly through a combination of transparency initiatives and governance reforms in the education sector. In the early 1990s, there were substantial 'leakages' of funds from the system of capitation grants - grants of money allocated to schools based on the number of eligible pupils. Between 1990 and 1995, a public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) was done by the World Bank.38 Calculations from this revealed that only 12.6 per cent of centrally allocated capitation funds for schools were actually reaching schools. And many schools did not receive their capitation entitlements at all, with parents and teachers in many cases unaware of the existence of the capitation grant.39 A follow-up PETS for 2001, however, revealed a dramatic increase in the proportion of capitation grants reaching the intended schools of close to 80 per cent.40

This significant improvement was down to a number of transparency measures and governance reforms. Broader governance and education policy reforms were vital in establishing the necessary political will and setting-up favourable conditions for transparency measures.

The mid-1990s saw Uganda shift to a decentralised system of power to the districts. As such, central funding systems were also reformed. Block grants of lump sum amounts were replaced with conditional grants to create accountability, and each of these grants was paid into a separate bank account.41

President Museveni had also used universal primary education (UPE) as a cornerstone of his campaign for the 1996 presidential elections. After the elections, therefore, Uganda's primary educational system underwent reform: tuition at the primary level was made free for up to four children per family and compulsory parental contributions were abolished. These parental contributions had previously formed a substantial proportion of schools' budgets. To counter the loss this caused to schools, the school financing system was restructured. UPE capitation grants (as they became branded) were increased: the nominal value per pupil was doubled.42

UPE became rapidly popular throughout Uganda and between 1995 and 2001, the school population doubled. Uganda then had to turn to international donors for budget support. This support came with a number of conditionalities, particularly around increasing transparency.43

38 Ablo, E.l and R. Reinikka, 1998. Do Budgets Really Matter? Evidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda. World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 1926. 39 Reinikka, R. and J. Svensson, 2004. The Power of Information: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign to Reduce Capture of Public Funds, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, pp. 683- 687 40 Using both the mean and the median. Source: Reinikka and Svensson, 2004. 41 Hubbard, P., 2007. Putting the Power of Transparency in Context: Information's Role in Reducing Corruption in Uganda’s Education Sector, Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 136 42 ibid 43 ibid

With the political will already there, the government took these conditionalities seriously, creating a monitoring and audit systems to ensure accountability. District governments published information on grants, salaries and financial reports on local, public noticeboards. Schools were also required to publish information on teacher salaries, grants, enrolment numbers and school financial reports.44 Each time the Ministry of Finance released funds, information was published via local media. Schools also received posters that detailed what they were due to receive.45 In this way both schools and parents were informed about the amounts to expect and the system enabled them to put pressure on the districts to deliver services for these funds. This system of publicising grants was put into force by the Local Governments Act of 1997.

The Ministry of Education and Sports carried out audits and commissioned reports that tracked the flow of funds through the system pinpointing obstacles and delays. A USAID review of these transparency measures concluded that 90 per cent districts were displaying information correctly.46

The publicity campaign in the media, however, stretched beyond information on grant distributions. Newspapers and radio were also used to inform the public about education budgets, UPE policies and to alert parents that holding schools and local government to account was important and that they as parents needed to monitor school funding.47

The reduction in corruption seems therefore to be related to a range of factors. Broader education and governance reforms established the necessary political will, systems and planning structures and provided a favourable environment for transparency initiatives to be properly implemented. Through mass publicity and information campaigns, though, the public was informed about the importance of accountability and provided with the information about the grants and so on, which was needed in order for them to hold schools and local government to account.

Sustainability, however, has been an issue. There is evidence that the public's interest did diminish after the initial drive. Information postings by schools, local government and the media also became more sporadic.48 It was also found that information disclosure was only effective in bringing about accountability in literate communities, where power structures did not cripple the ability to be assertive in response to cases of wrong-doing. In this sense, "transparency by itself is insufficient if there is to be no opportunity for collective action"49.

44 Hubbard, 2007 45 Collier, P., 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.150 46 USAID/Uganda “CONDITIONALITIES 1997/98” in Hubbard, 2007. pp. 7-8 47 ibid 48 World Bank, 2004. Uganda - Primary Education and Teacher Development and Education Sector Adjustment Credit Project 49 Hubbard, 2007.

6. Conclusion: the future challenges

In the new democratic Egypt, citizens’ expect and hope that their social and economic conditions will improve. It is the new government’s responsibility to provide them with access to high quality services. Stamping out corruption in the service delivery sector should, therefore, be a priority for the government to ensure that resources aren’t leaked or diverted away from where they are needed most.

Transparency and accountability initiatives have an essential role to play in overcoming this corruption. By publishing information in an accessible and useable way and involving citizens directly in service provision, these initiatives have the potential to expose corruption, increase responsiveness and empower citizens to demand accountability. While there are a number experiences to draw from in the Global South, many of them positive, it is obvious that transparency initiatives and information have limited value on their own however. A broader set of challenges remain.

Identifying where corruption is most virulent within the various sectors is important and more research needs to go into understanding the actors and relationships involved in corruption in the service delivery sector. Because corruption and poor governance are so interlinked, transparency initiatives work best when they happen alongside wider legal (such right to information laws), governance and sectoral reforms. Pressure for these reforms needs to come from all angles. Political will, as in Uganda, is also fundamental to driving out corruption. Sympathetic reformists within Egypts new government need to be identified and lobbied to drive transparency initiatives from the top. And just as important is the need for pressure from below: collective action by citizens. If corruption in Egypt’s service delivery sector is to be eliminated, then creating the right conditions for transparency initiatives is just as important as the initiatives themselves.

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