REVOLUTION in the PENTAGON: Presented to Daniel Martin
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REVOLUTION IN THE PENTAGON: MCNAMARA AMD THE MILITARY BUDGET A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Political Science University of Houston In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor-of Arts:with Honors Daniel Martin May, 1970 545434 REVOLUTION IN THE PENTAGON: MCNAMARA AND THE MILITARY BUDGET An Abstract of a Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Political Science In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Arts with Honors by Daniel Martin May, 1970 ABSTRACT The thesis attempts to accomplish three goals. First, it tries to analyze the changes which McNamara hoped to make in the defense budget. Second, it analyzes the McNamara budgets to decide how successfully the changes were implemented. Third, it spells out khat the lessons of McNamara's experience are for future civilian control of the Department of Defense. In order to analyze McNamara's changes, the budget for Fiscal Year i960 is given as it was formulated so that there can be a base with which to compare McNamara. The conclusion of this chapter is that Secretary of Defense McElroy was unable to control the military influence and that there was little civilian control within that budget. ' Then the changes McNamara wanted to make are given as he proposed them. They consist of a three-part program of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting. In addition, there were some, specific policy changes which he hoped to make, including an expanded limited war capability and a stronger missile deterrent. Finally, McNamara's budget procedure is given to analyze how successfully the changes were implemented. The conclusion is that McNamara was able to implement the changes which required a direct result, but was not able to implement changes in pro cedure. The reason was that, as one man, he was unable to enforce changes which would have to be watched constantly and over all outputs. As a result, the only hope for civilian control 2 of the Pentagon is to abandon the hope for control of outputs and to devise some way to change the goals of the services so that they will want to produce the results which the civilian leaders want. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER: PAGE I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1 II. PRE-MCNA^ARA BUDGETS.......................................................... 10 III. MCNAilARA'S PLAN................................................................. 47 IV. MCNAIiARA'S BUDGET.............................................................. 69 V. POLITICS IN THE PENTAGON................................................. 106 BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................. 115 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTl ON The Department of Defense has remained, since its forma tion in 19^7. perhaps the most awkward alliance in the Federal Government. The Department merges civilian and military per sonnel, each with their own constituency and each with their own conviction that they can best handle the affairs of the nati-n's defense. For that defense the Department maintains an entrenched bureaucracy of military personnel well versed in the requirements of superior military might. The problem arises from the American Constitutional principal of civilian control of the military. In effect, the military men who earn their rank by their ability to prepare for war answer to civilian leaders who have traditionally considered war to be the least desirable of alternatives. It may well be stated that the guiding principal of the National Security Act of 19^7, apart from the desire for coordination, was to firmly establish a meaningful civilian control over the American military machine. In the first twenty years of the Department, eight differ ent men served as the Secretary of Defense.Each brought his own aspirations, his own plans, and his own interpretation of his role. However, in that long list of Secretaries, only two This thesis does not permit coverage of each. For such information, see: C. W. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon (New York, 1966). 2 were so bold as to attempt to step beyond the role of civilian 2 administrator and into the role of military decision-maker. The first was Secretary Forrestal, who served the initial term beg inning in 19 A 7. However, this thesis is concerned with the second of those men, Robert Strange McNamara. More specifically, it hopes to spell out the changes McNamara hoped to establish in the Penta gon, how successfully he imp 1 cm i ted them, and what his successes and failures implied about the fossibi1ities of civilian control over the Department of Defense. Robert McNamara seems an excellent choice for this type of study for two reasons. To begin, in his extraordinarily long tenure as Secretary from 1®61 to 1968, he gained a degree of control never before experienced in the Pentagon. Through the use of his own friends and advisors placed in the traditional Pentagon offices, he managed to change the face of the entire Pentagon establishment.* 1* Since he was the most successful Defense Secretary in terms of individual power, the study of his technique could prove fruitful in analyzing political power in the Pentagon. The second reason why McNamara's tenure can be useful for 2 Pxobert J. Art, The TFX Decision (Boston, 1968), p. 166. ^Vincent Davis, The Adm ira1s Lobby (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1967), p- 23^; and Douglas Kiker, "The Education of Robert McNamara,*' Atlantic, CCXIX (March, 1967) > p. 51. L Douglas Kiker, Atlantic, p. 51. 3 studying power in the Pentagon is that he most clearly stated in a systematic form exactly what changes he was hoping to bring about. McNamara had left the business world to enter the Department, and he brought with him a formula for procedure known as P I anning-Programming-Budgeting - Systerns (PPBS). This formula dealt with changes in the budgetary procedure, and for that reason, the paper will be primarily concerned with form ulation of the defense budget. However, this does not limit the scope of the paper significantly since decisions within the Pentagon deal with either budgetary considerations or dis persal of existing equipment. However, with minor exceptions, even dispersals eventually must be included in the budget since all equipment must be maintained and replaced. For this reason, consideration of the budget effectively covers the vast majority of Pentagon decisions. The full implications of PPBS will be presented in the chapter on the subject. However, some details can be given at this time to focus the scope of the study from the beginning. Within the planning phase of PPBS, McNamara hoped to establish a military plan to be revised each year which could be used as a guideline for drawing up the budget. The Programming phase consisted of an intention to change the categories into which the budget was divided so that the new categories would better reflect the military goals of the Department. In this way, he hoped it would be easier to determine how effectively each goal was being accomp1ished. The third phase of the change. Budgeting << was an attempt to implement scientific analysis into the budget making process to induce more efficiency. Specifically, he wanted to establish systems analysis and cost/effectiveness as normal procedures for deciding between alternative weapons systems to accomplish defense goals. The full meanings of these terms will be given in the chapter on McNamara's plan for change. In order to develop this investigation, several factors will have to be investigated. This is a study of the changes McNamara made in budgeting procedure. In order to decide what constituted a change, some chronology of the formulation of pre-McNamara budgets will have to be given. This will be done in the second chapter. To aid in this task, the Fiscal Year (FY) I960 budget request will be examined in some detail. There were two reasons for selecting this specific budget as a base. Firstly, in time span, this was the closest to McNamara's tenure to be completely formulated and Implemented previous to the Kennedy Administration. In effect, this serves to reduce out side variations to a minimum. Of course, it would be unrealistic to assume "all other factors equal" over a period of years, and for this reason extra care must be taken to eliminate the remain ing variations. Secondly, there is considerable evidence that the FY i960 budget request was fairly representative of budgets in the later 19505.* The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense claimed as much before the House Appropria tions Subcommittee when they stated: 5 Secretary [of Defense! McElroy.... The basic approach, however, to the considera tion of service proposals was not any dif ferent than in past years. Mr. McNeil can speak from much broader experience than I can as to whether there was any basic difference. Mr, [Deputy Secretary] McNeil . 'There was no basic difference in our procedures.5 In addition to the stable procedures, the results were stable in both the percentage of the Federal budget devoted to the Defense Department and the split of that budget among the military services/ However, to avoid being misleading, it should be noted that there was some variation within the traditional budget divisions. Title of Division: 1 58 Request *60 Request % Rise in millions in millions Military Personnel $11,572 $11,965 2.5U Oper. and Main ten. 10,237 10,5I»2 2.85 Procurement 11,051* 13,348 20.7 Research, Develop., "2,253 3,772 66.8 . Test, S Evaluation Military Construction 2,086 1,563 -40.05 *7 It should be noted at the first that the history of the budget will be rather selective in what it emphasizes. The purpose is that certain procedures and events were considered crucial in the McNamara plan for change, and these are given 5U. S. Cong ress. House, Subcommittee of Appropriations Committee, Pepartment of De fense Appropriations for I960, Part I 36th Cong., Ist se s s.