DOCSLIB.ORG

Canon Law of Marriage Indissolubility of Marriage in 406 Two Synods of North Africa, Called the 11Th Council of Carthage Stated

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Canon Law of Marriage Indissolubility of Marriage in 406 Two Synods of North Africa, Called the 11Th Council of Carthage Stated Canon law of marriage Indissolubility of Marriage In 406 two Synods of North Africa, called the 11th Council of Carthage stated, " we decree that according to the evangelic and apostolic discipline neither a husband dismissed by his wife, nor a wife dismissed by her husband may marry another; but that they are to remain as they are or to be reconciled to one another. if they despise this law they ought to be subjected to penance. and on this subject a imperial law out to be promulgated." the canon's teaching on indissolubility appears to be absolute i.e. it does not allow for any exception. this is important because they was and still is, a debate over Matther 19:9 which has Jesus saying, "Now i say this to you: anyone who divorces his wife- I am not speaking of an illicit marriage- marries another is guilty of adultery. the expression illicit marriage is a translation of the Greek word proneia( ). it is possible to translate the this word as adultery. thus the text from Matthew could mean that anyone who divorces his wife and marries another is guilty of adultery except in the case of him divorcing his wife because she has committed adultery. but this Greek word porneia can have at least three other meanings: a relationship that is not really a marriage because of some legal impediment; a betrothal; an incestous union which is not a true marriage. in all these cases the man would be able to divorce his wife and marry another without being guilty of adultery for the simple reason that his first marriage was not a real marriage. However we translate the word porneia, the canon from the 11th cough of Carthage does not refer to any exception to the rule that a divorced person may not remarry. In 790s, the Council of Friuli was convened in northweast Italy. The 10th canon of the council explicitly teaches that the bond of marriage is indissoluble. it also states that there is not exception to this rule, not even in the case of adultery. with regard to Matthew's gospel the canon states that a sudy of Saint Jerome shows that the gospel teaches that a man whose wife has committed adultery is free to dismiss her, but he must not remarry because his first marriage still exists. Hence there was no exception at all to the indissolubility of marriage. In summery, from within the church of the Roman Empire, there emerged slowly two principles about marriage and consent. the first is based upon Roman civil law, namely that consent makes marriage. thus marriage does not begin with consummation, or the reception of a priest's blessing. the second principle namely that once marital consent has been given it cannot be withdrawn generally disagreed with Roman civil law. this second principle reaffirms that the understanding that marriage is indissoluble. Eventually the church authorities made it clear that this indissolubility does not allow for exceptions such as cases involving adultery. Archbishop HIncmar of Rheims and his emphasis on consummation. When pope Nicholas 1 wrote his reply to the Bulgarian church he has a very important contemporary Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, who bel office from 845 until his death in 882. While Pope Nicholas was upholding the centrality of consent alone with regard to the validity of marriage, Hincmar was teaching that marital consent must be followed by sexual intercourse without which the marriage is incomplete. in his time there was a marriage case in which he was asked to give a theological judgement. the case involved Aquitanian nobleman named Stephen. He married the daughter of Regimund another aristocrat. After the wedding ceremony Stephen said that he could not consummate the marriage. He explained that prior to the wedding he had had an affair with a close relation of his intended wife. He thus argued that the marriage was invalid because of the the impediment of affinity. Furthermore, his conscience forbade him to consummate the marriage. the case had two impotent elements. first there was the alleged impediemtn of affinity which if proved, would have resulted in the marriage being declared null and void. the second was the fact of non- consummation. with regard to the first element, Stephen refused to name the relative of his wife with whom he had had the affair. as a result, the existence of the impediment of affinity could not be proved. therefore if Stephen wanted to be declared free from the obligation of the marriage, his only hope was the fact that the marriage had not been consummated. accordingly in 860 he referred the matter to the bishops assembled at the Synod of Touzy. They in turn asked incmar for his opinion. In response Hincmar wrote " concerning the marriage of Stephen and the daughter of Count Regimund". In it he give reason why he believes that although a marriage begins with the wedding ceremony, it is not complete until it has been consummated sexually. for Hincmar sexual intercourse between spouses makes their marriage share in the bond that exists between Christ and his church. he bases his argument on Augustine: "not all weddings make the conjugal bond, such as those which are not followed by the union of sexes. Marriages do not have in themselves the symbolism of Christ and the church as the blessed Augustine says if the spouses do not avail themselves of each other maritally- that is if the union of the sexes has not followed up the marriages." 12th century Trance: Marriage is centred on Love and created by Consent. Despite Archbishop Hincmar's emphasis on the role of sexual intercourse within marriage, most of the Church's tradition acknowledged that it is the consent of the couple that brings a marriage into existence. this understanding had been present in the Roman Empire before Christ and was adopted by the Church though out the Empire. Even in the Germanic regions consent came to be understood as the factor necessary to bring a marriage into existence although external proof was required. this appreciation of mutual consent reached a climax in 12th century France. three great thinkers Ivo of Chartres, Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Lombard wrote about the necessity and the sufficiency of marital consent. Ivo who was bishop of Chartres from 1091 sought in his writing divorce and remarriage. Ivo used authorities such as Pope Gregory 11 who permitted divorce and remarriage when one of the spouses is impotent to argue that impotence is a ground for dissolving a marriage. Ivo however did not consider impotence to be an impediment to marriage which would make any attempted marriage null and void from the beginning. instead he accepts that such a marriage can exist but that it can be dissolved in order to allow remarriage. Ivo expands the question of impotence to the lack of sexual intercourse generally. Ivo cites canon 27 of the Frankish Council of Verberies which was held around 756. this canon allows the wife to leave her husband if she swears by the cross that she never had sexual intercourse with him. the central issue here is no longer impotence but intercourse. although reference is made to the possibility of separating no mention is made of remarriage. remarriage would be an indication that the first marriage is actually dissolved. It however seems that Ivo regards impotence to be a ground for dissolution and thus remarriage. For Ivo consent alone brings a marriage into existence. For a genuine marriage to exist, the couple must be of equal standing. if one party is free and the other other party is a slave, a marriage cannot exist between them because they cannot share in the symbolism of the relationship between christ and his church. Ivo was accused by one bishop of Evreux of dissolving certain marriages between free men and slaves and vis-versa. In his response he refutes the claim stating that he was not dissolving such marriages because they had never existed in the first place. when a slave did not divulge his or her state and entered the union with the free party, the free party lost his status and became a person of a lower rank. For Ivo true love could not wish the other to lose their status of being free hence the marriage could not stand. however if the free party knows of the servile rank of the other at the time of marriage the marriage after consent holds good. "but if a free man has taken a slave girl in marriage, he does not have the freedom to dismiss her if, first knowing her condition and consenting, they have contructed marriage because consent makes marriage not intercourse." the whole of Ivo's argument is based upon the principle of love and so puts love at the centre of marriage. Hugh of Saint Victor: Consent and consummation are important but only consent is necessary. In his work "on the virginity of the blessed virgin Mary", in which he upholds both the virginity of Mary as well as the fullness of her marriage he asks a rhetorical question: " for what is marriage unless it is the lawful fellowship between a man and a woman in which it is clear that each owes himself to the other by mutual consent? hugh primarily describes marriage as fellowship just as Augustine argues that marriage is for companionship and that it is within the companionship of marriage that love and friendship are exchanged. Hugh's definition of states that this fellowship is brought about by the mutual consent of the couple.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Irregularities and Simple Impediments in the New Code of Canon
    IRREGULARITIES A ND SIM PLE IM PEDIM ENTS IN TH E NEW CODE O F C A NON LA W B"THE H RE . H . N . I KE" L . V JO J C , JC DISSERTA TION SU M IT TED TO TH E FA C ULT"OF SA C RED SC B IENC ES , C A H O IC ERS I OF A MER T L UNIV TY IC A, ‘ I WA S H NGTON, D . C ., m PA RTIA L FU LF I LM ENT OF TH E REQUIREMENTS FOR TH E DEGREE OF DOC TOR OF C A NON LAW MA RC H B T T NIH IL O S A . T . .D HOMA S J. S HA HA N, S T . C ENS OR DEPUTA TUS . CONTENTS Introduction 7 I—Definition Division Chapter and of Irregularity . 9 — Cha pter II The Subject of Irregularity Chapter III—Irregularities Arising from Defect Chapter IV—Irregularities Arising from C rime — Chapter V Simple Impedirnents Chapter VI—The Cessation of Irregularities and Simple Impediments INTRODUCTION . The Church has always exercised the greatest solici tude for the members of her clergy . This fact is clearly evident in her repeated promulgation of decrees of differ ent councils and synodal enactments relative to this phase of her organization . Her eff orts in this respect have ‘ been nobly and generously seconded e verywhere and at all times by the hierarchy as may be substantiated by t e liable documentary proof . The subject of irregularity is of its very nature an im por tant one. Irregularities have been instituted by the Church to preserve the dignity and honor of her min istr y.
    [Show full text]
  • Common Misconceptions About Divorce and Annulments in the Catholic Church
    Common Misconceptions about Divorce and Annulments in the Catholic Church Once people divorce, they are no longer part of the Church. Divorced people are excommunicated and no longer able to receive the Eucharist or other sacraments. (FALSE, NOT FULLY ACCURATE) Divorce in itself does not prevent Catholics from receiving the sacraments, though if the individual in question is responsible for the breakup of the marriage through some sinful action (infidelity, spousal abuse), there may be questions about his or her ability to receive. These questions are best handled in the confessional. Catholics who divorced and remarried outside the Church are not under the penalty of excommunication, but they are in an objective state of sin and must refrain from reception of the sacraments until their irregular marital status is corrected. An objective state of sin does not mean that this is a bad person, it's simply a state that is not consistent with what Jesus and the Church teaches and believes. Catholics in this situation must still participate in Mass, but may not receive Eucharist until their marriage situation is regularized according to the teachings of Jesus Christ and his Church. (See St. Mark 10:2-12; St. Matthew 5:31- 32 and 19:3-9.) An annulment wipes away all vestiges of the past relationship, and children from that relationship become illegitimate. (TOTALLY FALSE) If a declaration of nullity is made regarding a past marriage, the Church is saying that a permanent bond of marriage did not arise at the time of the wedding. This means that both people of the prior union are free to celebrate a marriage in the Church.
    [Show full text]
  • On Validity and Invalidity of Sacraments Robert E
    ON VALIDITY AND INVALIDITY OF SACRAMENTS ROBERT E. RODES, JR. Notre Dame Law School HIS ARTICLE had its genesis, more or less, in an after-dinner conver­ Tsation with a theologian who remarked, as we were talking about sacraments and priesthood, that the notion of "validity" belonged in my discipline of law rather than his discipline of theology. His doctrine is very much concerned with sacraments as celebrations, and so he is less apt to ask whether they are valid than how well they come off. On his understanding, talk about validity or invalidity of a sacrament is no more useful than talk about validity or invalidity of a birthday party. His impatience with traditional notions of validity is shared by many ecumenical-minded people who see invalidity as a pejorative term and are unwilling to apply it to the ministrations of those Protestant bodies that lack priests ordained in the traditional fashion but seem to be living in Christ's presence at least as fully as a typical group of Catholics or Orthodox. These problems with the notion of validity of sacraments are, in fact, very similar to some of the problems we have with the notion of validity of legal transactions. If it seems unacceptable to consign a child to hell (or even limbo) because the priest used the wrong formula in baptizing him, it seems analogously unacceptable to put a family out of their home because their title deed is not sealed in the proper way. My friend's dismissal of validity as a mere legal concept is, of course, not to be taken seriously.
    [Show full text]
  • Support and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse Florence J
    Hastings Law Journal Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 6 1-1973 Support and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse Florence J. Luther Charles W. Luther Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Florence J. Luther and Charles W. Luther, Support and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse, 24 Hastings L.J. 311 (1973). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol24/iss2/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. Support And Property Rights Of The Putative Spouse By FLORENCE J. LUTHER* and CHARLES W. LUTHER** Orequire a "non-husband" to divide his assets with and to pay support to a "non-wife" may, at first glance, appear doctrinaire. How- ever, to those familiar with the putative spouse doctrine as it had de- veloped in California the concept should not be too disquieting. In 1969 the California legislature enacted Civil Code sections 4452 and 4455 which respectively authorize a division of property1 and perma- nent supportF to be paid to a putative spouse upon a judgment of an- nulment.' Prior to the enactment of these sections, a putative spouse in California was given an equitable right to a division of jointly ac- quired property,4 but could not recover permanent support upon the termination of the putative relationship.5 This article considers the ef- fect of these newly enacted sections on the traditional rights of a puta- tive spouse to share in a division of property and to recover in quasi- contract for the reasonable value of services rendered during the puta- * Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
    [Show full text]
  • Putative Marriages: What Are "Civil Effects"? Ryland Percy
    Louisiana Law Review Volume 36 | Number 2 The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term: A Symposium Winter 1976 Putative Marriages: What Are "Civil Effects"? Ryland Percy Repository Citation Ryland Percy, Putative Marriages: What Are "Civil Effects"?, 36 La. L. Rev. (1976) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol36/iss2/31 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 Severe consequences to good faith possessors, should the state demand a return of the products removed from water- bottoms, could provide incentive for reversal of the instant decision. If the court is willing to extend its fruits analogy to others holding similar patents, that extension of equitable relief would go far toward relieving the harsh results of a decision that has finally corrected an aberration in Louisiana property law. Hopefully the decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board will not fall beneath the pressures brought by dissenting groups. Mere changes in the composition of the court should not be relied upon at a later time to overturn a decision bringing harmony to the law of navigable waterbot- tom ownership. 53 Francis J. Crosby PUTATIVE MARRIAGES: WHAT ARE "CIVIL EFFECTS"? Two recent decisions by the Louisiana Supreme Court highlight the difficulty traditionally attending determination of the "civil effects" that flow to good faith spouses in a putative marriage.' The difficulty arises in the courts' at- tempts to articulate a difference between rights and duties that arise solely as a result of a marriage contract and are therefore "civil effects" and rights and duties that are per- sonal and would exist regardless of the existence of a mar- riage.
    [Show full text]
  • The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: an "End Run Around Marriage" Or Just a Marriage?
    Child and Family Law Journal Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 3 3-27-2020 The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: An "End Run Around Marriage" or Just a Marriage? Dana E. Prescott, Esq., Ph.D Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj Part of the Elder Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons Recommended Citation Prescott, Esq., Ph.D, Dana E. (2020) "The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: An "End Run Around Marriage" or Just a Marriage?," Child and Family Law Journal: Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. Available at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj/vol8/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Child and Family Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Barry Law. The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: An “End Run Around Marriage” or Just a Marriage? Dana E. Prescott, Esq., Ph.D* I. INTRODUCTION For generations in the United States, each state determined the definition of a legally recognized marriage.1 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court long ago held that marriage “has always been subject to the control of the [state] legislature.”2 For the most part, these early notions of “federalism”3 permitted states to constrain the definition of a lawful marriage. States did so without much public controversy; at least when consistent with socially and legally *Dana E. Prescott is licensed to practice in Maine and Massachusetts and a partner with Prescott, Jamieson, & Murphy Law Group LLC, Saco, Maine.
    [Show full text]
  • Common Law, Informal and Putative Marriage
    COMMON LAW, INFORMAL, AND PUTATIVE MARRIAGE STEPHEN J. NAYLOR The Law Office of Stephen J. Naylor P.L.L.C. 5201 West Freeway, Suite 102 Fort Worth, Texas 76107 (817) 735-1305 Telephone (817) 735-9071 Facsimile [email protected] CHRIS H. NEGEM Law Offices of Chris H. Negem Energy Plaza, Suite 105 8620 North New Braunfels San Antonio, Texas 78217 (210) 226-1200 Telephone (210) 798-2654 Facsimile [email protected] State Bar of Texas 36TH ANNUAL MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION INSTITUTE April 18-19, 2013 Galveston CHAPTER 5 STEPHEN J. NAYLOR Law Office Of Stephen J. Naylor, P.L.L.C. 5201 West Freeway, Suite 102 Fort Worth, TX 76107 Telephone: (817) 735-1305 Facsimile: (817) 735-9071 E-mail: [email protected] EDUCATION: Texas Tech University School of Law J.D. May 1994 Student Senator Officer - Christian Legal Society Officer - Criminal Trial Lawyers Association Recipient, American Jurisprudence Award in Trial Advocacy Recipient, American Jurisprudence Award in Products Liability Texas Tech University B.B.A. in Management, (summa cum laude) 1990 Beta Gamma Sigma Honor Society President's Honor List Dean's Honor List AREAS OF PRACTICE: Board Certified-Family Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES: State Bar Of Texas State Bar Of Texas Family Law Section Tarrant County Bar Association Tarrant County Family Law Bar Association Eldon B. Mahon Inn of Court - Barrister (1999-2002, 2008-2009) Pro Bono Committee, State Bar of Texas Family Law Section 2005 to present Co-Chairman, Pro Bono Committee, State Bar of Texas Family
    [Show full text]
  • Faith Conquers Fear
    Faith-filled tradition Parishioner-built stone grotto is a staple of Assumption feast day in Franklin County, page 3. Serving the Church in Central and Southern Indiana Since 1960 CriterionOnline.com September 6, 2013 Vol. LIII, No. 47 75¢ Archdiocese to Faith Submitted photo pray and fast for conquers peace on Sept. 7 Dear Brothers and Sisters in Christ, Last Sunday, Pope Francis called the fear Catholic Church throughout the world to mark Saturday, Sept. 7, as a day of Young woman prayer and fasting for peace in Syria, strives to touch the Middle East and throughout the the hearts world. He also invited members of other religions, and all of youths in people of good will, to participate in this trouble around Archbishop initiative in whatever Joseph W. Tobin way they can. the world Through his heartfelt words during the Angelus in By John Shaughnessy St. Peter’s Square, the Holy Father united himself clearly with the anguish of suffering Jenna Knapp never considered herself people across the globe but, especially, with in danger as she walked into prisons the victims of the bloody civil war in Syria. in El Salvador where she routinely He did not mince words in condemning met with male and female youths who the obscenity of that slaughter, particularly, were serving sentences for crimes that While Jenna Knapp, center of back row, visited gang members in jail and wrote down their stories the apparent use of chemical weapons included extortion and murder. during her three years in El Salvador, she also volunteered to help younger children avoid that that resulted in the massacre of hundreds, Instead, the 25-year-old Indianapolis future, teaching them life skills and vocational skills.
    [Show full text]
  • Minors in Canon Law Thomas O
    Marquette Law Review Volume 49 Article 2 Issue 1 Summer 1965 Minors in Canon Law Thomas O. Martin Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Thomas O. Martin, Minors in Canon Law, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 87 (1965). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol49/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MINORS IN CANON LAW MONSIGNOR THaOMAS 0. MARTIN, J.C.D.* Like other legal systems the Canon Law provides protection for certain classes of persons who have been found by experience to need it. One such class is composed of those who by reason of their youthful age have not as yet sufficient experience to guard against all of the pitfalls which they may encounter in business transactions. This same lack of experience may also warrant milder treatment of their delin- quences. The degree of protection afforded varies in inverse ratio to their age and development. As they become more capable of making their own decisions the law withdraws its special protection more and more and treats them like any other subject. Canon Law sets the age of majority, i.e. of presumed full capability and responsibility at the completion of twenty-one years,' as does the law of most states. One who has attained majority has, then, full use of his rights.
    [Show full text]
  • Prajak Boonphao Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Canon Law, Saint
    CANONICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PASTORAL CARE OF PERSONS IN MARRIAGES BETWEEN ROMAN CATHOLICS AND BUDDHISTS IN THAILAND Prajak Boonphao Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Canon Law, Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Canon Law Faculty of Canon Law Saint Paul University, Ottawa © Prajak Boonphao, Ottawa, Canada, 2020 ii ABSTRACT Marriage is an institution based on natural law. Every person has the natural right to marriage which is, however, affected by cultural and social conditions. The pastors of the Church, therefore, have to make every effort to understand the particularity of situations within which marriage and family are lived today and respond accordingly through their pastoral action. Thailand is considered a Buddhist country due to the fact that the vast majority of its population is Buddhist. Most marriages celebrated in the Catholic Church are non- sacramental because a Buddhist is the spouse of the Catholic party. Canon 1086 of the 1983 Code states that due to the impediment of disparity of worship, a marriage between a person who was baptized in the Catholic Church or received into it and a non-baptized person is invalid. A dispensation from this impediment must be granted by the competent authority in order for the union to be valid. The conditions stated in cc. 1125–1126 must be taken into account for a dispensation to be granted. The thesis identifies the actual pastoral problems faced by persons in marriages with the disparity of worship and canonical questions faced by Church authorities; it also proposes canonical-pastoral responses to such cases.
    [Show full text]
  • Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California
    RIGHTS OF THE PUTATIVE AND MERETRICIOUS SPOUSE IN CALIFORNIA This comment will present a comparative discussion of the rights of putative and meretricious spouses' in California, together with an analysis of the princi- ples upon which these rights depend. Catagorizing plaintiff as either putative or meretricious and then discussing the relative rights of each affords a convenient method of approach. Therefore, the basic characteristics that define plaintiff as putative and the rights accorded upon such qualification will be discussed first. Then, a similar treatment of the meretricious spouse will follow. I THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE A. Qualification A putative marriage is one in which at least one of the parties has a good faith belief that the relationship existing between them is a valid marriage. 2 Only a party having such a belief is a putative spouse.3 No marriage ceremony is nec- essary. Even a good faith belief that a common law marriage was valid is suf- 4 ficient to make the believer a putative spouse. A person incapable of contracting a valid marriage is not thereby barred from becoming a putative spouse.5 For example, assume that A's divorce from B is, without A's knowledge, invalid. If A and C, in good faith, enter into a pur- ported marriage, both A and C are putative spouses. That A was incapable of contracting a valid marriage with C is merely a factor considered in determin- ing A's requisite good faith belief.6 The court looks to the facts in the particular case. The education, intelligence, and experience of the one claiming putative 7 status are considered.
    [Show full text]
  • Library of Congress Classification
    KB RELIGIOUS LAW IN GENERAL. COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS LAW. KB JURISPRUDENCE Religious law in general. Comparative religious law. Jurisprudence Class here comparative studies on different religious legal systems, as well as intra-denominational comparisons (e.g. different Christian religious legal systems) Further, class here comparative studies on religious legal systems with other legal systems, including ancient law For comparison of a religious legal system with the law of two or more jurisdictions, see the religious system (e.g. Islamic law compared to Egyptian and Malaysian law, see KBP) Comparisons include both systematic-theoretical elaborations as well as parallel presentations of different systems For influences of a religious legal system on the law of a particuar jurisdiction, see the jurisdiction For works on law and religion see BL65.L33 Bibliography For personal bibliography or bibliography relating to a particular religious system or subject, see the appropriate KB subclass 2 Bibliography of bibliography. Bibliographical concordances 4 Indexes for periodical literature, society publications, collections, etc. Periodicals For KB8-KB68, the book number, derived from the main entry, is determined by the letters following the letter for which the class number stands, e.g. KB11.I54, Dine Yisrael 7 General Jewish 8 A - Archiu 8.3 Archiv - Archivz e.g. 8.3.R37 Archives d'histoire du droit oriental 9 Archiw - Az 9.3 B e.g. 9.3.U43 Bulletin/International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists 10 C 11 D e.g. 11.I54 Dine Yisrael: shanaton le-mishpat ʻIvri ule-mishpahah be-Yiʼsrael 12 E - Etuder 12.3 Etudes - Ez 13 F 14 G 15 H 16 I e.g.
    [Show full text]