Common Law, Informal and Putative Marriage
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Irregularities and Simple Impediments in the New Code of Canon
IRREGULARITIES A ND SIM PLE IM PEDIM ENTS IN TH E NEW CODE O F C A NON LA W B"THE H RE . H . N . I KE" L . V JO J C , JC DISSERTA TION SU M IT TED TO TH E FA C ULT"OF SA C RED SC B IENC ES , C A H O IC ERS I OF A MER T L UNIV TY IC A, ‘ I WA S H NGTON, D . C ., m PA RTIA L FU LF I LM ENT OF TH E REQUIREMENTS FOR TH E DEGREE OF DOC TOR OF C A NON LAW MA RC H B T T NIH IL O S A . T . .D HOMA S J. S HA HA N, S T . C ENS OR DEPUTA TUS . CONTENTS Introduction 7 I—Definition Division Chapter and of Irregularity . 9 — Cha pter II The Subject of Irregularity Chapter III—Irregularities Arising from Defect Chapter IV—Irregularities Arising from C rime — Chapter V Simple Impedirnents Chapter VI—The Cessation of Irregularities and Simple Impediments INTRODUCTION . The Church has always exercised the greatest solici tude for the members of her clergy . This fact is clearly evident in her repeated promulgation of decrees of differ ent councils and synodal enactments relative to this phase of her organization . Her eff orts in this respect have ‘ been nobly and generously seconded e verywhere and at all times by the hierarchy as may be substantiated by t e liable documentary proof . The subject of irregularity is of its very nature an im por tant one. Irregularities have been instituted by the Church to preserve the dignity and honor of her min istr y. -
Canon Law of Marriage Indissolubility of Marriage in 406 Two Synods of North Africa, Called the 11Th Council of Carthage Stated
Canon law of marriage Indissolubility of Marriage In 406 two Synods of North Africa, called the 11th Council of Carthage stated, " we decree that according to the evangelic and apostolic discipline neither a husband dismissed by his wife, nor a wife dismissed by her husband may marry another; but that they are to remain as they are or to be reconciled to one another. if they despise this law they ought to be subjected to penance. and on this subject a imperial law out to be promulgated." the canon's teaching on indissolubility appears to be absolute i.e. it does not allow for any exception. this is important because they was and still is, a debate over Matther 19:9 which has Jesus saying, "Now i say this to you: anyone who divorces his wife- I am not speaking of an illicit marriage- marries another is guilty of adultery. the expression illicit marriage is a translation of the Greek word proneia( ). it is possible to translate the this word as adultery. thus the text from Matthew could mean that anyone who divorces his wife and marries another is guilty of adultery except in the case of him divorcing his wife because she has committed adultery. but this Greek word porneia can have at least three other meanings: a relationship that is not really a marriage because of some legal impediment; a betrothal; an incestous union which is not a true marriage. in all these cases the man would be able to divorce his wife and marry another without being guilty of adultery for the simple reason that his first marriage was not a real marriage. -
Common Misconceptions About Divorce and Annulments in the Catholic Church
Common Misconceptions about Divorce and Annulments in the Catholic Church Once people divorce, they are no longer part of the Church. Divorced people are excommunicated and no longer able to receive the Eucharist or other sacraments. (FALSE, NOT FULLY ACCURATE) Divorce in itself does not prevent Catholics from receiving the sacraments, though if the individual in question is responsible for the breakup of the marriage through some sinful action (infidelity, spousal abuse), there may be questions about his or her ability to receive. These questions are best handled in the confessional. Catholics who divorced and remarried outside the Church are not under the penalty of excommunication, but they are in an objective state of sin and must refrain from reception of the sacraments until their irregular marital status is corrected. An objective state of sin does not mean that this is a bad person, it's simply a state that is not consistent with what Jesus and the Church teaches and believes. Catholics in this situation must still participate in Mass, but may not receive Eucharist until their marriage situation is regularized according to the teachings of Jesus Christ and his Church. (See St. Mark 10:2-12; St. Matthew 5:31- 32 and 19:3-9.) An annulment wipes away all vestiges of the past relationship, and children from that relationship become illegitimate. (TOTALLY FALSE) If a declaration of nullity is made regarding a past marriage, the Church is saying that a permanent bond of marriage did not arise at the time of the wedding. This means that both people of the prior union are free to celebrate a marriage in the Church. -
Mauritius's Constitution of 1968 with Amendments Through 2016
PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:39 constituteproject.org Mauritius's Constitution of 1968 with Amendments through 2016 This complete constitution has been generated from excerpts of texts from the repository of the Comparative Constitutions Project, and distributed on constituteproject.org. constituteproject.org PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:39 Table of contents CHAPTER I: THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION . 7 1. The State . 7 2. Constitution is supreme law . 7 CHAPTER II: PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL . 7 3. Fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual . 7 4. Protection of right to life . 7 5. Protection of right to personal liberty . 8 6. Protection from slavery and forced labour . 10 7. Protection from inhuman treatment . 11 8. Protection from deprivation of property . 11 9. Protection for privacy of home and other property . 14 10. Provisions to secure protection of law . 15 11. Protection of freedom of conscience . 17 12. Protection of freedom of expression . 17 13. Protection of freedom of assembly and association . 18 14. Protection of freedom to establish schools . 18 15. Protection of freedom of movement . 19 16. Protection from discrimination . 20 17. Enforcement of protective provisions . 21 17A. Payment or retiring allowances to Members . 22 18. Derogations from fundamental rights and freedoms under emergency powers . 22 19. Interpretation and savings . 23 CHAPTER III: CITIZENSHIP . 25 20. Persons who became citizens on 12 March 1968 . 25 21. Persons entitled to be registered as citizens . 25 22. Persons born in Mauritius after 11 March 1968 . 26 23. Persons born outside Mauritius after 11 March 1968 . -
On Validity and Invalidity of Sacraments Robert E
ON VALIDITY AND INVALIDITY OF SACRAMENTS ROBERT E. RODES, JR. Notre Dame Law School HIS ARTICLE had its genesis, more or less, in an after-dinner conver Tsation with a theologian who remarked, as we were talking about sacraments and priesthood, that the notion of "validity" belonged in my discipline of law rather than his discipline of theology. His doctrine is very much concerned with sacraments as celebrations, and so he is less apt to ask whether they are valid than how well they come off. On his understanding, talk about validity or invalidity of a sacrament is no more useful than talk about validity or invalidity of a birthday party. His impatience with traditional notions of validity is shared by many ecumenical-minded people who see invalidity as a pejorative term and are unwilling to apply it to the ministrations of those Protestant bodies that lack priests ordained in the traditional fashion but seem to be living in Christ's presence at least as fully as a typical group of Catholics or Orthodox. These problems with the notion of validity of sacraments are, in fact, very similar to some of the problems we have with the notion of validity of legal transactions. If it seems unacceptable to consign a child to hell (or even limbo) because the priest used the wrong formula in baptizing him, it seems analogously unacceptable to put a family out of their home because their title deed is not sealed in the proper way. My friend's dismissal of validity as a mere legal concept is, of course, not to be taken seriously. -
Pupillage: What to Expect
PUPILLAGE: WHAT TO EXPECT WHAT IS IT? Pupillage is the Work-based Learning Component of becoming a barrister. It is a 12- 18 month practical training period which follows completion of the Bar Course. It is akin to an apprenticeship, in which you put into practise everything you have learned in your vocational studies whilst under the supervision of an experienced barrister. Almost all pupillages are found in sets of barristers’ chambers. However, there are a handful of pupillages at the ‘employed bar’, which involves being employed and working as a barrister in-house for a company, firm, charity or public agency, such as the Crown Prosecution Service. STRUCTURE Regardless of where you undertake your pupillage, the training is typically broken down into two (sometimes three) distinct parts or ‘sixes’. First Six First six is the informal name given to the first six months of pupillage. It is often referred to as the non-practising stage as you are not yet practising as a barrister in your own right. The majority of your time in first six will be spent attending court and conferences with your pupil supervisor, who will be an experienced barrister from your chambers. In a busy criminal set, you will be in court almost every day (unlike your peers in commercial chambers). In addition to attending court, you will assist your supervisor with preparation for court which may include conducting legal research and drafting documents such as advices, applications or skeleton arguments (a written document provided to the court in advance of a hearing). During first six you will be required to attend a compulsory advocacy training course with your Inn of Court. -
Support and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse Florence J
Hastings Law Journal Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 6 1-1973 Support and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse Florence J. Luther Charles W. Luther Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Florence J. Luther and Charles W. Luther, Support and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse, 24 Hastings L.J. 311 (1973). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol24/iss2/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. Support And Property Rights Of The Putative Spouse By FLORENCE J. LUTHER* and CHARLES W. LUTHER** Orequire a "non-husband" to divide his assets with and to pay support to a "non-wife" may, at first glance, appear doctrinaire. How- ever, to those familiar with the putative spouse doctrine as it had de- veloped in California the concept should not be too disquieting. In 1969 the California legislature enacted Civil Code sections 4452 and 4455 which respectively authorize a division of property1 and perma- nent supportF to be paid to a putative spouse upon a judgment of an- nulment.' Prior to the enactment of these sections, a putative spouse in California was given an equitable right to a division of jointly ac- quired property,4 but could not recover permanent support upon the termination of the putative relationship.5 This article considers the ef- fect of these newly enacted sections on the traditional rights of a puta- tive spouse to share in a division of property and to recover in quasi- contract for the reasonable value of services rendered during the puta- * Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. -
Putative Marriages: What Are "Civil Effects"? Ryland Percy
Louisiana Law Review Volume 36 | Number 2 The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term: A Symposium Winter 1976 Putative Marriages: What Are "Civil Effects"? Ryland Percy Repository Citation Ryland Percy, Putative Marriages: What Are "Civil Effects"?, 36 La. L. Rev. (1976) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol36/iss2/31 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 Severe consequences to good faith possessors, should the state demand a return of the products removed from water- bottoms, could provide incentive for reversal of the instant decision. If the court is willing to extend its fruits analogy to others holding similar patents, that extension of equitable relief would go far toward relieving the harsh results of a decision that has finally corrected an aberration in Louisiana property law. Hopefully the decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board will not fall beneath the pressures brought by dissenting groups. Mere changes in the composition of the court should not be relied upon at a later time to overturn a decision bringing harmony to the law of navigable waterbot- tom ownership. 53 Francis J. Crosby PUTATIVE MARRIAGES: WHAT ARE "CIVIL EFFECTS"? Two recent decisions by the Louisiana Supreme Court highlight the difficulty traditionally attending determination of the "civil effects" that flow to good faith spouses in a putative marriage.' The difficulty arises in the courts' at- tempts to articulate a difference between rights and duties that arise solely as a result of a marriage contract and are therefore "civil effects" and rights and duties that are per- sonal and would exist regardless of the existence of a mar- riage. -
The Inns of Court and the Impact on the Legal Profession in England
SMU Law Review Volume 4 Issue 4 Article 2 1950 The Inns of Court and the Impact on the Legal Profession in England David Maxwell-Fyfe Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr Recommended Citation David Maxwell-Fyfe, The Inns of Court and the Impact on the Legal Profession in England, 4 SW L.J. 391 (1950) https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol4/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. 19501 THE INNS OF COURT THE INNS OF COURT AND THE IMPACT ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND The Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, K.C., M.P., London, England A TTHE present day there are many eminent lawyers who have received a part, perhaps the greater part, of their legal grounding at Oxford or Cambridge or other universities, but there was a time when no legal teaching of any consequence, except in Canon and Roman law, was obtainable anywhere outside the Inns of Court. Sir Wm. Blackstone called them "Our Judicial Univer- sity." In them were taught and trained the barristers and the judges who molded and developed the common law and the principles of equity. The Inns were not in earlier times, as they are now, inhabited merely during the daytime by lawyers and students who dispersed in all directions to their homes every night. -
Women and Legal Rights
Chapter I1 "And Justice I Shall Have": Women and Legal Rights New Brunswickfollowed theEnglishlegal so displacing the legal heritage of the other non-British groups in the province: the aboriginal peoples, the reestablished Acadians and other immigrants of European origin, such as the Germans. Like all law, English common law reflected attitudes towards women which were narrow and riddled with misconceptions and prejudices. As those attitudes slowly changed, so did the law.' Common law evolves in two ways: through case law and through statute law. Case law evolves as judges interpret the law; their written decisions form precedents by which to decide future disputes. Statute law, or acts of legislation, change as lawmakers rewrite legislation, often as a result of a change in public opinion. Judges in turn interpret these new statutes, furthering the evolution of the law. Women's legal rights are therefore much dependent on the attitudes of judges, legislators and society. Since early New Brunswick, legal opinion has reflected women's restricted place in society in general and women's highly restricted place in society when mamed. Single women In New Brunswick, as in the rest of Canada, single women have always enjoyed many of the samelegal rights as men. They could always own and manage property in their own name, enter into contracts and own and operate their own businesses. Their civic rights were limited, although less so at times than for married women. However, in spite of their many legal freedoms not sharedby their married sisters, single women were still subject to society's limited views regarding women's capabilities, potential and place. -
UK Immigration, Legal Aid Funding Reform and Caseworkers
Deborah James and Evan Kilick Ethical dilemmas? UK immigration, Legal Aid funding reform and caseworkers Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: James, Deborah and Killick, Evan (2010) Ethical dilemmas? UK immigration, Legal Aid funding reform and caseworkers. Anthropology today, 26 (1). pp. 13-16. DOI: 10.3366/E0001972009000709 © 2009 Deborah James This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21396/ Available in LSE Research Online: February 2011 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the published version may remain. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. Ethical dilemmas? UK immigration, legal aid funding reform and case workers Evan Killick and Deborah James Anthropology Today 26(1):13-15. Anthropologists have an abiding concern with migrants’ transnational movement. Such concern confronts us with some sharp ethical dilemmas.1 Anthropologists have been intensely critical of the forms of law applied to both asylum seekers and potential immigrants, drawing attention to its ‘patchy’ and ‘paradoxical’ character (Andersson 2008). -
The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: an "End Run Around Marriage" Or Just a Marriage?
Child and Family Law Journal Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 3 3-27-2020 The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: An "End Run Around Marriage" or Just a Marriage? Dana E. Prescott, Esq., Ph.D Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj Part of the Elder Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons Recommended Citation Prescott, Esq., Ph.D, Dana E. (2020) "The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: An "End Run Around Marriage" or Just a Marriage?," Child and Family Law Journal: Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. Available at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj/vol8/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Child and Family Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Barry Law. The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: An “End Run Around Marriage” or Just a Marriage? Dana E. Prescott, Esq., Ph.D* I. INTRODUCTION For generations in the United States, each state determined the definition of a legally recognized marriage.1 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court long ago held that marriage “has always been subject to the control of the [state] legislature.”2 For the most part, these early notions of “federalism”3 permitted states to constrain the definition of a lawful marriage. States did so without much public controversy; at least when consistent with socially and legally *Dana E. Prescott is licensed to practice in Maine and Massachusetts and a partner with Prescott, Jamieson, & Murphy Law Group LLC, Saco, Maine.