DOCSLIB.ORG

Niger in 2016

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Niger in 2016 Niger in 2016 President Mahamadou Issoufou and his ruling ‘Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme’ (PNDS) consolidated their grip on power, though not without pushing to absurd levels the unortho- dox measures by which they hoped to strengthen their position. Opposition leader Hama Amadou of the ‘Mouvement Démocratique Nigérien’ (Moden-Lumana), who had been arrested in 2015 for al- leged involvement in a baby-trafficking scandal, remained in deten- tion. He was allowed to contest the 2016 presidential elections from his cell. Issoufou emerged victorious, though not without an unex- pected run-off. The parliamentary polls allowed the PNDS to boost its position in the National Assembly. Although the elections took place in an atmosphere of calm, they were marred by authoritarian interventions, including the arrest of several members of the oppo- sition. The ‘Mouvement National pour la Société de Développement’ (MNSD) of Seini Oumarou had to cede its leadership of the opposi- tion to Amadou’s Moden, which ended ahead of the MNSD in the Assembly. In August, the MNSD joined the presidential majority, which did not bode well for the possibility of political alternation in the future. National security was tested by frequent attacks by Boko Haram fighters in the south-east and raids by insurgents based in Mali. While the humanitarian situation in the south-east worsened, the army managed to strike back and engage in counter-insurgency operations together with forces from Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon. Overall, the country held its own, despite being sandwiched be- tween security challenges that caused some serious losses. Rains were deficient, leading to a cereal deficit that would mean earlier shortfalls in 2017. Economic performance was affected by depressed oil and uranium prices. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004401440_010 98 niger in 2016 Domestic Politics Presidential elections were scheduled for 21 February, together with legislative polls, and a presidential run-off would take place, if nec- essary, on 20 March. All the tycoons on Niger’s political scene en- tered the fray, joined by various lesser presidential hopefuls. These last included Mahamane Ousmane, who was strong in the eastern city of Zinder but was handicapped by a new party vehicle, and Ibrahim Yacouba, an adviser to President Issoufou, who had been expelled from the PNDS the previous year over an internal dispute. Seini Oumarou and Hama Amadou continued to be the president’s main rivals. Oumarou, leading Niger’s second party and with his fief in western Tillabéri, hoped to profit from the incarceration of Amadou, who was also from the west (Issoufou being from the central Tahoua region). However, while Amadou’s detention was expected to hinder his visibility to voters, his party exploited it by playing the martyrdom card. Faced with this splintered field, the opposition parties decided to rally behind a single candidate if elections went to a run-off. The effect of this deal, referred to as the ‘Coalition pour l’alternance 2016’ (Copa 2016), was to allow Issoufou a lead in the first round. The ruling party hoped to transform its incumbency into a ‘knock-out’ (by taking more than 50% of the votes in the first round), making a second round unnecessary. Issoufou’s campaign arguments made much of the limited gains in agriculture and infrastructural devel- opment. Critics pointed out, not without reason, that the develop- ment programme had suffered from increases in defence spending and that the government had used threats to national security as an excuse to harass civil society activists and the opposition. These accusations centred round Hama Amadou’s treatment. While the facts of his involvement in the baby-trafficking affair re- mained unclear, the handling of the case had electoral consequenc- es if not political connotations. Detained in Filingué, 180 km north of the capital Niamey, Amadou had been refused bail in December 2015. This decision was confirmed on appeal on 11 January. A few .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 'Parti Nigérien Pour La Démocratie Et Le Socialisme' (PNDS)
    Niger Klaas van Walraven President Mahamadou Issoufou and his ruling ‘Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme’ (PNDS) consolidated their grip on power, though not without push- ing to absurd levels the unorthodox measures by which they hoped to strengthen their position. Opposition leader Hama Amadou of the ‘Mouvement Démocratique Nigérien’ (Moden-Lumana), who had been arrested in 2015 for alleged involvement in a baby-trafficking scandal, remained in detention. He was allowed to contest the 2016 presidential elections from his cell. Issoufou emerged victorious, though not without an unexpected run-off. The parliamentary polls allowed the PNDS to boost its position in the National Assembly. Although the elections took place in an atmosphere of calm, they were marred by authoritarian interventions, including the arrest of several members of the opposition. The ‘Mouvement National pour la Société de Développement’ (MNSD) of Seini Oumarou had to cede its leader- ship of the opposition to Amadou’s Moden, which ended ahead of the MNSD in the Assembly. In August, the MNSD joined the presidential majority, which did not bode well for the possibility of political alternation in the future. National security was tested by frequent attacks by Boko Haram fighters in the south-east and raids by insurgents based in Mali. While the humanitarian situation in the south-east © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2�17 | doi 1�.1163/9789004355910_016 Niger 129 worsened, the army managed to strike back and engage in counter-insurgency oper- ations together with forces from Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon. Overall, the country held its own, despite being sandwiched between security challenges that caused some serious losses.
    [Show full text]
  • Elections in Niger: Casting Ballots Or Casting Doubts?
    Elections in Niger: casting ballots or casting doubts? Given its centrality to the Sahel region, the international community needs Niger to remain a bulwark of stability. While recent data collected throughout the country shows an increase in motivation to participate in this month's election, doubts about the electoral process and concerns for longstanding development issues mar the enthusiasm. Birnin Gaouré, Dosso, December 2020 By Johannes Claes and Rida Lyammouri with Navanti staff Published in collaboration with Niger could see its first democratic transition since independence as the country heads to the polls for the presidential election on 27 December.1 Current President Mahamadou Issoufou has indicated he will respect his constitutionally mandated two-term limit of 10 years, passing the flag to his protégé, Mohamed Bazoum. Political instability looms, however, as Issoufou and Bazoum’s Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS) and a coalition of opposition parties fail to agree on the rules of the game. Political inclusion and enhanced trust in the institutions governing Niger’s electoral process are key if the risk of political crisis is to be avoided. Niger’s central role in Western policymakers’ security and political agendas in the Sahel — coupled with its history of four successful coups in 1976, 1994, 1999, and 2010 — serve to caution Western governments that preserving stability through political inclusion should take top priority over clinging to a political candidate that best represents foreign interests.2 During a turbulent electoral year in the region, Western governments must focus on the long-term goals of stabilizing and legitimizing Niger’s political system as a means of ensuring an ally in security and migration matters — not the other way around.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger - Minority Rights Group
    Niger - Minority Rights Group https://minorityrights.org/country/niger/ Minorities and indigenous peoples Current issues Background Contacts Main religions: Islam, traditional religions. Main languages: French (official), Hausa, Arabic, Tamashek (Tuareg Berber) Djerma (Songhai), Fulani. The results of the 2012 Census have yet to be finalized; the previous Census was conducted in 2001. Estimates by the US government for 2006 suggest a population made up of a majority of Hausa 53.1 per cent), followed by Zarma (Djerma/Songhai) (21.2 per cent), Tuareg (11 per cent), Fulani/Peulh (6.5 per cent), Kanuri (5.9 per cent), Gurma (0.8 per cent), Arab (0.4 per cent) and Toubou (0.4 per cent). However, in the absence of universally accepted figures, estimates vary. IWGIA, for example, in its 2011 figures for Niger’s indigenous population puts Peulh at 8.5 per cent, Tuareg at 8.3 per cent and Toubou at 1.5 per cent. In any case, over half of Niger’s population is Hausa, settled agriculturists who live in the south. Second to them, comprising a fifth of the population, are Songhai cultivators whose homeland is located west of the Hausa territory. Songhai are a broad constellation of ethnic clans including the Dendi, Djerma, Gube, Kurtey, Sorko and Woga. Dendi who live on the Niger-Benin border are essentially descendants of the Songhai who resisted the Moroccan conquest of central Songhai and Gao. Djerma are found east of the River Niger between Niamey and the Hausa belt, and along the River Niger. They are believed to be descended from Malinké and the Sarakolé and to have migrated southward from Mali before the rise of the Songhai empire and to have adopted Islam in the tenth century.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?
    Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? Africa Report N°208 | 19 September 2013 Translation from French International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. The Scramble for Power: Between Civilian and Military Rule (1960-2010) ................... 3 A. Old Imbalances: The Colonial State’s Weaknesses and Violence ............................. 3 B. The Failure of the First Republic (1960-1974) .......................................................... 4 C. The “Military Politicians” (1974-1990) ...................................................................... 6 D. A Fragile and Uncertain Democratisation (1990-2000) ........................................... 8 1. Short-lived regimes: The Second, Third and Fourth Republics .......................... 8 2. The armed rebellions of the 1990s ....................................................................... 9 E. The Tandja Decade (1999-2010) ............................................................................... 11 1. The “second Tuareg rebellion” ............................................................................. 11 2. The abuses of tazartché .......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Situation Analysis: Niger February 2016
    Situation Analysis: Niger February 2016 Situation Analysis: Niger February 2016 Idayat Hassan International IDEA regional resources © International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2016 International IDEA Strömsborg, SE-103 34, Stockholm, Sweden Email: [email protected], website: www.idea.int The electronic version of this publication is available under a Creative Commons Attribute-NonCommercial- ShareAlike 3.0 licence. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the publication as well as to remix and adapt it provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, that you appropriately attribute the publication, and that you distribute it under an identical licence. For more information on this licence see: <http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/>. International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members. Graphic design: International IDEA ISBN: 978-91-7671-040-1 Contents Introduction .......................................................................................5 Electoral context ...............................................................................5 Presidential candidates and election management ................................... 5 Voters’ register .......................................................................................... 6 Voter apathy ............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • IFES Faqs Elections in the Republic of Niger: 2020 General Elections
    Elections in the Republic of Niger 2020 General Elections Frequently Asked Questions Africa International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011 Crystal Drive | Floor 10 | Arlington, VA 22202 | www.IFES.org December 22, 2020 Frequently Asked Questions When is Election Day? ................................................................................................................................... 1 When does campaigning start and end? ...................................................................................................... 1 Why are these elections important? ............................................................................................................ 1 What will security be like on Election Day? .................................................................................................. 2 Will internally displaced persons be able to vote? ....................................................................................... 2 What is the legal framework governing these elections? ............................................................................ 2 What is the electoral system? ....................................................................................................................... 3 How will the new biometric voter roll and identification of voters work? ................................................... 4 What is the gender balance within the candidate list? ................................................................................ 4 What is the structure of the
    [Show full text]
  • African Elections in 2021
    Updated February 1, 2021 African Elections in 2021 Seventeen African countries are slated to hold presidential and/or legislative polls in 2021. Scheduled election dates are listed below; some may be subject to change due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic or other factors. https://crsreports.congress.gov African Elections in 2021 Selected Country Election Snapshots little opportunity for the opposition to gain power through Uganda (Presidential & Parliamentary, Jan. 14) elections.” President Yoweri Museveni was elected to a sixth term in January Benin (Presidential, April 11) amid an internet blackout, in polls marred by harassment of the President Patrice Talon is widely expected to win a second five- opposition and reported fraud. U.S. officials asserted that the year term. His government has sharply curtailed Benin’s once electoral process was “fundamentally flawed.” Museveni received vibrant civic space, cracking down on press freedoms and 58% of the vote. Opposition candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, aka enacting a new electoral code that effectively excluded the Bobi Wine, received 34%; his new National Unity Platform leads opposition from legislative elections in 2019. Several prominent the opposition after winning 17% of directly elected seats in the opposition leaders have been sentenced in absentia for various National Assembly, in which Museveni’s party retained a majority. crimes and are presently in exile. Over a dozen ministers lost elections to opposition candidates. Chad (Presidential, April 11 & Parliamentary, Oct. 24) Djibouti (Presidential, due by Feb. 8) President Idriss Déby, in power since 1990, is seeking a sixth President Ismail Omar Guelleh, in power since 1999, is running term.
    [Show full text]
  • Petro-Democracy: Oil, Power and Politics in Niger
    Petro-Democracy: Oil, Power and Politics in Niger Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen vorgelegt von Jannik Schritt geboren in Eutin Göttingen 2018 Betreuungsausschuss Erstbetreuer: Prof. Dr. Nikolaus Schareika Weitere Betreuer: Dr. Andrea Behrends Weitere Mitglieder der Prüfungskommission: Prof. Dr. Roman Loimeier Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 22.11.2017 For Angela and Edzard Abstract In 2008, Niger signed an oil contract with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) over the Agadem oil block located in the far eastern region of Diffa; and in 2011, they inaugurated the country’s first and only oil refinery near Zinder, the second biggest city, situated in the country’s south-east. While the inauguration had been planned as a major celebration to mark the coming of oil, it soon became a highly contested political event. That day, with new President Mahamadou Issoufou coming from the capital Niamey (located in the west of the country) to Zinder to mark the occasion, youths set alight tire street barricades and clashed with police. The protests turned into violent riots some days later with youth clashing with security forces in the streets, burning down a police station and looting a bank. Two people were killed and several were injured. Using in-depth ethnographic material collected over 13 months of fieldwork from 2011 to 2014 within the methodological framework of the extended case method, the book takes the event of the oil refinery’s inauguration
    [Show full text]
  • AKE Insights NIGER SECURITY OUTLOOK
    AKE Insights NIGER SECURITY OUTLOOK KEY POINTS Niger's 27 December 2020 election has the potential to pave the way for an historic transition. However, incumbent President Mahamadou Issoufou’s likely successor, Mohamed Bazoum, inherits a sharply deteriorated security situation which threatens the fragile stabilisation achieved during Issoufou’s presidency. Should the next president fail to quell intensifying insurgency by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Niger faces the following risks: • Further territorial expansion and more frequent attacks by ISGS in western Niger • Diminished capacity to combat militant activity in the south-east • Political instability as discontent among minority groups grows About us AKE has over 20 years of experience working with the financial sector, providing clients with political and economic risk consultancy. Our experienced team provides tailored analysis and strategic forecasting, allowing our clients to better assess risks in challenging environments. Contact us: +44 (0)20 3816 9970 / [email protected] Or visit: www.akegroup.com / @akegroup AKE SPECIAL REPORT – NIGER SECURITY Header OVERVIEW On 2 January Niger’s electoral commission declared ruling party candidate Mohamed Bazoum the winner of the 27 December 2020 first round of presidential elections with just over 39 per cent of the vote. The result means that Bazoum will face runner-up Mahamane Ousmane, who won 17 per cent, in a run-off on 20 February. Although voting was calm, the election comes amid a surge in attacks by suspected Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) militants in which nearly 150 people have been killed since early December. The election marks a historic moment for Niger as incumbent President Mahamadou Issoufou’s decision to stand down after two terms paves the way for the country’s first peaceful power transition.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger Walraven, K
    Niger Walraven, K. van; Mehler, A.; Melber, H. Citation Walraven, K. van. (2005). Niger. In A. Mehler & H. Melber (Eds.), Africa Yearbook: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in [..] (pp. 125-132). Leiden: Brill. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/9623 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Leiden University Non-exclusive license Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/9623 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). Niger ' ' In. 2004 Niger maintained a fair degree of political stability. The multiparty démocratie sys- "$£ tem was further Consolidated by successful presidential, parliamentary and municipal elec- /?%' ktions. Cause for concern was a series of attacks by armed Tuaregs on civilians and army Mf> ' ^-personnel in the north, and the activities of the 'Groupement Salafiste pour la Prédication pT-,$t le Combat' (GSPC) in the country's frontier zones. The govemment maintained macro- j*'î>economic stability as a resuit of tight fiscal policies, a robust growth rate estimate and thé |J' 'flaancial assistance of the donor Community. Agricultural output, however, declined as a Jf^fesultof poor harvests. Social stability remainedprecarious, while occasional govemment "Haction against journalists underlined thé limits of press freedom. ?i>omestic Politics political landscape became more complicated when Cheififou Amadou, a former '*,',prime minister, established a new political party, the 'Rassemblement Social Démocrate' jlSD) in January. This was the culmination of a lingering two-year crisis in thé second party £ Niger 's ruling coalition, thé 'Convention Démocratique et Sociale' (CDS). Cheiffou and thé CDS leader, Mahamane Ousmane, président of Niger between 1993 and , struggled with each other for supremacy in the party.
    [Show full text]
  • BTI 2014 | Niger Country Report
    BTI 2014 | Niger Country Report Status Index 1-10 5.32 # 76 of 129 Political Transformation 1-10 6.60 # 46 of 129 Economic Transformation 1-10 4.04 # 108 of 129 Management Index 1-10 6.11 # 30 of 129 scale score rank trend This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2014. It covers the period from 31 January 2011 to 31 January 2013. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in 129 countries. More on the BTI at http://www.bti-project.org. Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2014 — Niger Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. BTI 2014 | Niger 2 Key Indicators Population M 17.2 HDI 0.304 GDP p.c. $ 664.8 Pop. growth1 % p.a. 3.8 HDI rank of 187 186 Gini Index 34.6 Life expectancy years 57.5 UN Education Index 0.177 Poverty3 % 75.2 Urban population % 18.1 Gender inequality2 0.707 Aid per capita $ 26.5 Sources: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2013 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2013. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than $2 a day. Executive Summary During the period under review, Niger made important progress on both democratic and economic fronts. As promised, the military interim government conducted free and fair presidential and legislative elections in January 2011. In April 2011, power was transferred to the new civilian government under Mohamadou Issoufou.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger in 2011
    Niger in 2011 Presidential and legislative elections concluded a successful return to civilian rule. The new president, long-time opposition leader Mahamadou Issoufou, gained a precarious hold on power as it would be difficult to keep all the promises made on the economic front and sections of the military remained unruly. In the summer, there was another coup threat, followed by several arrests. At the start of the year, a kidnapping incident involving two young Frenchmen rocked the capital and underlined the deterioration of security in the Sahelian region, made worse by the violent overthrow of the Kadhafi regime in Libya. A catastrophic harvest further complicated the country’s food security and presaged famine for 2012. General economic prospects for 2012 were boosted by the beginning of oil production and the start-up of a new uranium mine. Domestic Politics Ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled to finalise the transition to civilian rule, the party alliance, ‘Coordination des Forces pour la Démocratie et la République’ (CFDR), came apart. The CFDR had been formed in 2009 to oppose the continued hold on power by President Tandja – deposed in 2010 by the military for his constitutional putsch the previous year – and that of his party, the ‘Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement’ (MNSD). Local elections, delayed into 2011 as a result of logistical problems, preceded the general contest on 11 January. While 80% of council seats were taken by the country’s four principal parties, the results signalled an end to the dominance of the MNSD, essentially in place since the end of the Cold War.
    [Show full text]