Public Diplomacy in Indonesia: Reflections for Progress 2 Foreword Executive Summary

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Public Diplomacy in Indonesia: Reflections for Progress 2 Foreword Executive Summary Public Diplomacy in Indonesia Reflections for Progress May 2015 Table of Contents FOREWORD 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 INDONESIA AS AN EMERGING POWER 5 BY REBECCA HEYLIGER DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 9 BY FATANA TEMORY DIGITAL DIPLOMACY 13 BY MARIA CAMILA PORTELA CULTURAL AND EXCHANGE DIPLOMACY 17 BY DANIELLE SAROYAN INTERFAITH HARMONY AND FAITH DIPLOMACY 21 BY SORAYA AHYAUDIN RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND FAITH DIPLOMACY 25 BY NASHWAH AKHTAR NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 BY MICHELE JOHNSEN PARTNERS IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 33 BY CAITLIN DOBSON SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS 37 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 38 Public Diplomacy in Indonesia: Reflections for Progress 2 Foreword Executive Summary Inaugurated in October 2014, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has received both praise and Our team’s primary objective was to research current public diplomacy strategies being implemented by criticism for being the “boy from the kampongs,” lacking in military or political background, yet consid- and within Indonesia. Our own strategy in this initiative was to conduct as much background research ered a “man of the people.” International observers have likened him to United States President Barack as possible prior to coordinating meetings with a range of organizations from the public, private, and Obama with promises of “hope and change” throughout his rise to power. In foreign policy terms, USC nongovernmental sectors. Through face-to-face meetings with each organization, we were able to gain Center on Public Diplomacy Research Fellow Ellen Huijgh has described Indonesia as a nation with “a objectives. a decade old issue of the Bali Nine drug smuggling case. a deeper understanding of the roles they play in fulfilling both internal and external public diplomacy thousand friends” and yet “no best friends forever (BFFs),” an assessment even further complexified by emerging powers, digital Culminating in the most recent Bali Nine executions, strained Indonesia-Australia relations, and heated diplomacy, cultural and exchange diplomacy, faith diplomacy, democracy promotion, non-state international debate surrounding the topic of the death penalty in particular, analysts have suggested the actors,This report and outlinesgovernment-NGO our findings partnerships and recommendations. These areas in of seven research key areas:were selected not only in relation Indonesian government’s recent stance as a return to Sukarno-style foreign policy. The executions have to each team member’s individual interests, but also to cover as much ground as possible. While we hope been considered by some an effort to use a decade-old issue as a “diplomatic offensive.” Simultaneously, the collation of our individual reports provides valuable insight, generating a better understanding of it is appeasing its domestic audience, in which 86% have remained in favor of the death penalty for drug current efforts within Indonesia, we do not claim this report to be a complete assessment of the entire - public diplomacy landscape. al attention, Indonesia has proven a timely and fascinating case study of public diplomacy. trafficking. An emerging nation with a young democracy, a new President, and an increase in internation What we did discover through our research was the Indonesian government is just as concerned with its While it will be interesting to see how the Indonesian government presses forward within the current domestic audience as it is with international audiences in implementing public diplomacy strategies. On context in considering both its domestic, regional, and international audiences, Indonesia must continue a domestic level, the Indonesian Ministries are provided with ample opportunity in applying its “Bottom Up Diplomacy” initiative, as the general public understands the concept and importance of public diplo- being viewed as an equal partner, deserving of respect. macy. On a global scale, now is as vital a time as ever for Indonesia to assert itself on a global stage, not walking that fine line between projecting an image of being a friendly and tolerant nation, while also only in terms of economy and rule of law, but also through maximizing its soft power assets. with the world through our website www.pdindonesia.com. Our hope is for this information to ade- As recent as April 2015, United States Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Richard From the beginning planning stages to date, our team has shared photos, blog posts, and initial findings continued discussion of the progress of this rising nation. States, as well as civil society leaders to discuss Internet censorship and “The Democratization of Infor- quately reflect the current climate throughout Indonesia’s public diplomacy landscape and contribute to mation:Stengel traveledOpportunities to Indonesia in a Changing to meet Media with Landscape.” government With officials the largest from Muslimboth Indonesia population and in the the Unitedworld, and the fourth largest market for Facebook, the Southeast Asian nation is provided with ample opportu- nity in promoting an image of religious tolerance, digital engagement, Internet freedom, and cultural di- versity. Indonesia has the means and strategies in place, and with proper implementation the Southeast Asian country can generate stronger relations both at home and abroad while continuing its rise. Caitlin Dobson, MPD Research Team Lead Public Diplomacy in Indonesia: Reflections for Progress 3 Public Diplomacy in Indonesia: Reflections for Progress Public Diplomacy in Indonesia: Reflections for Progress 4 Indonesia as an Emerging Power These policy positions are relatively new, as they coincided with the fall of Suharto. A transition to a more democratic political system and increasingly liberal economy has allowed the U.S. to improve relations with Indonesia. Modern day relations with Indonesia suggest the need for a partnership rather than an asymmetrical relationship. This is especially Key Findings evident in its support for people-to-people ties. Indonesia has seen dramatic economic growth in recent years. Indonesia is the only country in the world in which the U.S. Government operates an @America center, a cultural high- As Indonesia’s economy continues to grow, its relationship with the United States is likely to change. Despite this tech, interactive operation heralded as the digital-age center inviting youth to explore U.S. culture without having to growth, it seems the U.S. has maintained its asymmetrical power position over the island nation. There is a clear-cut travel to the U.S. The center also serves as a facilitator for Indonesian students wishing to study in the U.S. Currently difference between what the U.S. is projecting as its position with Indonesia and what is being felt by Indonesia. Since there are 8,000 Indonesian students studying in the U.S., although this number has slowly decreased over the past de- the beginning of the 21st century, Indonesia has seen impressive economic growth. Its GDP has averaged 5.4% growth cade as the number of Indonesian students studying in China has risen. since 2001, causing a jump from the 27th largest economy in 2000 to the 16th largest today. By 2040 it is projected Indonesia’s economy will be the 4th largest, only behind China, India, and the United States. As a result, Indonesia will The second priority, to increase trade and investment, is key to U.S. policy in the country, as it takes advantage of Indo- not only continue to see economic growth, but also an increasing share of the balance of power in the global community. nesia’s economic growth. Being aware of the continuous potential for growth, the U.S. has strategically placed itself as a trade and investment partner. Monitoring climate change throughout the developing world has been an aspiration for Indonesia’s economic growth is supported by a large and growing population of approximately 250 million people. This the U.S. in recent decades. This is due to the realization of the effects of global warming. As Indonesia continues to see population has been key to Indonesia’s political reform and democratic transition. Calls by tens of thousands of students economic growth, pressure on its natural resources will continue to grow, as will pressure from the U.S. to control the for former President Suharto’s resignation in 1998 contributed greatly to his downfall. Although a very geographically negative environmental effects. spread out nation, the democratic transition would not have been possible without the participation of the general public. Finally, good governance has been a U.S. priority toward Indonesia, however in a less obvious way. Because the rela- tionship between the two nations, in its modern day form, is relatively new, the U.S. must be careful as not to be seen as A largely young, driven population, and expansive natural resources paired with the desire for democracy lends it- intervening with Indonesian politics. self to economic development. An archipelago of hundreds of islands with even more diverse ethnicities wishing to be represented, the transition to democracy has been smooth and should be commended. This can be partially due to the local political representation belonging to the major islands, but can also be attributed to pluralism pushed by the Indonesia perceives the U.S. position as progressive yet still asymmetrical. government. The new Indonesian government is committed to freedom of expression, diversity and cooperation across The local perception of how the U.S. acts toward Indonesia differs from the positions projected. They do agree that gain cultural attractiveness in tandem with its economic growth. Indonesia has seen continuous growth in tourism over since the fall of Suharto and Indonesian reform, their interests are more aligned. However, the approach taken by the peoples. Indonesia has six official religions and is a promoter of religious conservatism. This has allowed Indonesia to U.S. is projected to change depending on U.S. administration. For the most part, Indonesians feel they are moving in the economic wellbeing. right direction in terms of partnership-based relations.
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