University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics 2005 Distributional conflict, the state, and peace building in Burundi Léonce Ndikumana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper Part of the Economics Commons Recommended Citation Ndikumana, Léonce, "Distributional conflict, the state, and peace building in Burundi" (2005). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 49. https://doi.org/10.7275/1069125 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Working Paper Distributional conflict, the state, and peace building in Burundi by Léonce Ndikumana Working Paper 2005-13 UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Distributional conflict, the state, and peace building in Burundi Léonce Ndikumana* Department of Economics University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 Tel: (413) 545-6359; Fax: (413) 545-2921 Email:
[email protected] Web: http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~ndiku This draft: June 2005 Abstract This paper examines the causes of conflict in Burundi and discusses strategies for building peace. The analysis of the complex relationships between distribution and group dynamics reveals that these relationships are reciprocal, implying that distribution and group dynamics are endogenous. The nature of endogenously generated group dynamics determines the type of preferences (altruistic or exclusionist), which in turn determines the type of allocative institutions and policies that prevail in the political and economic system. While unequal distribution of resources may be socially inefficient, it nonetheless can be rational from the perspective of the ruling elite, especially because inequality perpetuates dominance.