Before a Board of Inquiry Transmission Gully Notices of Requirement and Consent Applications Under: The Resource Management Act 1991 In the matter of: Notices of requirement for designations and resource consent applications by the NZ Transport Agency, Porirua City Council and Transpower New Zealand Limited for the Transmission Gully Proposal Between: NZ Transport Agency Requiring Authority and Applicant And: Porirua City Council Local Authority and Applicant And: Transpower New Zealand Limited Applicant Evidence of John Godfried Vannisselroy 1 _________________________________________________________________ QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE 1. My full name is John Godfried Vannisselroy. 2. I am providing this evidence as an expert in rail design for passenger operations. 3. I have 39 years experience in the rail industry – including design, construction and operation of railway vehicles. I originally trained in coachbuilding, then worked in rolling stock design, and am now employed by KiwiRail as a Locomotive Engineer driving electric multiple units. I have also been actively involved in the Rail and Maritime Transport Union, providing analysis of ways to improve the quality of the Wellington commuter rail system. As a locomotive engineer, I have an intimate knowledge of the Wellington system. 4. I have read the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses as contained in the Environment Court Consolidated Practice Note (2011) and agree to abide by it. SCOPE OF EVIDENCE 5. I have been asked to provide evidence on changes that could be made to fixed infrastructure (i.e. tracks, signals, stations, signage and other infrastructure, rather than rolling stock and operational systems) on the Kapiti Line, that would: 5.1. allow a reduction in factors the adversely effect service delivery and therefore the ability of the rail system to attract users 2 5.2. and thereby potentially counteract the predicted traffic induction effect of Transmission Gully, particularly the predicted modal shift of some current rail users to the new road1. “MORE ATTRACTIVE SERVICE” AND DEMAND What constitutes a “more attractive service”? 6 Based on surveys of passengers and rail service planning work done in recent years, I have adopted the following as the key determinants of service quality that are relevant to fixed infrastructure. 6.1 Availability of services that meet the needs. 6.2 Frequency of services. 6.3 Transit times, taking into account transit times for train services, time spent waiting (determined by service frequency), and time needed to get to the service. 6.4 Comfort (particularly at stations). 6.5 Safety (particularly at stations, but also on routes leading to stations). 6.6 Adequacy of park and ride facilities (taking into account availability of alternatives such as feeder bus services). 6.7 Legibility of the system (i.e. the ability of passengers to know what services are running, and how to use them). 6.8 There are other key determinants that are not dependent on fixed infrastructure, such as the quality of rail vehicles and the service provided by operating staff. Effects of service quality on demand 7 My personal experience working in the rail system, and the research I have seen, suggests that: 7.1 There is a group of rail users whose modal choice and frequency of journeys is unaffected by quality. They will generally be users who have no 1 AEE, p 246. I have not been able to find precise figures for this expected modal shift. An analysis of likely numbers is in my view important. Train services are communal, so if a change makes a service less economic that can have impacts on the service or the overall system, and therefore other passengers’ transport options. 3 other choices, but it includes those who have no deadlines and are therefore not seriously affected by delays. 7.2 There is a group of private car users who are very unlikely to ever use rail, unless they have no choice. Nevertheless, the effect of the Supergold Card would suggest that group may be smaller than has been estimated in some modelling. 7.3 Between the two groups above are many users and potential users who will make major changes in their modal choice, for some or all journeys, depending on their circumstances and the services they are offered. It is that group which is most sensitive to changes in quality. 7.4 Improving comfort levels is unlikely on its own to generate major behavioural change; although there is evidence that the introduction of new rolling stock will attract new users to the system. For example: the introduction of the then new Ganz-Mavag electric multiple units in the early 1980s resulted in a 14% increase in patronage, and a similar increase can be expected with the current introduction of new electric multiple units from Rotem. 7.5 New levels of service (e.g. new stations, significantly increased frequency) has generated measurable modal shift to rail (and other public transport). 7.6 A high quality service will be far more attractive to people who are considering whether to make a shift to rail in light of other drivers (e.g. fuel increases, shifting to a new location). Those users are likely to be particularly sensitive to service quality, as they have not yet become resigned to things like the smell of urine at stations, unreliability of train arrival and transit times, and uncomfortable rolling stock. For example: fuel price rises have seen significant shift from private car usage to suburban rail, however service quality issues have seen the majority of those users drift back to other means of transport. 7.7 A poor quality of service will tend to encourage modal shift away from rail where people feel they have a choice, or have a new car-based option available to them (e.g. a new road, an additional car in the household). A poor quality of service will therefore be likely to increased induced traffic effects of new roads. 4 7.8 Other travel demand management measures (e.g. work travel planning) are less likely to be effective if a high quality and reliable public transport service is not available. KEY INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITATIONS ON THE KAPITI LINE 8. I undertook an exercise some years ago, as part of input to the Western Corridor Planning process, to identify the changes that would be most important to allow more reliable, frequent and faster services. I have updated that work to provide information for this purpose, taking into account changes made to the lines over the last few years. I have also included information related to legibility which was not involved in my earlier analysis. Key limitations 9. The most important limitations on the lines are listed below. These are ordered by their overall significance for supporting positive modal shift, but different limitations affect different groups of users (e.g. for some users lack of park and ride space may be the most important factor driving their modal choice). 9.1. The single track section of line between Paekakariki and Muri stations (more precisely known as the single track between North and South Junctions). 9.2. Congestion caused primarily by terminating services at intermediate stations (specifically at Porirua and Plimmerton Stations), but also by ill-considered timetabling. 9.3. Numerous restrictions affecting the operating speeds of rail services. 9.4. The lack of passing loops or relief facilities through most of the line. 9.5. The lack of operating stations for a number of locations, notably the suburbs of Muri and Raumati, but also specific event locations such as Queen Elizabeth Park and the ferry terminal. 9.6. The lack of real time information (planned but not yet scheduled for installation). 9.7. Low park and ride capacity 5 9.8. Stations are often unattractive, uncomfortable, perceived as unsafe, and difficult to access safely and conveniently. 9.9. Poor provision in relation to bus replacement services (signage, marked bus stops, etc). North and South Junctions Single Track 10. The single track section extends 2.9 km. 11. This has the same effect on train services as a single lane piece of road or bridge has on road traffic – services going in one direction must wait at a signal until the service going in the opposite direction has gone through the stretch from the pervious signal. 12. In addition to this obvious effect, this particular part of the line is a very steep section of track (going uphill towards the south) with a number of narrow tunnels that date from when the line was built in the 1880s, and speed restrictions for freight trains. Freight trains frequently stall on the grade, further delaying other services. 13. North South Junction is the “tail” that “wags the dog” for rail operations on the Western Corridor and in turn this effects rail operations on the Hutt Corridor due to services on both corridors sharing the same tracks through the Kaiwharrawharra “Throat”. Without massive changes to rail reliability on the rest of the Western Corridor, the North and South Junctions single track limits this section of the corridor to a practical maximum frequency than 20 minutes in each direction (unless services were run in only one direction, in which case a greater frequency would be possible). 14. The problem created by the single track has been long recognised. Greater Wellington Regional Council commissioned BECA to prepare a feasibility report for possible tunnel deviations as a solution to the problem. That study - the 2005 Pukerua Bay – Paekakariki Railway Tunnel Feasibility Report - recommended that two new tunnels be built to replace the existing line (leaving the existing line available for other uses such as a walkway/cycleway). That solution would greatly reduce the grade problem for heavy trains (changing the grade from 1:66 to 1:100), remove the limitations on wagon/freight size for the freight trains, and ensure that an incident in one tunnel would not prevent the use of the line.