140 chapter VI

A CRITICAL STUDY OF ^AMARA’ S M Y A Y A D k BY VALLABHA

/ ^ Vallabha and Sankara both are advaitins, s t i l l the former is ^uddhadvaitin, while the latter is the kevaladvaitin.

This is, of course, not merely the terminological difference, nevertheless, they are d istin ctly exponents of two different theories. The main thesis of Vallabha is that the jiva is not the fallacious appearance of the Brahman. The illu stration is that very small piece of the gold is nothing but the gold it s e lf , in the same way, the is the Brahman only. That is why, it is the pure non-dualism. The illu stration is rather not precise, because, the gold is insentient, so

there is no problem of perform.ing some karmans by it s e l f and accumulating some fru its to be experienced. On the other hand, the jiva is sentient, therefore, he has to do some karmans ultimately he gets its results and differs from the

Brahman. That is why there is a lot of difference between the piece of gold and the part of Braliman i.e . the jivas

According to Vallabha, this world is the actual transformation

of that pure Brahman and that is not the illusory appearance

of the Brahjnan. At the time of the transformation there is no change in the Brahman. He gives an example to support that point. 'Wlien the ornaments are made up of the gold, the gold does not change. This is rather a clumsy idea. Because, when the ornaments are made up of the gold, the gold definitely

changes though the goldness does not change. Moreover, some 150

additional metals like copper etc. are essential for the making of the ornaments. The same is the case with the Brahjnan■

Vi/hen the Bral'iman turns i t s e l f into the world, i t undergoes

some changes. Only the Brahmanness remains as the same.

The other i.e . the world or the body of the jiva also is not

realj but, is illu sory appearance. For, the real thing is

that which does not perish at a ll. In this sense, a wise man

w ill not dare to say that the Brahman remains unchanged at

the time of the creation and also this destructible world vjill

not be considered as the eternal rea lity by the same person.

While thinking about the muktis, Vallabha thinks that

i t is of two types. One is jivakrta and another is

Bhagavatkrta. When the devotee by undergoing the rules and

regulations, prescribed by the sastras, attains the state of

liberation, it is jivakrta, that is knovm as sayujya. On the

other hand,' when the Lord Krsna • • • Himself selects an adherent, that is known as Bhagavatkrt a , that is sadyomukti ■ These

characteristics are mentioned by Dr. B.M.Dhruva. In the

second type of liberation, means are not essential, but the

w ill of the Lord is the deciding factor.

Vallabha admits that the Brahman is of two types viz.

saguna and nirguna . Nevertheless, really speaking the

1. An introduction to the Suddhadvaita School of

Philosophy of ori Vallabhacarya - pp. 111 difference is dependent on the real and non-real nature of the gunas. This means that Vallabha speaks of Sarvavyapitva, nityakartrtva and bhoktr tva as the sagana characteristics, _ ' - ’ ' 2 while alpajnatva, j aramaranayuktata these as nirguna ones.

One can understand i t while speaking of complete absence of the gunas, but here there is disappearance of some specific gunas only. The counter part of the same argument w ill be, some gunas s t i l l remain when you speak of nirgunatva.

One cannot fina it as etymologically real. But this is sagunatva only, just by changing some gunas hither and thither. Another division of the Brahman is parabrahman and Aksarabrahman. Here Vallabha thinks that the parabrahman is of aahidaivika form. Aksarabrahman is the cause of the world, parabrahman is the cause of Aksarabrahman. Therefore, i t is the cause of the caused

One is struck with wonder to know that according to

Vallabha, the sense-organs are eternal, they don't have a beginning or an end. 3o at the time of the liberation the 4 sense-organs remain. At the same time, Vallabha thinks himself as aavaitin. The real problem is that i f at the time

2. See M.T.M. 2 pp.593

3. Ibid. 2 pp.394

4. Ibid. 2 pp.593 of the emancipation the sense-organs do not disappear, '/;hat does i t mean? Does Vallabha want to speak of jivanmukti?

The main d iffic u lty is Vallabha nowhere states about the jivanmukti. Perhaps while thinking of Sadyomukti, he may ce as a matter of fact, thinking of jivanmukti. Anyway, it is beating i.a\ out the bush. This must be remembered that no one can emphasise that this is Vallabha’s opinion, nevertheless, i t is only a guessing. Further Vallabha points out that the sense-organs perfectly understand the thing, but the iiental organs sometimes confuse and one cannot grasp a thing properly. There are four faculties, which can be called as , - 5 mental organs viz. niscaya, samsaya, viparyasa and svapa.

According t.o these mental organs one accum.ulates the kno'wledge. That is why, i f the knowledge is wrong, it is the defect of the miental organs, and not of the sense-organs.

I f the sense-organs have neither beginning nor an end, then who dies? The atman has no death. I f everybody remains the samie, how does the world-cycle miove on? Moreover, in that case everybody v.dll be eternal. Why should then one try for the release, i f the body remains for ever? As Vallabha points out, at the time of destruction the sense-organs become in visib le and at the time of the creation they become perceptible. So the problem of the sense-organs remains as

5 - See K.T.M. 2 pp. 593* 153

it is. On the basis of that it will also be dangerous to say that Vallabha is advaitin.

Vallabha thinks of the three types of the ji v a .

Those v/ho have merged in the worldly enjoyments are pravaha.-jivas. Those who s tric tly observe the rules of the vedas are maryada.jivas and those who love the God, because of the God has obliged them are pustijiv a s . On the deeper level he again thinks of the three types of the jiva viz. susadhana - one who gets liberation on the basis of the

/V ^ jnana, the karmans and the devotion and Nissadhana - one who gets emancipation without the help of these means.

Dustasadhana - one gets release with some bad m.eans.

According to Vallabha that is called as maryadam.ukti, which is gained by some means, on the other hand, that is pusti -

- mukti which is accumulated without such means. While explaining the two types of the j i v a , Vallabha says that one is daivi or divine and the other is asura or demonial.

The daivi jivas are always e lig ib le for the attainment of the liberation, v/hereas, the a suras are bound by the ties 6 of the worldly attachiments. Vallabha has never mentioned as to what happens to the asuras? Do they get liberation, or it is impossible for them for ever? If the liberation is beyond their capacity, again the same question can be

6. See ’ The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya’ , pp.26 154

put forth how then this world-cycle will move on ?

The divine jiva 3 are again divided into two viz.maryada and pu sti■

Vallabha does not admit may a, notiAdthstanding, in his idea of tirobhava, maya appears. Not only this, but the real understanding is that the world is real, never-

-thelessj the liberated and the intellectual people suppose i t as Brahmadharmin, while, the ffigryadbdharmins and the ignorant people think of the world as mayadharrnin.

The problem is that when one thinks of such a gradation, the objectivity of the particular topic, disappears. The ultimate result is that the world appears as an effect of maya ana not as the real entity. It is like this that

Vallabha tries to refute the maya, notwithstanding, through the other door, the maya enters. So to avoid the maya is rather difficult. The preference is given to the theocracy than to the philosophy in Vallabha's system.

Another peculiarity of Vallabha’ s philosophy is that he regards Ehagavata as the fourth prasthana, not only this, but, in his bhasya he quotes the references from 7 the Bhagavata, as the most reliab le evidence. Really speaking

7. -- nrtJr) rpjr^ - - - I

pp. 36 I rr- -L o t >

the Upanisada, the Brahmasutras and the Bhgg;avadGita, these three are called as prasthariatrayi and it v.as a custom that one who w ill write a comraentary on these three should be called as the acarya. In the case of Vallebha he thinks of four prasthanac. Moreover, i t v:as not a convention before Vallabha. Though Ramanuja was a vaisnava simpraaayin, he did not believe in the Ehagavata as the fourth prasthana. It is also significant to note here that though Ramanuja or Vallabha viere bhaktisampradayins and they believed in the personal God, s t i l l , they were called as advaitins. Another queer thing is that in advaita also there are so many sects like kevaladvaita, suddha -

- dvaita, visistadvaita and dvaitadvaita etc. and they are mutually rivals, but they call themselves advaitins.

As a matter of fact, advaita with these acaryas, who believe in more than one rea lity, becomes a misnomer.

Vallabha’s favourite illustration is the sparks of the blazing lire. According to him, the jiva is the part * / or the amsa of the Brahman, from a whom the jiv a s come out, as the sparks from the blazing fire. This is incompatible because, how can the sparks coming from the b.lazing fir e , become a part of the fire ? and yet at the same time possess only a portion of its essential aspect ? 156

Vallabha thinks that the samsara is unreal and the world is real. The etymological meaning of the word samsara ^ 9 is 'dyrfb 3rFrrf^fB' and of the .1 agat

Here etymologically one cannot make any difference between the tvw, though the woras are different. The purport of these two concepts is the same. Not only this, but in

coth con these concepts the sense of motion persists. The jagat or the samsara means the same mobile entity. Once, one accept this m.eaning, then, one cannot think of the world as the only real entity and the samsara is unreal.

Because mobility and impermance are common in both. The thing vvhich has the property of mobility, etc. has to undergo destruction. 3o according to me, the world and the samsara, both are synonyms. Mrs.Mrudula Marfatia, in her book named, ’ The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya' argues that fo r Vallabha, the samsara alone is unreal, which is so in

Sankara’ s opinion too, in addition to the world, which is 10 unreal from the ultimate point of view. Here according to

Mrs.Marfatia the world is also unreal from the ultimate point of view. 3o i f Vallabha also admits the two levels like

See pp.205

9. Ibid. II pp. 497

10. See 'The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya’ pp. 52 157

paramarthika and vyavaharika, the difference betv/een iankara and Vallabha w ill be verbal only. When one accepts these two levels, he can well establish his own theory.

In that case it w ill be not necessary to admit the w’orld and the samsara as different, nevertheless, by calling them with a single name, one can understand their connotations,

Moreover, by labelling both with the single name, i t w ill not be clumsy. I f there is no such fundamental difference, it is just purposeless to admit the tvro terms. So Vallabha’ s this distinction of tho world and the saiiisara is superficiai and j very near to Sankara in the sense that, from the point of view of the highest lev el both the world and the samsara are unreal.

The next argument of Mrs.Marfitia is that according to

Vallabha, Maya is one of the powers of the Lord with which he brings about the manifestation and the concealment of the world. This is the la ter development of the v:ord may a,

of course, it is possible that the full-fledged development of the term maya has taken place upto the date of Vallabha.

For, Vallabha’ s period was 1$th Century A.D., whereas,

Vidyaranya’ s period was 14th Century A.D, In his Vedanta -

- oancadasi he has written the whole prakarana, where he ' _ - ""12 has discussed the concept of maya, at fu ll length.

11. See 'The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya', pp. $2

12. See ' Vedantapancadasi - Citradipa prakarana 158

Vallabha says that the world is not unreal as Sankara believes it to be, notwithstanding, our experience or the p ra titi of it is unreal.^ While interpreting the world as mithya, Sankara’ s intention may be that the world is not actually rnithya, but the experience is fa lse and one can

very v/ell understand it by iankara's favourite illustration

of iuktika and ra ja ta . When one perceives ^uktika as

rajata in the dim ligh t, it is not the juktika that is unreal, but its experience to the perceiver is false. Seme is the case with the world. When one gets emancipation, bis notion about the world changes, in the same v-ay, as man’ s understanding about the ouktika and rajata changes.

Therefore, it is rather a false accusation to say that

Sankara denies the perceptible world. On the other hand,

Sankara wants to change the wrong notion of the man about the world, and this is not only Sankara's intention, notwith-

- standing a ll the Upanisadas also suggest the same, i.e .

that enjoy with det^hm_ent.^ Here the word tyakta does not

suggest the abandonment of the karmans, nevertheless, suggests on the other hand, the forsaking of the results. The same mieaning m.ust have been intended here that is, one should remove the misconception about the v/orld and its nature.

13. See ’The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya’ pp.59

14. ’WtTT; ^ i sa U. 1 1 «j

and when the notion v d ll change, naturally, the man v/ill perceive the Brahman everywhere. Not only this world, but this body also is a great obstacle in the path of liberation in achieving the highest joy of a man. So for attaining that, one must abandon this wrong notion. In this respect, ;Dankara and Vallabha both hold the same view. Unfortunately Sankara was misunderstood by the people and these fake - philosophers wrongly think that Sankara denies the existence of this perceptible world.

Further Mrs.Marfitia argues that this knowleage is confusing as it is rooted in maya, but, the object is not 15 mayika or unreal. This is a contradictory statement.

The reason is that when one gets the knowledge, it is d e fin ite ly of some entity. One cannot get the knowledge of a thing which does not exist. The question arises here, bow can the knowledge of the Brahman be gained? Yes i t is true that no one can actually perceive the Brahman, but, through the pratikopasana one can ultimately get the knowledge of the Brahman. Moreover, i t is not only the verbal knowledge, but, the realisation is the most important in the knowledge of the Brahjnan, as Sankara has pointed out,

3?^iTcTp^-i rfprn ^ (B3SB 1 .1 .1 .1 ) and not merely the

15. See 'The ^^hilosophy of Vallabhacarya ’ pp. 63 IGO verbal knowledge like that of the other worldly things.

So v/hen the knowledge is mayika, then the object must be mayika. This should be rather in a reverse position i.e . the object is mayika, therefore, the knowledge is also mayika.

The follov;ers of Vallabha arise the question as to v/hether this lower Brahman (aankara’ s distinction) known as Isvara, who is the substratum of the world, is real or not, i f i t is real, i t means the acceptance of the dualism, i f i t is unreal, i t cannot be the substratum. How can the 16 illu sion arise in the absense of the substratum. fhe answer should be given in this way, that the lower Brahman is real on the empirical level. So in that case the v^orld has a substratum of the lower Brahman, that is of Isvara, and when the man attains liberation there is no question of the lower or the higher Brahman at a ll.

Another argujnent of Vallabha’ s followers is that even in the case of a juggler, who gives rise to illusor7' appearances and embarusses the onlookers, the la tter ai-e not illusory, while in the case of Brahman creating the illu sory vvorld, 17 the jiv a s as forming the part of the world, are unreal.

There is a contradiction in the very statement it s e lf.

16. See ’The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya’ pp. 6^-6]^

17* See 'The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya’ pp. 6^ I G l

Because in the esse of the juggler, Vallabha’s followers believe that the onlookers are real, while thinking about the Brahman and the world, they think that the .I'ivas are unreal. 3o the concept of tv/o levels will easily solve this type of complication. On the empirical level the

onlookers and the ,]ivas both are real, nevertheless, in

the fie ld of the higher lev el nothing is real, except the

Eraifjiaan. Vallabha’ s followers have taken here the fir s t illustration in general sense i.e. one can very v/ell understand it as an example of empirical standpoint, but, the conclusion, Vvhich is based on that illustration is about the higher level. The illusoriness of the world and the unreality of the jivas is nothing, but the thinking on the higher lev el. So according to Sankara a ll this business

can take place on the empirical level. On the higher lev el nothing remains. Here Vallabhaites have not made clear the difference between the jivas and the bodies. Therefore, they can argue like this that thus the jivas w“hich are illu sory cannot be made to experience any illusion. Further, if the avidya resting in the jiva, is the cause of the illusion, there is no necessity of the Isvara at all

To realise the necessity of the Isvara, Bhamati , the eminent t.ika, on the Brahmiasutra ^ankarbhasya iG2

18 v/ill be useful here.

Second illustration given by Vallabhaites is that a prince, ta^io, through basic ignorance of his being a prince,

considers himself to be the son of a farmer. There is a

lo t of difference between this exajnple and the conclusion

that is the Brahman creating the illusory world, and the 19 ,iivas as forming the part of the world are unreal. The

reason is, in this example the fir s t half of the conclusion

is taken into consideration. That is just as the world is

asat, the prince supposes himself to be a son of a farmer

through the basic ignorance. I t wall be rather incorrect to

say that the jivas are the parts of the world, and that / ^ is why, are illu sory. For, according to Sankara's philosophy

the jivas are not the parts of the world, but they are

the parts of the Brahman. ¥hy did such a fault creep in the

philosophy? Though Vallabhaites tried to argue about

Sankara, they might have consiaered their own philosophical

ig. 1%' ^s# trrraf fl' 3fr5grrrc7T.CT^- Tvr-^|-ffeT;3ST4, ^ tj?t T H ; 5Tfn fsTfa gfps^TTTFTiT TSrfn ^ 55^, ^ ? 3Tn£rTTc?T^

( B. T. 7.1. 4* 1.3 )

19. See 'The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya' pp.65 i c a

tenets also in that light. Notwithstanding, it is not consistent with Sankara's philosophy. Sankara never says that the ,]ivas are the parts of the world, for, he knew it full well tnat this world is aecaying, on the other hand the jiva or the soul is eternal. This great incongruity was always in Sankara’ s mind. Therefore, i t was impossible for him to say the .jivas are forming the parts of the world. Moreover, basic ignorance is the cause of everybody, who believes, this decaying world to be real. But this w ill not be appropriate example for understanding in the case of the Brahman, creating the illusory v;orld ana the jivas as forming the parts of the v.'orld are unreal.

In opposition to the theory of superimposition, as laid down by Sankara, the followers of pure monism argue as follows - in the illu stra tio n of the sky, on which the blackness, d irt etc. are superimposed, that sky is not absent (unperceived - apratyaksa), since the pronoun ' idam’ or ’this’, in ’this is dirty’ (idarn malinam) refers to 2C ” ■ something which is known. The argument is made, because, j ^ the opponent aces not know Sankara’ s real position. The / /V — meaning intenaed by Sankara is well explained by Vacaspati

Mshra in his ttika called Bhajnati, that is though the

20. See ’The Philosophy of Va.l labhacarya ’ pp. 69 1G4

sky is dravya, i t cannot ba grasped by the sense-cr§ans, because, i t has no form and at the same time, cannot be touched. The sky cannot be psychological also, for, it has 21 no external function. That is why it is apratyaksa♦ 3o / /V one who v/ants to understand Sankara's intention of using a particular term, it is better he should refer Ehamati. y /V Here Sankara has not used the term - apratyaksa in the common sense, but, i t has a technical meaning. Therefore, in that particular sense of apratyaksa, the sky is said to be d irty or malina. Further the opponent says that while in the case of a cosmic superimposition, -which the followers of Sankara speak of, the substratum is said to be non­ existent and there cannot be any superimcosition on a 23 substratum, which is non-existent. The opponent spaaks of the cosmic superimposition and its substratum. He thought that the Brahman is a substratum of the world, then, in that case, may be he is pretending that he aoes not know hov.: the substratum can be visualised. Because, though one cannot perceive the actual Brahman, he can see its effect i.e . the world. Another point is that i t is not a distinguishing charscter that a thing is not capable of being seen, therefore,

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B.7^1 .1.1.1

22. See 'The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya’ pp. 69 ICO

i t cannot be a substratum of a particular entity. A simple question can be put to Vallabhaites, "Have you seen the

God?" Cr the most simple, is i t possible for anybody to perceive his manes? Then, how can he believe that there is a God, or, there were some manes, in the same way, he can believe in the unknoiATi substratum. The substratum again is not completely unknown, one can grasp i t by verbal knovjledge. Moreover, after understanding i t fu ll well by the verbal knowledge, ono can experience it . It may be said that these are rather steps fo r attaining the emancipation.

The opponent further asks that "'Does the term ' idam' stand for the sky or for ^malinya' (d irt) ?" I f the former, the postulate of the substratvuri being unknown is contradicted; if the latter, well, tliere is no case of superimposition. Since malinya as understood in connection

Vidth the clouds etc. supported by the sky is what is meant by idafli and that is the cognition of that as that tasminneva tadbuddhih and not the case of atasminneva tadbuddih as the definition of superimposition would require. Therefore, the Erahman cannot be the substratum and i f i t is the substratum, it must be knowable (Known ?) 23 i.e . tasya .jnatattvan;. Here Vallabeites can ask such questions, because, they could not properly understand

2 3 . See ’The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya' pp.69 lC(-i

y bankara'G intention in using the word apratyaksa• Of course, here iaam stands fo r the sky (^nly, for, ultimately the clouds have the substratum of nothing, but, the sky,

Kalinya etc. goes vn.th the clouds, the re?,son is that clouds have some kind of form, on the other hand, sky mec.ns just the space. One can find the definition of the sky as sabdagunakam akasam , here nothing is said about the form.

In the space, how can one find malinya etc. 3o, in this sense also the sky is apratyaksa. The clouds have a particiilar shape. So, one can find malinya in that specific shape. The clouds a remain in the sky that is why, ultimately the sky is called as malina. Bhainatikara has given very fine interpretation of the word apratyaksa, which I have already stated. This is the superimposition that a person does not say that because of the clouds the sky is malina, nevertheless, he speaks of that the sky is malina. This is not at a ll tasminneva tadbuddhilj. because the clouds are differen t and the sky is d ifferen t. But, one supposes them as the same, and argues. So, I cannot understand, what is the harm there, in admitting the Brahman as a substratum. The next paint is , it must be knoweble i. e . tasya jnatattvam. The meaning of the word knowable is the thing to be known. That is vday, the Brahman can De a knowable thing. I f Vallabhaites suppose i t is / ru ’ known’ that is also not completely wrong, Sankara himself has said that there is some speciality in Brahman, which 1G7

is knowable. Sankara, in his lucid and perspecuous style has written the cause behind understanding the knowable 24 Brahman. Ey the above discussion i t is clear that the

Braliman is the substratum of the world and also this substratum is always a knowable thing, therefore, Vallabhaites would not be conscious about i t .

Mrs.Marfitia further proclaims that it may be noted that Vallabha’ s statement viz.|^ stands in sharp contrast to what Sankara has said in his 25 adhyasabhasya i.e . ^ 4>f|^

24. ^ i ^ ^ 1 m i ^ w fWnwnrm i

9^rTf^icFEFrn^ I ..... 3n~Frni

yp^Ta - ^ =TrpTFfTrf^ 1 Trf^ *f|r =TrFrrfw ^w fw f^;^;

^ =TI TjcfpHcl^ t 3Tn=^T ^ ■niT ^ ^ ^ s 5'-FT* gfe5;iTfw, g=rrrTn=m^ i gf^:

fciyfciM^: ...... I BoSB. 1.1.1.1

2$. See 'The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya’ pp.94 1G8

It is absolutely correct that the whole pramana-premeya- vyavahara is based on the superimposition. The reason is that the doer has some kind of necessity and to fu lfill that he does some deeds. When the .I'ivanmuktas perform some a c tiv itie s , they are because of their destinj;". It is true that they have already known the fa ls ity of the world snd the rea lity of the Brahman, but, without performing those deeds, they cannot get liberation. 3o one must make the distinction between the jivanmuktas and the ordinarj^ persons. Coimnon liian performs the deeds fo r shere worldly pleasure, on the other hand, the jivanmukta longs fo r the fu ll-lib e ra tio n i.e . the Videhamukti. For getting that kind of liberation, he must perform the deeds and end them.

Conmion m.an have not that much capacity. He thinks that the wife, the children and the wealth are mine, then, why should one worry? He cannot follow the illu sory nature of the world. Nevertheless, the jivanmukta minds i t well and performs the deeds, makes oneself free from the cycle of births snd deaths, It may be possible that while considering about this statement, Sankara thinks according to the ordinary person and Vallabha thinks of the jivanmuktas

There is no problem in the case of iankara, because, the whole adhyasabhasya is for the common man only. Vallabha should have mentioned it sp ecifica lly i.e . the statement is not in the context of the jivanmuktas. This eva is useless, which is used by Vallabha is niradhyastaireva.

According to me there should be niradhyastairapi. The reason 1G9

is that by using evs. it means only those people, who are free from the bondage of performing the deeds. Really speaking, common man d e fin itely performs the deeds, for, they have no other way, nevertheless, the uncommon people, who are beyond the clutches of the avidya, also perform the deeds, for, not to return in this world again, that is, because, getting the absolute liberation.

While writing Anubhasya, Vallabha has criticise d oankara in the very fir s t sutra, athato brahmajijnasa ,

Vallabha has taken four objections. They are as follows - (1) the impossibility of renunciation; (2) the necessity of supplying an adjunctive term i.e. should be undertaken etc. (3) the lack of an object of human endeavour resulting from interdependence, (4) the elimination of the 26 scriptural statements as useless. It w ill be useful i t we discuss it one by one. The whole Indian philosophy is nothing but a means for the path ' of emancipation, for getting liberation renunciation is a must. Because, without avoiding everything i.e . doing away with the attachments of the worldly things, in the lit e r a l sense, j /V one cannot be liberated. 'When Sankara declares the meaning anantara of the word atha, he communicates four requisites, amongst ’vhich the second one is

^ihamutrabhogaviraga *. iankara does not advise to abandon the things, but, the pleasure coming from them is

26. See »The Philosophy of Vallabhacarya’ pp. 93 170

to be abandoned. Another point is not only the things of this world, nevertheless, the pleasures of heavenly life also to be avoidea. That is why, it is not the im possibility / fV of renunciation. Sankara requests to avoid the pleasure, v.hich comes from the enjoyments of the v^orldly and the heavenly things.

Second objection is that injunctive term is necessary.

After all it is a philosophy, therefore,, philosophical tenet is important, and not the mere xvording. Here objector’ s objection is rather childish. The reason is that in those four requirements i t is intended that it should be undertaken,

Otherwise what is the use of just listin g them one by one i.e. nityanityavastuviveka, ihamutrabhagaviraya, samadamadi-

- sadhanasampat and mumuksatv a , and further i^ankara directly says that *tesu hi satsu ------(BSSB 1.1.1.1) means after getting them, one can try for the liberation.

The difference between the objector and bankara is that the objector says that there must be some injunctive term like 'i t should be undertaken’ etc. and ^ankara declares that after having get them it is clear that Sankara is very conscious about the attaining of the four requirements.

That is why, this objection also does not stand.

Third point is the lack of object of h'uman endeavour resulting from interdependence. I cannot understand the resl implication of the objector. But, according to me,

:Dankara has never thought about the God, therefore, liberation given by the God-bhagavatkrtamukti, is impossible in Lis philosophy. Naturally a hurfian being must make efforts for his einancipation. I t might have been intended by iankara. On this background, how can there be a lack of human endeavour resulting froiu the interdependence

Why should Sankara have thought of these four requirements?

The man must exert for getting these requirements and after that he should be lia b le to try for the release. Human endeavour is always necessary in Sankara’ s philosophy.

Last point is that the elimination of scriptural statements as useless. The noteworthy point is that

Sankara’ s darsana is astika-darsana. It considers the sruti as a valid means of knowledge, i.e . pramana , is well knowi. This suggests the fa ls ity of the above objection, / yv Second thing is that Sankara admits logic, which is based on the sruti. So sruti is the final authority according to bankara. In BSSB, in the sutra tarkapratist hanad ------

(BS3B 2. 1.3. 11) he has clearly stated that the Brahman is the cause of the world which is understood by the loeic 27 _ _ ^ which folloxvs the agama. Here the word, ^agamanusaritarka'

27* '35^ '311 ill M*il Htll

I BSSB 2.1.3.11 1^0

is very significant. Hov»' can one aare to say now such statement like, by understanding the word atha in the sense of anantara, there will be the elimination of the

scriptural statements as useless. bankara’ s w h o le philosophy is based on the sruti. Koreover, it is extremely funny that just by considering atha in the sense of anantara suggests the abandonment of the scriptural statements as useless. By v/hich process, one can understand such meaning, is inexplicable. Ko one can grasp i t by the three -saktis of the word vj.z. abhidha laksana end vyanj ana. Another point is, Sankara's clear cut explanation of the interpretation of atha is significant for knov/ing its meaning in the proper sense of anantara i.e , after having become accustomed with the four requisites, the jjrahmajijnasa is intended.

While explaining the term Brahmajijnasa, Vallsbha makes the same mistake. Ke follovv's the meaning of the /V — — / ^ word Brahma,]ijnasa, in the same sense in which, Sankara j thinks i t . But the controversy is that Sankara thinks it karmani sasthi on the other hand, Vallabha thinks as 1' 2g sese sasthi, which is rather incorrect. The definitions of the both are ^s follows - karmani Sasthi -

2 g. farfe R ^ c'vrin'^i:i^i Pm gtcWTc' I ■?h™^TTTf%rnRrTW^ ^

A.B. 1.1.1 173

29 ff^ r explanation is ^

^ Wcf, I ’ krdyoge is significant,

when the word is krdanta, then the genitive case should be

applied to the doer - the karta or to the object - the

kariuan. The example given is ^ Sasthi _sese ' grfcitrf^^nb^^: w^^rPT^TrfyrEf; m

^55fir qcif'a 1^ I t is clear that in the case of

the Brahrr.an and the jijn a s a , there is no

That is Vvhy, i t cannot be sese sasthi. The examples of

iese_sastM are ‘ rHT; gr=r^: 1 ^ :V etc.

Another point is the definition of the karman is ^ 3 1 ^ I ^ . Which is the most desirable thing that is karman.

Here also the Brahirian is most desirable thing, according

to the mumuksu. That is why, in the compound Erabjaajijnasa

there must be karmani sast&5 and not sese sasthi. There

is the krdanta i.e . jiinasa - WcTnTSST^ 3^nd the

Erahjiian i s ^ ^ fr i'u H o c ^ I ^

Vallabha treats 3Ta: ^ and WT^I^iT'f^Tv^Tc

as bne sutra, while Sankara separates the two. Vallabha

does not make any comraent on the same, nevertheless, his

29. See V8K 2.3.65

30. See Ka - 50

31. See V.sK 1.4.49 174

tjikakara Mr.a.T.Pathaka points out that Sankara aiviaes the tv/o sutras and Vallabha does not. That is alright.

Vi/hen the hetu is fu lfille d , then only sutra should be 32 , . divided. The fir s t point is, Sankara is the foremost coniUientator of the Erahmasutras as tradition accepts.

Though i t may be possible that Sankara knew some previous commentaries on the basis of which, sometimes he declares

^cTT-^. ^ (ESSE 1.4.4-14) etc. Notwithstsnding, it is just the guessing and not the proof. One can understand the Erahmasutras on the basis of oankara’ s commentary, which is the first available evidence. Because as far as I know the bare Erahmasutras are not available. So what was really intended by the sutrakara? Does he really v/ant to separate the two sutras? Kow can one unaerstazid it? Moreover, by aividing these sutras, there is no harm. On the other hand,

Mr.Pathaka himself has said, ‘ ‘ / /V which is the supporting statement to Sankara and not to

Vallabha. That means the Brahman is the cause of the world, is the hypothesis. The logical reason is,

(E.3. 1.1.2) So the sutra ends there. The next sutra

32. 3T? ^ Wrrsfn^TT^n^: no: f m c m

"TT^ ccJ I I c; i

3^5^^ I I |c: ^rfZo;

o^^GTTrftr I

Bal. T. 1 . "1 . 2 175

in which the valid means of knov/ledge is described, is

^ b!"| (B.3. 1.1.3)-^ Therefore according to i'lr.Pathaka also division of the sutra is esseritial. The y /V result is Sankara is not wrong, but, Vallabha is rather incorrect in combining the two sutras in one.

Vallabha’s next argument is that Sankara’s thinking about the sutra ^ (B.3. 1.1.4)^ is wrong.

According to Sankara ^ (B.3. 1.1.4) s» > means all the Vedanta texts admit that the Brahiman is the only cause of the world. It is knovm on account of the harmony of the scriptural texts, referring to the Brahman alone, is a matter to be proved. Another point is, according to Vallabha, samanvaya is not of the Vedanta texts, but the Brahman is not the nimitta-karana, it is samavayi — / Ar karana, here the samanvaya takes place. Sankara gives the prima-facie view that the Brahman is the cause of the origination, subsistence and dissolution of the world, and proves it on the Vedanta texts. That means he does not plainly mention that it is the fact that the Brahman is the

33. srrtiT^: ^ ^ fiTc- f3Tf? ^

TBlc’M I d,-rr I

^^T~=crm-Wfc^.T?^ h

Bal. T.1.1.3 176

cause of the world. He proves it by the logic, Vv'hich follows the sruti and ultimately declares that the sutra

(B.3. 1.1.4-) suggests the harmony of the scriptural texts, £.3

referring to the Brahmian, as the cause of tie v/orld. It is more appropriate here, because, one must fir s t discuss whether

i t is the cause of the world or not? Then only it v/ill be

useful if one goes deeper and discusses whether it is nimitta-

karana or samavayi-karana. 3o the question is asked by

iankara and also the correct answer is given.

Another point is, i t nay be noted that the sutra

(B.S.1.1.2)* etc. has already established

that the Brahman is the cause of the origination. Thus the

samanvaya sutra as explained by Vallabna seems only to

restate the same. What is the validity of this sutra then?

The sutra is that, which te lls one, the fact in short, but, 34 with its full significance. Therefore, by telling only the

one fact in two sutras, \\dll not prov“ the propriety of the

sutras ■

frir.Fathaka argues that the advaitns accept for the

disappearance of the misapprehension about the sastrapravrt t i ,

34. I

^ ^

3KD\^ pp.3f^5 X i t

and the knowledge about the existence of the Brahjaianj as 35 two aifierent facts. What is the wrong in admitting so?

The advaitin has stated the sastrapravrtti, which is correct

The reason is that though after the disappearance of the delusion the verbal arguments are fu tile , s t i l l , upto the bhramanivr11i every scriptural statement is significant, oecona objection is also not sound because, to admit the

Brahman, by a ll the vadins, do not make an obstacle to the brahmasattabodhartha of the sastra. The sastra can give you the theory, on the basis of which, you can experience the facts. That is v^fhy, Vallabha wants to refute the sastres the reason behind is that i f they are considered to be meaningless, it will be a purposeless thing. The sastras mention the facts and one can understand it by one's experience. If the sastra is anarthaka, then, by which evidence Vallabha is going to prove his philosophical tenets?

^ fiwfe i 3tb i ^

=T arf^: wici-nT^rr

Bal. r. 1 .1 .3 1 7 8

Vallabha further argues that according to somebody, these modified forms are prakrt a , but, the jiv a , who is 36 inside of i t and free from avidya is ananaamaya. Ke adds 37 to it that some sarvaviplavavadins speak of modification.

The ynsv/er is that Sankara has fir s t stated the sutrakara>s view, and then he has turnea to his own opinion, which is different from that of the sutrakara. The first point is that the purusa is annarasamaya; he is different from the annarasamaya, but, is pranamaya at manhe is other than the pranamaya and is vi.i'nanamaya, who is not manomaya, in this passage the may at; is used in the sense of vikara or modification. Therefore, will it be possible for saying that the mayat is in the sense of pracarya or the abundance and the word anandamaya is used for the Brahman. I t w ill be

36. rSLfi fui

f S n c _____ |

(A .-B. 1.1.10)

37 . 3T5r M 1 1 h 1 ^

(A.B . 1.1.12) 1 7 9

3S like the ardhajaratiya maxim. If the objector says that the prakarana is about the Brahman, so the anandamaya means the Brahman, that is also not sound, because, in that case, the annamaya w ill also be the Brahman. Again the objector argues that the annamaya etc. has another atman stated, nevertheless, after the anandamaya there is no such mention.

In that case there is a blame of prakrtahana-aprakrtaprasanga.

Moreov^er, by using the v/ord anandamaya, there is no suggestion of the Brahman, because the sruti is pri^^a is the head of the anandamaya. Mo da is the right side, pramoda is the north side, ananaa is the atman and the Brahman is the substrat'uin like the t a il. In the sruti ' the Brahman is described, that very Brahifian is mentioned in the ^priya is its head’ etc. To realise that Brahman properly, there is

s 3TTcW cTFTT?. 3TTTRT 3TrFTT

t W r = F T ^ : (c. ^ i a) ^ rfe 3TT^-=2FIJJ- 'T-^ rrr^ ^rPTcj

f m c . \

B3SB 1.1.6.19 180

is the arrangeffient of annairiayadi liv e kosas. That is why, there is no prakrtahana-aprakrtaprasanga. The problem is that ‘ g1%ii5T ^ is said in the sense of the limb of the annamayadi. In the same way, ^ is said as a limb of anandamaya. So how the limb should be treated as the main thing or the avayavin? The prakarana is not sufficient proof, for, considering the Brahman as the limb of the anandamaya, the prakrtatva is not desturbed.

So, anandamaya is Brahman. In that case the d iffic u lty arises that the whole i.e . the avayavin. w ill be the limb or the avayava. That means anandamaya Braliman-atman will, be ananaamaya Brahman the t a il. One must admit either o the avayava or the avayavin, in that case only the mention of the Brahman w ill be alright. s 3i| <~HI SS in this statement the Brahman should not be taken, for, no one can find there the mention of the word Brahman.

Another point is that after the sruti ■gl^iPT, '

Hcitc ^ frf^ this sruti is mentioned.

In this ;^ruti anandamaya Brahman should be followed, otherwise, to admit the Brahman is the virtue and to avoid i t is the fault, so in the statement ^ the word Brahman is used in the sense of the highest Brahman.

I t ’ s not proper to ask whether the viord anandamaya is used in the sense of the Brahman or not, for, by the p riya , moda etc. qualifications the anandamaya atman is X'^ell knovTn. Then the question arises how the highest Brahman is t a il in the statement * The reason is, l! oO lp

here the t a il should not be understood in its general sense, but it has a sense of substratum. It is the substratum of the world. I f one supposes, by the usage of the word anandamays, the liighest Brahman is mentioned, then, in that case, pr iy a , moda and pramoda vd.ll be the limbs of that anandamaya Erahman and it Vi/ill be savisesa. Kotwith-

-standing, in ’37^ £fi"^ here the Brahman is described as n irvisesa. Another point is, i f the anandamaya means the abundance of anands, then, it is obvious that there is an iota of the sorrow. Because, the very v?ord abundance suggests that there must be a little bit of opposite thing.

I f one supposes a l i t t l e bit sorrow in the anandamaya Brahman, , ^ , / b e then, xr^ etc. that sruti will/contradictory

Moreover, every embodiment has a separate priya etc. therefore, anandamiaya v.dll also d iffe r , nevertheless. Brahman is not d ifferen t in everybody, jru ti proves to i t and says f * ?il HH, 3FT=^ Again by the usage of the word anandamaya, the highest Brahman is mentioned, this opposition is rather incorrect. The reason behind is that the v/ord anandamaya is not repeated. Only the word ananda occurs often. For example, < ^ ------, ^ STnFHT 3TPT^ 1 ^ (g.^. IrqT 3fT=F2i V

R.%) T3rra 3

or ^ ’ it suggests that the word ananda is used in the sense of the Brahman. That is v/hy i t is also clear that the word anandamaya does not suggest the Brahman. This anandamaya is mentioned in the same rank

in which anandamayadi atmans are stated, which are

transformed and therefore, liable to be abandoned. In the

s ru ti, Brahman is described as, 57rT <=^| 3T^TC3t t - rpWT 3o like the anna may a, pranamaya the v.'ord anandamaya is used with the suffix mayat , which is in the

sense of transformation or modification. By this long discussion, Sankara has proved it very well that the word

ananaamaya suggests here the transformation and not the 39 abundance.

Here Vallabha calls i^ankara ' sarvaviplava vadin'.

May be he has used this term sarcastically, because, in the real sense of the term, Sankara is not sarvaviplavavadin.

It is true that he abandons the world, 'but, this abandonmient is not from the general point of view. ,Sankara supposes the unperceived highest principle as sat, which is impossible for a common man, to understand according to his intellectu al / /V capacity. On the other hand, for Sankara, i t was his nature

39. See B3SB. 1.1.6.19 1 6 0 only. This qualification, which is used by Vallabha is f i t for the Bauddhas, though one cannot find i t in the Buddhist dictionaries, and Buddha, really did not admit any kind of permanent entity. I t is clear that the

/ /V raised objection is definitely against Sankara, though the term is not appropriate.

/ ^ Vallabha further abuses dankara, that he has divided 40 . . the adhikarana. Really speaking, Sankara has made one adhikarana of nine sutras i.e. 11 to 19. Other discussion about the is stated above, bit the Ida.me of adhikaranabhanga cannot be laid at his door. V^at is the intention of Vallabha, while using the term aahikarana is also not clear, w'hen he says Sankara commits the adhikaranabhanga nistal

Next argument is to make distinction in the Erahinan as 41 saguna or nirguna, to show inability in the Brahmajijnasa.

40. g'l J-’Ml 6 ^I 1 ^ qTrci'l

Bal. T. 1.1.1^)

41 . ^ Tjfc^TTTc^W^ ^ y'l

tf'-r-C:, I 3, O T W F T rf^ ■JpTFTTH -=TT grnTTprfq; cT??t^Tpi •Hc^l civyfc Ml f-iw 1 |i A i :§t?rrr£7i7^ |

(A.B. 1.2.1) 1 84

Because oankara has not admitted the gunas like the sainkhya.

The noteworthy thing is Vallabha has also admitted two types of the Brahman, though the names d iffe r, Vallabha calls them as sak'ara and nirakara. W ill he admit his own incapability, in the Brahmajijnasa ? Another and rather important point is that when Sankara speaks of sagunatva and nirgunatva, it is clear that that of

Vallabha. For, according to Sankara, sagunatva means having all the gunas and nirgunatva means ’completely attrib u teless’ . Nevertheless, Vallabha does not defin itely speak of sagunatva and nirgunatva, he describes sagunatva as having some attributes and nirgunatva as abandorument of particular gunas, and having some gunas at the sam.e time.

So according to Vallabha nirgunatva does not mean complete absence, v/hich is etymologically possible. Cn the ether hand, though Sankara has not adjnittea gunas like the samkhyas, his philosophy can very well travel cn the two levels one is empirical and the other is transcendental.

On the empirical lev el only he admits the sagunatva of the

Brahman, on the transcendental level nothing remains,

So the question of sagunatva and nirgunatva aoes not arise at a ll. No one is competent enough to understand

/ /V oankara’s intellectual height, so, for the common man he has maae this distinction of the vyavahara and the parajnartha. 185

A very trivial and j.llogical interpretation of the origination of the Mayavada is given as it is sagunavada and its origination is because of the ignorance of the

BrahiJiavada i.e . ^uddhadvaita. >.ayavada is, in a v^ay, extreme negativity, but, Vallabha here speaks of the sagunavada. To proclaim that iankara was ignorant about the

Erahjuan. This is very baseless and irresponsible statement, manifesting Vallabha's audacity. Sankara accepts sagunatva and nirganatva on the empirical level. Therefore, when he uses the term sagunatva, i t is not his owtl intention to emphasise the sagunavada, nevertheless, to mention an angle of the empirical life. Mayavada is not at all sagunavada. I t is an excellent reasoning behind avoiding the reality of the perceptible world.

iankara’ s explanation of the statement ’ the world is asat’ is imaginary according to Vallabha. I t is true that iiankara has propounded his theory systematically and in a full-fledged form. Notwithstanding, everyone must

(Bal. T. 1.2.17)

43. rc^ciHftTf^irr^ - tt \ 3rrT f m U'+ccil rci,“T=rW

Bal. T. 1.3.2 186

remember this that the seeds of this theory, one can find soon, in the Rgveda . That is why, this theory is not merely k alp ita, it has some firm foundation. Another thing is that, the sru tis, which are quoted by Vallabha, like

?n w ’ (Bai.T. 1.3.2)

’ ^TT fsicf T^FrrAr’ (Bal. T. 1.3. 2) suggest that the

Brahman is the cause of the v/orla and a ll this visib le vrorld has come out of that Brahman. So Sankara’ s interpretation has firm fo'ondation of the s ru ti. Then, how can i t be called as kalpitamata ? It is also clear, by this very sruti that this perceptible world is not real, but, the only rea lity is that of the Brahman.

About the sutra 1. 3.14 Vall.abha thinks that Sankara has written this sutra in the context of the Brahman and the j i ^a. So he speaks of it as false. The case is rather differen t. Sankara thinks it in the same way as Vallabha.

According to Sankara, in the sutra 1.3.14 - SPjTT^: ’ the word dahara is used in the sense of the highest Brahman.

^ /V „ ^ankara doss not speak of the unity of the jivg and the

Brahman, in this sutra, because, he very well knows it that it will be rather out of context. Vallabha's commentator

Mr.Pathaka concludes that the aim of this a.dhikarana is to _ _ _ 44 dismiss the Mayavada. One cannot find repuaiation of

■ g ^ I Bal. T. 1.3.14 187

Mayavada in this sutra. Another point is that in one breath Vallabha te lls of the unity of the jiva and the

Erahman in the Kayavada and in the next breath he himself te lls that the Kayavada is nothing but the sarvassri:karavada.

Hov7 can these two theories be suggested by the same single statement? I f there is the unity of the jiva and the

Brahman, then, there w ill not be sarvasairikara or chaos, and i f there is sarvasarukara or chaos, then, hov/ is i t possible to find cosmos and discipline? Both these terms have been usea by Vallabha himself, therefore, though the term sarvasarukara may be used by Vallabha sarcastically, in this paper context i t is completely wrong. Moreover, the term sarvasairikara does not at a ll suggest Sankara’ s concept of Mayavada. The reason behind is, there is an order in

:3ankara’ s whole system, though apparently it appears like a negative approach to a bigot.

In the sutra 1 .3 .1- Vallabha clearly states fo r the annihilation of the mithyavada, which could have developed _ 45 in the future, Vyasa has written this sutra. I cannot miderstanci the problem, because, lik e Vallabha, oankara also communicates the same, that is, this sutra is written in the

45. ^ ^ qTWFTrrwcT ci«Tr

3rf^?rii]^i7r:TnTra i

Bal. T. 1 .3.15 r\ r-\ I 6 d

context 01 the Erg.hman and not the ii v a- Nowhere Sankara has written that such sutra states something about the jiva then, on which ground ivS Vallahha c ritic is in g Sankara ?

Is there some substancial evidence, or is he criticising just for the sake of disputation?

Another ob■^-ction raised by Vallabha’ s t ikakara is that in the sutra I . 3.I 6, while discussing that the Brahman is dahara, Vallabha has given the illu stra tio n of Yasoda^^

3he saViT the whole world in the mouth of ^rikrsna. It is the capacity of the Brahman and not of the jiv a . Here t ikakcra proclaims that what was seen by Yasoda" v;as not seen because 47 of maya, nevertheless, i t was due to the God’ s amnipotence.

It is a mere flimsy guess mthout evidence that this may be the refutation of Mayavada, because, Vallabha nowhere gives a single word to dispute the Mayavada. His t ikakars just mentions it as the refutation of the Mayavada. He does not take slight efforts to show where the refutation of the Mayavada has taken place in the bhasya. There is no reference to the word m,aya, or the real Maya vada in the

A.B. 1.3.16

47- fdlfc HI -^'1 c| I rG,M4M I I

Bal.T. 1.3.16 iS9

whole sutra. That is v^hy, one is at a loss to know the efforts of disputing the Mayavada in this context.

On the 1.4.3 Vallabha opens very childish question, that is , according to the Mayavadin, maya is aefined as avyakts. In the Bhagavad G ita, avyakta means ^sara.

3o it is like talking nonsense. It w ill not 'ce incorrect, i f one supposes, Vallabha’ s this very statement is nothing less than nonsense. It is not the rule that the particular word must be used in the particular sense everyv;here.

Notv/ithstanding, the meaning changes according to the context.

The same words like ^neti n e ti' can very well be used with the Brahman and the maya. But the context must be different and the intended meaning also different. IVhen a person proclaims the Brahm^an as *neti neti ' it is clear that its description is impossible, because it is not a thing to be grasped. On the other hand, when somebody speaks of *neti n e t i' in the context o f the maya, the intended meaning is definitely not to be experienced, but, i t is neither sa t, nor a_s^, no one can define i t in one way

4 ^ * fdi'H : - H I -^1 '^1 r< H : I cit|T cfr^^wc'rrairr hi 1 f3^fr

trprnr H I =11 fticTc^ I

Bal.T. 1.4.3 iOO or the other and therefore, it is beyond, description.

So Vallabha’s argument is ridiculous. Vallabha also says that iankara thinks maya is the b ija , nevertheless, ir the Bhagavad G ita, Krsna himself declares that I -rr, the bija or the root cause of a ll the en tities. The question may be like this, when the God himself is the root-cause of the world, v;hat exactly is the role of the maya ? The siinificant point is, in the Bhagavaa Gita, Krsna declares every best thing - vibhuti as himself ’^?TTT^W°Fr^S etc. That is why, on this basis, it will not be proper, i f somebody th.inks that as the fina] statement There are many paths to realise God, in the same way, there are aifferen t paths to understsna the origination of this w^orld.

Sc, i t may be the one angle or aspect am.ong the many theories about the origination Krsna, though, he is personified, is nothing but the Erahman it s e lf, and in the ultimate sense, everybody understands the Erahman as the cause of the Vv’Drla.

The Erahman is avyakta, it has nothing to do vdth this world.

This is the reason, >/hy maya and such other en tities are mentioned as the cause of the v/orld.

/ /V / Sankara has very in tellectu a lly understood the sruti statements. It w ill be simply astounding ignorance i f somebody may think that the sruti statements are wrong.

There are some statements, which are apparently contradictory / J. ^ with the srut i . So to judge them aankara divides them i D l

4 9 by the adhyaropa - apavada rule. There are such statements like cTri^ , etc. v/hich are like the superimposition of the Iksariadikriya on the Brahinan.

On the other hand, when its ultimate nature is suggested, in that case, it is exception. Apparently contradictory statements of the s ru ti, v/hich are I'ully relevant, must be treated in their proper sense. For this reason, the adhyaropa-apavada system is essential and not useless.

In the sutra 1.4*23 oankara has never said that the samavayi cause is maya and the nimitta cause is Braim'ian■

To be frank, the word maya does not occur in the explanation of this sutra.at a ll. According to Sankara, the Brahman is t):e upadana or the material cause, end -Iso the nimitta or efficie n t cause of the v/orld. He explains the whole sutra in a very systematic way, explaining every v.-ord witii its proper meaning. There he proclaims that by the affirmation ana the illu stra tio n , i t is clear that the Brahman is both the material and e ffic ie n t cause.

49. sfc^Trrfnrrqy fsrfc i i

T T T i c'tt mi ■nil 3^-^^-7TTrc;TT cfV^T^r^^TrMcJl’d; I q yirn-Tr^ ^

Bal.T. 1 .4.14 ^ I IS2

3o there is no resort of ardhajaratiya raaxim. The word may a is not at a ll used in this sutra, and the prcblerii

01 inseparable ( samavayi ) cause does not arise cn this background. For example, the assertion of ^^ankara is, ?. ’ . ) TWTa ^'(^4 iVsTTo the illustration is, ^ f^irrcT

^frsr f3Tc^ i (^. 3. It is, this to be noted that Sankara has explained this sutra very satisfactorily and the question about the

Brahman, as the material and the e ffic ie n t cause is rather cut of context, after understanding Sankara's v/hole discussion.

While refuting someboay’ s system, one must refute it by giving some relevant causes. In 2.1.12 - Vallabha discards I-'iayavadin, simply saying that by refuting saiiikhya, ______"■ ■” 51 Mayavadins are already refuted. Gn the other hand, while

H P T ^ T T ^ ’PT 3^ rn4l 6 1 ci ’TP T

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Bal. T. 2.1 .12 f •r\ l U o commenting on this Gutra, oankara has given the reasons, on the basis of which, he condemns the other systems.

The sutra 2.1.14 is very important from the point of viev; of the origination. Vallabha has made very harsh comments against Sankara, in the context of this sutra, i.e. it is the effort for the murder of a thief, v;ho has already entered ... in the house. In this sHtra, Sankara has proved the unity of the cause and effect, from the highest point of viev;.

Cn the empirical level, there is a God or Isvara to rule

/ yv V iw over this v/orld. Sankara is satkaryavadin, but, one can find the rea lity of both the cause and effe ct, in the ultimate stage. So the ananytva or the identity is the natural state of cause and effect, before the creation.

After the creation, the effect becomes unreal. Vallabha says that the decision should be taken accordine to the sutra. 53 Independent idea is not at a ll useful.. N^iVertheless, the fact is that it is not Sankara’ s own imagination. In the sruti also one can find the statements like, ^

52. STTfq: |

A»B.

53* 31^1 ■y'li Htiis# Igrf^:

A. B. 2.1.14 iD4

^ T T £rd,T"' ( etc. Moreover, the words of the sutra also suggest the / /V same meaning, as intended by Sankara. In the very fir s t word ^tadananyatvat ^ suggests the unity of the cause i.e . the Brahiaan and the e ffe c t viz. the world. There is the

sufficient evidence of the sru ti, suggested by the

' arambhanadi sabdah ?. That is cj|HI

yfrm ' , On the basis of this

/ a- — very concept Sankara has propounded this sut ra . On the

contrary, Sankara’s interpretation is more reliable than

that of Vallabha or Ramanuja. This is not the reaction

of Vallabha's harsh criticism, full of abuse, but, it is a

fact, because, in the interpretation of this sutra. Ramanuja

seems to have been confused. I have given the x*jhole explanation

about it in the previous chapter viz. "A c r itic a l study of the

refutation of Sankara’ s Mayavada by Ramanuja.” Vallabha gives his explanation about the same sutra in one para and two paras are wasted in giving wrong interpretation of Sankara’ s

bharya, and at the same time, abusing him. 'ifnereas,

Sankara did not refute anyone, notvdthstanding, explained

the sutra in a lucid manner and tried to clarify his own

intended meaning. Vallabha’ s expression is very illogical

and rnaae in bad taste i.e .- etc. Really speaking, / ^ Vallabha has wasted a lot of energy in abusing Sankara, without

some reasonable cause. Sankara has indeed done a great work

for the propagation of his mission. So it is not proper to

ca ll him a th ief. Moreover, Vallabha has no excellent strong 195

and logica l base fo r arguing T'-^ith Sankara, anu on the

other hand, he was not able to propound his ov.n pbilosophy

in the logical manner, in bis Anubhasya.

In the sutra - 2,1.2? * * Vallabha

proclaims that Sankara thinks of tbe anupapatti. The fact

is that :3ankara makes a prima-facie view in the first part of

this sutra. There iankara proclaims single qualification as

anupapanna, and in his answer, he makes clear what his opinion

about the same is. This show that Vallabha’ s conclusion is

baseless, not only this, but, he further declares with 54 audacity that such a madman should be neglected.

In the sutra 2.2.8 Vallabha tried to use

He declares, ’ By this the abandoned Kayavada, one can say, is still in the hearts of the impudent^^ Ajain Vallabha’s

expression is very harsh and abusive. It is regretted that there is no substance in Vallabha’ s argument. 2.2.1 deals with ’T^Rj^Tqrrf^; i.e . the prakrt i or the purusa are

incapable of being the cause of the creation of the world.

A.E. 2.1.27

55. trfr^rrftf "nfcTriT ^ i

A.B. 2.2. g iD6

In the same topic the sutra Tm >^.2.7 and *3TgTtfccfr^^; ’ 2.2.'^ < ccur.In both these sutras ;Dankara and Vallabha have stated the same, i.e. the prakrti or the purusa cannot be the cause of the world. The same illu stration s have been given by both. In his commentary in the seventy sutra, Sankara declares that the highest God is indifferent from the point of view of his nature or the

swarupa, br

Vallabha to refute iankara. The point is that there is no resem:blance. between the samkhya and .'Sankara. On the contrary

sanikhya is the august antagonist of bankara. There is a lot of difference, when samkhya proclaims that like the •” ’ or the ^ ’ purusa can create the v/orld, with the help of the prakrt i , and v;hen Sankara makes a statement,

"With the association of the miaya, the Brahman creates the world." The illu strations given by the sanikhya are not equally applicable to the prakrti, for, one is active and

sentient, in the given illu stration s, nevertheless in the case of the prakrt i and the purusa, there union is impossible, the reason is, the prakrt i is active and insentient, on the other hand, purusa is sentient, still passive. Here in the case of the Brahiman and the may a such question aces not arise. Because, the Brahman creates the world, for the sake of the or' the enjoyii.ent, anc. for that reason, the Brahxaan takes the help of the may a. iS7

Therefore, here Vallabha’ s statement is net logical and

sound. Not only th is, but, i t lAdll not be an exaggeration

i f somebody thinks that Vallabha purposely misunderstood ^Dankara.A

Vallabha further tried to refute :Dankarc and Buddha

in the same argument. Vallabha proclaims that in both of 56 these systems liberation is impossible. Firstly, Puddha

nov;here speaks of the emancipation. Buddha’ s theory is

^ sabbam aniccam^ On this background, how can the eternal

release be proved? 3o, Buddha is out of picture here. From

the point of view of Sankara, avidya-vanasa is the cause J of liberation. Nevertheless, when Sankara thinks of the ayidya, it is all-pervading. Therefore, when the man becomes

avidyagrasta, he perceives every thing affected by the

avidya. In this v.'orldly life there is not a single entity,

which is frpe from the avidya. So, the imagination of the

en tities not based on the avidya is out of context.

56. 3rf^?rrra=OT fsrfc

-qefRfa i

Bal. T. 2.2.23 iC8

In the context of the sutra 2.2.26 Mr.Pathaka has written some slokas. One is like this -

-H^i ’^Ti ^ n r ^ r g n i

Ho'v can he dare to say lik e this? In the case of Buddha i t is alrigh t, because the Baudhadarsana is supposed to be avaidika, or nastika darsana. But in the case of iankara, / ^ i t w ill oe a foolish argument. The reason is, Sankara darsana is called as astika darsana. The second and most important point is, one can find the seeds of this Mayavada in the Rgveda and Upanisads also. The N a ^a d i y a - s~uk t a is the well-knov/n example of it . So, in spite of a ll these evidences, to speak of Mayavada as invalid science is, not to have an intellectual capacity, to understand it in a logical way. One cannot refute Mavavada on the basis of this sutra.

In the comiixentary cf the sutra 2.2.26 Vallabha has 57 given a fo lk -ta le. I ca ll it as fo lk -ta le because, some references are given there, and then, the foot-note is also given that this reference cannot be found, but, by the

57. ^ m : ^TtTTSl '3WP:

A.B. 2.2.26 ICO

authority of the publisher, the name is mentioned as

Padmapurana. There is no reference to the sloks, which is given by Mr.Pathaka te llin g that i t is of dankara. is The next coiTiTaent is that Sankara is cursed by Vyasa, and himself _ 5^ as i f a fire , for the purity of the world, vjrote the sutras.

One cannot trace such a story anywhere in the literatu re.

So, by giving such take-stories and trying to refute oankara

Vallebha, exposes himself as a frustrated bhasyakara. Very strange statements have been made by Vallabha, in the context of i^ankara.

Vallabha thinks that Sankara is asatkaryavadin, that is why, he corrjnunicates that 'FTTTY^.. . . ' ®tc.

His e ffic ie n t t ikakara promptly declares that i t is the - - 59 refutation of the avidyavada. In s amud ay adhi karana there is the refutation of the Buddha. Vallabha also holds the same.

Moreover, in the fir s t para in this sutra i.e . he himself tried to dispute the Buddha. In the next para he speaks of avidyakhandana, vrtiich means the refutation of

Sankara himself, of course, it is according to the tikakara.

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59. 3TfWrW< - 3ferfTTfci I Bal.T. 2.2.26 200

It is also possible that in Vallabha's mind asatkaryavadin mesns the Bauddhas only, nevertheless, his tikakaras might have misinterpreted. This may be relevant. Otherwise, it w ill be d iffic u lt to understand Vallabha, v;ho in the fir s t para fights with the Bauddhas and in the next pars abuses

Sankara. Vallabha has taken the same adhikarana , which is against the Bauddhas. In the last sutra of this adhikarana also he has refuted the Bauddhas. So according to me, this may be due to the misunderstanding of the t ikakara, of what was really intended by the bhasyakara viz. Vallabha.

60 In the sutra 2.2.31 he uses the wordt ^

His c r itic also makes the arguments with the same thought 61 and logic. Here Mr.Pathaka says that just as by the help of the sruti this Mayavadin parts in the same way,. etc.

■What an audacity to v^rite illo g ic a l statements to refute

60.

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A.B. 2.2.31

Trf^T^gTTrnrr^pT .rf r cyoM fc I

Bal. T. 2 .2.31 201

no less a darsanakara than Sankara? Why should one think of the sruti as the highest means of valid knowledge?

Nowhere Vallabha states the in valid ity of the s ru ti. Now can the so-called critic corrmient like this?

About the sutra 2 . 3 . Vallabha again makes some arguments which are not consistent with the bhasya of

^ 62 _ Sankara. This sutra deals with the problem of the caitanya of the jiv a . Really speaking, this is not very controvercial sutra. liankara proclaims that the caitanya of the jiva is of course, due to the Brahman. Vallabha thinks i t as the

M^r.* But the point is that dankara nowhere states that this sutra destroys the jiv a tv a . On the contrary, dankara was fu lly aware of the Brahman-ness of the ,]iv a .

On this basis, he can declare =TnTr; |’

Another very strange comment is made in the discussion of this sutra is that Sankara is the Madhymika Bauddha■

I

A.B. 2.3.1^

1iii-OTfTij^7p5^7no:n^ f ^ r r r

A.B. 2.3.1^ 202

The evidence is given of the purana. The difficulty is, now-a-days also purana does not seem to be valid means of knowledge. Vallabha thinks i t as a valid means of knowledge and Bhagavata purana as the fourth prasthana. No other acarya has given so much importance to the purana. That is rather correct also, because, the purana is compiled by many people. There is no authority in the fie ld of the purana. Just as Ramayana is wriuten by Valmiki, vio one can tell definitely that a particular purana is written by the particular author.

On the basis of such puranas, Vallabha quotes that i^ankara is the incarnation of the Madhyamika Bauddha.

It is a most illo g ic a l statement made without evidence.

The detailea discussion w ill be unnecessary waste of time and energy.

In the sutra 2*3’ 29 iankara clearly states that the jiva is anu from the secondary standpoint and is vibhu from the highest point of view. Vallabha’s argument is that

Sankara supposes the Brahman as the jivamatra only, and 64 the other worldy things are unreal. What is wrong in

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A.B. 2,3.29 203

assuming so? Vallabha’ s d iffic u lty is that he does not ory to understand Sankara’ s concept of mithyatva, and therefore, imagines that Sankara does not understand the

Brahmasutras correctly. Nevertheless, in the case of

Sankara, he is the most methodical commentator, that is why, when he writes the Brahmasutrabhasya, he starts from the word - meaning of the sutra. No other acarya has used such a method. While writing the bhasya on the particular sutra, ;^ankara fir s t mentions the sutrakara’ s intention and then aeclares his own opinion. Therefore, to proclaim / ^ — that bankara has confused the sutra is , to show one's own incapability of understanaing iankara.

/ ^ Vallabha always supposes that Sankara is nothing but, 65 . the Madhyamika Bauddha. He further declares that Sankara is asatkaryavadin and therefore, deserves to be ignored.

Though he proclaims such statements o ff and on, sometimes without any context, he remembers Sankara. I t is impossible for anybody to ignore Sankara completely who is like a doyen among vedanta philosophers. In the sutra 2.3.35 iankara clearly states that the jiva is the agent and the

65. I A.B. 2.3.35

66. ^ I A.E. 2.3.39 2 0 4 sense-organs are considered in the prakarana of the .1 iv a .

It is very clear, still Vallabha himself has made it clumsy and has remarked that Sankara should be ignored.

Sankara neither proclaims that the .] iva is mi thy a, - 67 nor does he declare pratibimbavada. This is rather a later aevelopment that Sankara was a pratibimbavadin or vivartavadin etc. He communicates that the ,iiva is abhasa, because it is not real, in the sense in which the

Brahman is real, the reason is that i t has an empirical existence. There is the difference in the every jiv a , due to the various karmans. The Brahman is one and the only real entity. So i f the ,1 iva is the Brahman, in the empirical sense, then a ll the jivas would experience the same pain and pleasure. But, the case is different in the worldly life, and that is why, from the ultimate point of view only, the jiva is the abhasa of the Brahman. The illustration given by Sankara is also appropriate. That is of the .jalasutya. One cannot find the vibrations of the _ .I'alasurya in the real sun. Because the .I'alasurya is not real.

67. fRs-’'T t ^ i c r f W Bal. T. 2.3.50

6S. 7T?rr w i t h 3^ r |

B3SB 2.3.17.50 2 0 5

The same is the case of the jiva , so Vallabha's argumentation is unnecessary and illo g ic a l.

Vallabha is very fond of cursing Sankara without

quoting him or without understanding what was intended by him. In the same way, he refutes Sankara just by arguing 69 in a single sentence in the last para of the sutra - 2./+.14-

According to his tikakara the term sarvaviplava is fit

only I'or Sankara. So he immediately jumps to the conclusion — / /V that sarvaviplavavadin means Sankara. One can very well understand by this example of Vallabha, how Sankara's commentary is a hard nut to crack fo r him, though Sankara’ s

style is lucid. This particular sutra 2.4.14 is explained by Sankara more clearly than Vallabha. In this whole sutra

Sankara nowhere states that sruti — ^

3Hyfd5?7 , which is stated by

Vallabha as a evidence for the argumentation against bankara. The conclusion of Sankara is also quite clear 70 that who is the basis of the vani etc. is the goddess.

A. B. 2. 4*14

70. -prsrfhn^ i

BSSB 2.4.7.14 1^,

Though Sankara has not sp ecifica lly stated the words adhyatmika and the adhidaivika, still, he declares that everywhere there is the division of the adhyatmika A - and the adhidaivika etc. One can understand Sankara’ s intention behind using such a statement.

Every acarya except dankara could not escape himself from the illu s iv e illu sion . Vallabha also finds himself in the same track. He tried to define the maya, which was far differen t from that of Sankara. Sankara does not go into the deep nature of this maya. He does not make unnecessary efforts in quoting the etymological meaning etc. Vallabha's tikakara does that. He quotes which fa ils to express the nature of Sankara’ s maya. He declares maya is pra.inanama. Or she was born in the family of Janaka. 3o the word maya suggests the sense of 72 astonishment. The second definition is important, which

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denotes the sense of astonishment. The reason is sufficient like Sita, who was born in the family of Janaka. The history of the birth of Sita is not new to the Indian mind, but, the way in which Sita is born, was amazing for a common man, In this context only, the maya is astonishing and in its ordinary sense. The first definition, one can trace from the Rgveda also. Notwithstanding iankara's maya is completely aifferen t from a ll these meanings. Therefore, a person goes deeper and deeper into this maya and gets stuck when he trie s to find out, its nature. The best way is to keep silence in the discussion of maya delineated by Sankara, though he is called as Mayin or Mayavadin.

Vallabha in the same sutra interprets the word maya 73 in the sense of the sport. The discussion is of the sutra - ‘ m IT] a - 3-2.3

Really speaking, there is no scope for Sankara’ s maya though the word maya occurs in this sutra. Moreover / /V ^ — oankara uoes not mean that the maya is just a sport.

Though the meaning of the word maya is d iffic u lt to be understood, s t i l l , i t does not surely suggest any meaning in a ligh ter vein.On the other hand, i t is beyond

A.B. 3.2.3 2C8

the capacity of a common man to grasp its nature. Therefore,

Vallabha's interpretation does not stand to reason.

Another point is, this sutra deals with the svapna stage.

So it has nothing to ao with the maya, which was intended

by Sankara. Vallabha also aiscusses the problem of the

dream-stage, but, he gives unnecessary importance to the

word maya, which really speaking, suggests the illusory

nature of the world as it is in the dream-stage. So it can

be said that Sankara and perhaps only he could follow the

sutrakara on the proper lines and this is the best example

of it The reason is that Sankara has a vast ground to

spreaa his theory of Mayavada, in this sutra, for,

sutrakara himself has used the word maya. Nevertheless,

dankara discards this opportunity and never uses the word maya in the whole d iscu ssio n of th is s u tra .

In the sutra 3.2.6 Vallabha d criticises Sankara in

the abusive language. Here his objection is also ireelevant.

According to Vallabha, Sankara accepts the trtlya dehabheda 74 _ - etc. F ir s t point is that Sankara nowhere speaks of' the

lingdeha, in this particular sutra, if at all it is

74. ccfpr fsrf^

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A.B. 3.2.6 09

intended by Vallabha. The reason behind thinking about the

idea of the lingabheda is that he has used the word

trtiya. It may be that the first one is Vasudeo, second

one is .jiva and the third one, who is dead, that is why,

different from the body, unequal to the jiva who has a

body and completely detached from Vasudeo, because, he is not liberated. 3o in this sense, that is, ’one who is

d iffe re n t from the body and s t i l l longs for the body’ , might be the ling adeha. Another point is that iaankara

declares that the dream-world is made by the jiva. Here it

is possible that the jiva means the lingadeha or the subtle

body. For, in the dream-state the gross body cannot do

anything. It is the sphere of the subtle body or the lingadeha

which is responsible for the dreams. Nothing is wrong there

in assuming the dream-state as made by the jiva. The whole

adhikarana describes the dream-state, who is its doer etc.

Therefore, if Vallabha thinks that Sankara’s interpretation

is incorrect then that is not so. Vallabha’s bhasya here

is not that much clear. Is he going to give the reason of

T i n the jiva, or does he want to state

something about the dream.-state is not clear. Vallabha

further tells that Sankara makes two different sutras i.e.

' ------3 . 2 . 5 ' and ' ^>nrrftGTT^ . . . 3 . 2 . 6 ’ 75 y ^ out of one. That is not Sankara’s mistake, if at all

A.B. 3.2.6 210

Vallabha thinks so. If Vallabha wants to discard the sutrakara, then why should he not combine them against the view of the sutrakara? For the logical reasoning the sutra •• 3*2.5* is also essential. In the last part, Vallabha abuses that Sankara does not understand the Brahmavada and that is why, he commits , . , 76 such irastakes.

/ / V — — — Vallabha c r it ic is e s Sankara’ s Mayavada as a kalpanasastra. In the real sense it is not so. Because, one can find its seeds from the Rgveda. But, oankara system etised i t . About the d iscu ssio n of the sutra

‘ - 3-2.27* - Sankara’s interpretatioi is more correct than Vallabha. It is not the judgement of the prejudiced mind, nevertheless, is the fact. Because, iankara communicates that here the Brahman and the jiva are one and the same from, the highest point of view, but, just as one find an ear-ring is different from the serpent in the normal life, in the same way, the difference can be visualised of the Brahman and the jiva on the empirical level. Whereas, Vallabha thinks of the Brahman, itself

A.B. 3 .2 .6

77. HT’^cTTg I Bal.T. 3.2.27 n I -f ( C l l

becomes different according to the desire of the devotee.

Sankara’s interpretation is more logical, for, ^ruti also supports Sankara than Vallabha, e.g.

I rS.. ^, R)' Nowhere in the s ru ti the m u lt ip lic it y of the Brahman is described on the transcendental le v e l.

Vallabha has w ritten commentary upto 3 .2 .2 7 . From the next sutra t i l l the la s t sutra 4*4.22, the commentary has been written by Vitthalanatha, the son of Vallabha.

So while considering the criticism on the Brahmasutrabhasya of Sankara, he is also taken into consideration.

In the discussion of the sutra 3.2.27, Sankara thinks that it suggests the Vyapakatva of the Brahman. Vallabha finds fault with him and says that this is not so. Because, by the sutra ’ (B. 3. 1.1.2.2 ) it is already proved. Notwithstanding, it is the prakarana of the

Brahman, and so Sankara’ s in ten tio n i s quite correct.

Vitthalanatha criticises Sankara in the context of the sutra 3.3.3* Mr. Pathaka says that to suggest the importance of our own sutra he abuses others.

7B. ^;:rf7TPTT=rr5T

A.B. 3.3.3 212

The prakarana is about the unity of the vidyas. So

Sankara tried to find that out, whereas in this sutra

Vitthalanatha tried to find out his own bhakti cult.

According to the prakarana, which is the chief means of y /V the knowledge, Sankara’s interpretation has a logical

connection. Vitthalanatha inserts that and above all lays

the fault of Sankara as a wrong interpretation and that 79 is why, liable to be discarded. The fact is that every acarya tried to emphasise his philosophy through these

sutras• Therefore, who knows what sutrakara's intention was? Another point is that if the discussion is based

on the logic, which is of course, supported by the sruti,

then in that case, sutrakara's intention may be fulfilled.

Before the discussion of the fourth adhyaya

Vitthalanatha has written some slokas. In one of them he also criticises oankara as '' oTR^ff

f-i (sloka-3). The terra sarvaviplava is used in

the sense that ’everything is illusory’. But the point

to be noted is that Sankara is not sarvaviplavavadin,

because, he declares the Brahman is the resort of the whole world. It is the positive attitude and not the negative one. But th is Brahman i s unperceived, so n a tu ra lly

jrrfni

A.B. 3»3»3 213

the opponents think that Sankara denies the existence of the world and that is why, he is sarvaviplavavadin■

Though they are philosophers, i t i s a wonder that they cannot understand this view of dankara. According to me, this abusive criticism is also real on the empirical level, for, from the highest point of view, nothing remains except the Brahman. Therefore, this abuse will also be insignificant with these worldly enjoyments.

dankara admits jivanmukti, like Vallabha, still, in the sutra 4.1.3 Vitthalanatha asks, ”0h you, according to whom the liberation is due to the knowledge, do you also think that the fruit of the karmans must be experienced which are beginningless and which grow up like the sprouts.” I cannot understand the significance of this question. Sankara admits the jivanmukti, this means he admits the beginningless karmans which can come to an end by experiencing them. Jivanmukti means that one understands the real nature of the Brahman and the false impression about the world, but, there are some karmans of which the fruit is yet to be experienced and

I t1 c-q=>' C)T W I

A.3. 4.1.3 o 14^

to experience that, though, he is liberated, he goes on performing the karmans. So thus, there is no propriety in asking such a question. There is no harm to Sankara's

bhasya. One can, however, properly evaluate and judge

Vitthalanatha on this basis.

There i s the c o n flic t between Sankara and V itthalanatha

in the context of the discussion on the sutra - 4*3*3

The discussion is about the

transmigration of a atman after death. According to

Vitthalanatha the atmans first go to the deolaka then

to vayu, then to Aditya* Nevertheless, ^aankara prefers

Agniloka, Vayu and Varunaloka. Vitthalanatha's opinion i s not sound* The fa ct is that there is no reference to

the order. It is not declared that the order should not

be disturbed. Therefore, to refute Sankara on this level is not reasonable. There must be some genuine problem to

fight for. Or, there must be some definite order given

in the text, if that is not so, it is not the fault of the

bhasyakara. In that case, one can understand the order of

the text as one likes. So to condemn Sankara on this

basis is very childish and untenable.

The last objection is taken by Vitthalanatha in the discussion of the sutra /+..3.14 (according to Anubhasya)

The problem i s , ’ The Brahman cannot move, because, i t is

all pervading.* In the case of the jiva also gamana O 1

is impossible, for, -when the jiva is enveloped in the

avidya and the upadhis, he cannot reach the Brahman,

and when he d ie s, he becomes completely d iffe re n t e n tity .

Really speaking, he does not die, but, the body dies and

the .jiva becomes separated from the body. This whole

—adhikarana ■ I ■ ^ . — • —~ is about the Erahman. ■ - Sankara deals with it

correctly and logically. According to him, one can find

immortality in the parabrahman and not in the karyabrahman.

The reason is that the karyabrahman has an end. Vitthala -

- natha thinks about the jiva here unnecessarily. Another

point is that, according to him the .jiva is perishable.

He declares that after the destruction of the avidya and

the upadhi, the jiva cannot go to the parabrahnian and Si a fte r the destruction he becomes completely d iffe re n t etc.

Here according to me, tannasa means jivanasa, for it is

impossible to think about the end of the parabrahman. It is

also surprising to understand the end of the jiva. Because

the jiva ultimately means the atman, the Brahman♦ So who dies? It is the body and not the jiva. Therefore,

this idea is illogical. That is why, Sankara is more

correct and logical than Vitthalanatha.

g l. TTTT^ - - - I r 4T'

^ I r H -H rcl 1 ^ - - A. B. 4 . 3 .14 216

To sum up, there is a lot of difference in the coramentaries of Sankara and Vallabha on the Brahmasutras.

Sankara's Brahmasutrabhasya is quite compatible with and representative of his theory. While from Anubhasya , one cannot properly understand Vallabha’s theory. In the

Brahmasutrabhasya iankara, no doubt, criticises samkhya,

Jaina and the Buddhist, but, there is a quite sufficient evidence. On the other hand, Vallabha abuses Sankara without any firm foundation and evidence. He tries to / /V — refute Sankara without quoting him proiperly. His tikakara is also efficient in this business. For example in the sutra 1 . 3 *16 , there is no scope for Sankara’s maya•

Vallabha has given the illustration of vigvarupadarsana made by Bhagavan to Yasoda by his power. While explaining this Mr.Pathaka the critic, immediately conveys the idea _____ $2 that there is the destruction of the Mayavadin etc.

It is really unnecessary here to speak of the Mayavada.

But it is a general tendency that if you cannot be greater by your own intelligence, you can pull down others. This method i s very well accepted by Vallabha and h is t ik a k a ra .

There are so many examples which show this attitude of

Vallabha. For example, again without quoting Sankara,

Vallabha makes only passing remark that thus dull-witted

g2. HI 3T| cf I' rqMy I roiclTV-i I Mh I I

Bal. T. 1.3.16 o t >

should be neglected. Here it is clear that the dull-witted y - ^3 is Sankara himself. Or, consider another example that system should be neglected for, there is no knowledge of the Brahman. Neither does Vallabha want to elaborate any philosophical tenet, nor does he desire to refute

Sankara for his gross fault. Vallabha tries to tread on the same path on which Sankara does, i.e. to discard the opponent as the etc. Nevertheless, Vallabha cannot bear that responsibility and carry it upto the last sutra y Vallabha abuses .sankara in an indecent language i.e. it is the effort for the murder of a thief, who has already entered in the house. Another draw-back is that he calls

Sankara sarvaviplavavadin, time and again. It may be sarcastic. One can tolerate it for once or twice, but, when for ever Vallabha calls Sankara sarvaviplavavadin, the question arises, ’What is the fact? Is it the fact that

N \ A.B. 2.1.17

^ MI M I HI cl.'fri*ic^

A.B. .3J2.6

85. jrrr737: I

A.B. 2.1.14 218

Vallabha does not understand Sankara, or does he pretend to be so? Whatever it may be, nevertheless, it is due to the lack of the power to understand. Sankara has criticised many schools, s t i l l , h is commentary i s lu c id and im p artial.

Unfortunately, one cannot find this lucidity and logicality in Vallabha’s bhasya.

In his bhasya, Vallabha declares that one who accepts the difference like saguna and nirguna, is incapable of realising the Brahman. It's true that Sankara accepts such difference, but, at the same time Vallabha also holds good this difference. Really speaking an ordinary layman can understand Sankara’s classification, though not realise it, notwithstanding, it is beyond his limits to understand that of Vallabha. The reason is that when Sankara proclaims that a particular entity is saguna, then it is clear that, that entity has those gunas and when it is nirguna, then, there is not a single guna at all. Notwithstanding, one cannot find such rule in Vallabha's system, for, when he declares that certain thing is saguna that means that thing has some gunas and some are absent. The same is the case with nirgunatva, when a thing is nirguna, it does not mean tha-

86. ^

A.B. 1.2.1 219

that thing is attributeless, but, that thing possesses some gunas and abandons some.

Vallabha’s tikakara Mr.Pathaka proclaims that for those Mayavadasiddha this adhyaya is utilised, in which the detachment from the gunas is described. I do not understand the significance of this sentence. Where does

Sankara speak of the gunas like the saiiikhya? Then what is the use of telling the detachment of the gunas to one, who has not mentioned anywhere such gunas? According to me,

Vallabha may be the first person who is audacious to / ^ mention oankara’s incapability in realising the Brahman.

Mr.Pathaka declares again, "Your sruti ' Yato vaco’ etc. w ill collapse th e n .” The case i s , in th is whole sutra

/ / V V nowhere ;aankara speaks of ‘ yata vaco’ etc. Then, on what basis is Mr.Pathaka arguing so? In short, all these statements, in this context, of the bhasyakara and his tikakara, are baseless. Moreover, Vallabha’s own classi-

- fication of the saguna and nirguna is of the ardha.iaratiya type.

^7. Tiuri i

Bal. T. 1.2.9

^ qr^TTTci^T

Bal. T. 1.2.9 ^ 2 0

Another strange thing is, Vallabha has taken one extra sutra, which one cannot find in the Brahmasutra-^ankarbhasya.

Other iankarbhasya is the first available evidence of the

Brahmasutras. Other commentators might have taken the sutras from the ^ankarbhasya itself. Therefore, there may not be difference in the actual Brahmasutras, though there is a lot of difference according to the different theories. Vitthala-

- natha, the son of Vallabha, thinks of the sutra - 4«3-4, which is not found in the .Sankarabhasya. There may be another reason that the particular sutra might be essential for the development of Vallabha’s theory. This motive is also not fulfilled in this context. Because, in this adhikarana the path of the soul is described and in this particular sutra, there is just addition of some stations, that’s all. Therefore, what was Vitthalanatha’s intention in selectin g th is sutra and what is the source of i t ?

These questions are s till unanswerable.

By observing such faults of Vallabha, of either purposely misunderstanding Sankara, or of blaming him for what he never meant, one is construined to say that Vallabha misses the mark everywhere.