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INFORMAL LOGIC XV.l, Winter 1993 Book Review Persuading Science edited by Marcello Pera and William Shea STEVE FULLER University of Pittsburgh Pera, Marcello and Shea, William, eds. especially as understood by Bas van e1991). Persuading Science: The Art of Fraassen, who argues that the explanatory Scientific Rhetoric. Canton,MA: Science virtues that realists take to be emblematic History Publications, USA. Pp. xi + 212. of scientific theories are really "pragmatic" ISBN 0-88135-071-0. in that the adequacy of an explanation de pends on the interests of the person request ing an explanation. There are no better or In June 1990, Marcello Pera gathered worse scientific explanations per se. Fearing together in Naples several distinguished that van Fraassen might demote the status of historians and philosophers of science to explanations in science, McMullin responds discuss how rhetoric may bridge two polar by observing that those so-called pragmat images of scientific reasoning: the positivist ic indicators of good explanations-such picture of universal methodological stand as coherence and fecundity-often presage ards and the historicist picture of relativ genuine epistemic improvements in scien ized standards of inquiry. For most of the tific theories. McMullin thinks he is doing people invited, this was the first time they rhetoric a favor by showing that it has had explicitly considered the role of rheto latent epistemic tendencies. ric in science. Some turn out to be more re McMullin's understanding of the role of ceptive to the role of rhetoric than others, rhetoric in science is typical of philoso though no one really embraces a "strong phers who view it as synonymous with thesis" about the rhetoricity of science. pragmatics. The telltale sign is that rhetoric In fact, Dudley Shapere ends up arguing is imagined to be something that lies be that progress in a science can be measured yond the core scientific reasoning process, by the extent to which the science has which is taken to be a formal(izable) lan developed a self-contained discourse guage. Whether our cue is from Camap or which procedurally rules out rhetorical Chomsky, language is seen as consisting of factors from influencing the arguments! a mapping function from one syntax to an For the informal logician or the analytic other (i.e. its semantics), which is then em argumentation theorist, the main question bedded in a speech context, which, in turn, to ask about the nature of rhetoric is how it determines how the language is used in differs from what linguists call pragmatics, particular situations. 1 After Quine, this namely, the study of those features of a picture has acquired special significance speech situation that determine the meaning for science, as it is now realized that no da of an utterance. Clearly, for someone like tum bears decisively on the fate of a scien Ernan McMullin, there is no difference at tific theory-a pragmatics is needed to all. His idea of the "rhetoric of science" is negotiate the exact relevance of the one to the pragmatics of theoretical discourse, the other.2 66 Steve Fuller While a rhetorician would have no In examining Darwin's rhetoric, Kitcher trouble recognizing this pragmatic resolu shares a curious obsession with several of tion of the "underdetermination" problem the authors in this volume-especially as a species of casuistry,3 she would Gerald Holton (on Bohr's and Einstein's nevertheless find the philosopher's priori rhetoric)-in wanting to show that scien ties strangely misplaced: Why focus so tific authors use rhetoric to persuade them much on articulating and formalizing theo selves about the truth of their theses before ries in the first place, when all the argu they try to persuade others. The obvious ments are over which theory applies in rhetorical force of appealing to such al particular cases? The source of the rhetori leged episodes of self-persuasion is to cian's puzzlement is already suggested by show that the scientifIc author is a sincere the very expression "underdetermination," inquirer, not a mere practitioner in that which implies that methodology can get "glib and oily art" which often passes for the scientist some of the way to testing a rhetoric. Yet, purity of motives notwith theory, but then, after a point, something standing, I doubt that scientists do-or more contextual needs to take over to fully should-only publish what they sincerely determine the relevance of data to theories. believe. Rather, they publish arguments Yet, in fact, relatively little scientific that they are willing and able to defend be though much philosophical-effort is fore an audience, anticipating many of the spent on formal theory development, considerations that such an audience and usually that effort is made independ would raise in response. Let us not forget ently of any specific tests. Indeed, one the Popperian point that a commitment to finds in science what one finds in other arguing a position is not equivalent to a spheres of casuistic reasoning, namely, declaration of faith. There is, after all, an flexibly interpretable theories that can be important rhetorical difference between adapted to an audience as the situation science and religion that turns on the dis demands.4 tinction between suspended disbelief and The rhetorician, then, does not suppose outright belief. that the targets of argumentation are the An important consequence of Kitcher's theories themselves, but rather that theo fixation on Darwin's sincerity is that his ries function as tokens that are variously paper gives the impression that everyone mobilized in debates which may consist al who read and argued with Darwin were most entirely of scientists but which have preeminently concerned with determining implications that extend beyond the fate of the "origin of species." In this context, this or that research program. Such an in Kitcher presents the successive editions of version of the status of theories from tar Origin as Darwin's follow-up attempts to gets to tokens is characteristic of a strongly get his points across more clearly to his rhetorical approach to scientific argument, multiple audiences and to correct earlier one which sees rhetoric not as an accretion errors. While this may have been Darwin's on logic and methodology but as some strategy, it does not follow that he was read thing from which logic and methodology that way by those audiences, most of are abstracted. 5 While nobody in the vol whom were not intrinsically interested in ume grants such a strong role to rhetoric, our animal origins but in what implications sometimes the price that is paid is a particular accounts might have for their warped sense of the history of science. To own interests. Failure to heed this point elaborate on this point, I will focus on renders mysterious the obvious misfirings Philip Kitcher's paper, which philosophers and misunderstandings that delayed the ac should find the most interesting one in the ceptance of Darwinism. It also invites spu entire volume. rious questions such as "Were Darwin's Review of Pera and Shea 67 interlocutors so biased that they failed to fate of a proposition, and this typically re see what he was saying?" A rhetorician quires knowledge of people and events would conjecture that the interlocutors outside the context where the argument were really using, not addressing, takes place. Scientists, no less than philos Darwin's arguments, probably in order to ophers, can argue about things endlessly, score points with some powerful audienc but usually in science the arguments be es. In order to approximate Kitcher's ideal come implicated in events outside the speech situation, these audiences would speech situation that force closure.6 The themselves have had to express an interest distinctiveness of the rhetoric of science in having Darwin and his interlocutors will come from such a study of kairos. address each other directly. Since it is still radical for philosophers Even rhetoric's biggest avowed de even to invoke "rhetoric" non-pejoratively, fender in the volume, the convener and ed my review of this brave book should not itor Pera, fails to take to heart rhetoric's end on a negative note. In particular, inversion of the status of theoretical dis Kitcher's view that rhetoric focuses the at course. Strictly speaking, Pera's "rhetoric" tention of cognitively limited but interest is a theory of dialectics that enlarges on the ed reasoners is very worthy of further project of dialogical logic associated with elaboration. In addition, about half the vol Paul Lorenzen and Nicholas Rescher. As ume is devoted to provocative studies of such, it is limited to arguments about the changes in scientific rhetoric during the merits of propositions that reflect the be seventeenth century. Taken together these liefs of the parties to the dialogue. To his papers-authored by Peter Machamer, credit, Pera realizes that his approach Richard Westfall, Paolo Rossi, Maurizio leaves the termination of arguments myste Mamiani, and the editor Shea-attempt to rious. The mystery is dissolved, however, explain how scientists moved from what once dialectics is seen as only a partial rep Machamer calls a "Neo-protagorean" resentation of rhetoric, one that is suitable rhetoric early in the century (Galileo and. for teaching how to make moves in an ar Descartes) to a depersonalized anti gument, but one that, at the same time, rhetoric at the end of the century (Newton). fails to offer guidance on when an argu Westfall's explanation is perhaps the best, ment should begin or end. The timing of namely, that the Neo-protagoreans were arguments, what the Greeks called kairos, conjuring a modem scientific audience depends on knowing what is at stake in a into being, whereas Newton could simply particular dialectical encounter beyond the take that audience for granted.