The Change to Trench–Warfare at Anzac

CHAPTER I1 TIIE ClIANGE TO TRENCH-WARFARE AT ANZAC HAMILTON’Sinstructions to Birdwood on May 1st were:

I‘ Until you receive further orders, no general advance is to be initiated by you. . . . But this is not to preclude any forward movements which may be usefully undertaken with a view to occupying such points as may facilitate your advance . . . hereafter and meanwhile conipel the enemy to maintain a large force in your front. By this means you will relieve pressure on the troops in the southern portion of the Peninsula, which is your present de.” The two strongest Anzac brigades having been sent to Helles, it became necessary for Birdwood to hold the line as best he could with the assistance of the two half-brigades of the Royal Naval Division which had been left him in place cf them. The N.Z. & A. Division, now reduced to one brigade -the 4th Australian-occupied the most difficult sector of the line. Birdwood therefore allotted to it all the naval troops, whose combined strength was only that of one full brigade. As the result, the N.Z. & A. remained two brigades strong, while the 1st Australian Division now also comprised only two. This garrison of 14,500 (10,400 actual rifles) with some 30 guns in position was much the weakest that ever, during these months, defended Anzac. In order to make the fullest use of it, Ari the whole line was divided into four sections: of which the Left and Left Central were held by the N.Z. & -4. Division under General Godley, and the Right Central and Right by the 1st Australian Division under General Bridges. The brigadier’ of the infantry of each section became also the section -/000 YdS commander, the section-engineers and

‘These sections were actually numbered from the smith ntutliwards I. z z and 4. hut to avoid confusion they are here termed Right, Right Central, Left Central, and Left. 2 Or senior brigadier, when there were more than oiie

44 May, 19151 CHANGE TO TRENCH-WARFARE 45 artillery being placed under his orders. As this system, with modifications, continued until the Evacuation, it is necessary to give a brief description of the sections. The Left Section, which had been that of the New Zealanders, began at the extreme north with two isolated posts established by them on the coastal foot-hills,5 the nearer being known as “ No. I Outpost’’ and the farther as “ No. 2.” Their garrisons, though out of touch by day, were during those hours protected by the warships, whose fire the enetny feared The main line of the New Zealand section had been established along Walker’s Ridge, the old goat-track which led deeply up it from the North Beach having been transfornied into a winding road cut immediately in rear of the crest. High on this spur, behind the knoll and gap where Tulloch had first fought, the brigadier had retained his headquarters exactly where they had been first established by Braund’ in the struggle of the Landing. Not far beyond this, where Walker’s Ridge ran into the main range at Russell’s Top, the New Zealanders had succeeded under the eyes of the enemy in digging their front line across the narrow summit to the steep wooded edge at Monash Valley. Here their sentries looked over the successive ridges inland, between one of which and the mountains of Asia could be seen the haze overlying the Dardanelles, though nowhere the water itself. Along the edge of Russell’s Top they had bent back their trench for some distance, so as to hang over Monash Valley: there the Left Section ended. Opposite its centre Russell’s Top narrowed to The Nek, held by the Turks, beyond which the crest rose to Baby 700 and, hidden behind it, the other summits of the range, all in the enemy’s hands. The direct line of advance against those summits had thus been barred by the Turkish

‘SPQ b 177 ‘See (for Tulloch) t’ol I, pp 257-91; (for Braund) idem, pfi 333-5, 471, 509 The trench on the summit also was that partly dug by the 2nd Bu. 46 THE STORY OF ANZAC [May. 191s trench sixty yards in front of the New Zealanders, who, in order to approach it more closely, were proposing to sap forward and eventually to connect the sap-heads by a new front line. In addition there was occupied on May 9th on the sea- ward side of the Top an advanced knuckle (known as “ Turks’ Point ”), which subsequently proved a position of great advantage The line, which in the New Zealand section had .run roughly eastward, now turned southward and leapt 250 yards across the western branch of Monash Valley to Pope’s Hill. Here began the Left Central Section, in which Monash’s 4th Australian Brigade had been struggling to establish an even more difficult foothold. The post on Pope’s Hill lay, as it were, upon an island or peninsula in the fork between the two branches. A hundred and fifty yards farther south, on the Second ridge, separated from Pope’s by the eastern branch of the valley, lay Quinn’s, the apex of the Anzac position. This post, little over half-a-mile from the sea, was the farthest inland. Thence the troops held a line of trenches for a mile and a quarter south-westwards along the Second ridge to the sea, thus occupying what was roughly a triangle, with coast-line for base, one side running due east for half-a-mile, and the other south and south-west for a mile and a half. It was the difficult apex of this triangle (Pope’s, Quinn’s, Courtney’s, and the gaps at the head of Monash Valley) which formed the Left Central Section. At the beginning of May the exact compass bearing of Monash’s sector from that of the New Zea- landers had been uncertain, and on May Sth, when it was proposed to connect the two by sapping between Pope’s and Russell’s Top, the staff had to exhibit flags at the nearest points of the two positions in order to make sure of them. It was realised that only by means of such a sap down the lofty exposed side of Russell’s Top could movement in daylight between the two positions be rendered possible. The avenue (known as “ Bully May,1g15] CHANGE TO TRENCH-WARFARE 47 Beef Sap ’’1 which was eventually carried, partly IJY tunnelling, down the alniost sheer hillside, was until the end of the campaign the only practicable direct approach by day from the front of the Left to that of the Left Central. Further, as an obvious precaution in case the garrisons were ever driven from the head of Monash Valley, an inner line of defence was dug 400 yards in rear down both its sides, from the Top to Courtney’s. By tunnelling the troops gradually connected Quinn’s, Courtney’s, and Steele’s, which had at first been detached from each other; but this connection existed only in the front line, the folds in the valley-side that sheltered the headquarters of the post and the bivouacs of the garrisons remaining without unio~i. ,qt Courtney’s on the Second ridge the Left Central Section and the sector of the N.Z. 8z A. Division ended; at the next post, Steele’s, the Right Central Section and the holding of the 1st Australian Division began. The 1st Divi- sion’s line was now practically continuous. Men of the 1st Brigade were sapping across one small gap on Maclaurin’s , , Hill, where on May 7th there 440 Yds remained five yards to be com- pleted. A further negligible interval at the “nick’’ of Wire Gully remained to the end of the campaign filled only with barbed ~ire.~South of this, across the .-- 400 Plateau, the trenches were now continuous. In the last of the four sections, the Right, which began immediately south of the 400 Plateau and ran along Bolton’s Ridge to a point above the sea, the troops, as on the cxtreme left, had been comparatively uninterrupted, and their trenches were consequently deep and secure. A few posts on the steep

‘See Vol I, pp. 350-1. On a day in May men citting in their dugouts above Bridges’ Road (the valley on the Anzac side of this gap) saw a ,:ohtar): Turk with a numher of waterhottles slung round him standing in this nick almve them and looking down on the scene as if dazed. He had evidently been sent to bring water to the Turkish trenches. and, making his way up the wrong gully had found himself in the Australian linea. He dived back and escaped down’ the cnerny’s side of the hill. a few abota ringing after him. 48 THE STORY OF ANZAC [May, 1915 slope above the shore connected the trench-line with a wire entanglement upon the beach, which formed the extreme right Hank. The enemy had at this stage approached the Anzac line very closely at Russell’s Top and in the two Central Sections, but especially in that of Monash’s brigade-the Left Central. Here the Turks were on the Second ridge with the Aus- tralians, each holding their own side of the hill. At Quinn’s the voices of men speaking could be heard in the opposing trenches. across a crest the width of a tennis court and almost as level. In the Right Central Section also the enemy was on the Second ridge at German Officers’, but only tentatively as yet on the 400 Plateau. He appeared to hold the edges of its spurs and gullies; but his main position was farther back on Gun (ie., the Third) and Mortar Ridges. In the Left and Right Sections, both on the wild coastal spurs north of Walker’s Ridge and among the ridges south of Lone Pine, he as yet appeared only in small numbers, since any concentrations by day were liable to be discovered and shelled by the warships. From the first day the proximity of the opposing fronts in the two Central Sections forced the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps to engage in an unceasing struggle to extend its foothold. This had been established in the Battle of the Landing by a line of men who simply lay exposed on the crest by day and dug by night; but, when once most of a trench-line had been dug and communication cut through to it, almost all further extensions were made by sapping, that is to say, by working from inside the existing trenches. At such places as Quinn’s, Courtney’s, Pope’s, and Steele’s the foothold was at first so slight that, while the men in the firing line occupied a trench a few yards beyond the crest, the supports were maintained on the slope immediately behind it. There they remained night and day, repeatedly, on the receipt May, 19151 CHANGE TO TRENCH-WARFARE 49 of alarms, fixing bayonets and preparing to rush over the summit to meet the enemy as he advanced, or to drive him out of the front trench if he should have taken it. But early in May the sap-heads, which were pushed out from all parts of the front, began to be joined laterally to form a new and advanced front line, the old front-trench becoming now the support-trench. Thus not only were the early rifle-pits trans- formed into a deep and practically continuous line, but in most parts a new front-trench began to extend parallel to and a few yards in advance of it, with numerous short communication trenches like the rungs of a ladder connecting the two. Such was the Anzac line early in May. Its garrison after the two brigades sailed for Helles was: Left Area (N.Z. & A. Div.)- Left Section (previously held by N.Z. Inf. Bde.)- Naval Bde. (Brig.-Gen. Mercer). Left Central Section4th Aust. Inf Bde. (Col Monash) , reinforced by Marine Bde. (Brig.-Gen. Trotman). Gen. Trotman,e being senior, com- manded the section. Right Area (1st Aust. Div.)- Right Central Section-1st Aust. Inf. Bde. (Brig.- Gen. Walker). Right Section-3rd Aust. Inf. Bde. (Col. Sinclair- MacLagan) . It will be seen that, after the departure of the two brigades for Helles, all the troops had to garrison the line. Even the beach parties, which by day un- loaded stores under Lieutenant Littler, had now at night to occupy the inner- most defences upon Ptugge’s Plateau, previously held by Mercer’s Naval Brigade. Except for a few troops held for local support immediately behind such posts as Quinn’s, there was no reserve. Birdwood and Godley were both especially anxious concern- ing the security of the Left Central ‘ Cen. Sir Charles N. Trotrnan K.C.B.: R.M.L.1; of Salisbury. Wilts.. En&: b. Burcornbe, Wilts., a8 Apr.. 186;. Died II March ipag. 50 THE STORY OF ANZAC [May, 191s Section, which was recognised as the most difticult on the front. It is true that an advance of the enemy on Russell’s Top (in the Left Section) would have been more dangerous; but it was less probable, since the foothold there was deep anti the attacking Turks would be exposed to naval fire. In the Left Central Section, on the other hand, the 4th Brigade was holding the bare edge of the hillside at three unconnected posts-Pope’s, Quinn’s, and Courtney’s-with the Turks on higher positions half-encircling them. The training of this brigade had been somewhat shorter than that of the others; its staff was more largely “ civilian,” and had been subjected to the heavy strain of conducting the adverse fighting on May 2nd and 3rd, when its 1)attalions had suffered heavily in the unsuccessful attempt to seize Baby 700. “ I shall be a little anxious,” Birdwood informed Hamilton, when sending away his two strongest brigades, “ while I have to rely on the 4th Australians and naval battalions.” For a time mixed garrisons drawn from both these held the posts in the Left Central sector. During this interval, however, when the Anzac garrison was at its lowest in numbers, the enemy did not fling his strength against it; for Liman von Sanders “after the first two weeks,” as he himself writes, “ of bloody fighting ”‘ had given to Essad Pasha almost the identical order which Hamilton had sent to Birdwood, namely, to refrain for the present from any general attack. The tasks of the opposing armies at Anzac thus 1)ecanie for the first time those of trench-warfare. They differed from those of later years in France in that the troops immediately behind the line (and in early stages the garrison of the firing line itself) had not only to guard the position hut to undertake the intensified work of sapping, tunnelling, and digging in every direction to extend their tenure: while all except the front-line troops had also to cut roads along the hillsides hehind their positions. and to carry ammunition, rations, and water to the trenches on the crests. Though such “ fatigues ” were heavier and more continuous than in later years, there were rarely any periods of even nominal rest; and the fact that the Turks needed at any time only to rush the invaders off a few yards of hillcrest, in order to hurl them from their ’ Fiinf Jahre Turkri. ). 95. a r.0 ch $

May, 19151 CHANGE TO TRENCH-WARFARE 51 foothold, caused the tension in the front line to be far greater than the A.I.F. experienced in any other theatre of war. The effort to burrow forward and increase the narrow foothold never ceased, night or day, until the Evacuation, and the strain of holding it against surprise resulted in the lines being crowded in a manner hardly ever practised after the troops had left Gallipoli. The front and support trenches were, as a rule, each fully manned by different companies of the battalions holding the various sectors ; the reserve companies of the same battalions, which were employed as carrying or digging parties during the day, slept at night close behind the support lines in their greatcoats and with their arms. At all times of anxiety-which were f requent-any troops which happened to be in “rest” were liable to be moved up night after night to positions in rear of important posts. After dark in some sectors the men lay so thickly in the old trenches, or on the wide tracks behind the Iines, that it was often difficult for a messenger to pick his way without trending on their sleeping bodies. In its main incidents, however, the life was identical with that afterwards experienced in the trenches of France. That is to say, it was confined by the walls of the trench and the barrier of the enemy’s line, both almost as impassable as the “Ocean” which bounded the ancient world. In these deep narrow alleys the front-line troops and supports lived as completely enclosed as in the lanes of a city, having their habitations along them in niches undercut in the wall, some- times curtained by hanging blankets or waterproof sheets. h,Ieanwhile the company and battalion headquarters, the medical aid-post, the quartermaster’s store, and other offices became gradually as fixed and recognised as the public offices of a metropolis. The bivouacs on slopes behind the lines resembled the clustered booths at a great fair. In some respects most men came to regard the routine as one of city life. The actual system of manning the line, which was garrisoned more heavily at night than by day, may be illustrated by two examples. In the sector held by one company of infantry opposite part of Johnston’s Jolly the routine was- hy day: only one platoon (perhaps thirty-five men) in the new front line; a second in the old firing line (by that time the

5 52 THE STORY OF ANZAC [May, 1915 support line) ; the two cthers bivouacked in a cominunication trench further in rear and employed in fatigues in the neighbourhood. At night: two platoons in the new firing line; one in the old; and only one sleeping in the communication trench. Similarly in the Pimple salient, opposite Lone Pine, in a length of the front line containing five bays (of 8 yards each) there were by day thirty-five men, seven in each bay. If the enemy had attacked by day, these would have been helped by the men who happened to be performing the regular fatigues in the neighbourhood, all of whom must take their rifles and equipment to their working-places. At night, on the other hand, the front-line garrison was increased to eight in each bay, half of whom were allowed to sleep. In addition there were in the Pimple in later months two machine-guns always mounted in hidden positions, and four others ready to be mounted, with two men always standing by each to keep watch. The garrison of the Pimple was also at that time supported every night by two companies from the reserve which came up and slept close behind the line. During the early months the Anzac troops, largely in con- sequence of Birdwood’s advice in the days of the Landing to let the Turk waste his ammunition but to save theirs, allowed the enemy to do all the firing at night, while their own sentries silently watched over the parapet. Till the end of the war the Australian troops seldom threw a flare, leaving it to the enemy to illuminate No-Man’s Land for them if he pleased. but preferring themselves to keep watch in the dark. But this contemptuous attitude was abruptly changed in Gallipoli so far as night-firing was concerned, by the discovery that the inaction permitted the enemy’s patrols to move freely in No- Man’s Land. A report even went that barbed-wire flung out in front of the Australian trenches opposite the Jolly, and not “anchored,” was twice removed at night by the Turks.* Sentries were thenceforward ordered to maintain an inter- mittent sniping fire throughout the dark hours. As in France, it was only a proportion of the troops in each bay of the front line who kept watch-normally a sentry (or a sniper and his observer) by day, and two sentries by night As- early as May 5th some of the trenches were, in the opinion 8There was no actual foundation for this. May, 19151 CHANGE TO TRENCH-WARFARE 53 uf the Staff, becoming so deep as to be difficult to defend if attacked, and orders were issued that a fire-step or bench must be prepared, by standing on which men could shoot over the parapet, or at least through loop-holes, or climb out to make or meet a charge. It was enjoined that loop-holes must be made in the parapet so that as many riflemen as possible could fire through them without exposing their heads. By day, when these improvements had been made, the sentry in each bay stood observing through his periscope or through a loop-hole ; but during dark men could safely look over the parapet. For an hour or more in the night, usually about dawn-the hour at which an attack was most probable-the whole garrison of the front line was ordered to “ stand-to ” on the fire-steps looking out towards the Turkish line. For months together it was only during these intervals that many of the troops ever gazed on No-Man’s Land, or the enemy’s trenches, or the longed-for country beyond. The whole area in advance of the front line became clothed with the mystery of the unexplored, to venture into most parts of which, even for an instant, was by day certain death, and by night perilous. On rare occa- sions a man exposed himself with impunity-for example a Turk, who one day had accidentally pitched his shovel from German Officers’ Trench, calmly got out, picked it up, and returned before any Australian shot at him. But such im- munity was the rarest of chances. Once the enemy had established his line close to any part of the front, the daylight watch could only be kept through periscopes or, with great caution, through loop-holes. An acute trench-warfare was carried on by means of snipers, trench-mortars, artillery, machine-guns, and, at certain posts, bombing and mining. These activities did not begin to reach their keenest until slightly after the time with which this chapter mainly deals; they will therefore be touched on later. But a branch of trench-warfare for which there was more scope at this time than afterwards was the patrolling of No-Man’s Land. In the earlier stages this had to be done incessantly, in order to locate the enemy’s positions and to discover what he was about. At the beginning of May the Anzac Turks, like those at Helles, occupied positions in the scrub only partly entrenched, and relied largely upon snipers S4 THE STORY OF ANZAC [May. rgr, firing from nests in the bushes. But they were working to connect up their lines; and the Anzac force, seeing new parapets daily extending through the low growth, soon began to realise that it was in danger of being completely hemmed in on the land side by earthworks. This caused the divisional commanders to become anxious lest, at points where they desired to advance the line, even slight progress might become impossible without heavy fighting. A further cause of un- easiness was the fact that in certain places the Turkish parapet began to rise in hummocks, resembling the mounds on a gold- field, which immediately created a suspicion that the enemy was engaged in something beyond mere trench-digging. The section-commanders suspected that these heaps were either the earth from tunnels in course of excavation towards the Australian line, or were hpaulements from behind which the enemy might suddenly open with artillery at point-blank range. In order to settle these doubts patrol enterprises were undertaken. In the narrow bullet-swept No-Man’s Land between the opposing trenches of the two Central Sections there was even at night little opportunity for such scouting. When the Aus- tralians were afterwards transferred to France, they found No-Man’s Land peopled every night by patrols of Loth sides, endeavouring by sight and sound to ascertain the intention of their opponents. Rut at such positions as Quinn’s or parts of Russell’s Top these enterprises were out of the question, and both Australian and naval battalions lost men in attempting them. Between Courtney’s and Steele’s, however, where the ground in front of the trenches dipped, two or three men of the 14th did creep by night down the gully as far as a small stone hut. It had been suspected that this might be used by snipers or to cover earth excavated in mining, but it was found empty, except for the bodies of five dead Turks. The same gully was frequently visited by Sergeant Harry Freanie, of the 1st Battalion, then in Steele’s? who discovered that the trenches could be safely left at night through a hole broken by mistake in the tunnel then being driven between Steele’s and Courtney’s. This opening being in a slight scrubby depression, a patrol could crawl from it without showing against the sky-line. It was consequently used as a sally-port ‘See Vol XII. Plate 89 8th May, 19151 CHANGE TO TRENCH-WARFARE 55 for several dangerous scouting expeditions against the important work known as ” German Officers’ Trench,” which the Turks were beginning to dig about IOO yards from Steele’s. Farther south, on the two lobes of the 400 Plateau:’ although No-Man’s Land was at this time fairly wide, the surface was so flat and exposed to machine-gun fire that patrolling was highly dangerous. Nevertheless, when the enerny was oherved sapping oiily 120 yards distant. on the northern edge of the Jolly, it was at once decided to send by night a party to discover the nature of his works. Accordingly on May 8th thirty volunteers of the 4th Battalion under Lieutenant Fanning crept out at IO p.m. upon what was really the first trench-raid attempted by Australian troops. The line crawled forward in the dark, constantly passing the dead who lay there thi~kly.’~At ten yards from the newly- dug Turkish trenches Fanning found that only half his men were in touch with him. From the enemy’s line came the sound of laughing and singing, and the rifle flashes showed that the Turks were firing occasional unaimed shots into the air. But the position was well garrisoned, and, as there was no prospect of successfully rushing -7 it, Fanning withdrew his party. Soiiie of the men who went upon this enterprise thought that, while lying in No-Man’s Land, they could hear coming from underground the rum1)ling of a truck on rails. A siniilar report was also made by men /r .. of the 3rd Eattalion, south of w’”’’’,,,, /(/,,,I I,,, ,I, \\\‘+ the 4th. A patch of new earth suggestive of a sap-head had appeared in the scrub facing the 3rd, but a patrol found it to be only the scar made by a shrapnel

10 Johnston’s Jolly and Lone Pine. To gain ground on the northern lobe (the Tolly) Maj. Heane’a Lompany of the 4th Llattalion tunnelled forward to the outpost position orignally held by ioutit (I’d 1. p. 528). which thenceforward became part of the front line ”The advance was not discovered by the main body of the enemy, hut one man, Pte. A. Campbell (of Bathurst. N.S.\i-.), was shot through the head, apparently hy a stray bullet. His mate, by name Cliffe (of Port Hacking, h.5.W.). picking him up and carrying him, as he thought, to the Australian line, ran upon a Turk. The two grappled and Cliffe seized his opponent’s rifle and tripped him, but other Turks of the patrol rushed the Australian and made him priaoner. This incident passed unnl)ser\ed by the main body of either side. 56 THE STORY OF ANZAC [8th-1zth May, 1915 shell. It being, however, still thought possible that the Turks were mining from the head of Owen’s Gdly, into which the Australians could not see, a combined patrol of the 2nd and 3rd was sent thither, but found no sign of recent digging. A little farther south, where an earthwork could be seen out in the scrub on Lone Pine, seven men of the 2nd under Sergeant Scott** crept out from the Pimple salient past the square clearing of the Daisy Patch, for 150 yards on to the Pine. At this stage intense fire broke out from a Turkish position 350 yards beyond, no less than five machine-guns joining in. The enemy had probably seen a party of the 11th, similarly sent to occupy a knoll near the southern edge of the Pine. Neither party was able to pro- ceed, but the volume of fire made it clear that the Turks were now present in great strength on the plateau at a point some 450 yards east of the Australian trenches at the Pimple. While the outstanding condition of the Anzac front was the tension along the central sector, on the two flanks movement was comparatively free. Here, as has been explained, the enemy could not concentrate by day for fear of the warships. Indeed, south of Lone Pine he did not at this stage appear to maintain a single machine-gun, and his first visible line of trenches was that which could be seen running along the horizon at Gun Ridge, 900 yards distant. The four intervening spurs were occupied only by his patrols and snipers, and it was not until May 12th that scouts of the 3rd Brigade, pushing to Weir and Pine Ridges, found Turks entrenching there. In the early days the garrison of the Right Section was therefore able to send its patrols nightly far down the valleys towards Gaba Tepe. A similar freedom on the northern flank led to enterprises of the utmost importance, which will he described in due course.

Sgt W. H. Scott (No 564, 2nd Bn). Draper; of Eastwwd, N.S.W.; b. Sydney. 3 June, 1894. Died of wounds, 8 Aug, 191s