Sociology: Proscience or Antiscience? Author(s): Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Feb., 1989), pp. 124-139 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095666 Accessed: 02/06/2009 08:18

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http://www.jstor.org : PROSCIENCE OR ANTISCIENCE?*

RANDALL COLLINS Universityof California-Riverside

Criticisms of the scientific status of sociology possess some validity when applied against narrowlypositivist interpretationsof sociological methodsand metatheory, but do not underminethe scientific project offormulating generalized explanatory models. (1) Critics allege that sociology has made no lawful findings; but valid general principles exist in many areas. (2) Situational interpretation,subjectivity, reflexivity, and are alleged to undermine explanatory sociology, but these topics themselves can be explained by a widened conception of that allows informal procedures in theorizing aimed at maximizing explanatory coherence. (3) Thefact that intellectualdiscourse itself is a historicallychangeable social product does not invalidate objective explanatory . (4) The historicist claim that there can be no principles that hold across particular times and places is invalid and rests upon a confusionof underlyinggenerative principles with the complexities of the empirical surface of . (5) Metatheoretical criticism of the of causality does not underminea sophisticatedconception of scientific sociology. Sociological knowledge can and does advance, but it depends upon building the coherence of theoretical conceptions across different areas and methods of research.

In recent years there have been a variety of sociological knowledge. But the overall thrust assaults on the conception of sociology as a of the criticisms, that sociology has and can science. These include the following themes. have no scientific validity, I believe is wrong. (1) Sociology has failed to produce valid To be sure, science is not the only valid mode findings or lawful generalizations. (2) Deter- of discourse, or of knowledge. Sociology, ministic laws do not exist because social like many other intellectual disciplines, can action consists of situational interpretation, be concerned with empirical descriptions based on human subjectivity, reflexivity, and including both contemporary social condi- creativeness. (3) We are locked in a world of tions and historical sequences; it can discuss discourse; society itself is a kind of text that moral issues, propose or excoriate policies for we read in different ways at different times. practical action, and compare existing condi- (4) The foregoing position is often connected tions against ideals; its can discuss founda- to , the claim that only historical tional, methodological, and other metatheo- particularsexist, and no general laws can be retical issues. But the core activity that gives found that apply at all times and places. (5) the field of sociology its intellectualjustifica- Finally, there are various technical criticisms tion is the formulation of generalized explan- of scientific methods and metatheory, espe- atory principles, organized into models of the of the conception of causality. The cially underlyingprocesses that generate the social of science today is in a postposi- world. It is these that determine how tivist mode; and a scientifically oriented particularconditions result in particularkinds sociology, it is said, is intellectually out of of outcomes. It is these generalized explana- date. tory modes that constitute a science. The various criticisms are not necessarily I will attempt to show that none of the united. Some of them include important difficulties raised the points that contribute to the widening of by antiscience argu- ments prevent sociology from formulating valid generalized explanatory modes. We * I am indebtedto Paul DiMaggio, Richard have the basic structures of several such Campbell, Robert Hanneman,Arthur Stinch- models already, in areas ranging from micro- combe, and JonathanTurner for commentson an sociology, through formal organizations, to earlierdraft of this paper. . It is not inevitable that

124 American Sociological Review, 1989, Vol. 54 (February:124-139) PROSCIENCEOR ANTISCIENCE? 125 sociology must be a scientific failure, nor has vided that they are not unequals in power or it failed. Those who attack scientific sociol- competitorsfor scarce resources. Variations ogy typically fight against a caricature of on this principle have been formulated "" at its narrowest. On the other numerous times, based on a wide range of hand, many practitionersof allegedly scien- research. Homans (1950) stated the basic tific sociology have assumed just those point, drawing upon studies of informal narrowconceptions of method and substance groups in industrial settings, as well as that make them vulnerableto the antipositivist anthropological research and experimental attack. small groups. Durkheim ([1912] 1954), in In what follows, I will deal in turn with the analyzing the central dynamic of religious major criticisms of sociological science but rituals, seized on the similar principle that also suggest what we can learn from the intensely focused interactionproduces moral antiscience critiques. The flux of situational solidarity and conformity to the group's interactions,human subjectivity and reflexive- symbols; Goffman (1967 pp. 1-136) extended ness, the dynamism and episodic movement this model to sociable conversations. The of macrostructures,are all part of sociology's famous Asch (1951) experiments demon- subject matter. It has been the merit of some strated the effect of group cohesion upon of the antiscience positions to bring these to pressures for conformity even in visual our attention, and even to explore their perception. Symbolic interactionist pattern; but this exploration has made it converges on the same point: if a person's possible to formulate these processes more are derived from the stance of a generally and hence to widen the realm of generalized other based on his or her social explanatory models which are the core of experience, then what individuals think must scientific sociology. be influenced by their patternsof interaction. Research on self-conceptions (M. Rosenberg THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF 1979; R. Turner 1978) can be regarded as a SOCIOLOGICALRESEARCH variant on this principle, demonstratingthe influence of group membershipand solidarity One line of attack dismisses sociology upon beliefs about oneself; in another appli- because we have no findings. After almost cation, expectation states research (Berger, 100 years of research, we still have come up Wagner, and Zelditch 1983) shows the effects with no valid generalizations, no laws of of group pressuresupon task performance(as sociology. This criticism is often made by did W.F. Whyte's famous Street Corner outsiders to our discipline; for instance, Society, 1943). Studies of networks (Bott Alasdair MacIntyre(1984) uses it as grounds 1971) provide the equivalent formulation: for his argumentthat there can be no secular, network cohesion results in homogeneous nontraditionalbasis of morality; Alexander attitudes. The coherence among these various Rosenberg (1980) argues that since the social kinds of theory and research constitutes have, and can have, no laws, any strong that the interaction- sociological explanation must come from a density/solidarity/conformity principles are sociobiological level of determinism. Sociol- true. ogists themselves sometimes also make the (ii.) Human cognitive capacity is limited; same dismissal, usually in the context of a accordingly, the more complex or uncertaina discussion of alternative metatheories (e.g., situation, the more that participantsfall back Spencer 1987). upon a taken-for-grantedroutine and focus But the charge that sociology knows on the particular area that presents the most nothing, that we have no valid generaliza- dramatic problems. There has been a great tions, is patently untrue. Let us review a few deal of convergence on this principle from of these, starting from the microlevel and very different points of view. HerbertSimon moving up to the macrolevel. presented this as the principle of "bounded (i.) The longer, more intensely, and more rationality," which explains why members of exclusively persons interact with each other, organizationsengage in "satisficing" in most the more that they will identify with one areas while troubleshootingthe most pressing another as a group, and the more pressure problem at any given time (Simon 1957; they will exert and feel for conforming to March and Simon 1958, pp. 173-71). From a local patterns of behavior and belief, pro- very different angle, Garfinkel's (1967) 126 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW ethnomethodological experiments demon- when a state's apparatusof militarycontrol is strate that individuals cannot cope with the broken down by internal dissension among full complexity of social arrangementsand elites: this breakdown is especially likely their justifications (especially since questions when there is military defeat and/or the about these justifications are in principle economic strain of long-term military ex- endless); accordingly, people actively resist penses beyond the organizational capacity of whenever they are forced to question more the state to collect revenues. This principle, than a very few taken-for-grantedroutines at as stated is limited: it tells us when a revolt once. Corroboratingevidence comes from will break out, not who will win, nor what experimental research on judgments under kind of social transformation, if any, will uncertainty(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky follow. This pattern has many variations: 1982). when the factors causing breakdownoccur in There are many ramifications of this a centralized state and coincide with popular general insight regardinghuman strategiesfor class conflict mobilized by changing property operating with bounded rationality in a relations, the result is a major social transfor- complex world; one might say it is one of the mation, a "revolution"in the fullest sense of common themes of the social sciences in the the term (Skocpol 1979). The interaction of late 20th century. It affects our efforts to demographic growth, money supply, and constructmodels of humancognitive process- inflation can be a prior determinantof the ing. It has implicationsfor understandingthe state's fiscal crisis (Goldstone 1986, 1987); nature of organizations and of the social the position of a state within the world system shaping of markets (Williamson 1975; White affects its ability to bring in revenues ahead of 1981). It explains why a source of power its military expenses (Wallerstein 1974, pp. within organizationsand occupations is occu- 133-47); geopoliticalpatterns determine which pying a position that has access to a crucial states will become overextended and hence area of uncertainty,whose occupants are able unable to sustain themselves militarily (Col- to define to the rest of the organizationwhat lins 1981b, 1986, pp. 145-209). In particular kind of nonroutine reality they are facing kinds of military/state organization (such as (Crozier 1964; Wilensky 1964).' The cogni- most premodern empires), the result of tive limitation principle also implies that geopolitical or fiscal crisis is disintegration change on the macrolevel would follow a into smaller coercive units. A more complete patternof long periods of routinizationbroken theory of state crises, both revolutionaryand by sudden episodes of restructuring.I would nonrevolutionary, would have to take into suggest, in this light, that the microprinciple account these kinds of considerations But I of cognitive limitations is implicated in believe we can accept with confidence the Perrow's (1967, 1984) macromodel of orga- basic principle of state military/fiscal crisis nizational systems, in which the combination leading to disintegrationof the apparatusof of nonlinearity of organizational processes coercive control, and that in turn leading to a and tight coupling among them results in revolt of subordinates. episodic "system accidents." My purpose in citing these principles is (iii.) On the macrolevel of the state, an merely to disprove the argumentthat sociol- importantprinciple is: A political crisis arises ogy knows nothing, and hence that a is impossible. I have not attemptedto pick out our most importantprinciples, to set 1 Power can also be based on resource depen- dence in a network structure (Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, and Yamagishi 1983; Willer 1987); and 2 A fiscal and/or military crisis is not the only on coercion, exercised with varying degrees of route to the dissension among elites that leads to effectiveness in differentnetwork structures (Willer the disintegrationof the coercive apparatus.The 1987; Schelling 1962). Power also depends on the fiscal/militarycrisis theory is not a complete theory organizational distribution of control resources of all revolutions and other revolts; but it appears (Etzioni 1975) and on the conditions of mobiliza- to be true, as far as it goes, and it covers a very tion and conflict among opposing groups, both important portion of events. As Paul DiMaggio civilian (Tilly 1978) and military (Collins 1988b). points out (personal communication),this theory is Power is a complex phenomenon;we have made related to a more abstract explanatory principle, progresson a series of partialtheories, without yet applicable in many contexts, about the disintegra- pulling them all together. tion of an organizationalsystem. PROSCIENCEOR ANTISCIENCE? 127 forth a systematic theory, or to assess the enact society. Such work includes the partic- overall state of our knowledge in sociology ipant observation practiced by symbolic (an effort to do so is in Collins 1988). Hence interactionists,as well as Goffman's efforts to these principlesmay look eclectic, lacking the map out the natureof everyday life. Without elegance of an overarching image of the such research, we would be left studying the social world. But I have given some hints fundamental realities of sociology's subject how these principles, although they are matter only indirectly, at methodological chosen almost at random from different parts arm's length. In the last few decades, there of the field, may be coherent with one have been further in microre- another, and I have suggested that such search,including ethnomethodologists' breach- principles are not trivial but lead to sociolog- ing experiments, and culminating in perhaps ical insights into a wide range of important the closest empirical analysis ever done in the questions. There are a good many other social sciences, using audio and video principles of this sort, especially in organiza- recordings of natural interactions as a basis tion theory but also in other areas of for developing formal models in conversation sociology. There is of course plenty of room analysis. for improvementin our precision and in our Most of this work would have been ruled understandingof the scope of these , out by textbook canons of research 30 years but enough evidence has built up that we can ago. The sense of alienation form the be confident we have good approximationsof sociological "Establishment" felt by many how some importantprocesses work. Many interpretive sociologists is no doubt due to different social scientists have contributedto memories of having lived through that time. this knowledge; we do have a core we can The vituperation against "positivism" is build upon, and a discipline we can be proud partlythe expression of an oppressedintellec- of. tual minority against their long-standing Is there anything salutary in the criticism oppressors after finally gaining a foothold in that sociology knows nothing? It is not true, respectability. but it should serve to remindus that sociology But we need not assume that all connection has a serious problem in professional self- between interpretiveand scientific sociology presentation. And within our own ranks, we is now severed, and that microresearchwith need to pay more attention to the explicit interpretivemethods should be institutional- cumulationof what we do know. ized as a kind of "separate but equal" enclave. On the contrary, the achievement of the SITUATIONALAND REFLEXIVE interpretive microsociologists should INDETERMINISM broaden our sense of acceptable methods for sociological science. Clearly, a scientific It is sometimes held that deterministicexpla- method for our field cannot rule out studies of nations are impossible because social action the subjective; sociological science cannot be consists of situational interpretation,subjec- founded on an exclusionary tivity, reflexivity, and emergence. This is an (although we should avoid going to the old criticism, going back at least to Dilthey's opposite extreme of ruling out the importance distinctionbetween the Geisteswissenschaften of behavior, includingunconscious behavior). and the Naturwissenschaften,and ultimately A science does not have to be built out of to the German Idealists' revolt against the "harddata" in the narrowsense. What makes Enlightenment. In recent years this line of it scientific is its ability to explain the criticism has become very prominent, so conditions under which one kind of pattern much so that one might characterizethe late holds ratherthan another, in whatever realm 20th century as a time of neo-Idealistrevival. those patternsmay be found. It is importantto recognize that subjectiv- Similarly, sociological science cannot be istic and interpretive schools of thought in equated to a rigid operationalizationof all of recent sociology have made positive contribu- its concepts. Not only is it legitimate for tions to sociological knowledge. On the explanatory theories to include nonopera- methodological side, these approaches have tional concepts at some levels; even a very fostered microresearchin naturalisticsettings, positivistic model must include general orient- empathetically entering into the processes, ing concepts within which its specific hypoth- feelings, and thoughts of real people as they eses and operationalizedvariables are located. 128 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW We always need a model of what the world is so to speak; even numbers and logical like, a mental picture of what are the relations have some areas of indeterminacy. fundamentalprocesses and entities and how We encounter this when number systems are they link together (see J. Turner 1988; Willer extended to infinity or to infinitesimality, and 1987). Specific hypotheses make sense only in nonconverging algebraic series. Many in terms of some such background assump- systems of equationsare unsolvablemathemat- tions about what kind of world we are dealing ically. Even rather restricted formal systems with. The narrower traditional forms of of logic always encounter G6delian incom- positivism, in demandingtotal operationaliza- pleteness; more complex systems of multi- tion of all concepts, merely took for granted valued, modal, and other nonclassical logics an unconscious conception of the world in have even greater areas of disagreement in which its explicit hypotheses were lodged. interpretation(Lewis 1986). I have expressed Such researcherscould easily lock themselves this elsewhere (Collins 1988, Appendix A) in into commonsensical or ideological assump- the following formula:mathematics is always tions, which their focus on the foregroundof embedded in words. But notice what conclu- research techniques kept them from seeing. sion follows: not that mathematics and The interpretivesociologies do us a service in mathematical science is impossible; on the forcing the issue, so that we are made contrary,a successful science is possible even explicitly aware of those backgroundmodels incorporating areas of fundamental uncer- and thus able to theorize them. tainty, dealt with by tacit and informal understandings. Tacit knowledge is knowl- The Place of Informal Concepts and edge too, as long as it works. Intuitions in Theory Whateverour kinds of explanatorymodels, we still need to be concerned about validating The notion of a complete and rigid formaliza- our theories. The that we are always tion, operationalization,and measurementof involved in interpretations (and at many everything in a scientific theory is a chimera. levels) does not mean that we can accept There are informal concepts and intuitive every interpretation offered at face value. leaps at several points. There is always a Typically we cannot decide these issues by a metatheoretical stance about what we are simple operationalization,, and doing intellectually in the first place. Scien- one-shot test. But the physical sciences face tific theory sketches a model of the aspect of most of these same problems, and their the world underconsideration; hypotheses are success in many areas shows that some derived from this, by a process of derivation research programsand theoretical models do that itself involves intuitive leaps. When prove themselves in the long run over rival operationalizingconcepts for empirical test, ones; there can be convergence on models we always make another intuitive leap in that work, that capture the central ways in deciding that particular or which the world is, even if these scientific other observations actually bear upon the models are inevitably vague and cluttered theory. These intuitive or informal leaps are around the edges. Successful heuristics and areas in which theoretical discussions can intuitions are possible, and unsuccessful ones take place (or, in many cases, ought to take which lead us into blind alleys can be ruled place). But they are not illegitimate. That is out. simply the way the world is. They do not The crucial criterion is that the best theory undermineour ability to have a science, for (with its ancillaryassumptions and heuristics) all sciences have these places where there are is that which maximizes coherence; it brings intuitive leaps. If physical scientists some- together the most successful explanatory times forget this and talk in crude positivistic models into a consistent overall picture of terms as if they report "nothing but the how the world operates. Methodologically, ," that is because they have been can be part of the coherence successful at making the right intuitive leaps criterion;the best validated theory is the one as their scientific procedureshave cumulated, maximally grounded to the empirical world so that they now have workable models that via the various explanatory submodels it they know intuitively how to apply to most of incorporates.An extreme, all-or-nothingem- the things they study. piricism is impossible; but a flexible empiri- Everythingwhatsoever has "fuzzy edges," cism, working with imprecisionsand intuitive PROSCIENCEOR ANTISCIENCE? 129 concepts where necessary, and making a great out (Goffman 1974), but Goffman did not deal of room for theoretical work that ties regard this framing activity as free-floating, things together, is a central part of science. and he rejected the suggestion that it reduced One needs to work nonpositivistically, so to the world to a kind of psychedelic fantasy. speak, to be a successful positivist. Transformativereinterpretations of subjective It is in just this vein that the interpretive reality are linked together into orderly trans- schools have contributedsubstantively impor- formations, among "adjacent"frames, so to tant theories. Among these are the symbolic speak. For Goffman, the bottom level frame, interactionisttheory of the self (part of which out of which all the others arise, is the is coherentwith well-establishedprinciple [i.] physical interactionof human animal bodies, mentioned above); the ethnomethodological an ecological baseline that links Goffman theory of everyday rationality (which is theoretically to Durkheimian theory of the coherent with the limited cognition principle, ritual basis of solidarity and of symbol- [ii.] above); as well as other existing and construction (for elaboration, see Collins potential contributionsto sociological knowl- 1988, pp. 188-203, 291-97, 320-34). edge. Goffman's (1959) model of It is possible, then, to have a structured in everyday life is a model, in the sense of understandingof subjectivity. In that perspec- "what the world is fundamentallylike" that I tive, the explorationsof the subjective side of mentioned above; from this base, one can go human life in the last few decades, notwith- on to develop specific explanatoryprinciples. standingtheir sometimes extreme pronounce- I have argued, for instance, that it provides a ments, have contributedelements towards a base for understandingthe differences in class much more sophisticated explanatory theory cultures, between those wielding power and of mind than would have been possible those subjected to power (Collins 1988, pp. before. 203-14). How Unpredictable is the Social World? Many sociologists in the interpretivecamp, Let us confront the issue of unpredictability however, claim that their major substantive head on. How much of the social world is finding is the impossibility of deterministic unpredictable?A great many things are highly theories (e.g., Blumer 1969, p. 60). In their predictable. It is the patternof people going empirical investigations,they discover, above to work over and over again to the same jobs all, emergence, unpredictability,situational- that makes up much of formal organizations; ity, humancapabilities for subjectivelyreflect- repetitive patterns make up households and ing upon and changing social conditions. families; networks of friends and acquaint- Here we have an argumentabout what kind of ances similarly are constituted out of behav- model we arrive at, not about whether it is iors, cognitions, emotions, and communica- possible to have any model at all. tions that are heavily patterned.For regularity But is it true that the main feature of the and predictabilityto exist, it need not even be social world is unpredictability,overwhelm- the same persons who repeatedly interact. ing any determinateprocesses? I suggest that Most stores have only episodic relationships it is not true, and that this perception comes with particular customers, but it is the from selectively focusing on a limited portion predictabilityof a certain number of people of the social world. Although much (but not coming in to shop that allows businesses to all) content of sociology consists of human stay open at all. Although microsociology is subjectivity, it does not necessarily follow the theoretical bastion of indeterminacy, it that this cognition and feeling are indetermi- should be apparent from these examples of nate. Without pursuing this point into the everyday life that the microlevel has a high status of theories of cognition and emotion, degree of predictability. let us think of Goffman, the acknowledged The theory of indeterminacyseems to rest genius of micro-interpretivesociology. Goff- upon two suppositions.One is that this kind of man used soft methods, but he believed the predictabilityis banal. It is true, but it is too world he was studying is hard. His social boring for sociologists to pay attention to it; theory of language (Goffman 1981) grounds we should focus on something that everyone cognition in the social of interaction. does not alreadyknow. So one might say there The complexity and reflexiveness of human is a built-in bias toward studyingthe dramatic subjective worlds come from the many and unpredictable.But I would deny that what possible "reframings" that actors can carry is banal from a participant'spoint of view is 130 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW necessarily banal for an explanatory theory. tions, the emergent events often look highly On the microlevel, Garfinkeltook the banality patterned.The belief in indeterminismhere is of everyday life as a productto be explained, a by-product of individual . If and uncovered cognitive mechanisms that al- we go to a genuinely interactive level, it is low it to happen-and that show us the pres- possible to specify the combinationof ingre- sure points when these mechanisms are inter- dients that go into the situation and determine fered with. On the macro- and mesolevels, its outcomes. (Such models of chains of good sociological work consists in refraining interactions are proposed by Heise 1979, the banalityof taken-for-grantedpatterns. Al- 1987, and by Collins 1981a.) though it seems naturalto a particularperson Does Knowing a Sociological Law Reflex- thatshe or he does a job and chats with friends ively OverturnIt? Finally, there is the argu- every day, there is much that sociologists have ment that whateverlaws sociologists may dis- uncoveredas to why jobs are structuredin this cover will be reflexively overturned.As soon way rather than that, why these persons are as people know what these laws are, they can friends ratherthan others, and so forth; these act to make them false. But although this are the contents of, for example, organiza- sounds plausible in the abstract,it is difficult tional theory, exchange and networktheories, to think of many cases in which it actually and stratificationtheory. applies. Perhapsthe Thomas Theoremitself is The other supposition leading us toward the prime example of a principle that can be theoretical indeterminacyis more valid. It is reflexively undermined. We have been most the recognition that situations can sometimes interested in this as a theory of prejudice, of change very rapidly: that there are negotia- the self-perpetuatingnature of biases against tions, conflicts, sudden insights, decisions, particularcategories of persons. By becoming and, on the macrolevel, movements, revolts, aware of these biases, the liberal public in the and revolutions. All this is true. But do we United States has made efforts to counteract take this as the end of analysis, or as a the bias. But does this actually violate the beginning point, a challenge to develop Thomas Theorem?Instead, we seem to be at- theories to explain when such sudden shifts tempting to avoid the circumstances under will occur? I have already noted that on the which the theorem gets started in a negative macrolevel, we know some of the crucial direction;we avoid giving negative definitions featuresthat make revolutionspredictable. On of persons, in the hopes that the consequences the microlevel, indeterminacy is typically will be a positive self-fulfilling prophecy in- grounded in some version of the Thomas stead of a negative one. Theorem. But if situations are determinedby Determinativeprinciples on the macrolevel subjective definitions, we can still ask what look ratherdifficult to evade. For instance, if determineswhat the definition of the situation military defeat or fiscal crisis leading to will be.3 What sometimes makes situations breakdown of the coercive apparatusfosters seem to have an unpredictable, emergent revolutionaryconflict, one can hardlyprevent quality is that one looks at them from the this simply by being aware of it; the best a point of view of a single actor who knows governmentcould do would be to try to avoid only his or her own intentions. But if we this principle's coming into operation, by know enough about all the actors in the avoiding circumstances that lead to military situation, and the structureof their interac- or fiscal crisis. Reflexivity may enable people to try to change the distributionof indepen- dent variables, but not the relationships 3The findings of ethnomethodologicalresearch between independent and dependent vari- do not supportthe notion of a great deal of sudden ables. Similarly, principles of formal organi- emergence and reinterpretation.Clegg (1975), for zational structuregive informationas to what instance, who set out to study a constructionfirm people can work around,but hardlywhat they in microdetail armed with tape recorder, soon can fly in the teeth of. Even on the found that the banality of everyday repetitiveness was overwhelming, and he had to shift to conflict microlevel, where an individual would seem points in management to find more dramatic most capable of reflexively changing an material. Ethnomethodological theory proposes outcome, I would suggest that when individ- that makingeveryday life into a routineis the basic uals actually control outcomes they are doing process, and that people attemptto avoid and gloss it by applying microsociological laws, not over disruptionsas much as possible. going against them. For instance, when PROSCIENCEOR ANTISCIENCE? 131 people deliberately go into an encounter makes inroads into the cosmopolitan side of group or similar group-dynamics situation, sociology (e.g., Brown 1987; Gottdiener they are implicitly making use of the 1985). microprinciple ([i], above) regarding how But the upsurgeof sociological researchon group solidarity is generated, because they cultureis not always merely relativistic. It has want its emotional payoff. Their mistake also been carried forward in a deterministic typically is to overestimate how long such mode: we have rather good researchers and solidarityand emotional will last, after theories about the materialand organizational a temporarygroup of this kind is disassem- base of the productionof culture, both as it is bled. Knowing the principle does not under- distributedamong social classes, as well as in mine it.4 more specialized culture-producing institu- It would be rash to predictthat sociological tions (Bourdieu 1984; DiMaggio and Useem science will explain everything. There may 1982; Coser, Kadushin, and Powell 1982). well be a considerableresidue of indetermin- Culture does not simple organize itself; it is ism even if sociology is successful far into the organized by social processes. future. But our intellectual impetus comes Foucault (1969), the most significant of the from pushing back the frontier. To preach French "discourse" school, has documented indeterminismand nothing further seems to the social bases of ideas in such practical me a parasiticalstrategy, since it is intellectu- fields as psychiatry and law. But Foucault ally of interest only if there is some body of does not attemptto underminethe validity of theory already existing that one wishes to his own discourse as a historian. Moreover, counter. The constructive is job to build as the historical patterns that he emphasizes as good an explanatorytheory as we can. determinativeof the field of discourse-the I have tried to establish that a science can bureaucratizationand specialization of social operate flexibly, and on all kinds of subject control agencies, the shift in public/private matters. Against this backdrop, I will com- boundaries,the move from ritualpunishments ment more briefly on the remainingcriticisms to a reflexively conscious self-are highly of sociological science. congruentwith Weberian(Weber [1915]1946) and Durkheimian/Maussian(Carrithers, Col- SOCIETY AS DISCOURSE lins, and Lukes 1985) theories of modernity. The best of this European work reinforces Another criticism goes as follows. We are rather than departs from the central cumula- locked in a world of discourse; society itself tive traditionsof sociological knowledge. is nothing more than a kind of text that we The intellectual popularity of "discourse" read in different ways at differenttimes. This as a master worldview is bolstered by the is a populartheme now, deriving from French success of the sociology of science in structuralismand its offshoots. It has created showing how knowledge is a social . a veritable revolution in the world of literary This success is indeed something to cheer criticism. is This understandableas a profes- about. But we should not forget that the sional ideology, elevating literary theorists' sociology of science is an own field by the assertion that all reality is a discipline, which has made great strides in the piece of literature. "Discourse" has thereby last 30 years in cumulating sociological won a wide influence in the larger intellectual models of what determines the kind of work (including the publishing business). It knowledge produced by particularkinds of fits well especially with the particularistic, organizationalconditions descriptive themes of anthropology and also (see Whitley 1984, for recent summary and synthesis). Notice what this does for the claim of undermining 4 It is sometimes said that knowing too much scientific knowledge. There is a determinism abouthow socialrelationships operate makes them at the very heart of this alleged indetermin- go flat. Canan exchangetheorist or someonewho ism; sociology of science itself is becoming a appliesDurkheimian and Goffmanian ritual theory fall in love? Does the theoretical self- scientific success. consciousnessdestroy the situation?I can attestto This raises some interesting issues of you it does not; robustsocial processeshave a reflexive self-consciousness. Some sociolo- quite wonderful power, overridinga 'weaker gists of science (e.g., the British school processlike momentaryreflectiveness. aroundMichael Mulkay, HarryCollins, Steve 132 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW Woolgar, and others; see Knorr-Cetinaand HISTORICISM Mulkay 1983) go so far as to argue that science is merely a set of competing power Historicism is the claim that only historical claims. The only democraticpath is to allow particularsexist, and no general laws can be no single voice to have a privileged position; found that apply at all times and places. This hence, Mulkay (1985) and others have taken argumentarises to some extent in conjunction to writing and presenting papers in a "New with other antipositivistcriticisms, as a kind Literary Form," in which the author steps of oppositionalunited front. But it also has its aside and lets many competing voices appear. autonomous basis in the actual practices of The result is entertaining,but it is not clear . It is a price we are why reflexiveness should prevent scientific paying for a very good thing. The last 20 knowledge. Bloor (1976, 1983), who power- years, since the publications of Barrington fully applies a Durkheimiantheory, argues in Moore and Charles Tilly in the 1960s, have his "strong program" that a sociology of been a golden age for historical sociology. science can and should explain not only false We have learneda great deal about macropro- knowledge claims but also true knowledge. cesses by looking at historical materials with From an organizational perspective, the a sociological eye and by making compari- power claims in scientific discourse that sons across societies and times. This, for Mulkay and others document are themselves instance, is how Moore (1966) showed the part of fairly predictable patterns. Different connection between the forms of capitalist kinds of intellectualdiscourse (i.e., particular agriculture and the differing political struc- scientific disciplines) are embeddedin organi- tures of modern states. But although this zations, and they themselves can be under- shows us something about particular states stood as organizationalforms. Hence, organi- (17th-century England, 19th-century United States, etc.), the theoretical con- zational theory (especially the theory of how underlying have a more universal various kinds of task uncertainty and of ceptions application;it is for this that a family of models resource dependence affect organizational related to Moore's (Paige 1975; Skocpol behavior and structure; see Whitley 1984; 1979; see also Stinchcombe 1961; Weber Fuchs and Turner 1986) shows scientific [1923] 1961, pp. 81-94) have been power- is a construction discourse not free-floating fully applied to other times and places. in but appears predictable ways under given Historical sociologists are under two sorts we circumstances. Furthermore, know that of pressure to announce themselves as organizational structures are at least partly historicists. One is that they come into a good determinedby the task environmentsin which deal of contact with historians. Historicism is they work (Collins 1988, pp. 467-85). This a kind of professional ideology for historians; means that the objective natureof the subject they make their living by describing particu- matteris one of the determinantsof the social lars, and furthermorethe pressuresof intellec- activity (including the discourse) that makes tual competition within their field lead them up science. to specialize and to resent intruderson their Argumentsthat exclusively emphasize dis- turf. Hence, historians tend to dislike any course are one-sided; although there is a suggestion that there are general processes, culturally constructed component in any and particularlythat such processes might be knowledge, it also can be knowledge of uncovered by comparing across times and something. Indeed, any argument about the places (i.e., across the boundaries of their social basis of knowledge is self-undermining researchspecialties). Historiansoften espouse if it doesn't have some external - an ideology that would make it impossible to reference as well-otherwise why should we consciously develop a general explanatory believe that this social basis itself exists? We theory; and many historical sociologists need to get beyond polemically one-sided respondto criticism from historiansby giving , of either the subjectivist or in to their ideology. the objectivist sort; a multidimensionalepiste- But historians'claims are not consistent. In mology can take account of the way we live interpretingtheir particularcases, they implic- in a cultural tunnel of our own history, but itly draw upon some ideas of what general still we can cumulate objective knowledge structures are and how patterns of social about the world. motivation and change operate. The analysis PROSCIENCEOR ANTISCIENCE? 133 of historical reality can hardly be approached theoretical level of abstract and universal with a tabula rasa; historians have theories explanatoryprinciples, and a level of histori- whether they know it or not. What makes cal particulars. Insofar as our theories are someone a great historian, one whose work successful, we will become better and better commands widespread intellectual attention, at showing how the myriad arrangementsof is typically his or her ability to create a historicalparticulars are generatedby particu- theory, to show the more general skeleton lar combinations of variables in theoretical underlyingthe narrativeof particulars.Lesser modes. There will always be tasks for historiansare usually those who operate with historians, and for historical sociologists, in naive, taken-for-grantedconceptions, or with making this kind of concrete interpretation. old theories that have passed into common At the same time, exploring concrete history discourse. Historians at their best have been is one of the main ways that we make building , although they progress in building and validating our have not always discussed it as such, and general models-although such theory is built have typically interwoven it with their and validated by its coherence with all kinds particular historical description, sometimes of sociological research, contemporary as with considerableartistry and dramaticstyle. well as historical. I have no sympathy with the blanket claim It is not true that there are no explanatory that historical particularism is all that is principles that hold generally across history. possible; on the contrary,we cannot even-see The three examples that I gave at the begin- particulars without general concepts. But ning of this paper are completely coherent, as there is a more valid reason why historical far as I know, with evidence from any histor- sociologists tend to work at a low level of ical epoch, and there are many more such prin- generality with theories embedded in the ciples. Of course, some principlesmay not be understandingof a particularrange of cases. applicable because the independent variable Even if one's aim is to develop general does not exist in a given historical situation. theory, the macromaterials of long-term One cannot predict either the existence or the history are extremely complex. Although we nonexistence of revolutionarycrises if there is may know something of rudimentary pro- no state. But there is doubtless a more abstract cesses, getting any very abstractpicture of the formulationrelated to principle(iii.) thatwould overall combinationof conditions operatingin apply to sources of crises in political power in historical change is very difficult. Theoreti- stateless societies. Macroprinciplesin general cally oriented historical sociologists have are likely to be more complex than microprin- worked with intermediateapproximations to a ciples, involving combinations of many pro- level of explanatorygenerality. For instance, cesses. But we have at least rudimentaryout- Weber's massive historical comparisons of lines of promisingprinciples on the macrolevel the conditions involved in the rise of as well. It is a mistake in criticizing the limi- rationalized capitalism have yielded many tationsof particulartheories (e.g., in widening general analytical points, but embedded in an the referencefrom allegedly independentsocie- account of certain concrete sequences of ties to a world system, or overthrowingunili- world history. This same halfway combina- near evolutionism or or tion is found in modem work such as that of functionalism), to go to conclude that general Mann (1986) on the conditions determining theory is impossible. The result of this critical the history of social power, of Goldstone development is not no theory at all, but im- (1986, 1987) on the state crises and social proved theory. transformations;and I will admit that my own work (Collins 1986), on such matters as the extension of Weberian theories of capitalism THE METATHEORETICALATTACK or of sexual stratification, is also quasi- ON CAUSALITY embedded in accounts of particularhistorical developments. Such works are a challenge for Critics of explanatorysociology like to point theoriststo attemptto departicularizewhat we out that the consensus in the philosophy of have learned, to pull out the more fundamen- science has changed since the heyday of tal theoretical structures underlying these . It is generally acknowl- accounts. edged that programs such as that of Carnap, We will always have two levels: a which attempted to construct all scientific 134 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW knowledge from sensory experience orga- positivist image of their opponentsand do not nized into statements of formal logic and touch a more realistic image of science. mathematics,have failed. There is no consen- Criticisms of the concept of causality are sus now on an alternative for frequentlyraised in this spirit. Causal theories science, although most philosophers make are dismissed on the grounds that there is no room for theoretical preconceptions and such thing as "the cause" of anything;there is programs, and for pragmaticsin both theory always a complex of conditions, and those in formulationand research (Quine 1969; Dum- turnhave antecedentconditions, which can be mett 1978; Putnam 1983). It would be traced backwardsand outwards in an endless generally agreed that mathematicsand formal web. Given causes explain something only logic are not self-grounding, and there is under particularconditions, which are typi- considerable recognition of the of cally taken for granted, especially in statisti- nonformalized statements in any body of cal analyses of data that attempt to knowledge. Along with this, there is a causally explain all the variance in their loosening up in the conception of what particular sample. Some of the attack on constitutesknowledge: not merely the ideal of causality, however, has come from within the classical , but widened to include the scientific camp itself (Gibbs 1972) and does rather different scope of knowledge in the not dismiss the aim of testable, generalized biological and earth sciences, history, extend- explanatoryprinciples. ing perhapseven as far as alternativeforms of Certainaspects of this debateare merely ter- knowledge embodied in art (Goodman 1978). minological. "Cause"is to come extent a met- What does this mean for sociology? I aphor,a shorthandfor referringto our focus on would suggest that it puts sociological science a particularportion of a complex of conditions more on an even footing, epistemologically that are involved in producing certain out- comes. Some of speaking, with the established natural sci- these conditions may be con- comitantrelationships of a ences. For they too operate under the same among parts ,as well as antecedentconditions that sort of epistemological imprecisions. Sociol- determine which kinds of outcomes will fol- ogy will never be a science fitting the old low. (See general discussions by Klein 1987; logical positivist ideal, but none of the natural Walker1987; Meekerand Hage 1988. As Wal- sciences fits that ideal either. We are not lace [1987] points out, there is a variety of aiming at the impossible; if we can reach the causal patterns-continuous, episodic, multile- of and degree approximate pragmaticsuccess veled, etc.) But it is importantto retain this the natural sciences have achieved, that concept, whetherunder the term "causality"or would be plenty. It is true that some something equivalent, for it enables us to dis- sociologists may continue to uphold a meth- tinguish between explanationsthat work and odological ideal that is closer to the crude ones that are vacuous. Functionalistanalysis, induction-plus-mathematical-formalization for example, has turnedout to be a poor mode model of science. I would suggest that this is of explanation,unless it can be translatedinto particularlylikely in the applied end of our causalmechanisms (see Stinchcombe1986, pp. field, where purely descriptive information 80-100). One cannot "explain" something by (e.g., on the success of desegregation pro- giving it a name, even if that name is "norms" grams) has some immediate use, and hence or "rules" or "culture"-or for that mattera straightforwardinduction is more likely to be "problematique"or "discourse"-any more pursued. But this does not affect the larger than one can explain gravity by referringto a issue of the methods appropriatefor building "gravitationouspropensity." Here "causality" a general explanatoryscience. is useful by giving us a mechanism,which tells Modernphilosophy of science does not de- us what process is operatingand when partic- stroy sociological science; it does not say that ular outcomes can be expected ratherthan oth- science is impossible, but gives us a more flex- ers. "Causality"saves us from reifications, as ible pictureof what a science is. This is all to well as from ideologicaljustifications masquer- the good in consolidatinga science out of the ading underthe guise of explanations. materialsthat sociology alreadyhas available. As we have seen above, an explanatory A numberof the more specific technical criti- theory has as its core a model of "how that cisms mounted by the antiscience position in part of the world works," what the parts are sociology seem to me to cling to a narrowly and how they fit together. Specific causal PROSCIENCEOR ANTISCIENCE? 135 propositionsfit into such a model and are the ical level, Turner seems to assume a rigidly object of empirical testing, but they depend positivist conception of theory and fails to upon the backgroundconditions of the whole recognize that any theory involves interpre- model. Some of the objections to "causal tive leaps and pragmatics, including deciding theory" in sociology are directed at particular that given observations are appropriately kinds of statistical models (e.g., in the status connected to a given theory. All theories are attainmentliterature) built entirely at the level not equally valid; the question is which theory of propositions. But although such models works in the largest number of contexts that may be too embedded in a particularbody of are coherent with one another. data from a given historical period and fail to make explicit the structural conditions that frame these processes, that is not to say that Obstacles to Cumulationand The such causal processes cannot be incorporated OrganizationalPolitics of Sociology in a valid theory of the larger social universe I maintainthat when we go looking for it, we (see Campbell 1983). find bits and pieces of sociological knowledge Steven Turner (1987) voices a more lying all over the landscape. Our problem is specific objection, to causal statementsof the recognizing what we have and organizing it form "the more the X, the more the Y." He so as to maximize its visibility. Why is this so argues that such propositions are literally difficult? untrue unless the correlation is perfect; but One reason is the fragmentation and empirically there are always exceptions, and antagonism within our field. Sociology is hence such propositions have no logical divided into a large number of specialties. foundation. Turner denies that imperfect This is hardlysurprising, since there are many correlationcan be taken as an approximation thousands of researchers with an interest in to true causal relations. He holds that there is cultivatingtheir own turf; and since sociology no path, logically, from general propositions takes the entire social world (including its (which are always idealized and perfect) to causes and effects) as its target, there is an the messy world of inexact relationships. enormous range of empirical things that we Statistics provides no answer to this underly- can study. The sheer amount and diversity of ing issue. Theory is always underdetermined sociology give us a practical incentive not to by data, and a wide-open pluralism of pay attentionto work outside one's own area. theories is the consequence that presumable On top of this, there is a diversity of methods, will always be with us. whose proponents frequently regard work Turner's argument, however, leads to produced by rival methods as having no absurdextremes. Does anyone really believe knowledge value. And there is a furthersplit that if we had a large number of well- into theoreticalschools, which often denigrate validatedpropositions of the form "in a large each other as part of their competition for proportion[fill in the range of probability]of hegemony. These battles are especially in- cases, the more the X, the more the Y," we tense when theoretical factions have political would know nothing at all? Turner's argu- overtones, or when it is argued that only ment cuts against physical science as well as practical knowledge or politically engage against sociology; again, I would be quite expressions of a particular sort are worth- happy with the level of approximationand while. All these conditions make it difficult pragmatic success that these other sciences for us to pick out the places where theoretical have achieved, whatever a purist argument explanations come together, and to assemble like Turner's would say about the logical the bits of evidence thrown up by different status of such knowledge.5 On the philosoph- approachesinto a coherent pattern.6

5 As Willer (1987, pp. 43, 220) points out, of experimentalerror was considered ordinaryand physical scientists typically carry out experiments, no one even considered statistically testing the not to achieve statisticalvalidation, but to discover result. . . . [W]hat can it possibly mean to say that the range of conditions underwhich a theoretically physics is an exact science? . . . [E]xact meant the derived relationshipholds. Willer (1987, p. 220) exact use of theory, not necessarily the exact comments: "physicists were satisfied with an productionof clean results." experimentif its results came withina factor of ten 6 One of the main advantages of the natural or more of theoreticallypredicted values. This sort sciences may be that there are relatively few direct 136 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW Perhapseven more importantfor American ing togetherdifferent studies into theoretically sociology has been a different type of split, coherent patterns. between descriptive and theory-oriented re- Data from different time periods are a search. The latter is the search for general positive advantage in attemptingto cumulate explanatoryprinciples; the former is a much general explanatoryprinciples. The change in more straightforwardinvestigation of ques- empirical distributionsthat we often observe tions that, at least initially, are fully compre- enables us to formulate principles of scope hensible to a layperson. This is the class of and to refine our theories. For example, issues such as: how much social mobility is research from and com- there? (are we still the land of opportunity? munity studies from the 1930s through the were we ever?) how much racial discrimina- 1950s led to general principles about how the tion, and what progress towards its diminu- experience of giving or taking orders pro- tion? These kinds of could be duces divergentclass cultures (summarizedin theory-relevant, but it is not necessary that Collins 1988, pp. 211-14). The knowledge one have an explanationin terms of genuinely accumulatedremains relevant on the analyti- analyticalvariables in order to produce useful cal level, even if (as seems to be the case) the information. Statistical technique without harsher forms of authority have diminished much theory finds its place most naturally for most working people in recent decades, here. It is likely this practically oriented which would bring about declining differ- search for descriptive information that anti- ences in class cultures. A comparison of positivistic sociologists have in mind when historical differences would thus not merely they attack the methodological and antitheo- add particularisticdescription, but have value retical bias they perceive in sociology. for testing and extending the theory; its scope This division of labor between our different would be further bolstered by bringing in activities need not poison the atmosphereover even more extreme instances, which we can what is a scientificsociology. Practical/descrip- find most easily by going back to another tive researchcould doubtlessbe done betterif it historicalepoch in which extremely harshand were groundedin more analytical theory, but violent coercive controls were common. for manypurposes an atheoreticaldescription is Analytical theory must be distinguishedfrom enough. What is importantto recognize is that empirical generalizations about trends over cumulating an analytical core of explanatory time; only the former can give us understand- propositionsis a differententerprise. When we ing of future social patterns, whether or not attemptto cumulateour generalknowledge, we there is a reversal of empirical trends in the have to know what we are looking for and to independentvariables. cull it from the mountainsof descriptivemate- Another reason why we fail to cumulate is rial that make up so much of the researchlit- that we place too much emphasis on the most erature.Theory-oriented research and practical- recent advances in statistical techniques, and /descriptive research can live together insufficientemphasis on the connectionsof re- harmoniously, even if they produce an sults acrossdifferent methods. As Stinchcombe information-retrievalproblem. (1984, pp. 55-56) pointedout underthe head- More debilitating is an attitude that seems ing "Whyare Generalizations forgotten?": "the to carry over from practical/descriptivework biggest correlationcoefficients in a body of em- into all of sociological research:the tendency piricalmaterials will ordinarilygive rise to the to regardonly the latest data as relevant. If we biggest path coefficients. . . . Similarly, in al- want to know what the equality of educational most all cases, the metric coefficients in a re- opportunityis, the survey with the latest date gressionequation will be biggestrelative to vari- is obviously of most practical significance. ationsin causalforces when the pathcoefficient But this "bias of the present," a kind of is largest.... And, in turn,the big relationsin headline-chasing in sociology, is one of the loglinear analysis are almost always the same factors that turn our faces away from pull- ones thathave big metricregression coefficients ....What this means is that almost all of our causal knowledgefrom the time we were using political implications of their theories. This has correlationcoefficients (or even eyeballingcross- enabled them to avoid a source of controversies tabulations) is still our causal knowledge that has clouded the analyticalproject of the social throughoutthe transitionsto path analysis, to sciences, and of sociology above all. structuralequations with metriccoefficients, to PROSCIENCEOR ANTISCIENCE? 137 loglinear analysis." There are of course ad- a sense, is too much knowledge, especially vances, in the sense that log linear analysis or since so much of it is on the practical/descrip- latent variablemeasurement models enable us tive side, which becomes unwieldy if it is not to see certaindifficult patterns, to model certain boiled down into theoretical generalizations. complexitiesand take accountof particularpos- We suffer from the limitations of our sibilities of measurementerror. But these are cognitive capacity, and this cognitive over- developments,so to speak, on the edges of the- load reinforces the structurallybased tenden- oretically substantiveparadigms, not at their cies in the intellectualworld to simplify one's core. We should be building on the earlierre- sociological worldview down to one's own sults ratherthan dismissing them because the researchspecialty, theoreticalcamp, or polit- researchlacked all of today's technical refine- ical faction, and to focus solely on the latest ments. researchdata or technique. As current methodological sophistication (e.g., Campbell 1983; Lieberson 1985; Willer 1987) readily acknowledges, there is no auto- CONCLUSION matic "methodologicalfix"; explanatorymod- My final point, perhapsthe most important,is els are always underdeterminedby any partic- about the mood of sociology. It concerns our ular set of data, and theoreticalconsiderations social relationships,our attitudes toward one always enter into our assumptionsas to which anotherwithin our intellectualfield. Much of models can be plausiblyexcluded. If empirical what we express today abouteach other's work patternsare robustenough-that is, if our the- is negativistic,hostile, dismissive. This faction- ories are on the right track-we will find them alism is debilitatingbecause we need multiple with a variety of methods. If the theories have approachesin orderto cross-validateour find- a weak graspof the centralprocesses, thenwhat ings. we end up with aftergreat statistical refinement For sociology to make progress, we need is likely to be at best a shadow. some spiritof generosity, insteadof a spiritof All research methods have their weak- factionalantagonism. This is not the same as a nesses. We can overcome this problem by policy of "go your own way," toleratingeach showing a coherent pattern among results otherbut havingnothing to do with one another found with differentmethods. Thus, although intellectually.Building sociologicalknowledge there are weaknesses in cross-sectional re- is a collective enterprise, and in more ways search (Lieberson 1985), the coherence of than one. All human activities are social, and theory based on all sources of evidence can be science itself is a process of organizingthought used to validate our inferences as to what collectives. As in other human activities, con- factors are operative in a given body of data. flict is inherentwithin the organizationof the The existence of experimentalevidence helps intellectualworld. This is not bad, since con- enormously, when tied to a general theoreti- flict is a main source of intellectualdynamics, cal scheme; so do theoretical connections to including the processes by which we put for- naturalisticstudies (e.g., of organizationsor wardnew theoriesand collectively decide which of face-to-face interaction), to historical ones lead to the best results. But conflict need studies of dynamics, and indeed to the entire not be extreme. In no form of intellectuallife range of sociological research. Coherence, if do we depend more heavily upon each other it is sufficiently strong, can bail us out of any than in a science. To come together as scien- local methodological jam. And this is a tists, we need to concentrateon the coherence reason for working to theorize our findings of theoreticalconceptions across different pieces everywhere. From a methodologist's angle, of research. The personal aspect of that intel- theory might be regarded as a device for lectual structureis generosityand good will, a storing our understandingsof this coherence. positive feeling towardseach other's best con- Hence, ignoring earlier researchis a vice and tributions as we grope our way forward to- not a virtue; the very differences in research gether. methods give us an opportunity to validate our findings by "triangulation." Sociology is engaged in many different REFERENCES enterprises.The extreme diversity of what we Asch, Solomon E. 1951. 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