Definite Descriptions Are Directly Referential
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Definite Descriptions are Directly Referential Simon James Varey 2016 A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences University of Sydney Abstract Amongst those who have analysed definite descriptions as referential, most have considered them to be indirectly referential. In contrast, I will argue that definite descriptions are directly referential, in the sense of Kaplan (1980). In other words, the informational contents of utterances of definite descriptions are identical to their referents. In this thesis, I will first present a semantic frame- work inspired primarily by Kaplan (1980) with additions from Russell (2008) and Salmon (1986). I will then present a semantic analysis of definite descriptions whereby they are directly referential expressions. This analysis will also concur with Lewis’ (1979) suggestion that the referents of definite description utterances are determined by comparative salience. I will argue that this analysis provides the most theoretically virtuous explanation of the various semantic properties of definite descriptions. I will also examine a series of problem cases for this anal- ysis and argue that they can be resolved through independently justified means. Firstly, I will discuss Frege’s Puzzle, as presented by Salmon (1986), as it relates to the directly referential analysis of definite descriptions, as well as the related problem of de dicto indirect speech and propositional attitude reports. I will suggest that Salmon’s approach to these problems in the case of proper names will also apply in the case of directly referential definite descriptions. Secondly, I will argue that Kripke’s (1977) analysis of the phenomena discussed by Donnellan (1966) is compatible with the directly referential analysis of definite descriptions. Thirdly, I will provide an ambiguous analysis of modal operators to account for de dicto modal claims. I will conclude by discussing possible links between this analysis and analyses of other singular terms.1 1First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Nick Smith for his invaluable assistance in the creation of this thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank Laura MacDonald and audiences at the University of Sydney and the 2013, 2014 and 2015 AAP, 2014 APPC and 2015 AAL conferences for their feedback. Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my father Doug, mother Sue, sister Katrina and partner Anastasia. Without their unending support this thesis could never have been created. 1 Contents I The General Framework 6 1 The Four Kinds of Meaning 6 1.1 The Roles of Meaning . .6 1.2 Contents, Bases and Constitutions . .8 1.2.1 Contents . .9 1.2.2 Bases . 10 1.2.3 Constitutions . 11 1.3 Expressions and their Uses . 13 1.4 A Note on Denoting . 17 1.4.1 A Type System for Denotata . 17 1.4.2 Denotation Gaps and Presupposition . 20 1.4.3 Non-Extensional Operators and Non-Standard Denotations . 22 1.4.4 Truth versus Acceptability . 24 2 Propositions and Content 25 2.1 What are Propositions? . 26 2.2 Samesaying and Indirect Speech . 27 2.3 What Can and Can’t Play the Role . 29 2.4 de re versus de dicto ............................ 33 2.5 Propositions are Eternal but Bases are not . 34 2.6 The Other Roles Propositions Play . 37 2.6.1 Propositional Attitudes . 37 2.6.2 Modality . 39 2.6.3 Information . 40 2.7 Contents are Total . 43 3 Constitutions and Characters 44 3.1 Constitutions . 44 3.1.1 Constitutions and Reference Determiners . 45 3.1.2 Incomplete Constitutions . 51 3.2 Characters . 53 II An Analysis of Definite Descriptions 55 4 Definite Descriptions are Referential Expressions 56 4.1 Referential or Quantificational? . 56 4.2 Arguments for the Quantificational Analysis . 57 4.3 Arguments for the Referential Analysis . 60 5 The Denotation of Definite Descriptions 62 5.1 Empty Uses . 62 5.2 The Uniqueness View . 64 5.2.1 History of the View . 64 2 5.2.2 The Context-Level Uniqueness View . 65 5.2.3 Problems with the Uniqueness View . 66 5.3 The Familiarity View . 69 5.4 The Salience View . 70 5.4.1 History of the View . 71 5.4.2 The Notion of Salience . 72 5.4.3 Evidence for the View . 74 5.4.4 Formal Representations of Salience . 76 6 The Rival Analyses 78 6.1 The Indirectly Referential Analysis . 78 6.1.1 The Analysis . 78 6.1.2 The History of the Analysis . 81 6.2 The Directly Referential Analysis . 82 6.2.1 The Analysis . 82 6.2.2 The History of the Analysis . 84 6.3 Hybrid Referential Analyses . 87 7 The Best Analysis 90 7.1 Arguments for the Salience Directly Referential Analysis . 90 7.1.1 Unified Analyses . 90 7.1.2 No Partial Contents . 92 7.1.3 Samesaying and the de re ..................... 92 7.1.4 The Context-level Salience View . 95 7.1.5 The Salience Directly Referential Analysis is the Best Analysis . 97 7.2 Arguments against the Salience Directly Referential Analysis . 98 7.2.1 Frege’s Puzzle . 98 7.2.2 de dicto Indirect Speech Reports . 105 7.2.3 Donnellan on Definite Descriptions . 109 7.2.4 de dicto Modal Claims . 114 7.2.5 Salmon on Definite Descriptions . 117 A A Formal System of Contents and Constitutions 122 A.1 A Type System for Content and Constitutions . 122 A.1.1 Intensions, Colours and the Type System . 124 A.1.2 Non-extensional Operators, Non-standard Denotations and the Type System . 126 A.2 A Formal Definition of Contents . 127 A.2.1 The System . 127 A.2.2 A Recursive Definition of the ↓ Function . 129 A.2.3 The Different Kinds of Content . 130 A.2.4 Non-Extensional Operators and Non-Standard Denotations . 136 A.3 A Formal System of Constitutions . 136 A.3.1 The Different Kinds of Constitution . 138 A.3.2 Constitutions with Non-standard Denotations . 141 References 145 3 Introduction The main focus of this thesis is informational content.2 The informational content of an utterance of a sentence can loosely be understood as what that utterance says, or the claim that it makes. The informational content of an utterance of a subsentential expression can then be understood as what that utterance contributes to the infor- mational content expressed by the utterance of a sentence it is part of. The notion of informational content is very important philosophically for a number of reasons. In par- ticular, informational content plays a central role in analyses of indirect speech reports, propositional attitude reports and modal claims. In this thesis, I will be particularly concerned with the informational content of utterances of definite descriptions. I will claim that the informational contents of utter- ances of such expressions are identical to their referents. To use Kaplan’s (1980, p. 493) terminology, I will claim that definite descriptions are directly referential expressions. While there has been much debate over whether definite descriptions are referential or quantificational expressions, most of those who have held that definite descriptions are referential have gone on to claim, usually without much argument, that definite de- scriptions are indirectly referential.3 One major exception to this is Donnellan (1966), who claimed that some, but not all, utterances of definite descriptions were directly ref- erential. Contrary to all these figures, I will make the original claim that all utterances of definite descriptions are directly referential. I will present this claim, that definite descriptions are directly referential, in the form of a semantic analysis of definite descriptions: a theory which assigns each definite description a meaning.4 These meanings will, relative to the context of an utterance of a definite description, determine the informational content (and referent) of that utterance. The reason I present this claim in the form of a semantic analysis, rather than any direct assignment of informational contents, is that (as I discuss in Chapter 2) different utterances of the same definite description may have different informational contents (and referents), while all utterances of the same definite description will have the same meaning. Such an analysis will also answer the question: in virtue of what do utterances of definite descriptions have the informational contents they do? This thesis has two parts. In the first part, I will present a general semantic frame- work within which I will discuss and evaluate my analysis and rival analyses of definite descriptions. This framework will be based primarily on Kaplan’s (1980) Logic of Demonstratives with extensions and revisions from Russell (2008), Salmon (1986) and myself. In the second part I will present my salience directly referential analysis of definite descriptions and argue that it is the correct analysis of definite descriptions. 2Cf. Salmon (1986, p. 1): “The topic of this book is the nature of the cognitive information content of declarative sentences”. Unlike Salmon, I will not describe informational content as ‘cognitive’, as (to my ears) ‘cognitive content’ sounds like narrow mental content and (as I discuss in Chapter 2) the informational contents Salmon and I intend to discuss are wide mental contents. I will use the terms ‘informational content’, ‘information’ and ‘content’ roughly synonymously throughout this thesis (as I elaborate in Chapter 2). 3For example: Frege (1892), Kaplan (1980), Salmon (1986), Russell (2008). Salmon (1986, p. 20-21) does provide an argument for this conclusion, which I will examine in Chapter 7. 4More specifically, this semantic analysis will assign each definite description a constitution (a kind of meaning I will introduce in Chapter 1). In Chapter 3, I discuss why such a theory should be called a semantic analysis.