RATNAGIRI - UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR FORCE

MANORAMA SAVUR

Ratnagiri (in Konkan on the Western Ghats) was not always underdeveloped. It was made so. The roots of it are to be found in history and to coincide with the coming in of European powers. The changing class interests of the English, however, played the crucial role. The Indian ruling classes till almost the end of the last decade have perpetuated "underdevelopment". In this study we show as to why the English turned a cluster of barren islands into Bombay, and in order to do so how Ratnagiri, a flourishing region, had to be simultaneously pauperised. The process was a necessary and a deliberate one for the survival and deve lopment of a class that held power. We start with the assumption that labour is an essential ingredient for development. We also indicate how both extra-legal and later, legal devices were used to such man-power, from the flourishing region into a new one which needed labour power, and had not only higher potentialities for development, but had also strategic importance for political control of the whole of Western India. In order to maintain a continuous flow of labour force from the Ratnagiri region, the in itial step was to break, not only its economy, but its eco-system as well. Certain historical antecedents facilitated the process The next one was to deprive it of infrastructural facilities and strip it of major resources viz. man-power and forests. We br iefly trace the process of development of Bombay from the seventeenth century, and of the slow withering away of Ratnagir during the same period, mainly through the transfer of labour force Other contributory antecedent factors are not ignored but are given their due importance. In this paper we broadly reiterate that:

SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN Vol. 31, No. 2, September 1982 UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 183

"The teeming population of Ratnagiri has been the chief factor in the development of Bombay". (Bombay Gazetteer 1880:106)

Part I

Early History of Bombay In the first phase of mercantile expansion, England was only tech- nically concerned only with trade in India. Till the early seventeenth century, it had to contend with other European powers like the Dutch, the French and the Portuguese on the west coast. Although, the East India Company had set up its first important factory in Surat, it had to face many difficulties. For instance, till 1615, the Portuguese were virtual masters of the sea Again, the fertility of the soil of Gujarat roused the interest of the Moguls, and the region's richness had attracted the Marathas who had attacked Surat twice; finally Surat's importance was reduced by ravages of flood and fire. The English needed an additional but safer foothold on the west coast. The lucky break came when the Portuguese transferred a cluster of seven small islands in 1661 to the British Crown as a part of a marriage treaty. A greater part of the islands were more or less submerged under the sea and what remained above was almost barren (Malabari : 93). The few land owners around were mainly Portuguese, who created many technical difficulties to prevent the marriage treaty from being carried out. But Bombay was forcibly taken over by the English in 1662; five ships of war carrying 500 troops abroad were used for the purpose. Bombay, therefore, was considered both a troublesome, as well as, an unprofitable possession 'Malabari : 94-97). Yet, it had a splendid harbour that English at once recognised as strategically valuable. The island was, however, leased out to East India Company in 1669 for a modest rental of £10/- per annum But, it was made clear by the Charter Act of March 27th of 1668, that the East India Company could not trans-fer it to an alien power. In other words, England held feudal rights over the island. But some concessions had to be made and by the new Charter Act, the Company was empowered to exercise certain legislative and judicial authority, to appoint Governors, and to raise and train military forces. The total revenue, the Company was able to collect in 1669, was only £6500/-, which was insufficient to de- 184 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN fray even the cost of administration (Malabari : 394). Yet, political control was crucial, particularly at this stage, to get a monopoly hold of trade and when trade actually meant unequal exchange, loot and forcible appropriation of commodities.

The gateway to power and political control for the English was through the west coast and Bombay would serve as a fresh new port which would be free from interference of the local, as well as other European powers. Territorial acquisition combined with ab- stract political power would, however, be of little use unless men populated the newly acquired area The authorities therefore, decided to make Bombay the chief centre of trade and under Aunjier's governorship (1671-77), traders, both the English and native, were given every facility to establish themselves. Malabari also mentions that records of Mayor's Court indicate that loans were granted to handicrafts-men of every type ranging from gold smith to shoe smith; looms were provided for weavers; and every indulgence was shown to merchants and manufacturers to settle down in Bombay. By the third quarter of the eighteenth century, there was an influx of wealthy men too (Malabari : 129, 410-422). The keynote of the policy of the Governors was to promise security of life and property and freedom of religion to new settlers (Malabari : 103). It must be remembered that such freedom of religion was not permitted by the Portuguese.

Bombay began to grow in 1770 (Gazetteer of Bombay, 1901 : 121). The influx of people meant, on one hand the need for recla - mation of the Island and on the other construction of private houses and public administrative buildings. But, the island itself' had neither local population to carry out the construction work nor sufficient timber for construction. There was only a sprinkling of Bhandaries (toddy tappers), Kunbis (cultivators), and Kolis (fishermen) (Malabari : 393). But the English got control of Bankot and its neighbouring villages in 1756 and Malvan in 1765 (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 196-199); both from the Ratnagi district. A British Government document indicates that the first three groups of workers who migrated to Bombay were Mahrs, Malvanis and Bankotis (Bombay Gazetteer, 1980 : 143). The control of timber forest of Ratnagiri will be discussed later. UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 185

Growth of Bombay Docks and Need for Labour Surat had declined from mid-17th century. Although the English had control of Dabul and Bankot on the Ratnagiri coast, these two ports were progressively destroyed by the Portuguese who operated from neighbouring Goa. But since from 1660 Goan trade itself began to decline, the English decided to develop Bombay as their main trading port, (Surendra Gopal, 1975 : 100) for after-all it had a natural harbour. The English set up a shipyard in 1781 in Bombay, where 500 natives were employed. Later the number rose to 2,000 workers (Morris, D. M , 1965 : 11, 17). Britain had just passed through the first phase of her industrial revolution and now required a larger supply of cotton. Indian cotton supply was relatively small in size and poor in quality, yet Britain was unwilling to rely solely on American imports. The British industrial bourgeoisie also demanded an outlet for its finished products and under their pressure the East India Company's mono- poly was put to an end in 1813. Commerce immediately improved. For instance, Bombay's export of raw cotton rose from 30 million pounds in 1809 to 90 million pounds in 1816 and with an increase of price of American cotton in 1832, the Indian export jumped to over a million bales between 1835-361 (Edwards, S. M., 1901 : 109, 113). Bombay Government which acted in the interest of mercantile community pressed the East India Company in 1829 to open a sea route from Suez to Red Sea. Suez was opened in 1869. This at once brought Bombay a thousand miles closer to England than either Madras or Calcutta, and Bombay's importance vis-a-vis the other two ports rose enormously2 (Thorner, D., 1950 : 25-26). Growing trade, particularly after the boom following the American Civil War (1861-65), meant enlargement of the docks and port facilities, to berth larger ships. The work on Mazgaon dock was started in 1863, and on Princes Dock began in 1875; wet docks were expanded and the neighbouring private ones purchased Modernized and opened by 1880. Victoria docks (1888) was meant to berth very large ships (Edwards : 129-149). Exports rose from an average of Rs. 24 crores in 1870-72 to Rs. 39 crores in 1890-92 and for the same period imports from Rs. 12 crores to Rs. 17 crores.3 A definite proof of growth and profitability of commerce was setting 186 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN up of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce in 1836 (Thorner : 7). It was sponsored by British and Indian merchants, (Edwards 113) and the old system of agency houses began to make room for establishment of joint stock banks, Bank of Bombay opened its business in 1840, Oriental Banking Corporation in 1844 and by 1860 commercial Chartered Mercantile Bank and Central Bank of Western India gained their assured position (Edwards : 121). In spite of the growing prosperity of Bombay, the conditions of the dock workers and the working class in general were becoming miserable, with low pay, indebtedness, poor housing. With increasing influx of labour force in the city, chawls began to spring up in large numbers for the first time from 1860 onwards4. (Edwards, 1901 : 151). Ratnagiri peasants worked in both the organized and the unorganized sector, but the first major documented evidence suggests that they worked in the docks (Enthoven, R. E., 1901 : 33). Railways The significance of railways for our theme is two-fold. It is an infrastructural facility which has the potentialities for development but this potentiality was deliberately denied to Ratnagiri. Railway sleepers are made of durable timber and Ratnagiri trees were felled ruthlessly for laying the railway tracks, which brought in its wake ecological imbalance and contributed to the breakdown of the economy of Ratnagiri region. The British decision to introduce railways in India was dictated by two vital concerns, viz., industrial production and internal defence. The British industrial bourgeois found that the Indian export of raw cotton fell from 88 million lbs. to 34 million lbs. in 1846 (The Economist, 1947, quoted in Thorner : 7), due to lack of good internal transport. Cotton used to be transported by pack-bullocks or by bullock carts, which were both expensive and unsafe. The logical step then was to cover India or at least the strategic cotton growing areas with railways. Simultaneously it was thought that British products should also penetrate into these areas. The East India Company was hostile to this idea fearing that it would bring about its own downfall (Thorner : 10, 12). As stated earlier, the Company's commercial privileges had been cut by the Parliament in 1813, under the pressure of the industrial bourgeoisie. UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 187

Governor General Hardinge saw an additional value in Rail- ways, viz , for military control of the country, through quick troop movements through sensitive spots (Hardinge, Minutes of July 28th 1846). Incidentally, Hardinge, did not touch on the question of raising capital in Britain. On the contrary the revenue to support the Railways was to be drawn from the freight traffic (Thorner: 70). The G.I.P. Railway was projected in 1844; the first train steamed out of Bombay on 16th April, 1853 (Edwards : 120). The Bhor ghat with a steep incline of 15% miles, built at a cost of six million, was opened in April, 1863. The first section of B.B.C.I. was ready in 1860 and the Ahmedabad section in 18635. Now for the question of railways in Ratnagiri; it is raised because we assume that the infrastructural facilities contribute to regional de- velopment. It had been clearly laid down that freight would defray the cost of railways. Several attempts had been made to cultivate cotton in Ratnagiri without success. Yet, for a strange reason; a survey was actually conducted as early as in 1866 to build a Bombay-Mahad railway and beyond to Ratnagiri but, then the plan was dropped (Maharashtra Archives, 1970 : 1). The proposal was again revived in 1882 by the Commissioner of Customs and in 1883 by an young enthusiastic Assistant Collector of Kolaba, who insisted that the proposal was financially sound because there would be a reasonable traffic from Ratnagiri, the cradle of Bombay's labour force, as well as, from Deccan just across Mahad. He even argued, such competition from railways would pep up the coastal steamer service. The P.W.D. jeered at the Assistant Collector and turned down his suggestion on 12th April 1883 on the ground that the area was unproductive and the goods from that region "will not fill more than six truck loads a day". In other words, it was commercially not a profitable venture (Maharashtra Archives, 1970 : 6-9). One must also remember, railways at this stage were often owned by private companies. To anticipate, today's leadership also turns down the proposition, on the ground that the Konkan terrain is too rugged and expensive for railways. The Kasara ghat on the B.B.C.I. line and the Bhor ghat on the G.I.P. negate this argument. A metre gauge line did run on the Deccan plateau from Poona to touch Satara Road, Kolhapur, Belgaum and Dharwar. But these were political trouble spots where a number of mutinies were led by local Maratha chieftains which preceded the mutiny of 1857 188 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

(Cox, 1887 : 359, 362) and one of the purposes of railways was to facilitate quick troop movement. Ratnagiri on the contrary, was not only "trouble free'" but, its "teeming population", had been the chief factor in the development of Bombay (Bombay Gazetteer 1880 : 106). Ratnagiri had also been the place from which the Government drew man power for its own state structure, the police and the army. (Subodh Partrika, 1928 : 6). Ambedkar in his time, encouraged the move and endeavoured for the revival of the Mahar battalion in 1941 (Keer, 1954 : 338). It is mentioned here because Ambedkar was the son of the Konkan soil. Large number of Marathas and Mahars had entered the army and the police and earned the gratitude of the British for being obedient, hardy and brave soldiers (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 106). The British saw no point in investing in railways in south Konkan. For that matter their point of view is shared by the Indian ruling classes today. Bombay Textile Industry The enormous imports of piece goods yarn from Lancashire into Bombay set the Indian merchant community 'wondering whe- ther it might not be feasible to fight Manchester with their own weapon and themselves supply the demand of the island", and they did. Accordingly, the first mill was opened in 1857 and by 1860, six more were set up (Edwards : 121). But, it was the American Civil War which finally gave them the boost to turn into full-fledged industrial bourgeoisie, at least in the area of textiles (Buchanan, 1934 : 200). This new industrial bourgeoisie also needed cheap labour for its newly found textile industry. In the next section we shall show how Ratnagiri's economy was effectively ruined by the British, of course in their own interest, and in no sense with any concern for the Indian bourgeoisie. The British policy drew the most isolated parts of Ratnagiri district closer to Bombay by an elaborate system of water transport (NS., C. LXX, 1881 : 7). Ratnagiri labour was, therefore, flowing into Bombay, but seasonally and from the point of view of textile industry it was an unsatisfactory arrangement. But the migrant labourers, were after all cultivators, whom the pinch of poverty had, "drawn from their fields to Bombay" and towards the end of monsoon each year, they returned to the village in large numbers to help their relatives in agricultural operations (Gazetteer, 1901, I : 209). The Konkanies UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 189 were intensely attached to their land and, though heavily indebted, they were unwilling to sell their land and become full-time urban wage-labour. (Gazetteer, 1901, I : 209, 210). The instability of labour (vide Report of Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-18) resulted in critical deficiency in certain periods, which was actually felt by the textile industry (Royal Com- mission of Labour, 1921 : 21). Open bidding for labour was re- ported in street corners in 1891, the year of plague (Gazetteer, 1909, Vol. II : 192). Incidentally, inadequacy of labour is said to have even restricted the expansion of this industry (Mehta, 1953 : 81, 83, 225). The outflow of labour from Bombay back to Ratnagiri was heaviest in the month of May (Labour Gazette, 1930 : 718-726). The millowners devised various methods to ensure a regular supply of labour, such as for instance, holding back one month's pay in arrears, keeping a number of spare hands, or payment of piece wage rates (Gazetteer, 1909, I : 210, 208, 209). Some mills even tried to recruit labour from distant places like U.P. (Gokhale : 118-119) but the shrewdest of them all, wanted to draw labour from all over the country, for a ve ry different reason, i.e, to counteract the threat of combination (Morris : 63). Although there was an acute shortage of labour, entry into a textile mill was not easy, without the right contact, that is through a jobber, which meant payment of a month's wages as commission (Indian Textile Journal, 1893 : 133). A job in a mill did not resolve the migrant's problem. The raw recruit had a hard time. Separated as he was from his family living with relatives in a small crowded house as a khanavali or a boarder, as Morris points out, he incured many debts before he earned his wages, and had to put up with many privations. Even years of service had not eased the situation (Goankar, 1965). Thanks to the British policy of destruction of Ratnagiri eco- nomy6, the Indian industrial bourgeoisie managed to get cheap labour and flourished. The labour cost was only a small portion of the total cost of production especially with payment of piece wages (Morris : 117). Soon enough in 1883, the Mill Owners Associa tion announced that it was about to dispatch travelling agents 190 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN to various centres in Europe and Africa for the purpose of opening new markets for their piece goods (Morris : 121). Lancashire mill-owners reacted to Indian textile industry's growing profits, as a counter reaction to which Indian Mill Owners Association (IMOA) came into existence in 1875; IMOA was an instrument of self-protection. The Lancashire industrialist continued to pressurize the Parliament to bring in tariffs, and to introduce labour laws to regulate wages and bring control over the use of female and child labour in textile industry (Morris : 38). IMOA strongly protested against the factory bill. The reports in the local papers were watched over closely by the Government and secret communications were sent to the Viceroy. There were other types of reports too. For instance, the Satya Mitra (4th June 1880) stated the mill labourers were made to do hard labour for 14 hours a day which was injurious to health and even young children were not spared from the tyranny. It prayed that the factory legislation suggested by Manchester mill owners be passed to protect the workers from their heartless employers. On the other hand, some other newspapers showed that such reports were based on ignorance and warned the Government that if working hours were reduced, the wages would fall and cause undue suffering to the labourers who were at present satisfied and enjoying good health. That the working conditions were bad cannot be denied. Dnyanodaya (10-18th January, 1880) observed that the mill labourers worked from five in the morning to seven in the evening and got half an hour's rest in the middle of the day. They were allowed a few days rest only once a fortnight and even then some were employed for a few hours for cleaning the machines leaving them little time for rest or to attend to household chores. It is therefore not surprising that as early as in 1874, there were strikes in individual mills and departments. Again, there was a spate of strikes in 1890-92 (Royal Commission of Labour 1892 and Factory Commission, 1875, p. 22, 42 and 52, in Morris : 178) and in 1904. From 1919 onwards the working class was maturing and struggles became a common feature which reached a high water mark between 1926-30. After a period of lull between 1930-36, again the struggles began and the achievements by the end of the British period were quite noteworthy. These included 8 hours day, UNDER DEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 191

regulations regarding conditions of work, timely payment of wages, higher wage rates, compensation for injuries and above all, a right to unionize.

Very little information is available regarding the earlier strikes and the nature of labour organizations in nineteenth century. But we do know that Lokhande, the father of Indian trade unionism, hailed from Ratnagiri itself and worked hard for the upliftment of the workers, (Phule : 222) and he gave publicity to the plight of the workers as well as to the tortures undergone by Ratnagiri farmers under the knots in Dinabandhu7, in 1880.

Although man power had been deliberately and effectively dis- placed from Ratnagiri, all of them could not find work in organized industry, mills and docks. Bombay was a part of the colonial system. Migrant labour had therefore to work as menials in merchants' offices and even as domestic servants in private households on low wages (Gazetteer, B.C.I. 1901, I : 226) and the rest had to fend for themselves as petty traders, hawking vegetables or to live precariously on daily wages as carpenters, painters etc. using whatever skills they possessed. They also entered the tertiary sector, as well as, the repressive state structure as policemen and sepoys in large number.

Bombay Police and the Army: Right from the beginning, Bombay was a trouble causing posses- sion for the English. In the 17th Century, the Dutch, Portuguese, Moghuls, Siddis and Marathas were menace to the Company's trade. By the Charter Act of 1698, the Company was empowered to raise and train its military force. Even earlier, in 1669, a militia was re- cruited from the sparsely populated island. Police service was com- pulsory for all citizens. The Brahmins and the Banias however bought their freedom and therefore only the lower classes, particu- larly the Bhandaris, were conscripted at a low wage (Edwards: 19: 1). In 1776, regular sepoys were added to the Bhandari patrol. The close of 18th century was a period of chaos and internecine warfare (Edwards : 21). From 1886 onwards with the economic boom and phenomenal expansion of the Bombay city, the police force was strengthened (Edwards : 21). By this time Ratnagiri was well within 192 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

the British strangle -hold. The largest contingent of police was needed in the harbour and dock-yard particularly to control the growth of criminality among European sea men. European police force had been considerably reduced, (Edwards : 4) the reason for such action is not clear. Recruitment of Indians became necessary to check the growth of crime in the fast developing commercial, industrial city. Again, the British turned to Ratnagiri which they found as "remarkable for its number of people, their freedom from crime and their willingness to leave home for military and police service". For instance, an intensive village survey indicated the technique, where the revenue officer himself made a recruitment propaganda on 12th August 1945 (vide Revenue Officers Visit Book at Kondivile, Rajapur Taluka). The Marathas (cultivators), the Bhandaris (toddy tappers) and Mahars (field servants and agricultural labourers) were the main recruits (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 123). The police were poorly paid and were made to live in squalid conditions, even as late as in the third quarter of nineteenth century. Government was unable to pay them a decent salary (Edwards : 4). A British civil servant complained that due to lack of resources, the police force was inadequate to deal with some of the problems that Bombay was beginning to encounter. These were for instance, textile strikes from 1893 onwards, growth of beggars and Hindu-Muslim riots and the police strike in 1906 (Edwards : 4). Till 1908, the recruits, mostly from lower classes, were mainly used as brute force to maintain law and order. A dramatic political development brought about a change. In 1908, Lokmanya Tilak was arrested and riots broke out in which the Ratnagiri police and Konkani mill hands participated Tilak too was from Konkan. The Commissioner of Police was left with a few Europeans and policemen recruited from Deccan to cope with the riot situation. Incidentally, this calls to mind the lack of reciprocal concern by the great leaders in nineteenth century and early twentieth century almost all of whom were from Ratnagiri, whether Ranade, Gokhale, Paranjpe or Tilak. These upper castemen, had rarely shown any concern for their compatriots in Bombay in grave and perpetual distress8. An immediate consequence of Tilak riots was the birth of C.I.D. and recruitment of Brahmins and upper class intelligentsia UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 193

into police service as a Gazetted cadre and an enormous increase in confidential work to keep surveillance of political activities (Edwards : 134-155).

To the down and out poor peasants of Ratnagiri, the Marathas, and the impoverished agricultural labour, the Mahars, the army was an attraction (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 130), as it offered regular pay during sendee, and a relatively comfortable pension after re- tirement, "whereas a native ruler would have let him die in a ditch" (Cox : 336).

Even as early as May 1858, 47 per cent of the entire Bombay army was recruited from Konkan (Melville, P.M., 1859 : 219). Two specific regiments, the Maratha and the Mahar, were created. The British of course tried to justify the caste basis of recruitment on the principle of martial race as propounded by Lord Roberts. This is most likely to be untrue because the first recruits were Bengali Brahmins and this 1st Bengal Battalion had to be disbanded 7 years after the Battle of Plassey as these sepoys broke out in open conflict and had even earlier tended to be mutinous and disdainful of humbler duties (Cox : 333, 340). The sepoys of Bombay, recruited from lower castes of Ratnagiri, were reported to have carried out humbler duties; were said to be amenable to greater discipline, and were never unwilling to cross the seas; whether it be China, Aden, Burma, Abyssinia or Egypt, where they had distinguished themselves (Cox : 333, 393). British needed troops for the political control of the country and they cleverly managed to play one region against another by recruiting sepoys locally and using them in distant unknown regions, whose inhabitants were as much strangers as British themselves. By this ingenious tactic the proportion of white soldiers to native sepoys remained 1:5 (Cox : 219). In 1879, there were 5579 men from Ratnagiri in active service (of these 2180 were Mahars) and 7009 were pensioners (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 105, 130).

Part II

Here we shall explore the precise factors, chiefly breakdown of trade and agriculture and denudation of forests which led to the displacement of man power from Ratnagiri, and the final collapse 194 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN of its economy. The historical antecedents which contributed to this collapse, are also touched upon

Early Economic History of Ratnagiri Ratnagiri came under the control of various dynasties; avail- able historical data show that it prospered till the Europeans came in.

Trade

Ratnagiri was endowed with natural harbours. The chief trade centres like Bankot, Dabol, Ratnagiri, Malwan, and Vengurla were at the creek mouth, while others like Rajpur, Sangameshwar, Khed, Kharapet and Chiplun were far inland where trade crafts could easily pass (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 166). But no longer they can do so due to heavy silting of the rivers caused by wanton destruction of forests with which we shall deal a little later.

Names of these ports were known to the Greeks, Romans, and to early Christians, although there are no records of direct dealings. From the local trade centres corn, rice, butter, sesame oil, coarse and fine cotton goods, and sugar were sent sometimes to Africa and at times to Arabia (Vincent : 282, 423). In the fourteenth century, south Konkan became the natural sea-board of the Bahamani Kings. After 1500 AD., the whole of Konkan, south of Savatri river, came under Bijapur kings and Adil Shah set about to improve the district; he made Dabol as his headquarters (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 195). Between 15th and 16th centuries, lively coastal trade was car- ried on between Dabol, Chawl (in neighbouring Kolaba District) and Gujarat in both essential, as well as, in luxury goods. From these two Konkan ports were sent out coconuts, palm sugar, wax, be tel leaves and black pepper. Imports included silk and cotton textiles and horses. Horses were of vital military significance for Muslim rulers in their struggle against the Hindu Kingdom of Vijayanagar. (Surendra Gopal, 1975 : 77, 79). Ratnagiri trade was disturbed by the end of the 15,th century, especially with the arrival of the Por- tuguese in the Indian waters. The Portuguese plan was to make Goa a premier port and especially to capture trade in horses. UNDER DEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 195

Their position was strengthened with their capture of Chawl in 1521, and Bassein in 1535. The Portuguese, in order to control trade through Goa, took to marauding whole of the coast and went about burning all the ports from Srivardhan to Goa. The worst attacks took place in 1548, and 1557. Achra and Dabol were destroyed in 1560 (Nairne, A. 1894 : 47).

Goa then replaced Dabol as the centre of trade after 1521. Particularly valuable trade which was lost was in horses, which were also in demand in the southern kingdom for military purposes (Surendra Gopal : 94). The Konkan coast was under further strain in the second and third decades of the century with renewed interference of the newly arrived English and the Dutch. Struggles be tween the three European powers adversely affected the Konkan trade. Meanwhile, the Portuguese treasury was depleted by perpetual warfare and for some reason the Dutch chose to move on to fight the Portuguese on the Malbar coast and did not care to stay in Konkan (Nairne : 165, 63). The English were, therefore, left free to operate in the Konkan, first from Dabol in 1635, and later from Rajapur from 1638, where they set up their factory. In fact, at Rajapur, the English purchased the old Dutch factory in 1699 and closed it in 1707. The Bankot factory was established in 1757 and they simultaneously got control over five villages around it (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 748). With the eclipse of Goa as a centre of trade and with their foot-hold in Ratnagiri, the English were spurred to develop their newly acquired territory of Bombay as their centre of trading activity (Kindersley, 1921 : 16). In 1765, the forts of Malvan and Redi were taken and the Raja of Kolhapur in self-defence permitted the English to set up a factory in Malvan in 1972.9 But formal control of the area came much later. Malvan and its surrounding area was ceded by Raja of Kolhapur on October, 1st, 1812. On October 3rd, 1812, the Raja of Sawantwadi ceded in sovereignty the fort of Vengurla, with its dependencies. In November, 1817, the Peshwa power was overthrown and its territories in Konkan fell to the British (Wadhwa, D.C., 1976 : 621-23). In 1832, the Subdivisions of north and south Konkan were made full-fledged districts and renamed as Thana and Ratnagiri districts respectively.10 On 1st August, 1949, the territory of Sawantwadi was integrated with Bombay province (Bombay Government 196 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

Gazette, Extraordinary, 1949), and was included in the Ratnagiri district.

Agriculture and the Khoti System of Tenure : Although transit trade was a source of wealth for Ratnagiri, the essential economic activity of the people of south Konkan was agriculture One has to take into consideration the natural endow- ments of the country, the political administration and institutional practices to fully comprehend the breakdown of the agrarian struc ture and its inability to support its own population, even at a bare subsistence level. In other words, its people were literally squeezed out of the country. Ratnagiri is a narrow, 160 mile long coastal strip backed by high Sahyadri mountain ranges. There are British historical record-, to show that the coast lands and "wherever the hills drew back a little there was rich level of rice fields with a belt of coconut palms between them". Again, "on either side" of the fourteen rivers that cross the region, "were rice fields, plantain gardens and a sprinkling of mango or jack fruit orchards". The hills were also noted as "very fertile areas", and "except for the narrow strip of basalt 6 to 8 miles wide on the uplands, the area bears abundant and wholesome water". (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 3, 5-6, 20, 160). Yet, now one cannot but notice the barren laterit soil in the interior, and sand bars at the mouth of the rivers and creeks. At the sea end, the rivers look stately and wide but as one goes up the river, into the interior, they turn into narrow ribbons meandering on its still old broad sandy beds. The drastic ecological change has been attributed to the reckless British policy of permitting forests to be felled. With this the natural irrigation system began to fail which, of course, was no concern to the British. This indifference also contrasts sharply with the concern of the earlier local kings who were by and large interested in the welfare of the local people - their subjects; for instance, the Bijapur kings in the 16th and 17th centuries were said to have taken steps to improve the district and bring wasteland under tillage (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 192, 195). Shivaji also did everything to promote cultivation, by providing cattle, seeds and even money for the maintenance of the cultivator till harvest time. Only land under actual cultivation was assessed for revenue (Kulkarni, A. R., 1969 : 162, 155). Constant warfare and movements of the troops UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 197 often destroyed crops. To overcome this, inam grants were given to hereditary officers, who in turn were assigned the duty to protect the cultivators and create conditions for efficient agriculture (Kul- karni, A. R., 81, 83). Regarding the question of agriculture per se, there was no pro- blem of growing rice on the coast land the Kharpet or even on salt land near the coast and near the creek which contains much marine deposits; such soil was also favourable for garden crops. The local farmers improved the fertility of the soil by keeping flocks of sheep on their plots of land for two or three nights at a stretch. Land was also sometimes allowed to remain fallow (Kulkarni, AR., 84). On the slopes of the hills and plateau, soil was formed by the disintegrating laterite. In Konkan, barren land is called varkas of which there are two types, Malvarkas where the plough can be used and dongri varkas or steep slopes where cultivation is possible only by manual labour. Kulkarni mentions hill region cultivation in Maharashtra in general where soil is created and stocks are replanted in it (Kulkarni. A.R., 85). Nairane mentions even a more drastic method, where farmers used pick-axe instead of plough on the hill slopes to break down the black rock and to create soil for sowing. Early British accounts indicate that the country was lush green as every inch of the area was cultivated with paddy to feed teeming population of the region. Maharashtra, including Ratnagiri, is not agriculturally fertile, so the prime requirement for agriculture was man power (Kulkarni. A. R.: 79) and this was channelised through the institution of the family,11 where every member had one's allotted share of work that was necessary for getting a harvest out of the land. Anandibai Karve recalling her childhood experience in the last century, states that she used to get up early in the morning to fill up water from the irrigation canal that ran through her village. There was no well in her compound (Karve, D. D, 64). The irrigation canals were evidently not destroyed but generally fell into disuse due to callous unconcern of the British administrators. There is also evidence, that in Rajapur as early as 1826, a native official was permitted and even encouraged to set up a complicated water supply system for the town (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 359), but then Rajapur was a white man's haven, where even Childe, the 198 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

President of the East India Company, had spent his first years in India (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 787). Today the rivers are dry and the red laterite soil is parched In other words, the people of Ratnagiri themselves were responsible for the "fertility" of the countryside. Returning to the question of agricultural labour, the basic factors for the fall in the agricultural labour force, seem to be the perpetuation of the Khoti System12 of land tenure and to a small extent, the Inam watandarships in their distorted forms by the British. These were distorted because the function of both systems in their origin were different. The Khoti system, for instance, was introduced by the Bijapur kings, not only to facilitate the collection of revenue, but also to restore cultivation in villages which were de- populated and laid to waste by continuous wars in the district. (Candy, E. T., 1873 : 1). Elsewhere in the district, the revenue system was Kularg or Ryatwari, where each cultivator being an independent hereditary holder stood assessed at fixed rental in the public account beyond which nothing could be levied. The system persisted in the extreme north and the southernmost parts of the Ratnagiri district, even after the British took over (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 206-207). But as stated earlier, by the end of seventeenth century Ratnagiri's economy was in shambles; what had happened on the coast had already been accounted for, in the interior it was battered by the Moghuls. The indifference of the Peshwas also contributed to the havoc. The Peshwas vested the revenue farmer, the Khot, with both civil and criminal powers which were grossly abused The Khots did not attend to the complaints of the peasants. On the contrary, they "stopped at no exactations, (and) fines and (they) even extracted free labour". In other words, the Khots behaved like, petty barons of the medieval Europe, so that when British took over Ratnagiri in 1819, it was impoverished and was almost without trade (Choosey : 12, 46, 124). British rule contributed to further fall in agricultural produc tion. In the first few decades of its rule, the British permitted the Khoti system of land revenue to persist, although it was aware of the havoc of the system, created at the time of the Peshwas.13 British Government in practice chose to ignore the revenue reports of Pelly UNDER DEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 199

(1819-20), Chaplin (1820), Dunlop (1822) and the Peshwa Daftar reports clearly indicated that even during Peshwa-time, Khotiship was not only not hereditary, but often it was transferred from one person to another, particularly in the district north of Bankot river (Candy : 2). Turquand in 1857 writes that the Peshwa Government sometimes converted a Khoti village into a dharakari village, and also transferred villages from one Khot to another without taking a Khot's bedawpatar. Pelly as late as 1873 maintains a spurious distinction between watandar or sanadi Khot and non-sanadi khot. This assumption is based on the argument that knots often sought various means to obtain sanads from the Peshwa (Candy : 4). British records however indicate that most of the older inhabit ants ridicule that the terms that Khot and watandar are not only irreconsible but a contradiction in terms. Their argument is: Khot means makta or contractor and to designate a man as hereditary contractor is an absurdity (Candy : 2). The British might not have wished to get embroiled in local administrative problems and so perhaps permitted the Khoti system to persist. But the British retained for themselves the power to increase the revenue by enhancing the rents as and when they chose. The Khots had no problem either; they willingly paid any additional cesses, which they in turn duly collected from the ryots (Candy : 55, 59). The exploitative Khoti tenure, and the oppressive behaviour of the Khots led to mass exodus of young able bodied peasants; later women began to join the labour force, mainly in Bombay. This was advantageous to the British bourgeoisie and later to the Indians too. As stated earlier, there was an acute shortage of labour right from eighteenth century or perhaps even earlie r when numerous types of baits were used to attract immigrants. Bombay's initial need was for unskilled labour. At this point, it is also important to remember that the major prerequisite for agriculture in Maharashtra was man- power. With large scale migration, agricultural production fell and within thirty years of British rule, viz. by 1851, Ratnagiri district turned from a grain exporting area into a grain importing one {Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 106, 120.) An experimental survey was carried out in 1852 in Ratnagiri district and Kimball who was in charge of it, pointed out, that the privileges claimed by the Khot as hereditary rights were limited to 200 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN rights of villager rentier (Bombay Gazetteer, 1180:196, 120). These findings, however, were not translated into action till 1877, that is, till the real danger signals sparked in Deccan in 1875, when the peasants violently reacted to the unjust exactations of the landlords and moneylenders. This spontaneous outburst of the peasantry, popu- larly known as the Deccan riots was also a result of the indifference of the British administration to the needs of the exploited peasantry. The Government did not want a repetition of similar riots in Ratnagiri. The Khoti Settlement Bill was, therefore, introduced in the legislative assembly in 1887 and after many amendments was finally passed by the end of January 1880 (Bombay Gazette 1880, IV, 29-36). The Khoti Act I, of 1880 removed the proprietary right of the Khot to the soil, but confirmed the enjoyment of several other rights the Khot had grabbed fraudulently on the advent of the British (Choksey : 122, 123), such as for instance, (1) the revisionary rights which sometimes permitted the land to revert to the Khot, if the tenant died without an heir (Choksey : 122); (2) the Khoti fida - profit or remuneration for management of the system14. The new Khoti system persisted till the end of the British period; it was constantly repealed in parts or amended in the course of six more decades of the British rule. The important fact is that land was reverted to the peasants and the Khoti system was abolished only in 1949. The Khoti Act of 1880 amended first in 1949 and finally in 1963, acted as a double edged weapon for the Ratnagiri peasant. It gave him a semblance of security Although he got proprietary rights to the land as early as in 1880, he was no more than a "part-time" proprietor, saddled with an uneconomic holding. At the end of the British rule 66.8 per cent of these peasants owned on an average less than 5 acres of land (Census of Agricultural Holdings 1952-53). He therefore turned to Bombay to earn his bread, a mere pittance, as an industrial labour if possible, or whatever employment that came his way to enable him to pay his land revenue. Social forces even now compel him to cling to his tiny piece of land for his and his family's survival, at least at a subsistence level. But in the process, he also earned the unfair label of being Bombay's uncommitted labour force. This was the constant theme of the spokesmen of the industrial bourgeoisie till a little over a decade ago. UNDERTDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA Of RESERVE LABOUR 201

At this point it is important to ask: why did the British pass the Khoti act of 1880? Why was the poor peasant been given back his piece of land? That it has not benefited the bulk of peasantry till the end of the British rule is clear from the available statistics15. Why has he been freed from the feudal stranglehold of the Khot? This is atypical of India so also the fact that he was not burdened by debt (Choksey : 113). Choksey assigns his freedom from debt to Khoti tenancy system. This appears to be a shrewd, calculated move on the part of British administration to reconvert the newly emerging but impoverished, urban proletariat, whose roots were still in the countryside, into a docile, trouble free, part-peasant cum part proletariat. One cannot ignore certain historical changes taking place then. On the one hand, there were growing political movements in the countryside in India and on the other, a slowly growing conscious ness of the English working class; nor could the violent revolutionary movements in Europe be forgotten. Britain could therefore take no chances in its most precious colony. In this context, it is significant to recall Ashburn's statement in the Legislative Assembly in 1872, when he re-introduced the Khoti Settlement Bill. He stated that Konkan was the nursery of Bombay army and therefore it has to be kept relatively free from dissatisfaction real or imaginary16 (Bombay Government Gazette, V, 1879).

Deforestation : Ratnagiri could not remain an agricultural region for another reason. British policy of deforestation brought drastic ecological changes leading to serious imbalances. Right from the seventeenth century onwards timber was required by the British for mounting guns (Kulkarni, A.R. : 214), and for construction17 (The English Factories in India, I : 1670-71). The nearest source was the Bhiwandi or Kalyan forests, but it was not an easy source as these regions were under dispute between Shivaji and the Moguls. The East India Company was also anxious to get hold of teak for ship building, as teak was the most durable wood which did not shrink or corrode in water. The teak of South Konkan forests is rated next to that of Malabar in its quality. In 1822, Dunlop issued a proclamation permitting trees to be felled; they were made over to the Knots, and as stated in the pro- 202 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN clamations the Khots were expected to supply or sell wood to the Government (Gibson : 67). From 1826, the British maintained their rights over teak and sasoo trees which they needed for its own use (Gibson : 65-66). Dunlop had given the Khots the right to the forests on the presumption that they would take care of them (Gibson : 121) and keep up the supply of wood for British ship-building, which had become an important activity by 1830 (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880 : 172). Forest conservation was a known art even to the peasant who needed rab (wood ash) as a fertilizer for agriculture. The peasants would chop off only the side branches and this activity was strictly confined to a specific period viz., December to February. Again, Angaria for instance had a large fleet, and a shipbuilding yard too. He also had his teak forests carefully preserved and replenished. But by 1829 the whole of Angaria's preserve was sold, "nothing but stumps were left" and Ratnagiri forests were almost gone (Gibson : 71, 65). This was dangerous even from the administrator's point of view. In 1840, Government tried to stop wood-cutting and Dunlop proclamation was revoked in 1851. This was the time when railway tracks were being laid for which all kinds of timber was needed. The forest conservators found it "quite impossible to repress" the forest contractors, and the wood merchants. Railway companies brought pressure on the Government and it became difficult to control the felling and destruction of forests (Gibson and Fenner : 146). Destruction of forest led to heavy soil erosion and rapid silting of rivers, destroying not only the navigability of the rivers and blocking the ports with sand bars but also ruined the natural irriga tion system of the country. To sum up then, Konkan trade had been crippled before the British took over the area, and once it came under the colonial power, Ratnagiri's agriculture was totally destroyed within a short span of three decades. Its unfavourable ecology hastened the process. Ratnagiri had no industry to boast except of fancy articles of horn (Imperial Gazetteer, 1905, VIII:300) and manufacture of salt along the coast. The former was not encouraged and therefore faded away slowly, while the latter was made a government monopoly which brought a whimper of protest in a local paper, the Satya Shodhak 18. By a deliberate policy of uneven development, the British effectively made Ratnagiri a region of reserve labour force which the Indian UNDER DEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA Of RESERVE LABOUR 203 ruling classes gratefully inherited. The Konkan Brahmins escaped the ravages, for they deliberately uprooted themselves and perman- ently moved over to other urban centres, especially Bombay and Poona Karve explains that with the defeat of the Peshwas, the Brahmins were disposed of their office. But no sooner was Macua-lay's Minutes of 1835 passed, than they recognised the need for education and became a part of the urban intelligentsia (Karve : 3). Thus, Ratnagiri stagnated and continued to contribute its man- power for urban development of Bombay.

Part III

Post 1947 The last available findings show that Ratnagiri district con- tinues to contribute nearly half the migrants from the state. In this section we shall probe the reasons as to why even after the transfer of power the Indian bourgeoisie chose to continue the British policy of maintaining Ratnagiri as a backward area, and as a source for its necessary as well as reserve labour force. For the sake of analysis it is necessary first to separate the major segments of the ruling class, (a) The industrial bourgeoisie right from 1860 onward, to the present, needed cheap labour power. Major industries whether Indian owned or multinational, are largely based in Bombay. The newly growing industrial belts also radiate from this city. The section of the ruling class finds it useful to keep Ratnagiri as a hinterland whose main function still would be to supply labour force to work in the secondary and tertiary sector, (b) Power at the state level is largely rural-based and de- pends on land ownership. It springs largely from the sugar-belt in Maharashtra. Ratnagiri is therefore out of focus of rural develop- ment programme because it is of no consequence for this section of the ruling class too. As the British had effectively pauperized this area, Ratnagiri now became incapable of throwing up powerful leaders who could lobby solely for its development and reap benefits from it, as the sugar barons elsewhere have done. In the ultimate analysis, Ratnagiri continues to be an area of reserve labour, because its natural resources are unexploited, its land is underutilised, leading 204 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN to demographic imbalance, which in turn results in large scale out migration and lack of protest movements.

Natural resources unexplored The natural wealth of this area lies today in its rich mineral and fish. Maharashtra's mineral wealth is concentrated in the eastern Vidharbha and in Ratnagiri. The latter has extensive deposits of bauxite, chromite, limenite and iron ore (Deshpande, 1971 : 43, 44). Aluminium, the chief mineral wealth, fa not extracted on the excuse that it involves heavy power consumption. Yet, one has to note that the Koyna hydel project is in Chiplun taluka of Ratnagiri district, but the power it generates is diverted mostly to Bombay, so much so that only 752 villages in this dis trict had been electrified till the end of 1976-77. Hilly terrain is officially stated to be deterrent. Interestingly enough, the largest number of electrified villages are in the distant hilly Sawantwadi taluka and large reserves of bauxite are found here and good quality ore in its peripheral region, the Amboli Ghat (Techno-Economic Survey of. Konkan Region, Ratnagiri District, 1963 : 53), and in other parts of the district too (Directorate of Geology and Mining : 65, 66). Iron mining was started by private interests in 1954 and ore is expor ted to Japan, and Europe especially to Czechoslovakia, instead of being used for domestic consumption.20 Government reports that Ratnagiri also has mica, silica, copper and china clay (Socio-Economic Review, 1972-73 : 5), but the extraction of the ore is very negligible. The employment opportunities are also limited to a mere 888 persons in both mining and quarries (Socio-Economic Review, 1976-77 : 82). Ratnagiri has a long coastal line of 320 km. It has a great potential for deep sea as well as off shore fishing, especially in the southern part of the district, "with a continental shelf of 3,25,000 km.". The catch in this area is large, but much of it is wasted due to lack of poor internal communication (Deshpande, CD. : 50). It is, therefore, not fully utilized for internal consumption. Even if it was, there would still be a surplus available for export. A recent trend is to export prawns as much as 1300 metric tons annually (Socio-Economic Review, 1976-77 : 7). But there are no facilities UNDER DEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 205

for refrigeration and transport and fisheries are not developed. As late as 1976, the area could boast of only two canning units which could employ not more than 400 persons (Socio-Economic Review, 76-77 : 7).

Stagnation of Agriculture : Ratnagiri is almost unique in the sense that unlike other regions in the country, here land continues to belong to the tiller, even after the transfer of power. Therefore the ratio of non-cultivating owners of land (and their dependents) to cultivators (and their dependents) is 3692 to 31,737 (Ratnagiri District Hand Book, 1971 : 11). The absentee non-cultivating owners, however, are not the traditional type of landlords familiar on the Indian Scene, but are mostly small holders who have out-migrated to find employment in cities mainly Bombay, while the land is tilled by a brother, a cousin and oc- casionally by a gadi (servant). Ownership of land does not imply the tiller is able to subsist only by cultivating his own land. A recent village survey indicated that only 7 out of 21 families had a marketable surplus (Pinto, 1979 : 30). In fact, the characteristic feature of agriculture in this region is extreme fragmentation of land particularly in the rice lands where a plot may measure no more than 10' x 10' or 1/40 of an acre (Pinto : 32). Peasants, therefore, are locally classified as Ian (small) and ati Ian (very small). subsistence agriculture continues to be the main source occupation (vide table I); but, mere ownership of land has not resolved the problems of large scale poverty and underdevelopment. Nearly 40 per cent of land-holders own less than 5 acres of land and 66 per cent less than two acres (Socio-Economic Review, 1976-77 : 45). The spokesmen of the ruling class, whether it is the industrial bourgeoisie, (national or international) or landlords who wield power at the state level, have always found an explanation in the topo- graphy of Ratnagiri for failure to build the infra-structure and give agriculture a development push. Ratnagiri lies in the rain belt, where the monsoon seldom fails. Though 60 per cent of the land is theo- retically available for cultivation (Kunchar and Dikshit, 1972-76 : 16), the pattern of land utilization reveals that only 27.92 per cent of the total area in 1974-75 was cultivated (Socio-Economic Review, 1976-77:21), this stands in sharp contrast to the state 206 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN average of 59.19 per cent21. The percentage of land under fruit gardening is high and is on the increase which in itself is not an indication of under-development22, but the horticultural products are mainly for export market and hence the common peasantry is least concerned about this development. The pattern of land utilisation and deteriorating situation indicates that no serious attempts are made to bring more land under cultivation. This is historically a rice and coconut growing area, yet food grains have to be imported, so too coconut oil and Salt (District Census Handbook, Ratnagiri, 1971 : 14). Theoretically it is possible to convert Ratnagiri into a multiple crop area with proper inputs and irrigation. But the present norm is one crop23, and, under the existing social conditions, rice cultivation is found to be less remunerative than working as unskilled labour in Bombay factory, however trying the circumstances may be (Pinto, 1979 : 31, cf. Arunachalam, 1966 : 17). The rice grow ing area is also the area generally owned by poor peasants, and is outside the scope of national planning for integrated area development. One begins to wonder whether this omission is not deliberate. Irrigation and power had been given priority, in all the five year plans, except perhaps the second. Yet no serious attempts had been made to irrigate the rice growing farms of the peasants. At this point one cannot overlook the fact that is is neither mere lethargy of the peasant nor a lack of resources. If it had been so the whole of Maharashtra would have been neglected. Whatever may be the reasons stated by the ruling parties, geographical conditions are no bar to setting up irrigation projects. Take for instance, the sugar belt; the development of irrigation there is a "post independence" one. Much of it lies in the dry and even drought-prone area, but "most of the cane plantation became possible because of the newly constructed irrigation system". Walchandnagar, for instance, is reclaimed from waterlogged area. "It involved great financial investment to make the land cultivable" (Tikekar, 1966 : 48, 49). It is important to note that the sugar cane production increased from 24,800 hectares in 1949 to 2,200,000 hectares at the end of the fourth plan period (Maharashtra, 1973-74 : 42-44). Today sugar belt is not only Maharashtra's source of wealth, but also, the centre of power which of c ourse explains the concentration of public resources for private UNDERDEVELOPMEMT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 207 gains. This was made possible by a deliberate policy choice of deve- loping irrigation. 24 It hardly needs to mention that irrigation project per se has not brought about total development of the Sugar area. On the contrary, "the well-to-do irrigator tends to grow richer, while the benefits to the small farmer are hard to come by" (Deshpande : 79). As regards Ratnagiri, the Government, in its routine report monotonously states almost every year that this district has had no floods nor famine, and yet the number of people affected by scarcity in the area for the year 1971 was 409,000. From 1973 onwards the reporting is in terms of affected villages. They were 348 for that year (Socio-Economic Review, 1976-77 : 49). One cannot ignore the fact that Ratnagiri is crossed by 14 rivers and numerous streams. All that needs to be done is to conserve the rain water25. Incidentally, the south west monsoon seldom fails, but the seasonal run off of the rain water is immense. In this rain soaked area there is a shortage even of drinking water because the rulers do not even care to sink wells. Geographers are optimistic about possibility of constructing bandharas, and canals and state that the area has potentialities of tank irrigation (Deshpande, CD., : 73). Some of them are even hopeful that artificial bunding of the numerous streams at various level would he lp to raise the ground water level of a number of wells. (Arunachalam, B. : 261). This is not to deny a beginning that has been made in irrigation. But what is significant is that its use is confined totally to the southern end of the district, the nut-fruit cultivating area, and predictably the nutritious cashew-nuts and mangoes that are grown here are not for the local market. In other words, they are not for the consumption of the local people, but for foreign export market from which only a small fraction of the rich peasantry benefits. A Government report proudly states that a substantial quantity of the average annual yield of 23 thousand tonnes of the best Alphanso mango is exported and so also cashew nuts to bring in foreign exchange. (Maharashtra, 1973-74:49). Yet cashewnut is not a native product of this region as just century ago the use of the nut was practically unknown26. Earlier garden lands were chiefly coconut, betel nut and mango (Bombay Gazetteer, 1880: 144, 225). 208 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

Export brings rich dividends but orchard cultivation is an expensive proposition and under the present social structure possible only to the richest section of farmers or urban investors. Initial in- vestment is heavy, and the first returns from it take several years; the saplings have to grow into trees and then begin to bear. The poor peasant, therefore, does not have the economic capacity to sustain himself during the long period waiting. We also know that a powerful member of the Indian Merchants Chamber of Commerce, Bombay who has his interest in Ratnagiri offered free cashew saplings on mass scale, which he was even prepared to tend for five years. His offer was ignored by the peasantry as the terms of agrarian relations that would emerge at the end of the five year period were not made clear to them. The prevalent pattern in the district itself acts as a deterrent. There is evidence that Bombay financiers hold monopoly lease over picking mango trees for a paltry sum of Rs. 200/- to Rs. 300/-per tree. The monopolists of course operate through local merchants. A tree on an average bears one truck load of mangoes, but the pickle is sold in Bombay at the rate of Rs. 10/- to Rs. 12/- per kilo. The rate in the Gulf countries, the major market, is even higher (Savur, M., 1979 : 34). Horticulture is confined to the southern end of the district (Socio-Economic Review, 1976-77 : 33). Typically, irrigation schemes are also confined to the southern region and in the northern part it is merely marginal (Socio-Economic Review, 1976-77 : 35). It is no coincidence that the area under irrigation has increased remarkably from 1950-51 to 1970-71, yet the total area under irrigation is not more than 3.39 per cent of the total cropped area (Socio-Economic Review, 1973-74 : 18).

Table III indicates that investment in irrigation is not merely a private one, but also a government enterprise. No such efforts are made by the government in the rice growing areas, the area of the poor peasant. The reasons for favouring the southern region of Ratnagiri are not known, they need to be investigated. A natural sequel to this is that the credit and other facilities are also offered to make nut-fruit growing a successful enterprise. UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 209

To quote from a government report loan assistance was to 2029 hectares of fruit plantation, such as cashew-nut, coconut, arecanut and mangoes .... 13860 fruit trees were renovated as against the target of 17875 .... the target of 400 demonstration under intensive production of coconut was achieved. . . . Minor irrigation subsidy was given for 28 pump sets and 15 new wells, two community wells were completed and 3556 hectares of land were brought under irrigation command (target 6113 hectares) by bandaras at the cost of Rs. 39.03 lakhs., trenching of 1540 hectares of (sic) cashewnut (target 3225 hectares) and plantation of 4950 hectares of cashew (target 3225 hectares) was completed with total expenditure of Rs. 20.17 lakhs under soil conservation sub head (Socio-Economic Review, 1972-73 : 29-30). The Konkan Development Corporation (DCKL)27 participates in horticultural activity. It also "plans to associate itself actively with the Fort Foundation and the World Bank Projects for development of mango, cashewnut and pineapple" (Rajadhvaksha : 12). Its managing director informs that Maharashtra State Co-operative Land Development Board is collaborating actively with DCKL to establish rubber and eucalyptus plantation (Rajadhvaksha: 22). A final point to note is that mangoes and cashews are grown on varkas or waste land, which confirms our stand that ecology by itself is not a deterrent to development. Horticulture seems to be a solution to the problem of land use. In the present structure, how ever, one has to take into consideration not only land use but also land relations. It appears therefore that the development, to some extent, of industries also28 in the southern region, is a political decision based on vested interests This has acted as deciding factor because the poor peasants themselves have failed to bring any effective political pressure to get back their right to produce and live as they should. Social Consequences Lack of any meaningful changes in the agrarian system after the Khoti act of 1880 was passed, and failure to develop industries29 or to tap the existing natural resources, have led to large scale migration of adult workers30 leading to a grave demographic imbalance in the Ratnagiri region. This is reflected in: (a) Distorted sex ratio (table III); (b) Unhealthy age distribution pattern (table IV), resulting almost in depletion of a section of adult population (table V). Each of these demographic features has its social 210 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

consequences leading to further pauperization of Ratnagiri and these together have conferred backwardness on the Konkan region31. Excess of men over women is typical of India as well as Maha- rashtra. But this trend is reversed in Ratnagiri when the present so ratio stands at 1244 females per 1000 males in Ratnagiri. The state average is 930 females per 1000 males (Socio-Economic Review 1976-77 : 5). The figures from table III show that the gap is steadily widening: perhaps it would have been even wider but for the fact that in recent years women and single girls too are compelled to migrate out to seek employment. Such sacrifices as leaving home do not promise adequate compensation in terms of wages or in a better quality of life in the cities. Large numbers, particularly in the lower income groups, have therefore no choice but to live in poverty and loneliness in cities. They are thereby deprived of basic human necessity of family life - problem which needs to be further investigated. Sometimes, much concern is expressed that Ratnagiri has become an area of female agriculture. In the agrarian sector women exceed men by 21,000 (Census of India 1971 : 16). What is important, however, is to remember that women's participation in productive activity in principle is not to be condemned. What is regretted is that much of her toil and activity cannot be productive for the simple reason that by and large the holdings are small, the input! are low, the infrastructure is underdeveloped and credit facilities are scarce. High yield variety seed is available for exchange with ordinary seed but it cannot be availed of32. In other words, land as the main source if productive occupations is underutilized. Repatriation of money for agricultural improvement is impossible with the low wage level of the migrants in cities. In other words , the employment figures of women in the primary sector may include disguised unemployment. Data presented in tables IV and V indicate a higher con- centration of non-productive age groups living on in Ratnagiri. This is disastrous for the people themselves, both socially and economically. Our analysis also reveals under-utilization of land and failure to exploit the natural resources. A large section of the adult, productive population, is not on the spot to protest at this sorry state of affairs. Ratnagiri is reduced to a state of limbo. If unprovoked, the ruling classes would not bring about development changes UNDER DEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 211 to benefit the whole region, and its poor masses. What is perhaps acting as a draw-back in the situation is that jobs in the cities, even small-time ones, permit repatriation of money for subsistence for those left behind in the village. On an average it is no more than Rs. 30-40 as one case study clearly shows33. This has perhaps negated the possibility of a greater consciousness among the peasantry. Konkan is unique in another sense that its peasantry is not burdened by debts. But why has it even lulled those who periodically return to their village either for the jatara, the village fete or for participation in the agricultural activity during sowing or harvesting season? At the end of this study of uneven development we note that there is a stark contrast between the passivity in the countryside34 and the heroic struggle s on the industrial front in Bombay fought by the same worker from Ratnagiri. This curious paradox of peasant passivity in the homeland Konkan and protest in the metropolis needs to be urgently investigated and explained.

212 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

(* This includes a part of Kolaba)

Sources : Figures for 1820, 1846, 1872 are from Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. 10 pp. 196-109. For 1901 to 1951, Kulkami, op. cit., p. 18. For 1971, Census of India, 1971, p. 16 UNDER DEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 213

Source : Census of India, 1971, Maharashtra, p. 16.

Source : Census of India, 1971, Maharashtra, p. 17. (* 20-24 age is taken as a representative of adult productive age group. Other groups are not mentioned).

NOTES

1. S.M. Edwards, Census of India, Vol. X, Bombay Town and Island, Part 4, 1901, pp. 109, 113. He also mentions Melville Bill passed in 1813 which was responsible for the rise in trade. Melville Bill abolished exclusive trade of the Company with India. 2. Daniel Thorner reports that the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce opposed this move. He also tells us that the first to advocate improved shipping and laying of railway lines in India was Grindlays, the famous bankers whose interest though mainly commercial, appreciated the need for political safety of India. Daniel Thorner, Investment in an Empire, pp. 25-26, 5-6. 3. Exports were not confined to cotton although it rose to Rs. 8.4 crores in 1885, but also consisted of rapeseed, linseed and gingelly. Edwards, ibid.: pp. 149, 136. 214 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

4. Innumerable chawls sprung up in Bombay. These were meant to house the countless inhabitants from Ratnagiri and Satara. Gazetteer Bombay City and Island, Vol. I, pp. 179, 209, 211. 5. The inhabitants of the cotton country were in touch with the merchants who exported the product. Edwards, ibid, p. 121. 6. Bombay Gazetteer, 1880, (p. 106), Reports that Ratnagiri could not support its people, but provided Bombay with its earliest and cleverest workers, its cheapest and most trusty unskilled labour. 7. Dinabandhu was started in 1879 in Poona by Bhalekar and this press was bought over to Bombay in 1880 by Lokhande. 8. The only exception of an upper caste man was Sane Guruji. But he was not a national leader, but a school teacher. 9. Bombay Gazetteer, 1880, (pp. 196; 197), explains that in 1720; Moghuls divided the inland district of Ratnagiri into two, the northern part was given to Satara and the south-west to Kolhapur. 10. Government Order No. 3402, 17th December, 1832, Maharashtra Archives. It. The major cultivating caste in Maharashtra is Kunbi. Kulkarni points out the term Kunbi is derived from Kulumbi or Kutumbika, Ibid., p. 79. 12. Under the decadent Peshwa rule, the Khots had been permitted to become a special class of "land-lords" or village rentiers and managers who gained complete control of district records. Although the land of the peasant holders were entered in their own names, those of the tenants were in the name of the Khots who gained possession of the lands of the peasant proprietors through mortgage and reduced the peasants to the level of slaves. A Khoti village was therefore pulled down to the level of abject poverty, Bombay Gazetter, 1880, Vol. X, pp. 225-230. 13. Elphinstone toyed with the idea of converting Khoti villages into kulargi ones, but eventually, self-interest prevailed. Bombay Gazetteer, 1880, p. 231. 14. In spite of the saving clauses, the Khots filed many suits against the Gov- ernment and Saptahik Satya Shodhak, in anticipation of the passing of the Act, became the mouth piece of the Khots, right from October, 1879. 15. The number of people supported by agriculture in 1891 was 8,21,151, and in 1951 it fell to 4,95,197. R. V. Kulkarni, Industrial Development in Bombay Konkan, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (Bombay University.) 1961. 16. No mention is made of Konkan as the nursery of Bombay's textile labour. This is understandable as textile industry was at that time largely Indian and not British. 17. Building a fort was mooted in 1699 for which wood was needed, but three of its bastions were completed only in 1874. Foster, The English Factories in India, Vol. I, 1670-1671. UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AN AREA OF RESERVE LABOUR 215

18. Satya Shodhak, (23) of 11th and 18th January, 1880, complained about the rise of the duty on an article of universal consumption with Govern- ment take over. Confidential Report on Native Paper Maharashtra Archives.

19. Zachariah, Migrants in Greater Bombay, 1961. The contribution of Ratna- giri is 45 percent of the total migrants from the State of Maharashtra. 20. According to Government reports, in 1976, 8.67 metric tons of the total produce is sent out. It also mentions, Sethi Nippon as one of the three Engineering units, set up in the neighbouring area of Kundal taluka, Socio- Economic Review, 1976-77, p. 7.

1 21. The percentage of fallow land in Ratnagiri is 2 /2 times higher than the State average, ibid., p. 21. 22. The total area under food (Train in 1974-75 was 2,28,140 hectares, it fell in 1975-76 to 2.24,40 hectares while area under fruit rose from 19,539 to 2,643 hectares for the same period.

23. Til] 197° only two southern talukas, Vengurla and Malvan, could boast of two crops. But it constitutes only 4.35 per cent of the net sown area. Socio-Economic Review, 1976-77. p. 19. 24. All the sugar cane is an irrigated crop. (C. D. Deshpande : 77), He also mentions that gross income from sugar cane outstrips that from other irri- gated crops, that too in spite of heavier water requirement {ibid., p. 79). 25. The study group appoint ed by the Government, suggested building cement concrete bandharas, Times of India, Bombay: 20th February: 1980.

26. Socio-Economic Review, 1967-77, (p. 6) reports that 25 cashew nut factories have come up in the district.

27. DCKL appears to have been set up at the suggestion of Indian Merchants Chamber of Commerce, in 1971. 28. A Government report indicates that four large engineering factories have sprung up in Kudal. They are Wymen Garden, Sethi Nippon, Powder Metal and Arvind Metal. J.K. Files has been established in MIDC area Ratnagiri. Socio-Economic Review, 1976-77 : 7. 29. Except for two pockets, Chiplun and Kudal.

30. The density of Ratnagiri is only 153 per sq. km. as against the State average of 164. Socio-Eaonomic Review, 1976-77, p. 4. 31. When Maharashtra itself is considered as one of the few favoured States which receives 70 per cent or more of the institutional finance from the centre. (Raj Krishna, "The Centre and the Periphery", Economic Times, 12th May, 1980). 216 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

32. Our Survey showed that in 1978 only 8 households in Kondivli availed of the facility. I.R. 8 and Jaya fetches a high price of Rs. 120/- per quintal but require irrigation and a long period of 130-135 days for maturation. B.D.O. Office Records, Rajapur vide Savur, Case Study of Kondivli; op. cit., p. 25. 33. M. Savur, "A Case Study of Kondivale", in Under -Development of Ratnagiri, op. cit., p. 24. The money is not substantial enough to be productively utilised in agriculture. Yet, Rntnagiri is referred to as having "money order economy". 34. This does not deny the solid but silent support given to the industrial workers during their long periods of struggle.

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