DOCSLIB.ORG

Language and Time in Hegel's Ontology of Subjectivity Alexander Liepins Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdo

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Language and Time in Hegel's Ontology of Subjectivity Alexander Liepins Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdo Language and Time in Hegel’s Ontology of Subjectivity Alexander Liepins Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the PhD degree in Philosophy Department of Philosophy Faculty of the Arts University of Ottawa © Alexander Liepins, Ottawa, Canada, 2017 ii Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ..........................................................................................................................v Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. vi Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: Hegel’s Ontology of Time from the 1830 Naturphilosophie .........................................9 1.1. From Logic to Nature ..........................................................................................................10 1.2. Mechanics (A): From Space to Motion .............................................................................12 1.3. Conceptualizing Time .........................................................................................................20 1.3.1 Absolute Time ...............................................................................................................21 1.3.2. Eternity and Temporality .............................................................................................30 1.3.3. Time as Becoming .......................................................................................................36 1.4. Subjectivity and Time .........................................................................................................39 1.5. From Nature to Geist ..........................................................................................................44 Chapter 2: Intuition and Language in the 1830 Geistesphilosophie ..............................................46 2.1. Geist ....................................................................................................................................47 2.2 Intuition and Time................................................................................................................54 2.2.1. Feeling, Attention, Intuition .........................................................................................57 2.2.2. Space, Time, and Intuition in Kant’s First Critique ....................................................63 2.2.3. Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Spatio-Temporal Intuition ..............................................67 2.2.4. Time as Intuited Becoming ..........................................................................................74 2.3. Language and Time.............................................................................................................76 2.3.1 Speech ...........................................................................................................................80 2.3.2. Writing .........................................................................................................................85 2.4. Toward History ...................................................................................................................89 iii Chapter 3: The History of Subjectivity ..........................................................................................92 3.1. From Subjective to Objective Geist ....................................................................................93 3.2. History and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit ....................................................................96 3.3. The Concept of World History .........................................................................................100 3.4. History, Reason, and the Volksgeist ..................................................................................107 3.5. Subjectivity, History, and Constitutions ...........................................................................110 3.5.1. Hegel’s Idea of a Constitution ...................................................................................111 3.5.2. Language and Constitutions .......................................................................................114 3.5.3. The U.S. Constitution ................................................................................................120 3.6. History, Subjectivity, Freedom .........................................................................................123 3.7. From History to Logic ......................................................................................................130 Chapter 4: The Logic and Language of Subjectivity ...................................................................132 4.1. On the Relation of Language and Logic ...........................................................................133 4.1.1. Logic, Ontology, and the Relevance of Language .....................................................134 4.1.2. Gadamer on Language as the Presupposition of Logic .............................................137 4.1.3. Hegel on Language and Logic ...................................................................................140 4.1.4. Hamann and Hegel .....................................................................................................143 4.2. Truth, Subjectivity, and Language ....................................................................................150 4.2.1. The True is the Whole................................................................................................151 4.2.2. The Development of the Concept ..............................................................................154 4.3. Time and the True Development of the Subject ...............................................................163 4.3.1. The Speculative Sentence ..........................................................................................165 4.3.2. The Currency of Ahistorical Becoming in German Idealism ....................................172 4.3.3. The Scientific Standpoint ...........................................................................................183 4.3.4. Becoming and the Ontology of Subjectivity as Language.........................................190 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................194 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................200 iv Abstract This thesis argues that Hegel’s views on subjectivity are deeply rooted in, and defined by, both language and time. Specifically, we claim that Hegel’s account of subjectivity is decisively characterized by fundamentally ontological conceptualizations of both language and time. What we conclude is that Hegel’s philosophy and its conceptualization of subjectivity is a robust attempt to reconcile the changing, finite, temporal modes of being with the classical philosophical expectation that philosophy arrive at truth, which is non-finite and ahistorical. By defining time as becoming and language as the medium for the rational expression and comprehension of being that is meaningful for us, we claim that Hegel’s approach to the being of subjectivity is developed through a thematic relation of language and time. Overall this thesis aims to make an original contribution to Hegel studies and his views on subjectivity, time, and language by arguing that comprehending subjectivity means grasping how it becomes. This thesis begins, then, with the idea that both being and time are becoming, and that this is at once a finite and non-finite notion. From there, we emphasize that what Nature becomes is us, human subjectivity, and that we apprehend this being that is meaningful for us as time and through language. In history, subjectivity becomes as the written embodiment of a particular people, and, in philosophy, subjectivity becomes linguistically according to an ahistorical, non-finite notion of becoming as the subject’s own self-determination; neither excludes the other because there is only the continual becoming of our making sense of the rational whole. v Acknowledgements This research project was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, as well as funding from the University of Ottawa. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the Department of Philosophy, which assisted with several conference travel grants that allowed me to present the content of my thesis while it was still a work in progress. I would like to recognize and thank my supervisor, Jeffrey Reid, for his extremely thoughtful reflections, commitment to teaching, and scholarly mentorship. His guidance and encouragement throughout the research and writing process was essential to producing this thesis. I am also grateful for the questions and constructive feedback from my committee, Daniel Tanguay, Robert Sparling, and Isabelle-Thomas Fogiel, as well as this project’s external examiner, John Burbidge. Their involvement has strengthened the final version of this thesis. I want to thank the many professors I have had over the years who have contributed to my ongoing
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Dr. Theodore George Professor and Head Department of Philosophy
    Dr. Theodore George Professor and Head Department of Philosophy Texas A&M University [email protected] Areas of specialization: Gadamer, contemporary hermeneutics, contemporary continental ethics, philosophy of art and aesthetics, Hegel, German Idealism and Romanticism Areas of competence: continental European philosophy since Kant, the history of Western philosophy Education: Ph.D. in Philosophy, Villanova University, 2000 Dissertation: “Hegel’s Speculative Theory of Political Life: Community and Tragedy in the Phenomenology of Spirit” Committee: Dr. Dennis Schmidt (Director), Dr. Walter Brogan, Dr. Julie Klein Fulbright Fellow, Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, 1998–1999 Host: Prof. Dr. Günter Figal M.A. in Philosophy, Villanova University, 1997 B.A. in Philosophy and German (double major), Whitman College, 1993 Cum Laude, with honors and distinction in Philosophy and with distinction in German Thesis: “The Structure of Rebirth in Walden: A Connection with Thus Spoke Zarathustra” Appointments: Head, Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, 2015–present (Research leave 2018–2019; Interim Head 2014–2015) Professor of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, 2020–present Associate Professor of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, 2007–2020 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, 2001–2007 Honorary Appointment: Senior Researcher, College of Fellows, Philosophy Research Institute, Western Sydney University, Sydney, Australia, 2016–present Editorial Positions: Editor, Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2012–present
    [Show full text]
  • Hegel's Philosophy of Biology?
    Article title: Hegel’s Philosophy of Biology? A Programmatic Overview Short title: Hegel’s Philosophy of Biology? Article type: Research article Authors: Andrea Gambarotto (corresponding) & Luca Illetterati Affiliation: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, UC Louvain, Belgium Email: [email protected] Abstract: This paper presents what we call ‘Hegel’s philosophy of biology’ to a target audience of both Hegel scholars and philosophers of biology. It also serves to introduce a special issue of the Hegel Bulletin entirely dedicated to a first mapping of this yet to be explored domain of Hegel studies. We submit that Hegel’s philosophy of biology can be understood as a radicalization of the Kantian approach to organisms, and as prefiguring current philosophy of biology in important ways, especially with regard to the nature of biological organization, the role of teleology in biological explanation, and the relation between life and cognition. 1 I. Introduction The concept of life is a key concept of classical German philosophy as a whole and it would be reductive to think of it only in biological terms. The attention to the notion of life in the post-Kantian debate has a critical function with respect to all forms of dualism that have marked modern philosophy: those between soul and body, thought and world, and therefore, of course, spirit and nature. Life is, in fact, for post-Kantian philosophers, an embodied soul or an animated body, a mind that is never entirely separated from nature. From the very beginning of his philosophical quest, Hegel’s work presents itself as a ‘philosophy of life’, that is a philosophy that must do justice to the multiform experience of life, without falling into the abstract image provided by the intellect (Verstand), where the dynamism and vitality (Lebendigkeit) of concrete reality gets lost.
    [Show full text]
  • Eligible Journals (PDF)
    Last Update: 2021-07-08 CUP Open Access Agreement UNIVIE 2020-01-01 until 2022-12-31 Eligible Journals Acta Neuropsychiatrica Acta Numerica Advances in Archaeological Practice Africa African Studies Review Ageing & Society Agricultural and Resource Economics Review AI EDAM AJIL Unbound American Antiquity American Journal of International Law American Journal of Law & Medicine American Political Science Review Americas Anatolian Studies Ancient Mesoamerica Anglo-Saxon England Animal Health Research Reviews Annals of Actuarial Science Annals of Glaciology Annual Review of Applied Linguistics Antarctic Science Antimicrobial Stewardship & Healthcare Epidemiology Antiquaries Journal Antiquity ANZIAM Journal Applied Psycholinguistics APSIPA Transactions on Signal and Information Processing Arabic Sciences and Philosophy Archaeological Dialogues Archaeological Reports Architectural History arq: Architectural Research Quarterly Art Libraries Journal Asian Journal of Comparative Law Asian Journal of International Law Asian Journal of Law and Society ASTIN Bulletin: The Journal of the IAA Australasian Journal of Special and Inclusive Education page 1 of 8 Australian Journal of Environmental Education Australian Journal of Indigenous Education Austrian History Yearbook Behaviour Change Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy Behavioural Public Policy Bilingualism: Language and Cognition Biological Imaging Bird Conservation International BJHS Themes BJPsych Advances BJPsych Bulletin BJPsych International BJPsych Open Brain Impairment Britannia British
    [Show full text]
  • Kierkegaard's Socrates: a Venture in Evolutionary Theory.” Modern Theology 17(4): 442-473
    1 THE PROBLEM OF KIERKEGAARD ’S SOCRATES DANIEL WATTS This essay re-examines Kierkegaard’s view of Socrates. I consider the problem that arises from Kierkegaard’s appeal to Socrates as an exemplar for irony. The problem is that he also appears to think that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented. And part of the problem is the paradox of self-reference that immediately arises from trying to represent x as unrepresentable. On the solution I propose, Kierkegaard does not hold that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates is in no way representable. Rather, he holds that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented in a purely disinterested way. I show how, in The Concept of Irony , Kierkegaard makes use of ‘limiting cases’ of representation in order to bring Socrates into view as one who defies purely disinterested representation. I also show how this approach to Socrates connects up with Kierkegaard’s more general interest in the problem of ethical exemplarity, where the problem is how ethical exemplars can be given as such, that is, in such a way that purely disinterested contemplation is not the appropriate response to them. Socrates … this puzzling, uncategorizable, inexplicable phenomenon (Nietzsche) A plausible general hypothesis about Kierkegaard is that he modelled his work as an author on Socrates. This supposition helps to explain many features of his work: his self- withdrawing and maieutic gestures, his focus on ethical self-knowledge, his eye for paradoxes, his animus against those he regarded as modern-day sophists, his professions of ignorance. 1 Further, 1 This hypothesis has long guided Kierkegaard studies, going back at least to David Swenson’s way of introducing Kierkegaard to Anglophone readers, in the 1940s, as a “Danish Socrates” (1983 [1941]).
    [Show full text]
  • Spirit's Embeddedness in Nature: Hegel's Decentring of Self-Legislation
    doi:10.1017/hgl.2020.33 Hegel Bulletin, Page 1 of 20 © The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2021 Spirit’s Embeddedness in Nature: Hegel’s Decentring of Self-Legislation Heikki Ikäheimo Abstract A recently widely accepted view has it that the nature-spirit distinction in Hegel is to be understood as a distinction between a space or realm that is not normative, or does not involve norms, and one that is or does. Notwithstanding the merits of this view, it has tended to create a separation between nature and spirit which is both philosophically troubling and difficult to reconcile with the picture of Hegel as the arch enemy of abstract or unreconciled dualisms. In this paper I aim to show that the defining phenomenon for this view—collective self-government by norms—is on Hegel’s account both dependent on living nature that involves normativity broadly conceived all the way down and also subject to the ultimate normative or evaluative principle of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit —concrete freedom—the essence of spirit according to him. This is to say that for Hegel the normativity of collectively administered norms is neither the most basic nor the highest form of normativity. I. Introduction The view according to which Geist or ‘spirit’ in Hegel stands for some metaphys- ically suspicious, spooky entity, transcendent principle behind the appearing world, or a neo-Platonic One whose emanation the world is, has been out of favour for quite some time now. The recently widely accepted view, one that has demarcated itself against the first mentioned one, is that ‘spirit’ in fact stands for the Sellarsian ‘space of reasons’, or as it is often put the ‘space or realm of norms’ or the ‘nor- mative realm’.
    [Show full text]
  • Rachel Elizabeth Zuckert Department of Philosophy 5728 N. Kenmore
    Rachel Elizabeth Zuckert Department of Philosophy 5728 N. Kenmore Ave, 3N Northwestern University Chicago, IL 60660 Kresge 3-512 1880 Campus Drive home: (773) 728-7927 Evanston, IL 60208 work: (847) 491-2556 [email protected] Education: 2000 PhD, University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy and the Committee on Social Thought 1995 MA, University of Chicago, Committee on Social Thought 1992 B.A. (1), Oxford University (Philosophy and Modern Languages) 1990 B.A. (Summa Cum Laude; Highest Honors in Philosophy; Phi Beta Kappa), Williams College Areas of Specialization: Kant and eighteenth-century philosophy Aesthetics Areas of Competence: Early modern philosophy Nineteenth-century philosophy Feminist philosophy Languages: French German Academic Employment: 2018- Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University; affiliated with the German Department 2008-18 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University; affiliated with the German Department 2011-18 2006-2008 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University 2001-2006 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Rice University 1999-2001 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Bucknell University Zuckert 2 Publications: Books Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Awarded the American Society for Aesthetics Monograph Prize (2008); reviewed in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Comparative and Continental Philosophy, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Metascience, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Review of Metaphysics, and subject of review essays in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism and Kant Yearbook Herder’s Naturalist Aesthetics, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming (2019). Edited Volume Hegel on Philosophy in History, co-edited with James Kreines, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
    [Show full text]
  • The Future of Hegelian Metaphysics John W. Burbidge
    C Abstract: With the recent suspicion of metaphysics it is easy to be C R R I embarrassed by Hegel’s suggestion that his Logic is also a metaphysics. I S In this paper I want to argue that his conception of metaphysics is S The Future of I I S still highly relevant, and suggest some ways it could be developed S further. I start by suggesting how Hegel justifies his claim, and why & that justification still retains a measure of plausibility. Then I turn to & Hegelian MetaphysicsC a discussion of what we mean by cause, and how Hegel’s analyses of C R necessity, cause and reciprocity transform this concept in ways which are R I I T relevant to current developments in science. T I I Q Q U Keywords: Logic, Metaphysics, Cause, Necessity, Reciprocity U E E / I / John W. Burbidge In his Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel observes that his “Logic coincides Volume 4 / Volume 4 / Issue 1 with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thought that used Issue 1 to be taken to express the essentialities of things.”1 For all that the logic is the system of pure thought, these thoughts are not the empty categories of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, but the Logic “contains thought in so far as this thought is equally the fact (or object [Miller]) as it is in itself; or the fact (or object) in itself insofar as this is equally pure thought.” 2 The term translated by di Giovanni as “fact” and by Miller as “object” is the notorious Sache selbst.
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography
    Bibliography Allison, H. E. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defence, Yale University Press (2004). Allison, H. E. ‘Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis’, The Philosophical Review, 95, 3, (1986), 393–425. Allison, H. E. Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, Oxford University Press (2011). Allison, H. E. Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Cambridge University Press (1990). Allison, H. E. Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, Oxford University Press (2011), 275–6. Allport, G. W. and Postman, L. Psychology of Rumor, Henry Hold & Co. (1947). Ameriks, K. ‘Kant, Miracles, and Religion, Parts One and Two’, in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide, ed. G. E. Michalson, Cambridge University Press (2014), 137–55. Anderson, D. J. ‘Knowledge and Conviction’, Synthese, 187, 2 (2012), 377–92. Atwell, J. E. Ends and Principles in Kant’s Moral Thought, Nijhoff Publishers (1986). Audi, R. ‘Self-Deception, Action, and Will’, Erkenntnis, 18, 2, (1975), 133–58. Audi, R. ‘Self-Deception and Practical Reasoning’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19, 2, (1989), 247–66. Augustine. Treaties on Various Subjects, ed. R. J. Deferrari, Catholic University of America Press (1952). Auxter, T. Kant’s Moral Teleology, Mercer University Press (1982). Ayers, M. Locke, Routledge (1996). Bach, K. ‘An Analysis of Self-Deception’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 41, 3, (1981), 351–70. Bagnoli, C. ‘Self-deception: a Constructivist Account’, HumanaMente 20, (2012), 93–116. Banham, G. ‘Kantian Respect’, Kant Studies Online, (2008), 1–14. Barnes, J. ‘Belief is up to Us’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106, (2006), 189–206.
    [Show full text]
  • Table of Contents 1
    CURRICULUM VITAE Richard Bellamy Table of Contents 1. Personal Details ..................................................................................................................... 3 2. Career .......................................................................................................................................... 3 I Education and General Academic Record ............................................................................ 3 II Academic Appointments .............................................................................................................. 4 III Visiting Appointments ................................................................................................................. 4 IV Other Positions ................................................................................................................................ 5 V Prizes and Honours ......................................................................................................................... 5 3. Publications .............................................................................................................................. 6 I Books ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 a) Monographs ........................................................................................................................................ 6 b) Edited Books and Journal Special Issues ...........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Kierkegaard and the Limits of Thought
    1 Kierkegaard and the Limits of Thought Daniel Watts Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we have just contradicted ourselves. (Graham Priest) The ultimate can be reached only as limit. (Søren Kierkegaard) Graham Priest’s Beyond the Limits of Thought (Priest 2001) parades an eclectic line-up of thinkers to show how the history of philosophy has been shaped by the spectre of paradoxes at the limits of thought. One name that is missing from Priest’s line-up is ‘Søren Kierkegaard’. This omission is something of a surprise, especially given Hegel’s centrality in the book and its (second- edition) inclusion of Heidegger and Derrida. For, Kierkegaard’s writings are famous for nothing if not the way they involve such notions as ‘the absurd’, ‘the incomprehensible’ and ‘the Absolute Paradox’ and for their opposition to Hegelian ‘mediation’. But one can appreciate why an author might hesitate to venture something pithy about Kierkegaard on the limits of thought. For one thing, there is a real question whether we are supposed to take at all seriously talk of ‘the Absolute Paradox’ and the like in his enigmatic and often playful texts. And, as we shall see, the critics are so far from consensus in this regard as to associate Kierkegaard with nearly every imaginable view. I hope in this essay to help illuminate Kierkegaard’s place in the history of thinking about the limits of thought. I shall concentrate in the first instance on his treatment of the idea that 2 Christianity cannot be thought or understood. I shall begin by showing how this idea is ostensibly advanced by the pseudonymous work, Philosophical Fragments; and how this text positively courts the threat of self-referential incoherence in this connection.
    [Show full text]
  • CV September 2016 Wo
    KAREN NG Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University 2111 West End Avenue, 111 Furman Hall, Nashville, TN 37240 Email: [email protected] | Phone: 917.692.3089 ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS Assistant Professor of Philosophy (tenure-track), Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN August 2014 – present Assistant Professor of Philosophy (tenure-track), Siena College, Loudonville, NY September 2012 – June 2014 EDUCATION Ph.D. Philosophy, New School for Social Research, New York City, January 2013 Dissertation: The Life of the Concept: Freedom and Form in Hegel’s Logic Winner of the Hans Jonas Memorial Award in Philosophy M.A. Philosophy, University of Essex, Colchester, UK, September 2006 B.A. Honors, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, June 2005 AREAS OF RESEARCH AND TEACHING AOS: Hegel, German Idealism, Frankfurt School Critical Theory AOC: Modern Philosophy (esp. Kant), 19th and 20th Century European Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy PUBLICATIONS Journal Articles “Leben, Selbstbewusstsein, Negativität. Zum Verständnis von Hegels These der Speculativen Identität,” forthcoming in Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 2016. “Life and Mind in Hegel’s Logic and Subjective Spirit,” Hegel-Bulletin 37:2 (2016): doi:10.1017/hgl.2016.35. “Ideology Critique from Hegel and Marx to Critical Theory,” Constellations 22:3 (September 2015): 393–404. “Hegel’s Logic of Actuality,” Review of Metaphysics 63:1 (September 2009): 139–72. Book Chapters “From Actuality to Concept in Hegel’s Logic,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hegel, ed. Dean Moyar (Oxford: Oxford University Press), forthcoming 2017. “Hegel and Adorno on Negative Universal History: The Dialectics of Species-Life,” in Creolizing Hegel, ed. Michael Monahan (New York: Rowman and Littlefield), forthcoming 2017.
    [Show full text]
  • The Reflexivity of Knowledge Between Brandom and Wittgenstein
    “What the Picture Tells Me Is Itself”: The Reflexivity of Knowledge between Brandom and Wittgenstein VOJTĚCH KOLMAN ABSTRACT WORK TYPE Both Brandom and Wittgenstein base their concepts of experience on the game Article metaphor and the associated concept of rule. In fact, what Brandom seems to do is further refine Wittgenstein’s vocabulary by specifying the game as the ARTICLE HISTORY game of giving and asking for reasons and rules as the rules of inference. By Received: replacing the plurality of “games” with the one and only “game”, though, 30–March–2018 Brandom also lays the ground for a possible discord. This relates particularly Accepted: to the cognitive significance of different forms of human experience, such as 15–July–2018 music or art in general, which are treated by Wittgenstein as language games despite their being rather independent of claims and commitments and despite ARTICLE LANGUAGE their utterly lacking the representational dimension. In my paper, I will show English that with respect to these objections (as phrased, e.g., by Andrew Bowie), one KEYWORDS can argue that Brandom is in fact true to Wittgenstein’s instruction to always Language Game read his Investigations against his Tractatus. The general idea is to look at the Self-Consciousness game and picture metaphor as parts of a single concept that both philosophers Reflexivity work on together by going back to the very idealist concept of reflexivity or self- Game Metaphor consciousness. Hegel © Studia Humanitatis – Universidad de Salamanca 2019 V. Kolman (✉) Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic Vol. 8, No.
    [Show full text]