Language and Time in Hegel’s Ontology of Subjectivity Alexander Liepins Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the PhD degree in Philosophy Department of Philosophy Faculty of the Arts University of Ottawa © Alexander Liepins, Ottawa, Canada, 2017 ii Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ..........................................................................................................................v Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. vi Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: Hegel’s Ontology of Time from the 1830 Naturphilosophie .........................................9 1.1. From Logic to Nature ..........................................................................................................10 1.2. Mechanics (A): From Space to Motion .............................................................................12 1.3. Conceptualizing Time .........................................................................................................20 1.3.1 Absolute Time ...............................................................................................................21 1.3.2. Eternity and Temporality .............................................................................................30 1.3.3. Time as Becoming .......................................................................................................36 1.4. Subjectivity and Time .........................................................................................................39 1.5. From Nature to Geist ..........................................................................................................44 Chapter 2: Intuition and Language in the 1830 Geistesphilosophie ..............................................46 2.1. Geist ....................................................................................................................................47 2.2 Intuition and Time................................................................................................................54 2.2.1. Feeling, Attention, Intuition .........................................................................................57 2.2.2. Space, Time, and Intuition in Kant’s First Critique ....................................................63 2.2.3. Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Spatio-Temporal Intuition ..............................................67 2.2.4. Time as Intuited Becoming ..........................................................................................74 2.3. Language and Time.............................................................................................................76 2.3.1 Speech ...........................................................................................................................80 2.3.2. Writing .........................................................................................................................85 2.4. Toward History ...................................................................................................................89 iii Chapter 3: The History of Subjectivity ..........................................................................................92 3.1. From Subjective to Objective Geist ....................................................................................93 3.2. History and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit ....................................................................96 3.3. The Concept of World History .........................................................................................100 3.4. History, Reason, and the Volksgeist ..................................................................................107 3.5. Subjectivity, History, and Constitutions ...........................................................................110 3.5.1. Hegel’s Idea of a Constitution ...................................................................................111 3.5.2. Language and Constitutions .......................................................................................114 3.5.3. The U.S. Constitution ................................................................................................120 3.6. History, Subjectivity, Freedom .........................................................................................123 3.7. From History to Logic ......................................................................................................130 Chapter 4: The Logic and Language of Subjectivity ...................................................................132 4.1. On the Relation of Language and Logic ...........................................................................133 4.1.1. Logic, Ontology, and the Relevance of Language .....................................................134 4.1.2. Gadamer on Language as the Presupposition of Logic .............................................137 4.1.3. Hegel on Language and Logic ...................................................................................140 4.1.4. Hamann and Hegel .....................................................................................................143 4.2. Truth, Subjectivity, and Language ....................................................................................150 4.2.1. The True is the Whole................................................................................................151 4.2.2. The Development of the Concept ..............................................................................154 4.3. Time and the True Development of the Subject ...............................................................163 4.3.1. The Speculative Sentence ..........................................................................................165 4.3.2. The Currency of Ahistorical Becoming in German Idealism ....................................172 4.3.3. The Scientific Standpoint ...........................................................................................183 4.3.4. Becoming and the Ontology of Subjectivity as Language.........................................190 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................194 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................200 iv Abstract This thesis argues that Hegel’s views on subjectivity are deeply rooted in, and defined by, both language and time. Specifically, we claim that Hegel’s account of subjectivity is decisively characterized by fundamentally ontological conceptualizations of both language and time. What we conclude is that Hegel’s philosophy and its conceptualization of subjectivity is a robust attempt to reconcile the changing, finite, temporal modes of being with the classical philosophical expectation that philosophy arrive at truth, which is non-finite and ahistorical. By defining time as becoming and language as the medium for the rational expression and comprehension of being that is meaningful for us, we claim that Hegel’s approach to the being of subjectivity is developed through a thematic relation of language and time. Overall this thesis aims to make an original contribution to Hegel studies and his views on subjectivity, time, and language by arguing that comprehending subjectivity means grasping how it becomes. This thesis begins, then, with the idea that both being and time are becoming, and that this is at once a finite and non-finite notion. From there, we emphasize that what Nature becomes is us, human subjectivity, and that we apprehend this being that is meaningful for us as time and through language. In history, subjectivity becomes as the written embodiment of a particular people, and, in philosophy, subjectivity becomes linguistically according to an ahistorical, non-finite notion of becoming as the subject’s own self-determination; neither excludes the other because there is only the continual becoming of our making sense of the rational whole. v Acknowledgements This research project was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, as well as funding from the University of Ottawa. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the Department of Philosophy, which assisted with several conference travel grants that allowed me to present the content of my thesis while it was still a work in progress. I would like to recognize and thank my supervisor, Jeffrey Reid, for his extremely thoughtful reflections, commitment to teaching, and scholarly mentorship. His guidance and encouragement throughout the research and writing process was essential to producing this thesis. I am also grateful for the questions and constructive feedback from my committee, Daniel Tanguay, Robert Sparling, and Isabelle-Thomas Fogiel, as well as this project’s external examiner, John Burbidge. Their involvement has strengthened the final version of this thesis. I want to thank the many professors I have had over the years who have contributed to my ongoing