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Working Paper Working Paper No. 34 / November 2012 Reviewing Member States’ Commitment to the European External Action Service Abstract Based on interviews with diplomats from a representative cross-section of nine member states and members of the EEAS itself, the research findings of this EPIN Working Paper confirm long-standing traditions and member state perceptions of cooperation with European institutions. The paper also reveals new aspects of the intergovernmental method of foreign policy shaping and making in the European Union; in particular how different national positions can positively or negatively affect the consolidation of the EEAS and the role of the EU as an international actor. As such, the Working Paper makes an original contribution to the existing literature on one of most discussed actors in the European Union’s post-Lisbon architecture in the domain of EU external action. EPIN Working Papers present analyses of key issues raised by the debate on the political integration of Europe. The European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) is a network of think tanks and policy institutes based throughout Europe, which focuses on current EU political and policy debates (see back cover for more information). Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any of the institutions with which they are associated. ISBN: 978-94-6138-245-0 Available for free downloading from the CEPS (http://www.ceps.eu) and EPIN (http://www.epin.org) websites © Copyright 2012, EPIN & CEPS Contents Preface ............................................................................................................................................ i Steven Blockmans Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... ii Jackie West and Steven Blockmans France and the EEAS: A give-and-take relationship ..................................................................... 1 Vivien Pertusot From co-founder to wait-and-see: Germany’s policy on the European External Action Service . 9 Almut Möller and Julian Rappold Deliberate ‘spoiler’ or misunderstood pragmatist? Britain and the European External Action Service ..................................................................................................................... 14 Edward Burke The European External Action Service fails to impress the Dutch: Will it bring added influence? ............................................................................................. 19 Louise van Schaik Europeanising National Diplomacies: The Case of Romania ..................................................... 26 Paul Ivan The Europeanisation of External Representation: The Case of Sweden ..................................... 31 Fredrik Langdal Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The View from Portugal ...................................................... 37 Maria João Seabra The Impact of the European External Action Service on Spanish Diplomacy ........................... 41 Ignacio Molina & Alicia Sorroza European External Action Service: A view from Estonia ........................................................... 47 Elina Viilup Glossary of terms and abbreviations ........................................................................................... 56 Annexe I: Questionnaire used as basis for research .................................................................... 57 Preface he foreign affairs ministers of 12 EU member states (Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) Tco-signed an open letter to the High Representative on 8 December 2011 to identify glitches in the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS). This letter touched on the neglect of security affairs by the High Representative (HR) and pointed to the need to improve management and administrative procedures within the Service and the cooperation with the European Commission. Among other things, it called on the High Representative to circulate a yearly agenda, to produce regular preparatory policy and decision- making papers sufficiently in advance of the meetings, to set up a secure communications network and to optimise the identification of political priorities. Member states’ diplomats maintained that the letter was not meant as a criticism but as a constructive proposal, ahead of the High Representative’s report in the framework of the service review foreseen for mid-2013. In her own report on the first year of EEAS operations, submitted to the Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 22 December 2011, the HR denied the existence of systemic problems in cooperation with the Commission, while agreeing that the EEAS needed to stand on its own feet in administrative terms. The HR pledged to do more on security issues but indicated that EU member states were not doing their bit to help her put new systems in place. Indeed, given the limited resources available to the EEAS, support from member states services is key. This EPIN Working Paper explores several aspects of the role played by member states in the setting-up, organisation and functioning of the EEAS. This is a topical issue, and one that is currently the subject of a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), to be published in March 2013. The findings of this EPIN Working Paper, outlined in the Executive Summary, offer an independent preview into the attitudes of member states towards cooperation with the EEAS. Based on semi-structured interviews conducted with diplomats and civil servants of a representative cross-section of nine member states (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Portugal, Spain and Estonia) and members of the EEAS itself, research focused on member states’ influence on the creation of the EEAS, the impact of the new Service on EU member states’ diplomatic structures at the strategic and organisational levels (internal organisation, national diplomatic resources in third countries and international organisations), and the scope for synergies between national diplomacies and the EEAS on designated topics or in specific regions. The answers to the questionnaire (in annexe to this Working Paper) formed the starting point for the development of the papers written by research fellows of leading European think tanks, and carried out within the EPIN network. Initiated by project leaders Paul Ivan (previously at CEPS), Ignacio Molina and Alicia Sorroza (both at Elcano) this EPIN Working Paper both confirms long-standing traditions in and perceptions of member state cooperation with EU institutions, and unearths novelties in the intergovernmental method of foreign policy shaping and making in the European Union, in particular how different national positions can positively or negatively affect the consolidation of the EEAS and the role of the EU as an international actor. As such, this EPIN Working Paper makes an original contribution to the existing literature on one of most discussed actors in the European Union’s post-Lisbon architecture in the domain of EU external action. Steven Blockmans Senior Research Fellow and Head of the EU Foreign Policy unit, Centre for European Policy Studies. | i Executive Summary ember states’ views of the European External Action Service (EEAS) converge and diverge on a number of themes explored in this Working Paper, such as the need for Mthe Service, the response in national foreign ministries to its creation and performance so far, and what needs to be done differently to ensure the future success of the EEAS. What all nine member states covered by this study share is an interest in seeing the European Union emerge as a stronger player on the world stage. As the Swedish government put it in its parliamentary declaration of 2007, it would like to see the European Union be “a force in the service of peace, freedom and reconciliation.” Indeed, this goal was behind the Lisbon Treaty’s objectives for the creation of the EEAS in 2010; namely to enhance the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of EU external action and to combat the lack of synergy between national diplomacies of member states. Equally, in times of economic crisis, some member states see considerable merit in pooling resources and making cost savings by attributing additional tasks to the EEAS, especially in the areas of defence and consular services. Yet these hopes have been mitigated from the outset by the tension, indeed the paradox, between the desire to see the EEAS succeed in its mission and the will to protect and promote long-standing national interests in the field of foreign policy. This inherent tension is less apparent in the accounts provided by smaller member states such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Estonia than those from France and the UK, for example, with the latter stating: British diplomats believe that the EEAS is well-placed to complement the UK’s foreign policy objectives in a manner that is entirely consistent with the British government’s pledge not to cede more powers to Brussels. And from France: According to a French diplomat, the approach to the EEAS is akin to a love-hate relationship. After having pushed for its creation, France complains constantly about its functioning now. This attitude replicates patterns rooted in debates over Europeanisation versus national sovereignty. There
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