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Afghanistan Review Week 29 19 July 2011 Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises

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Afghanistan Review Week 29 19 July 2011 Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises CIVIL - MILITARY FUSION CEN TRE Afghanistan Review Week 29 19 July 2011 Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises INSIDE THIS ISSUE This document provides a weekly overview of developments in Afghanistan from 12 July—18 July 2011, with hyper-links to source material highlighted in blue and underlined in the text. For more information Economic Development on the topics below or other issues pertaining to events in Afghanistan, feel free to contact the members of Governance & Rule of Law Humanitarian Affairs the Afghanistan Team, or visit our website at www.cimicweb.org. Infrastructure Security & Force Protection Socio-Cultural Development Economic Development Steven A. Zyck ► [email protected] DISCLAIMER embers of Afghanistan‟s Wolesi In other regional news, Pajhwok Afghan News Jirga (lower house of parliament) reports that Afghanistan and Bangladesh are The Civil-Military Fusion Centre M joined the US government and In- seeking to strengthen their trade ties. The Af- (CFC) is an information and ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) in pushing ghan Embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh‟s capital, knowledge management for a forensic audit of Azizi Bank, the coun- is said to be working on draft agreements con- organisation focused on improving try‟s second largest private financial institu- cerning economic, commercial and cultural civil-military interaction, facilitating tion, reports the Wall Street Journal. Azizi cooperation to be signed by the two countries. information sharing and enhancing Bank, like the scandal-affected Kabul Bank, situational awareness through the reportedly made large and ultimately loss- After several weeks of decline, the value of CimicWeb portal and our weekly generating investments in Dubai‟s real estate the Afghan currency, the afghani, rose against and monthly publications. market in 2007 and 2008. The Wall Street the US dollar and the Pakistani rupee, says Journal further reports that the audit of Azizi Pajhwok. The rise in the afghani‟s value came CFC products are based upon and Bank is one of the key conditions which the after DAB, which oversees Afghanistan‟s fis- link to open-source information Afghan government must meet in order to cal and monetary policy, purchased USD 70 from a wide variety of organisations, receive IMF certification as a safe destination million on the open market. Pajhwok notes research centres and media sources. for official development assistance from the that the price of a 50 kg sack of Pakistani flour However, the CFC does not endorse IMF, the World Bank and other aid-financing declined from AFN 1,027 (USD 23.86) last and cannot necessarily guarantee the accuracy or objectivity of these institutions. Mohebullah Safi, the acting Gov- week to AFN 1,000 (USD 23.24) in the week sources. CFC publications are ernor of Afghanistan‟s Central Bank, suggest- ending 14 July. independently produced by ed that Azizi Bank was financially sound, with Knowledge Managers and do not USD 588 million in reserves. He suggested Various media reports cited significant pro- reflect NATO or ISAF policies or that media reports of corruption or misman- gress on the construction of a natural gas pipe- positions of any other organisation. agement at Azizi Bank would further erode line from Iran to Pakistan. Dawn, a Pakistani the public‟s confidence in the Afghan finan- newspaper, reports that Iran plans on finishing The CFC is part of NATO Allied cial system, according to CNN. However, Safi its leg of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline by the end Command Operations since July did confirm that the Central Bank, known as of 2012. This announcement came following a 2011. Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), is investigating joint meeting between Pakistani and Iranian Azizi Bank for “investment problems”. presidents in Teheran. A separate report in The National, a newspaper based in the United Tolo News reports that the fourth Economic Arab Emirates, indicates that Pakistan may Cooperation Organisation (ECO) summit was complete its leg of the pipeline in 2014. The held in Kabul. Intra-regional trade issues, par- Iran-Pakistan pipeline may pose a significant ticularly visas and tariffs, featured prominent- challenge to the construction of the Turkmeni- ly at the summit. Afghanistan‟s Minister of stan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natu- CONTACT THE CFC Commerce and Industries, Anwar-ul-Haq ral gas pipeline project, which The National For further information, contact: Ahadi, stated that Afghanistan was suffering notes may prove unrealistic given current se- because of neighbouring countries‟ trade poli- curity challenges in Afghanistan. Afghanistan Team Leader cies and asked for a “halt in transit problems”. Steve A. Zyck ECO‟s 10 members include nearly every Finally, the United States Agency for Interna- [email protected] country bordering Afghanistan, including Pa- tional Development (USAID) issued a press kistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and release drawing attention to the opening of a The Afghanistan Team Uzbekistan. fruit and vegetable wholesale market in Lagh- [email protected] man province. The new facility is not only intended to be more vent fruits and vegetables from being damaged or spoiled in convenient but will also, by including improved facilities, pre- inadequate facilities before they are sold. Governance & Rule of Law Amber Ramsey ► [email protected] he killing of Ahmed Wali Karzai, a half-brother of Af- Wali was a personality of national standing. For Shah Wali to ghan President Hamid Karzai and a powerful figure in get his stature will take a long time”. Nevertheless, several T southern Afghanistan, this past week produced a power tribal elders interviewed by The New York Times seemed hope- vacuum in much of southern Afghanistan, reports the British ful that the new situation will provide the push necessary for newspaper The Telegraph. Reuters notes that his death and the the Afghan government to put greater emphasis on developing subsequent discussions about who would succeed him high- the trust of the people. As stated by one local leader, Hajji Atta light Afghanistan‟s continued reliance on key figures who ex- Mohammad Alikozai, “[t]he administration will be more inde- ercise significant power and authority outside of state institu- pendent now, and if they are clean and straight with the peo- tions. The article explains that much of Afghanistan is con- ple, things could work out”. trolled by leaders who have gained power and wealth through personal connections rather than strictly through their positions In an effort “to encourage peaceful reconciliation in war-torn in the Afghan government. During years of civil war, men like Afghanistan”, the United Nations Security Council has re- Ahmed Wali were able to build vast fortunes and followers, moved 14 names from the UN Consolidated List of individuals many of whom still command these loyalties today. However, with links to the Taliban, reports Agence France-Presse. The analysts cited by Reuters suggest that this trend undermines 14 individuals include four current members of the country‟s and circumvents the country‟s growing democratic institutions, High Peace Council (HPC). According to German Ambassador which are needed to “cut back rampant, destructive corrup- Peter Wittig, who currently leads the UN Security Council tion” and challenge the position of Afghanistan‟s “warlords”. Committee charged with overseeing the sanctions list, “the For instance, Michael O‟Hanlon, a senior fellow in foreign message is clear: engaging for peace pays off”. The Taliban policy and defence at The Brookings Institution, told Reuters sanctions list previously included the names of 137 individuals that “[w]e should be assessing how well we are distributing subject to a travel ban, arms embargo and asset freeze. (For our contracts and other resources to various ethnic groups and more information on this subject, see the CFC report, Peace & tribes”. He added, “if we continue to prop up just one or two Reconciliation: Delisting the Taliban, June 2011). key strongmen, especially in Kandahar, we could be in trou- ble”. In other news, the head of the HPC, Burhanuddin Rabbani, visited India to discuss future cooperation between the two In an effort to “reinforce family and political pre-eminence in countries towards peace and reconciliation, according to Daily Kandahar”, President Karzai was quick to appoint another half Outlook Afghanistan. During his visit, Indian officials offered -brother, Shah Wali Karzai, to replace Ahmed Wali as the their support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace pro- leader of the Popolzai tribe, reports the New York Times. Ac- cess, Bakhtar News Agency reports. Afghan President Hamid cording to the article, Shah Wali was appointed just hours after Karzai formed the HPC in September 2010 to further peace the burial of his brother. Shortly after Ahmed Wali‟s funeral, talks with Taliban groups and engage militants in the reconcili- President Karzai petitioned tribal elders and government offi- ation process. Coinciding with Rabbani‟s visit to India, Paki- cials from throughout southern Afghanistan to accept his stani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani said on Wednesday, brother, Shah Wali, as the new leader of the Popolzai. Shah 13 July, that Pakistan should be included in the Afghan-led Wali is a businessman in Kandahar province, but some local peace process and should be consulted about Afghanistan‟s elders and political leaders told the New York Times that it will future strategy. During his speech, he noted the Joint Peace be difficult for him to fill the shoes of his late brother. Niyaz Commission established by Afghanistan and Pakistan in April Mohammed Serhadi, governor of the Zhari district in Kanda- 2011, which would utilise a two-tier strategy to promote peace har, was quoted by the Wall Street Journal as saying, “Ahmed and reconciliation in both countries. Humanitarian Affairs Erin Foster ► [email protected] he Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commis- ents and those subject to early or forced marriages, is one such sion (AIHRC) has released a new study entitled, factor highlighted in the report.
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