BlackwellOxford,IRELIndustrial0019-8676©Ja431000OriginalManagerialAlex 2004nuary Bryson RegentsUKArticles2004 RelationsPublishing Responsiveness of the Ltd ManagerialUniversity to Union of California and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain Responsiveness to Union and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain

ALEX BRYSON*

Over the last two decades, there has been a switch in British workplaces away from union voice and representative worker voice more generally toward direct employee involvement and nonunion representative forms of voice. This article assesses the implications of this switch for the effectiveness of worker voice, as measured by employee perceptions of managerial responsiveness. In general, perceptions of managerial responsiveness are better among employees with nonunion voice than they are among employees with union voice.

N   , F  M (1984) adapted Hirschman’s (1970) theory of consumer behavior to identify two mechanisms by which people dealt with problems they faced at work: “exit,” whereby workers leave less desirable for more desirable jobs, and “voice,” whereby workers use “direct communication to bring actual and desired conditions closer together” (Freeman and Medoff 1984:8). Union voice was the dominant voice mechanism for British workers at the time Freeman and Medoff were writing in 1984. However, since then, there has been a steep decline in voice arrangements where unions form the single channel of communication (union-only voice) and a less marked decline in dual-channel voice involving union and nonunion channels in combination. These two changes have been offset by a steep increase in voice arrangements that do not involve representative voice (either with or with- out unions). The rise in nonunion voice has resulted from a shift toward direct voice, i.e., forms of voice involving direct two-way communication between workers and management, such as regular meetings between senior management and the workforce, briefing groups, and problem-solving

* Policy Studies Institute, London. E-mail: [email protected]. I would like to thank Jeffrey Smith, Michael Handel, and David Levine; two anonymous referees; and participants at a PSI seminar for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. I acknowledge the Department of Trade and Industry, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, and the Policy Studies Institute as the originators of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey data and the Data Archive at the University of Essex as the distributor of the data. None of these organizations or individuals bears any responsibility for my analysis and interpretations of the data. I R, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January 2004). © 2004 Regents of the University of California Published by Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK.

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214 / A B groups (Bryson 2000). Between 1984 and 1998, the proportion of work- places with only union voice arrangements fell from 24 to 9 percent, whereas the proportion of workplaces with solely direct voice mechanisms rose nearly threefold, from 11 to 30 percent.1 Where unions were present, they existed alongside direct voice mechanisms in four-fifths of cases.2 There are theoretical reasons to suppose that managers respond rather differently to direct voice than to union voice. Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that for worker voice to be effective in influencing managerial behavior toward employees, it must be union voice. In contrast, human resources management (HRM) theorists and practitioners maintain that direct voice has become increasingly common because it delivers for management and employees. Although these two positions are useful starting points, it is simplistic to assume that all union voice is superior to nonunion voice or vice versa because both types of voice encompass a diverse set of practices. With these considerations in mind, I examine the effectiveness of voice mechanisms in delivering benefits for employees using data on employees’ perceptions of managerial responsiveness. Throughout the article, voice is deemed “effective” for employees where it is associated with more positive perceptions of managerial responsiveness. The second section outlines the propositions tested. The third section introduces the data. The fourth section outlines the method of analysis. The fifth section presents results, and the final section concludes.

Propositions Proposition 1: For voice to be effective in eliciting managerial responsiveness, it needs to be union as opposed to nonunion voice. However, union effects will be more muted in the absence of an on-site representative.

For worker voice to be effective in altering employer behavior, it may need to be union voice for two reasons. First, effective worker voice must be independent of management because it requires management to “give up

1 These figures are derived from the 1984, 1990, and 1998 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys, a consistent time-series of surveys based on workplaces with 25 or more employees. The remainder of this article uses the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), which incorporates workplaces with 10 or more employees and contains a richer set of voice variables than the time series. This explains the differences between the incidence of voice regimes as measured in the time series and incidence as measured in WERS98. See Bryson (2000) for details. 2 For a description of the nature of worker representation in Britain and how it differs from repre- sentation in the United States, see Appendix 1.

Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 215 power and accept a dual-authority channel within the firm. Such a change in power is difficult to attain in the absence of a genuine independent union or union-like organization” (Freeman and Medoff 1984:108). Second, with- out a union, individuals will lack the incentive to pursue public goods, namely, goods affecting the well-being of everyone in such a way that one individual’s partaking of the good does not preclude others from doing so. According to Freeman and Medoff (1984:8–9): Without a collective organization, the incentive for the individual to take into account the effects of his or her actions on others, or to express his or her preferences, or invest time and money in changing conditions, is likely to be too small to spur action. It does not necessarily follow that unionized workers are more contented with their management than nonunionized workers, even if unions elicit greater managerial responsiveness than would otherwise be the case. Indeed, Freeman and Medoff’s exit-voice analysis offers two explanations for the common finding in Britain and the United States that unionized workers express greater dissatisfaction with management than nonunionized workers (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Gallie et al. 1998; Bryson 1999). The first is the greater politicization of unionized workers. Freeman and Medoff (1984:142) suggest that unionized workers are more prone to express their voice “loudly” to ensure that it is heard, resulting in “voice-induced complaining,” which they distinguish from “true” dissatisfaction. They also suggest that “some of the critical attitude of the union workers is due to their greater awareness of problems and willingness to speak out” (Freeman and Medoff 1984:142). As Gallie et al. (1998:113–4) point out, “unionism as an oppositional form of representation may highlight organizational inefficiencies and color perceptions of management competence.” The second reason is that unions increase the stock of dissatisfied workers because dissatisfied workers are less likely to quit in unionized workplaces than they are in nonunionized workplaces. This is so because the union offers a voice outlet for worker dissatisfaction that is less costly than quitting (Freeman and Medoff 1994:141). In doing so, unions raise average workplace tenure, which is associated with greater dissatisfaction (Bryson and McKay 1997). Any negative association between unionization and employee perceptions of managerial responsiveness may be attributable to these effects rather than to a “real” reduction in managerial responsiveness in the face of unions. An alternative explanation for an association between unionization and dissatisfaction is that workers may be more inclined to unionize when dis- satisfied with management, in which case union membership is endogenous. I tackle this using a “selection on observables” methodology described later.

216 / A B In practice in Britain, union effectiveness in influencing management may depend on whether there is a union representative on site (Millward, Forth, and Bryson 2000:152–9). Union representatives are increasingly operating as a communication channel between local membership and management, attaching greater importance to “dealing with problems raised by the treat- ment of employees by management, and to resolving disputes” (Cully et al. 1999:201) rather than the more “traditional” activities of maintaining wages and benefits. They also may assist in the joint regulation of the workplace through negotiation over the form and content of formal procedures. If they are effective in these roles, the presence of representatives on site may contribute to more positive perceptions of managerial responsiveness. On the other hand, perceptions of managerial responsiveness may be poorer in workplaces with union representatives than in other workplaces if repre- sentatives play a role in mobilizing the discontent of union members or in raising the critical awareness of management through information provision. Which of these effects dominates is an empirical question.3 Either way, one might expect more muted union effects in the absence of a representative where it will be more difficult for union members to express their voice to management. I therefore distinguish between unions with and without on-site representation in my analysis. I also distinguish between workplaces with full-time union representatives and those with part-time representa- tives because the resources and support available to full-time representatives may enhance their effectiveness in delivering “voice” (see Appendix 1 for details on the British industrial relations system). Nonunion forms of collective voice, such as joint consultative committees of managers and employees, are common in Britain. However, in the absence of membership dues and true independence from management, it seems unlikely that they can overcome the collective-action problem in delivering public goods.4 British research points to the apparent powerless- ness of collective nonunion representation (Terry 1999:28) arising in part from the lack of legal protection afforded to nonunion representatives when organizing opposition to their employer. However if, as Freeman and Medoff (1984:18) suggest, the legitimacy of union representatives derives in part from the mandate they are given as elected representatives, one might expect

3 Using the same dataset as that used in this article, Bryson (2001) found that on-site union representation is associated with poorer employee perceptions of the climate of employee relations. 4 In Britain, the government’s Certification Officer establishes whether trade unions are truly independent of employers, as defined in Section 5 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consoli- dation) Act 1992. If so, they are issued with a certificate of independence in accordance with Section 6 of the act. Some employer-specific bodies, known as staff associations, do attain independent status, whereupon there is little to distinguish them from trade unions.

Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 217 elected nonunion representatives to have greater impact than their unelected counterparts, some of whom will be chosen by management. I therefore test the further proposition that where nonunion voice is independent of man- agement, it will be positively associated with managerial responsiveness.

Proposition 2: Direct voice is more effective in eliciting managerial responsive- ness than representative voice.

HRM theorists take issue with the supposition that effective voice needs to be either independent of management or collective in nature. Two themes have emerged from the HRM literature since the mid-1980s that suggest that direct voice may be more effective in “delivering” for employees than representative voice, whether the representative voice is union or nonunion. The first is the suggestion that worker representation, rather than efficiently and effectively communicating workers’ wishes and concerns to manage- ment, actually may create a barrier between management and workers. This barrier can be breached if management eschews intermediaries and deals directly with employees either on a one-to-one basis or in groups (Storey 1992; Peters 1988; Lawler 1986). The second theme is the treatment of workers as individuals rather than as a collective. If one recognizes that the wishes and needs of workers are, in fact, heterogeneous, management may be better able to understand them and respond to them through direct voice channels (Storey 1992; Lawler 1992; Pfeffer 1994).5

Proposition 3: The effects of union and direct voice in combination differ from their effects in isolation.

Although union and direct voice may be substitutes for one another, in practice, they exist together in the majority of unionized workplaces, as noted earlier. According to Storey (1992:43), “if HRM is primarily pursued on an individualistic plane, the reaction from trade union representatives and union members might be expected to play a not inconsiderable part in the success or otherwise of such an approach.” Equally, the presence of direct voice may have implications for the effectiveness of union voice.

5 If one goes back further, it is intriguing to find that direct forms of communication were originally part of a “welfare capitalism” package aimed at warding off trade unions. However, they were soon seen as integral to the development of “industrial democracy” based on “cooperation” between managers and employees in which employers offered fair treatment in return for a compliant and productive labor force. This ethos, espoused by the “human relations” school and practiced by large corporations such as Kodak, can be seen as the forerunner to the HRM belief in the superiority of direct communication over worker representation (Jacoby 1997).

218 / A B If union and direct voice are complementary, their combination may prove more effective in meeting employees’ needs than where they operate in isolation. For instance, they may address different issues (Proposition 4), whereupon the two channels may cover a wider spectrum of issues than one or the other. Where union coverage is not total, direct voice may “fill the gap” for nonmembers. There even may be synergy between union and direct voice. Union voice may operate more effectively in the presence of direct voice because any communication barriers arising from sole reliance on representative voice are overcome. The union may be able to operate more effectively where it can use the additional information obtained through direct voice. Direct voice may operate more effectively in the presence of union voice, for example, where the union ensures that management invests the necessary time and effort in direct communication. However, if union and direct voice are substitutes for one another or are perceived as such by employees or management, they may operate less effec- tively in combination than in isolation. If unions are intent on undermining nonunion voice, this may reduce its effectiveness. Equally, if management is committed to supporting nonunion voice at the expense of union voice, union voice may be less effective. Even if there is no conscious attempt to scupper dual-channel voice, it seems likely that the widespread adoption of alternative voice mechanisms in unionized workplaces has the potential to undermine union influence, albeit inadvertently. Indeed, two nationally representative surveys of employees in Britain in the mid-1980s and early 1990s offer “some support for the view that direct participation has the indirect effect of reducing employees’ sense of the necessity of union membership” (Gallie et al. 1998:109). Thus, although it is not possible to predict a priori whether the combina- tion of union and direct voice will be more or less effective than in isolation, there are good theoretical reasons for testing their effects in combination.

Proposition 4: Union voice is more effective than direct voice in tackling grievance-related issues and encouraging fair treatment, whereas direct voice is more effective in encouraging information sharing and consultation.

Unions traditionally negotiate terms and conditions of employment and broker and enforce procedural agreements for grievance resolution and fair treatment. Direct voice, on the other hand, is more concerned with facilitating information sharing and consultation between management and employees. Thus it seems likely that the effectiveness of these two types of voice may differ according to the issue in question. I therefore consider the relative effectiveness of union voice and direct voice in terms of information

Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 219 provision and consultation and perceptions of fair treatment by analyzing these as separate outcomes.

Data The data are the matched employer-employee British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98). With appropriate weighting, they are nationally representative of British employees working in workplaces with 10 or more employees. The surveys had high response rates (80 percent in the case of the workplace survey and 64 percent in the case of the employee survey), giving me some confidence that the data are representative of the populations from which they were drawn.6 The data are rich, allowing for the inclusion of a wide range of individual- and workplace-level controls to estimate influences on managerial responsiveness to employees. The matched employer-employee data allow me to identify alternative voice regimes based on measures derived from managers and test their impact on employee per- ceptions of managerial responsiveness using the employee survey.

Measures of Managerial Responsiveness to Employees. The survey asked each employee to provide a rating, on a five-point scale from very poor to very good, of how managers at their workplace were on five items: keeping people up to date about proposed changes, providing everyone with the chance to comment on proposed changes, responding to suggestions from employees, dealing with work problems you or others may have, and treat- ing employees fairly. All five can be regarded as “public goods” in that they affect the well-being of employees in such a way that one individual’s partaking of the good does not preclude someone else from doing so. They are therefore appropriate for testing the incentive effects of collective voice discussed earlier. Similarities between the items and their relatively high intercorrelation suggest that they share measurement of a common underlying construct with item-specific error.7 This is supported by principal-components analysis identifying a single factor with an eigenvalue above 1; the factor contained all five items, had an eigenvalue of 3.70, and explained 74 percent of the total variance. Reliability analysis indicates that a measurement scale

6 For full information on the survey’s design, see Cully et al. (1999). 7 The Spearman rank correlation coefficients were all significant at a 1 percent level (one-tailed), ranging from 0.611 in the case of fair treatment and the chance to respond to 0.782 in the case of the chance to respond and keeping everyone up to date.

220 / A B based on all five items has a Cronbach alpha score of 0.91 and that the scale is additive.8 For most of my analysis, I therefore use a simple additive scale in place of the five component items. Each item is rescaled to run from −2 (very poor) to +2 (very good), so the composite scale runs from −10 to +10. The scale is approximately normally distributed.9 Testing Proposition 4 involves distinguishing between outcomes related to information sharing and consultation, on the one hand, and fair treatment and grievance handling, on the other. I therefore construct two additive scales using the same approach as that described earlier. The first scale, referred to as the information and consultation scale, is based on responses to the first three measures of responsiveness (relating to keeping employees informed, providing everyone with the chance to comment, and responding to employees suggestions) (alpha = 0.89). The second scale, referred to as the fair treatment scale, is based on responses to the final two measures relating to dealing with work problems and treating employees fairly (alpha = 0.85).

Voice Measures. I distinguish between three types of voice: union voice, nonunion representative voice, and direct voice. Union voice is present where there is at least one of the following present: trade union(s) recognized by the employer for pay bargaining, an on-site union representative, or a joint consultative committee with one or more representatives chosen through union channels. Non union-representative voice is present where there is an on-site nonunion employee representative or a joint consultative committee where none of the representatives are chosen through union channels. Direct voice is present where at least one of the following is present: regular meetings between management and the whole workforce, briefing groups, or problem-solving groups. Appendix 1 describes further the nature of worker representation in Britain, and Appendix 2 defines the voice measures used and their mean values in my estimation sample. These voice mechanisms have two common features. First, they allow for the possibility of two-way communication between management and employees, giving employees the opportunity to voice their wishes and con- cerns. Second, where they depend on intermittent forms of communication, the opportunity for voice must occur regularly. Thus briefing groups are included only if they occur at least once a month, and joint consultative

8 The Tukey estimate of the power to which observations must be raised to achieve additivity is 1.20. 9 The mean is 0.58, and the median is 1.0. The distribution is a little skewed to the left (skewness = −0.26; standard error = 0.02) and less peaked than a normal distribution (kurtosis = −0.50; standard error = 0.03).

Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 221 committees are included only where they meet at least once per quarter. This ensures that I do not underestimate the impact of voice by including mechanisms that exist on paper but not in practice. In Table 1 I present a typology that identifies all eight combinations of union, non union-representative, and direct voice. It shows the incidence of voice among British workplaces and their workers in 1998. Whereas there was no worker voice in 17 percent of workplaces, only 7 percent of employ- ees had no access to voice, reflecting the concentration of “no voice” among smaller workplaces. Similarly, direct voice only characterized over a third of workplaces but a fifth of employees. The majority of employees work in workplaces with both union and nonunion voice. I also consider whether voice effects differ with extensive use, as measured by count variables measuring the number of union and direct-voice mecha- nisms present. Finally, I disaggregate my voice typology into its constituent parts to identify the effects of individual voice mechanisms. When interpreting results, bear in mind that the voice measures indicate the presence of voice at the workplace. Individual workers may or may not be covered by the arrangement.

Control Variables. My analyses control for a wide range of individual and workplace characteristics to minimize estimation bias arising from omitted variables. To allow for comparability across models, I use the same set of controls throughout my analyses.

Individual-Level Control Variables. Demographic. Analyses incorporate gender, age, education, and ethnicity, all of which have been associated with

TABLE 1 S  V A  1998

Type of Voice Arrangement Workplaces, % Employees, % Union only 5 5 Union + direct 19 21 Union + non union representative 2 4 Union + direct + non union representative 9 29 Direct only 37 21 Direct + non union representative 8 10 Non union representative only 3 2 No voice 17 7 Weighted base 2081 26,674 Unweighted base 2074 26,551

N: Base is all workplaces with 10 or more employees; all employees in those workplaces. Excludes those with missing data. Workplace data weighted back to the population of workplaces with 10 or more employees. Employee data weighted back to the population of employees drawn from those workplaces.

222 / A B employee perceptions of management in previous studies (Bryson 2001; Gallie et al. 1998).

Job-related characteristics. Control for five aspects of individuals’ jobs: occupation (based on the 1990 Standard Occupational Classification), years spent working at the workplace, hours usually worked each week, whether the contract is a permanent one, and gross weekly wage. Together these variables help capture an individual’s attachment to the workplace, the investment the individual has made in working there, and the individual’s status in the organization. The 12-category ordered variable capturing gross wages controls for a well-known union effect that may confound the voice effect, namely, the union markup on wages.10 Union-induced wage increases may make workers more positive about their working environment than they otherwise would be, so confounding estimates of a union-induced voice effect. Workplace tenure may be endogenous with respect to perceptions of managerial responsiveness because those least satisfied with their situation are likely to leave, so I omit it from my baseline models. However, in sensi- tivity analyses I include workplace tenure to obtain an estimate of union effects net of their impact on increasing the stock of dissatisfied workers.

Union membership status. If an individual’s decision to join a union depends, in part, on his or her perceptions of managerial responsiveness, it is endogenous, so I omit it from my baseline estimates, but I report sensi- tivity to its inclusion. However, union effects on managerial responsiveness may be confined to union members because it is they who use union voice. For example, members may gain disproportionately from the benefits of grievance and dispute handling, although one should not discount the possibility of spillover effects to nonmembers because these have been identified in analyses of wages (Forth and Millward 2000) and employee perceptions of the employee relations climate (Bryson 2001). Equally, the politicizing effects of union voice may only influence those most intimately involved with the union. To test for this, I present separate analyses for members and nonmembers to establish whether the impact of union voice is confined to union members.

Workplace-Level Control Variables. I use data obtained from the manager responsible for employee relations at the workplace to control for workforce

10 Models estimating gross wages confirmed that there was a significant wage markup effect attached to being a union member. The models are available from the author.

Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 223 composition, sector, ownership, location (region), the nature of the activity at the workplace, and personnel practices.

Workforce composition. In analyses of employee perceptions of their working environment, workforce composition variables are often associated with employee perceptions of their working environment, independently of the individual’s own demographic characteristics (Bryson 2001). I therefore include six variables that capture the composition of the workforce. Four of them (the percentage of employees who are women, the percentage who are part-timers, the percentage who are managers, and the percentage from nonwhite ethnic minorities) are the workplace-level analogues of individual- level variables in the model. In addition, I include the percentage of managers who are women to capture anything distinctive about the style of women managers and the total number of employees in the workplace.

Sector, ownership, and location. Single-site and multisite organizations differ markedly in the way they manage employee relations, and the management of employee relations also differs markedly across the public and private sectors of the economy (Millward, Bryson, and Forth 2000:61– 80), so my models control for this. I also include industry dummies to capture unmeasured industry differences. A 12-category regional variable captures workplace location.

Workplace activity. How responsive management is to its workforce may depend, in part, on its exposure to a competitive market environment. My workplace activity variable distinguishes workplaces producing goods and services for consumers, those supplying to other companies, those supplying to other parts of the organization they belong to, those which do not produce goods or provide services for the open market, and those which are purely administrative offices.

Management practices. Any positive effects of employee involvement on firm performance may be upwardly biased if they are simply an indicator that a workplace is well managed generally, and no attempt is made to control for “good management” (Huselid and Becker 1996). This is equally true with respect to the impact of voice on employees’ perceptions of management. I include three measures of management practice to account for this possibility. The first is a dummy variable identifying whether the workplace is covered by a formal strategic plan that sets out objectives and how they will be achieved. Second is a variable identifying whether the workplace or organization to which it belongs has been accredited as an

224 / A B Investor in People.11 Third, I include a variable identifying those workplaces with a formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing diversity.

Analysis General Modeling Approach. To test the impact of voice measures on employee perceptions of management responsiveness, I regress the mana- gerial responsiveness scales on the voice measures and control variables described earlier using ordinary least squares (OLS). Positive coefficients indicate a more positive assessment of managerial responsiveness. My estimation sample covers both the public and private sectors and consists of the 19,373 employees with no missing data on variables entering the analysis.12 These employees are located in 1440 workplaces. It is common practice to exclude managerial employees from analyses of employee views about management. I chose not to do this because, like other employees, most will experience “being managed” by others higher up in the managerial hierarchy.13 However, because employees in managerial occupations were more positive about management responsiveness than other employees (Bryson 2000), I tested the sensitivity of my results to their exclusion from the models. Their exclusion made no difference to my results. The analysis takes account of the complex survey design. First, all models are run on data weighted by the inverse of the employee’s sampling prob- ability. As well as allowing the results to be generalized to the population from which the sample is drawn, the use of probability weights also guards against estimation bias that can arise through differential sample selection probabilities.14 Second, I employ the Huber-White robust variance estimator that produces consistent standard errors in the presence of heteroskedastic- ity. Third, I obtain accurate standard errors by taking account of sample

11 The Investors in People (IiP) award is given to workplaces or organizations by independent assessors from Training and Enterprise Councils in England and Wales (Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland) that have a planned approach to setting and communicating business objectives and developing people to meet those objectives. 12 This figure falls to 19,331 when I run separate models for union members and nonmembers because individual union status is missing for 42 employees. 13 Those managers actually responsible for employee relations at sampled workplaces were eligible for the main management questionnaire and were not included in the eligible sample of employees at the workplace. 14 Differential sampling fractions can result in standard estimator biases (Skinner 1997). The weights account for all variation in sampling probabilities, thus eliminating differential sampling probability as a possible source of estimation bias. The weights also compensate for differential nonresponse.

Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 225 stratification and the nonindependence of individual observations due to clustering in the primary sampling units, namely, workplaces.15

Selection and Causation. Biases in estimating voice effects on managerial responsiveness can arise where there are unobserved or unobservable differ- ences between workers and workplaces with alternative voice regimes that are correlated with the outcome of interest. In tackling this issue, I adopt a “selection on observables” approach. This assumes that once I have con- ditioned on a large set of observable characteristics of workers and work- places, it is as if voice mechanisms are randomly assigned.16 Implicit in this assumption is a model or models of the process by which workplaces and workers sort and choose what types of voice to have. The approach requires highly informative data such as the WERS98 matched employer-employee survey.

Results Table 2 presents results from four models, each containing the full set of control variables plus alternative voice measures.17 My tables include the three indicators for the “good employer” referred to earlier so that my results are net of “good management” that might confound my estimates of voice regimes on managerial responsiveness. As anticipated, the “good manage- ment” indicators are positively associated with managerial responsiveness, two of them significantly so. Model 1 presents results for my typology distinguishing between the eight combinations of union, direct, and non-union-representative voice. These regimes are mutually exclusive. Contrary to my first proposition, employees perceive managers to be more responsive in the presence of nonunion voice

15 All analyses use the SVY commands in STATA that invokes the robust estimator, together with the STRATA and PSU subcommands available under SVYSET to account for stratification and clus- tering, respectively. 16 If conditioning on the observable variables in my equation is sufficient to control for the endo- genous choice of voice mechanisms by employees (and employers), then my voice measures effectively can be treated as exogenous, and I obtain unbiased estimates of voice effects. This broad approach underlies matching in the evaluation of job training programs (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999). My esti- mator is a form of regression-based linear matching that assumes a constant marginal effect for each voice outcome across individuals. For an empirical application of the same technique, see Blundell et al. (2000). For a discussion of Rubin’s model of causal inference that underpins the matching methodology, see Holland (1986). 17 Without controls, the F-test for the voice combinations is F(7.1363) = 9.10, P > F = 0.0000. Full versions of all the models presented in this article are available from the author. 226 / A B

TABLE 2 V E  E P  M R, W S

(1) (2) (3) (4) Voice combinations (ref.: no voice) Union-only voice −0.510 (1.29) Union and direct voice 0.033 (0.10) Union and non union representative voice −0.627 (1.42) Union, non union representative voice and −0.071 direct voice (0.21) Direct voice only 0.335 (1.10) Direct and non union representative voice 0.801 (2.32)* Non union representative voice only −0.698 (0.98) Number of direct-voice mechanisms (ref.: none) One 0.432 (2.26)* Two 0.620 (3.24)** Three 0.952 (4.12)** Number of union voice mechanisms (ref.: none) One −0.142 (0.64) Two −0.640 (3.28)** Three −0.473 (2.00)* Whether any non union representative voice 0.001 (0.01) Union voice mechanisms on site Recognition, full-time union representative −0.093 −0.122 (0.29) (0.38) Recognition, part-time union representative −0.587 −0.647 (2.95)** (3.21)** Recognition, no on-site representative 0.051 0.002 (0.23) (0.01) Union rep on site, no recognition 0.070 0.096 (0.15) (0.21) Union appointment to joint consultative 0.166 0.050 committee (0.91) (0.27) Non union representative voice mechanisms Functioning joint consultative committee −0.039 0.039 (0.24) (0.21) Elected non union representative 0.274 0.305 (1.29) (1.37) Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 227

TABLE 2 (cont.)

(1) (2) (3) (4) Unelected non union representative −0.381 −0.414 (1.46) (1.60) Direct-voice mechanisms Problem-solving groups 0.426 0.385 (3.30)** (2.93)** Regular meetings between senior management 0.434 0.446 and workforce (3.41)** (3.47)** Briefings that occur at least once a month and 0.023 0.007 devote time to employees’ questions/views (0.19) (0.06) Additional communication mechansisms European Works Council −0.192 (0.79) Off-site union representative 0.009 (0.03) Elected representative to joint consultative −0.205 committee (1.13) Systematic use of management chain for −0.053 one-way downward communication (0.36) Regular newsletter 0.376 (2.60)** Suggestion schemes 0.081 (0.61) Other consultation methods 0.210 (1.51) Indicators of “good” employer If workplace has formal strategic plan 0.262 0.243 0.220 0.145 (1.35) (1.23) (1.11) (0.72) Investors in People award 0.422 0.433 0.370 0.353 (3.02)** (3.16)** (2.65)** (2.58)** If formal written policy on equal 0.426 0.401 0.386 0.383 opportunities or managing diversity (2.04)* (1.98)* (1.94) (1.89) Constant −1.466 −1.473 −1.419 −1.455 (2.24)* (2.38)* (2.30)* (2.35)* Number of employee observations 19,373 19,373 19,373 19,373 Number of workplaces 1440 1440 1440 1440 F-statistic 86,1284 = 86,1284 = 90,1280 = 97,1273 = 11.33 11.96 12.75 11.87 R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11

N: The dependent variable is a simple additive scale based on five dimensions of managerial responsiveness. The scale runs from −10 (wholly unresponsive) to +10 (highly responsive). See the data section for details. t-Statistics in parentheses; * = significant at 95 percent level; ** = significant at 99 percent level. All variables in the table are (0, 1) dummies. Models contain controls discussed in the data section, namely, gender, age, ethnicity, educational qualifications, vocational qualifications, occupation, hours, contract type (permanent versus temporary), gross weekly wage, percent women, percent part-timers, percent managers, percent ethnic minorities, percent managers who are women, number of employees, single versus multiple-site organization, public versus private sector, regional dummies, and workplace activity. 228 / A B than they do where union voice is present, although non-union-representative voice in isolation is no more effective than union voice.18 However, only a com- bination of direct and non-union-representative voice proves more effective than having no voice. There is support for Proposition 2 that direct voice is more effective than representative voice. Relative to single-channel direct voice, union-only voice and the combination of union and non union-representative voice are asso- ciated with poorer perceptions of managerial responsiveness (−0.84, t = 2.75, and −0.96, t = 2.67, respectively). In accordance with Proposition 3, the effect of union and direct voice in combination differs significantly from the effect of union voice in isolation (0.54, t = 1.87). This combination also outperforms the combination of union and non-union-representative voice (0.66, t = 2.03). This suggests that adding direct voice to union voice can ameliorate some of the effects of union voice. However, the combination of union and direct voice is not significantly more effective than direct voice in isolation. Rather, it is the combination of direct voice with non union-representative voice that is particularly beneficial. This does prove more effective than direct voice in isolation (0.47, t = 1.91), and as noted earlier, this is the only voice regime that performs better than “no voice.” Thus it appears that the two aspects of non union voice—direct and representative—complement one another. However, their combination in a union environment is not effective. Model 2 in Table 2 shows that the number of direct-voice mechanisms has an additive effect on employee perceptions of managerial responsiveness, the positive coefficient rising with the addition of each direct channel.19 It appears that there are returns to more extensive use of direct voice. The negative union effect is not additive, but it is confined to workplaces with a score of 2 or 3 on the index. Union membership and workplace tenure may be endogenous, as discussed earlier, so I excluded them from the models presented earlier. However, when added to the models, union membership and longer workplace tenure are significantly associated with poorer perceptions of managerial respon- siveness, ceteris paribus. Since union members and higher-tenured workers are concentrated in unionized workplaces, I expected the union voice

18 Throughout this section, references to significant differences between coefficients other than the reference category are based on formal significance tests using the SVYLC option in STATA. In this case, union-only voice is associated with significantly poorer managerial responsiveness than direct voice only (−0.84, t = 2.75) and direct voice combined with non-union-representative voice (−1.31, t = 4.01). 19 The shift from one to two channels is not significant (0.19, t = 1.32), and the shift from two to three channels is only on the borderline of significance (0.33, t = 1.69). However, the difference between one and three is statistically significant (0.52, t = 2.61). Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 229 coefficients to be more positive when membership and tenure were added. This is precisely what happens. However, the pattern of results remains unchanged, and the union voice effects remain nonsignificant relative to no voice.

What Is Driving the Effects Observed? Although it is convenient to dis- tinguish between broad categories of voice (union, non union-representative, and direct) and some of the propositions I explore predict different outcomes for these types of voice, voice mechanisms may be heterogeneous, perform- ing different functions. As such, they may differ in their ability to elicit managerial responsiveness. In Model 3 I break my voice typology into its component parts, using dummy variables to capture the existence of each separate practice. Each dummy identifies the effect of a practice against the reference category of not having the practice (e.g., having a problem-solving group versus not having one). The coefficients tell whether it is better to have the practice or not. The model shows that problem-solving groups and regular meetings between senior management and the whole workforce are significantly associated with better perceptions of managerial responsiveness. However, briefing groups are not. Thus all direct-voice mechanisms are not equally effective. The same is true with respect to union voice and non union- representative voice. Union recognition is not associated with managerial responsiveness; what matters is whether there is a lay union representative on site and whether this representative is full time or not. It is only where there is a part-time lay union representative on site that union voice is associated with poorer perceptions of managerial responsiveness. As noted under Proposition 1, by increasing the flow of information to employees about management deficiencies, on-site representatives may create more critical awareness of management than otherwise would exist. They also may be instrumental in politicizing workers because “voice-induced complaining” may benefit representatives when making a case for change to management on behalf of employees. However, full-time on-site union representatives are not significantly associated with employee perceptions of management responsiveness. This may be so because full-time representa- tives are particularly well placed to perform the pastoral role described earlier, thus offsetting any negative effects that on-site representation may engender. What on-site representatives do and the influence they wield differ substantially with the hours they spend representing members, as is clear from analysis of the WERS98 worker representative interview data (Cully et al. 1999:192–214). Full-time representatives are more active, wield greater influence, represent a larger proportion of workers, are more likely to have 230 / A B managerial support, and can call on greater resources and facilities than other representatives. In these circumstances, managers are more likely to respond to worker voice than in instances where a more conflictual atmos- phere reigns or where representatives simply do not have the time, resources, or managerial commitment to engage constructively with management. I directly tested the possibility that part-time on-site union representation was simply proxying an environment in which employees sought union voice but were denied full-time representation by employer opposition. I did so by incorporating two measures of employer attitudes toward unions in my analysis, one relating to employer preferences for direct consultation with employees over consultation through union representatives and the other relating to support for union membership.20 An interaction between the presence of a part-time union representative and a desire for consulta- tion with the union was added to the model. It was positive and significant (0.84, t = 2.73), indicating that management support for union engagement ameliorated the negative impact of part-time on-site representation. How- ever, the main effect of part-time on-site representation remained negative (−0.75, t = 3.59). The interaction with support for union membership was not statistically significant. A negative effect of part-time on-site union representation that is independent of employer attitudes to unionization and is not apparent where representation is full time is consistent with the hypothesis that part-time representatives are in a position to deliver worker voice to management—perhaps raising expectations of success among employees—but are unable to effect constructive engagement with manage- ment to pursue workers’ concerns due to time constraints. Non union-representative voice is not effective. However, where there is nonunion representation, perceptions of managerial responsiveness are better where the representative is elected (0.66, t = 2.20). This lends some support to the proposition that non union-representative voice has a greater impact on management where it is genuinely representative of employees and independent of management. In Model 4 I test the sensitivity of these results to the incorporation of a more extensive set of voice dummies (e.g., including off-site union represen- tation) plus dummies for a variety of one-way downward communication methods that may impinge on perceptions of managerial responsiveness. Their inclusion has no impact on results. The only communication channel

20 The first measure identified those managers who “strongly disagreed” or “disagreed” with the statement “We would rather consult directly with employees than unions.” The second identified man- agers who were supportive of union membership based on the question: “How would you describe management’s general attitude toward trade union membership among employees at this establishment? Is management in favor of trade union membership, not in favor of it, or neutral about it?” Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 231 that is positively associated with improved perceptions of managerial responsiveness is the circulation of regular newsletters. It is not clear why this should be so.

What Works for Union Members and Nonmembers? Unlike the United States, many union members are located in workplaces where there is no union arrangement to represent them. Conversely, many nonmembers work in unionized workplaces (see Appendix 1 for details). Consequently, indi- vidual union membership status is not synonymous with the union status of the workplace the employee works in. Table 3 presents separate analyses for union members and nonmembers. As anticipated, the union effects discussed earlier are confined to union members, who are the main users of union voice. Although the coefficients in Model 1 suggest that the union effect is ameliorated in the presence of nonunion voice, this is only a statistically significant effect when comparing union-only voice with the combination of all three types of voice (union,

TABLE 3 V E  U M’  N’ P  M R

(1) (2) Members Nonmembers Voice combinations (ref: union only for members, no voice for nonmembers Union only — −0.217 (0.44) Union + direct 0.548 (1.51) 0.448 (1.27) Union and non union representative 0.264 (0.54) −0.518 (1.00) Union, direct, and non union representative 0.672 (1.91) 0.137 (0.37) Direct only 2.235 (4.35)** 0.240 (0.78) Direct and non union representative 0.918 (1.67) 0.838 (2.38)* Non-union representative voice −1.312 (1.53) −0.649 (0.91) No voice 1.801 (1.83) — Indicators of “good” employer Formal strategic plan 0.256 (0.70) 0.249 (1.16) Investors in People 0.334 (1.83) 0.557 (3.26)** Written equal opportunities policy 0.143 (0.41) 0.583 (2.48)* Constant −2.94 (2.53)* −1.32 (1.82) Number of employee observations 7619 11,712 Number of workplace observations 1440 1440 F-statistic 86,1284 = 8.75 86,1284 = 8.02 R2 0.13 0.11

N: Dependent variable as per Table 2. t-Statistics in parentheses; * = significant at 95 percent level; ** = significant at 99 percent level. All variables in the table are (0, 1) dummies. Models contain controls discussed in the data section, namely, gender, age, ethnicity, educational qualifications, vocational qualifications, occupation, hours, contract type (permanent versus temporary), gross weekly wage, percent women, percent part-timers, percent managers, percent ethnic minorities, percent managers who are women, number of employees, single versus multiple- site organisation, public versus private sector, regional dummies, and workplace activity. 232 / A B direct, and non-union-representative voice; 0.67, t = 1.91). For members, none of the voice regimes outperforms having no voice. However, the most striking thing about Model 1 is the fact that direct voice in isolation performs significantly better than any other voice regime, other than no voice, where although the direct-voice-only coefficient is higher, it is not significantly so (0.44, t = 0.44). Among nonmembers (Model 2), the only significant voice effect is the positive impact of direct and non-union-representative voice combined. This outperforms all other regimes, including having no voice (0.84, t = 2.38). I also ran separate member and nonmember models containing the individual voice mechanisms, as per Model 4 in Table 2. I find that members’ perceptions of managerial responsiveness only deteriorate significantly in the presence of a part-time on-site representative. Where there is on-site representation, members’ perceptions of managerial responsiveness are significantly better where that representative is full time as opposed to part time (0.90, t = 3.12) but still not significantly better than no voice. These effects are not apparent for nonmembers, but I do observe a positive association with the presence of elected nonunion representatives. The only positive effects apparent across members and nonmembers are the direct- voice effects relating to regular meetings and problem-solving groups (all of which were statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level or above). Team briefings have no effect among members or nonmembers. Thus, irrespective of membership status, direct voice has an important role to play in improving employees’ perceptions of managerial responsiveness. These results hold when I add in the additional communication mechanisms.

Are Union and Direct Voice Effective at Tackling Different Issues? To test Proposition 4, that union voice and direct voice may be effective in tackling different issues, I constructed the information-sharing and consultation scale and the fair-treatment scale, as described earlier. What is striking about Table 4 is that voice mechanisms have similar effects across both outcomes. Union voice is negative for both outcomes, but only where there is a part-time representative on site. Two of the three direct-voice practices (problem-solving groups and regular meetings with management) are posi- tively associated with both outcomes. Thus, contrary to Proposition 4, what “works” in achieving better information sharing and consultation also seems to improve perceptions of fair treatment by management. I also ran models containing my eight-way voice typology. This showed that the only voice regime that outperformed no voice was the combination of direct and non-union-representative voice. It did so for information sharing/ consultation (0.54, t = 2.40) and for fair treatment (0.26, t = 1.99). Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 233

TABLE 4 V E  I S⁄C  F T

(1) (2) Information and Fair Consultation Treatment Union voice mechanisms on site Recognition, full-time union representative −0.062 (0.29) −0.060 (0.48) Recognition, part-time representative −0.375 (2.88)** −0.272 (3.46)** Recognition, no on-site representative −0.032 (0.19) 0.034 (0.34) Union rep on site, no recognition 0.013 (0.04) 0.084 (0.45) Union appointment to joint consultative committee 0.013 (0.11) 0.037 (0.50) Off-site union representative 0.039 (0.17) −0.030 (0.23) Non union representative voice mechanisms Functioning joint consultative committee 0.037 (0.31) 0.001 (0.02) Elected non union representative 0.150 (0.96) 0.155 (1.82) Unelected non union representative −0.279 (1.68) −0.135 (1.30) Direct-voice mechanisms Problem-solving groups 0.242 (2.89)** 0.143 (2.67)** Regular meetings between senior management and workforce 0.323 (3.91)** 0.123 (2.36)* Briefings that occur at least once a month and devote time to 0.010 (0.13) −0.003 (0.06) employees’ questions/views Additional communication mechanisms Elected non union representative to joint consultative −0.088 (0.73) −0.116 (1.66) committee European Works Council −0.105 (0.64) −0.087 (0.99) Systematic use of management chain for one-way downward −0.019 (0.21) −0.034 (0.57) communication Regular newsletter 0.238 (2.57)* 0.139 (2.34)* Suggestion schemes 0.065 (0.76) 0.016 (0.30) Other consultation mechanisms 0.137 (1.51) 0.073 (1.30) Indicators of “good” employer If workplace has formal strategic plan 0.089 (0.69) 0.057 (0.69) Investors in People award 0.226 (2.54)* 0.126 (2.33)* If formal written policy on equal opportunities or managing 0.287 (2.20)* 0.096 (1.19) diversity Constant −1.549 (3.87)** 0.094 (0.38) Number of employee observations 19,373 19,373 Number of workplaces 1440 1440 F-statistic 97,1273 = 10.86 97,1273 = 10.89 R2 0.11 0.10

N: The information-sharing and participation scale runs from −6 to +6. The fair-treatment scale runs from −4 to +4. In both cases, positive coefficients signify more positive perceptions of managerial responsiveness. See the data section for details. t-Statistics in parentheses; * = significant at 95 percent level; ** = significant at 99 percent level. Models contain all controls discussed in the data section, namely, gender, age, ethnicity, educational qualifications, vocational qualifications, occupation, hours, contract type (permanent versus temporary), gross weekly wage, percent women, percent part-timers, percent managers, percent ethnic minorities, percent managers who are women, number of employees, single versus multiple-site organization, public versus private sector, regional dummies, and workplace activity. 234 / A B

Conclusions In general, nonunion voice is more effective than union voice in eliciting managerial responsiveness in British workplaces, and direct voice is more effective than representative voice (whether union or nonunion). These findings therefore refute my first proposition that in order to be effective, voice needs to be union voice in favor of my second proposition that direct voice is more effective in eliciting managerial responsiveness that represen- tative voice. Worker voice does not need to be collective or independent of management to be effective, and as HRM theorists suggest, direct voice can be an effective means of communication between management and employees. The only voice regime that proves more effective than having no voice is the combination of direct voice and non union-representative voice, and this only proved effective for nonmembers. Nevertheless, it outperforms all other voice regimes and is associated with significantly better perceptions of employee involvement and fair treatment. This refutes Proposition 4, which suggested that union voice may have a comparative advantage in tackling grievance-related issues and encouraging fair treatment. In support of my third proposition, the effects of union voice and direct voice in combination differ from their effects in isolation, with the combina- tion going some way to ameliorate the negative (though statistically non- significant) effects of unionism. The results raise three issues worthy of further research. First, why is it that some configurations of nonunion voice are effective and others are not? Although direct voice is generally effective, not all direct-voice mechanisms improve perceptions of managerial responsiveness. Regular meetings with senior management and problem-solving groups are associated with greater managerial responsiveness, whereas briefing groups are not, perhaps because briefing groups, by definition, are less intensive interventions. Direct-voice effectiveness also depends on how extensively it is used because its effective- ness increases with the number of direct-voice mechanisms used. Non union-representative voice is generally ineffective, except when combined with direct voice, whereupon it becomes more effective than any other voice regime. This suggests possible complementarities between these two forms of nonunion voice, akin to those envisioned for the combination of union and direct voice discussed under Proposition 3. A more thorough investiga- tion aimed at distinguishing between effective and ineffective nonunion voice configurations would involve developing and testing theories about qualitative variations in voice. Second, what lies behind unions’ apparent inability to improve managerial responsiveness? Perhaps surprisingly, even on issues such as grievance Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 235 resolution and the promotion of fair treatment, union voice is often less effective than some nonunion voice mechanisms. These findings are un- affected by the inclusion of workplace tenure, suggesting that they are not due to the union effect in raising the stock of dissatisfied workers. They are also net of any effect on wages because wage levels are included among my control variables. They are confined to union members, so I cannot discount the possibility that they are associated with voice-induced complaining, a heightened critical awareness of management that comes from the infor- mation flow to members through the union, or the presence of unions in response to greater preexisting dissatisfactions with management responsive- ness. However, the negative union effect is only found when unions have a part-time lay representative on site. This scenario covers 37 percent of all employees in WERS98 and 63 percent of those in unionized workplaces. It seems likely that on-site union representation engenders greater critical awareness on the part of workers and perhaps increases voice-induced complaining. In the presence of a full-time union representative, these factors—which will be associated with poorer perceptions of managerial responsiveness—may be offset by the higher quality of worker representa- tion that this entails. The part-time union representative, on the other hand, may heighten worker awareness of managerial deficiencies but may not have the resources or time to devote to rectifying them (see Appendix 1 for further details). This may create an expectation gap that may account for poorer perceptions of managerial responsiveness in the presence of part-time union representatives. Further research is needed to consider what makes a union (in)effective in the eyes of employees. The positive effect of managerial support for consultation with unions indicates that management orientations toward the union may play an important role, as they do in employee per- ceptions of the climate of employee relations (Bryson and Wilkinson 2002). Finally, why is it that the majority of voice regimes are no more effective than having no voice, and why is it that effective regimes are not wide- spread? Only the combination of direct voice and non-union-representative voice consistently outperforms “no voice.” Yet this regime only covers 8 percent of workplaces and 10 percent of employees in Britain. A fuller investigation of voice effectiveness will require an understanding of the conditions under which various regimes take root and prosper.

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Worker representation in Britain differs in a number of important respects from representation in the United States that account for what may appear to be unusual variable constructions.

Union Voice A workplace is said to have a “recognized” union where one or more unions are recognized by the employer for negotiating pay for any section of the workforce at the establishment. It is often the case that negotiations over pay take place at a higher level in an organization, but if they apply to employees in the sampled establishment, the union is recognized (Bryson and Wilkinson 2002). Unions recognized for pay bargaining also tend to be recognized for negotiation over a broad range of issues, including nonpay terms and conditions and procedural matters such as grievance and equal opportunities agreements (Millward, Forth and Bryson 2000). At the time of the survey, whether an employer chose to recognize a union was a purely voluntary decision. Since the 1999 Employment Relations Act came into effect in June 2000, there has been a statutory procedure for union recognition where there is majority support for union recognition among the workforce. Unlike the United States, many union members are located in workplaces where there is no union arrangement to represent them. My analyses of the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 indicate that 9 percent of the employees located in workplaces without union recognition were union members. These members account for 4 percent of all employees and 10 percent of all union members. In those cases where there is a union present but it is not recognized for pay bargaining, the union may still have a formal role in representing employees in grievance and disciplinary matters and may have negotiation rights on nonpay issues (a situation known as partial recognition). These arrangements covered around 1 percent of members, with another 8 percent of members located in workplaces with no institu- tional union presence at all. My analyses of WERS98 show that 4 in 10 nonmembers are located in workplaces with union recognition. Employees only have the opportunity to contribute their voice to the collective union voice if they become members. However, nonmembers may benefit directly from union-negotiated improvements to pay and conditions or indirectly through spillover effects (Millward, Forth, and Bryson 2001). They also may benefit from union 238 / A B representation in grievance and disciplinary matters, although, unlike in the United States, there is no legal requirement for unions to treat members and nonmembers similarly. What the union does at the workplace depends to a large degree on whether there is a union representative on site and, if so, whether that representative spends most or all of his or her time performing this function. In 56 percent of unionized workplaces (covering four-fifths of unionized workers), the union has a representative on site to voice members’ concerns and complaints. These representatives are employees of the workplace—unlike in continental Europe, where the representative is often a paid official of the union. In almost a third of unionized workplaces without an on-site repre- sentative (14 percent of all unionized workplaces), members are represented by an off-site representative, usually an employee of another workplace within the same organisation. In 31 percent of unionized workplaces there is no union representative at all; in these cases, union recognition is largely a matter of members being covered by collective agreements at the organiza- tional, sectoral, or national level. There are marked differences in the representational roles performed by full-time and part-time union representatives. The vast majority of part-time representatives spent under 5 hours per week representing union members, with around half spending less than 2 hours per week (Cully et al. 1999:198–200). Full-timers engaged with a much broader set of issues were more active in setting up meetings with members and recruiting new members, were more likely to be taken seriously by management, and benefited from higher union density than part-time representatives (Cully et al. 1999:198–214). I return to this distinction in the main text because it proves significant in the analysis. In a small number of cases, a union is present but is not recognized for pay bargaining. One percent of all employees worked in a workplace with a union representative present, although there was no union recognized for pay bargaining.

Non Union-Representative Voice Non union-representative voice can take a number of forms in Britain. Around 15 percent of employees work in a workplace where there are non union representatives. Roughly half these representatives are elected by the workforce, whereas the remainder either volunteer, are appointed by man- agement, or are chosen by a union, even where a joint union-management consultative committee is not present. Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 239 Joint consultative committees are traditionally the method used by employers to consult with employee representatives. These committees, which may operate at the workplace or organization level, provide a formal setting in which the employer can consult with staff representatives over issues of joint concern. They do not engage in negotiation over terms and conditions; rather, they are consultative forums for the discussion of issues such as working practices, health and safety, welfare services and facilities, and future workplace plans (Cully et al. 1999:101–2). Where unions are present, they may have a role in appointing staff representatives to the committee. [For more on the role of joint consultative committees, see Cully et al. (1999:98–102).] Nonunion employee representatives may be present at the workplace even in instances in which no joint committee is established. These include issue-specific representatives (such as those dealing purely with health and safety issues) and those whom the employer consults on a range of issues. At the time of the survey, there were also a small number of European Works Councils present among some larger employers with overseas operations. Nineteen percent of managers in private-sector transnational companies said that a European Works Council operated within their organization. These works councils are set up under European statute to establish consultation and information-sharing arrangements at the supra- national level (Cully et al. 1999:100–1).

A  T C  V M I distinguish between three broad types of voice: union voice, non-union- representative voice, and direct voice. The definitions are set out below.

Union Voice Union voice is present where there is at least one of the following present: trade union(s) recognized by employers for pay bargaining, a joint consult- ative committee meeting at least once a month with representatives chosen through union channels, or a union representative on site, whether the workplace has a recognized union or not. When disaggregating union voice, I distinguish between representatives according to their hours devoted to representation (full time versus part time) and their location (on site versus off site). 240 / A B Non Union-Representative Voice Non union-representative voice is present where there is at least one of the following present: a joint consultative committee meeting at least once a month (what I term a functioning joint consultative committee) with representatives not chosen through union channels and nonunion employee representatives. When disaggregating non union-representative voice, I dis- tinguish between elected and unelected representatives and those serving on a joint consultative committee and those who do not.

Direct Voice Direct voice is two-way communication between management and employees without the mediation of a representative. It is present where there are regular meetings between management and the whole workforce, briefing groups, or problem-solving groups. Briefing groups are briefings for a work group, section, team, or department that occur at least once a month and in which at least some time is given over to questions for employees. Problem-solving groups are groups that solve specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality.21 Sensitivity analyses presented in the main text incorporate a wider range of communication mechanisms, all of which are defined, together with the core voice items, in Table A1, which also presents information on the per- centage of employees located in workplaces with these voice mechanisms.

21 Managers are asked: “Do you have groups at this workplace that solve specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality? They are sometimes known as quality circles or problem-solving groups or continuous improvement groups.” Managerial Responsiveness and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain / 241

APPENDIX TABLE A1 V M  P  E L  W W T A P

Mean Value Voice typology Union only 0.05 Union + direct 0.21 Union + non union representative 0.04 Union + direct + non union representative 0.29 Direct only 0.21 Direct + non union representative 0.10 Non union representative only 0.02 No voice 0.07 Number of union mechanisms (count of 0–3 based on presence of recognized union, on-site rep, and JCC with union appointee) 0 0.42 1 0.10 2 0.34 3 0.14 Number of direct nonunion mechanisms (count of 0–3 based on presence of regular meetings between workforce and senior management, briefing groups, problem-solving groups) 0 0.18 1 0.35 2 0.36 3 0.11 Union voice mechanisms Union recognized 0.57 Union recognized, full-time union representative 0.10 Union recognized, part-time union representative 0.38 Recognition, no on-site representative 0.10 Union representative on site, no recognition 0.01 Union appointment to joint consultative committee 0.16 Union recognized, off-site union representative 0.03 Non union representative voice mechanisms on site Functioning joint consultative committee 0.38 Elected representative to joint consultative committee 0.21 Elected non union representative 0.07 Unelected non union representative 0.07 Direct-voice mechanisms Problem-solving groups 0.52 Regular meetings between senior management and workforce 0.37 Briefings that occur at least once a month and devote time to employees’ 0.54 questions/views Additional communication mechanisms Elected non union representative to joint consultative committee 0.21 European Works Council 0.10 Systematic use of management chain for one-way downward communication 0.70 Regular newsletter 0.64 Suggestion schemes 0.44 Other consultation mechanisms 0.20

N: Data weighted back to the population of employees drawn from sampled workplaces.