Federal Register/Vol. 81, No. 213/Thursday, November 3, 2016
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IATA CLEARING HOUSE PAGE 1 of 21 2021-09-08 14:22 EST Member List Report
IATA CLEARING HOUSE PAGE 1 OF 21 2021-09-08 14:22 EST Member List Report AGREEMENT : Standard PERIOD: P01 September 2021 MEMBER CODE MEMBER NAME ZONE STATUS CATEGORY XB-B72 "INTERAVIA" LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY B Live Associate Member FV-195 "ROSSIYA AIRLINES" JSC D Live IATA Airline 2I-681 21 AIR LLC C Live ACH XD-A39 617436 BC LTD DBA FREIGHTLINK EXPRESS C Live ACH 4O-837 ABC AEROLINEAS S.A. DE C.V. B Suspended Non-IATA Airline M3-549 ABSA - AEROLINHAS BRASILEIRAS S.A. C Live ACH XB-B11 ACCELYA AMERICA B Live Associate Member XB-B81 ACCELYA FRANCE S.A.S D Live Associate Member XB-B05 ACCELYA MIDDLE EAST FZE B Live Associate Member XB-B40 ACCELYA SOLUTIONS AMERICAS INC B Live Associate Member XB-B52 ACCELYA SOLUTIONS INDIA LTD. D Live Associate Member XB-B28 ACCELYA SOLUTIONS UK LIMITED A Live Associate Member XB-B70 ACCELYA UK LIMITED A Live Associate Member XB-B86 ACCELYA WORLD, S.L.U D Live Associate Member 9B-450 ACCESRAIL AND PARTNER RAILWAYS D Live Associate Member XB-280 ACCOUNTING CENTRE OF CHINA AVIATION B Live Associate Member XB-M30 ACNA D Live Associate Member XB-B31 ADB SAFEGATE AIRPORT SYSTEMS UK LTD. A Live Associate Member JP-165 ADRIA AIRWAYS D.O.O. D Suspended Non-IATA Airline A3-390 AEGEAN AIRLINES S.A. D Live IATA Airline KH-687 AEKO KULA LLC C Live ACH EI-053 AER LINGUS LIMITED B Live IATA Airline XB-B74 AERCAP HOLDINGS NV B Live Associate Member 7T-144 AERO EXPRESS DEL ECUADOR - TRANS AM B Live Non-IATA Airline XB-B13 AERO INDUSTRIAL SALES COMPANY B Live Associate Member P5-845 AERO REPUBLICA S.A. -
How Do Airlines Perceive That Strategic Alliances Affect Their Individual Branding?
Journal of Air Transportation Vol. 11, No. 2 -2006 HOW DO AIRLINES PERCEIVE THAT STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AFFECT THEIR INDIVIDUAL BRANDING? Konstantinos Kalligiannis Cranfield University Bedford, United Kingdom Kostas Iatrou Hellenic Aviation Society Athens, Greece Keith Mason Cranfield University Bedford, United Kingdom ABSTRACT Much research has been carried out to evaluate the impact of strategic alliance membership on the performance of airlines. However it would be of interest to identify how airlines perceive this impact in terms of branding by each of the three global alliance groupings. It is the purpose of this paper to gather the opinion of airlines, belonging to the three strategic alliance groups, on the impact that the strategic alliance brands have had on their individual brands and how do they perceive that this impact will change in the future. To achieve this, a comprehensive survey of the alliance management and marketing departments of airlines participating in the three global strategic alliances was required. The results from this survey give an indication whether the strategic airline alliances, which are often referred to as marketing agreements, enhance, damage or have no impact on the individual airline brands. Konstantinos Kalligiannis is a Ph.D. candidate at Cranfield University (on Airline Branding inconsistencies within the Airline Alliances) and holds a M.Sc. in Airport Planning and Management from Loughborough University, a M.Sc. in Air Transport Management from Cranfield University and a B.A. in Business Administration from Luton University. Konstantinos is also working as an aviation consultant and airport planner. His key areas of expertise include air traffic forecasts, airport planning, feasibility studies and business plans for start up airlines. -
Aviation Week & Space Technology
STARTS AFTER PAGE 34 Using AI To Boost How Emirates Is Extending ATM Efficiency Maintenance Intervals ™ $14.95 JANUARY 13-26, 2020 2020 THE YEAR OF SUSTAINABILITY RICH MEDIA EXCLUSIVE Digital Edition Copyright Notice The content contained in this digital edition (“Digital Material”), as well as its selection and arrangement, is owned by Informa. and its affiliated companies, licensors, and suppliers, and is protected by their respective copyright, trademark and other proprietary rights. Upon payment of the subscription price, if applicable, you are hereby authorized to view, download, copy, and print Digital Material solely for your own personal, non-commercial use, provided that by doing any of the foregoing, you acknowledge that (i) you do not and will not acquire any ownership rights of any kind in the Digital Material or any portion thereof, (ii) you must preserve all copyright and other proprietary notices included in any downloaded Digital Material, and (iii) you must comply in all respects with the use restrictions set forth below and in the Informa Privacy Policy and the Informa Terms of Use (the “Use Restrictions”), each of which is hereby incorporated by reference. Any use not in accordance with, and any failure to comply fully with, the Use Restrictions is expressly prohibited by law, and may result in severe civil and criminal penalties. Violators will be prosecuted to the maximum possible extent. You may not modify, publish, license, transmit (including by way of email, facsimile or other electronic means), transfer, sell, reproduce (including by copying or posting on any network computer), create derivative works from, display, store, or in any way exploit, broadcast, disseminate or distribute, in any format or media of any kind, any of the Digital Material, in whole or in part, without the express prior written consent of Informa. -
Antitrust Immunity and International Airline Alliances
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Gillespie, William; Richard, Oliver M. Working Paper Antitrust Immunity and International Airline Alliances EAG Discussion Paper, No. 11-1 Provided in Cooperation with: Economic Analysis Group (EAG), Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice Suggested Citation: Gillespie, William; Richard, Oliver M. (2011) : Antitrust Immunity and International Airline Alliances, EAG Discussion Paper, No. 11-1, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG), Washington, DC This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202391 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP DISCUSSION PAPER Antitrust Immunity and International Airline Alliances by William Gillespie and Oliver M. -
Working with Airlines II
BUSINESS TRAVEL BUYER’S HANDBOOK 2017 AIRLINES www.businesstravelnews.com Working With Airlines II. GATHER INFORMATION Proper data can help you win discounts for city pairs, multiple destinations from one city, regionally or across your travel program. A. Obtain information about your travel program from your TMC databases, online booking systems and third- party data consolidators: 1. Top 20, at least, city pairs by segment and passenger count, including car- rier and origin and destination data. 2. Carrier spend per airline per route for the most recent 12 months. 3. Tickets and value per class of ser- vice, including full-fare economy, discounted economy, business class and first class. Know the tradeoffs in using booked, ticketed or flown data. AFTER A WAVE OF MAJOR U.S. AIRLINE CONSOLIDATION AND THE CONTINUAL While bookings data is available growth of airline alliances and joint ventures, business travel buyers today have fewer more readily and with less of a lag, it avenues to negotiate airline deals than existed a decade ago. Certainly, that doesn’t help does not have the same precision as buyers negotiating position, nor does a market where demand and load factors continue ticketed or flown data. to increase worldwide. But business travel remains a lucrative and desirable segment 4. Analyze corporate card data to find for carriers the world over, given the possibility of premium-class and other high-yield trips booked outside your TMC. travel, and airlines still will heavily compete for that business, despite the leverage that Airlines do not count those trips consolidation has delivered to them. -
The Contribution of Global Alliances to Airlines' Environmental Performance
sustainability Article The Contribution of Global Alliances to Airlines’ Environmental Performance Belén Payán-Sánchez , Miguel Pérez-Valls * and José Antonio Plaza-Úbeda Economics and Business Department, University of Almería, Ctra. Sacramento s/n, La Cañada de San Urbano, 04120 Almería, Spain * Correspondence: [email protected] Received: 27 June 2019; Accepted: 22 August 2019; Published: 24 August 2019 Abstract: Global alliances have traditionally been related to improvements in the economic and operational performances of companies, particularly in the airline industry. However, we still do not know the effect of the participation in this kind of multilateral agreement on the environmental performance of airlines. The main aim of this work is to analyze whether the alliance membership of airlines has an effect upon their environmental performance, and if so, whether or not the characteristics of the global alliance, as well as the business model of the airline, may influence this relation to a greater or lesser extent. The results of regression and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in a sample of 252 airlines (58 included in one of the three global alliances: Star Alliance, Oneworld, and SkyTeam) show a strong and inverse relationship between environmental performance and belonging to an alliance. The paper also shows empirical evidence of the influence of the business model of the airline on environmental performance. These results suggest important implications for managers facing challenges regarding sustainability. Keywords: global alliances; sustainability; environmental performance; airlines; aviation 1. Introduction The aviation sector is the fastest-growing source of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide [1]. Many authors and corporations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), agree that environmental sustainability may be achieved through external pressure with the imposition and accomplishment of different policies, regulations, taxations and other fiscal instruments [2–6]. -
Information on Airline Fees for Optional Services
United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters September 2017 COMMERCIAL AVIATION Information on Airline Fees for Optional Services GAO-17-756 September 2017 COMMERCIAL AVIATION Information on Airline Fees for Optional Services Highlights of GAO-17-756, a report to congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found Since 2008, U.S passenger airlines Since 2010, selected U.S. airlines have introduced a variety of new fees for have increasingly charged fees for optional services and increased some existing fees. For example, each of the 11 optional services that were previously U.S. airlines that GAO examined introduced fees for “preferred” seating, which included in the price of a ticket, such may include additional legroom or a seat closer to the front of the economy as checked baggage or seat selection. cabin. Some of these airlines have also introduced new fees for other optional Consumer advocates have raised services, such as fees for carry-on baggage and priority boarding. Since 2010, questions about the transparency of many of the selected airlines have also increased existing fees for some optional these fees and their associated rules. services, including fees for checked baggage and for changing or cancelling a In April 2011, DOT issued a final rule reservation. From 2010 to 2016, U.S. airlines’ revenues from these two fees— requiring, among other things, that the only optional service fees for which revenues are separately reported to the certain U.S. and foreign airlines disclose information about optional Department of Transportation (DOT)—increased from $6.3 billion in 2010 to $7.1 service fees on their websites. -
ATIS01) for Discussion, Consensus, and Acceptance by the Industry
ATPCO TRAVEL INDUSTRY STANDARD ATIS-01 The Standard for Standards An industry foundation for innovating at scale Version 1.0, 29 May 2020 atpco.net ATIS-01 | The Standard for Standards Published 29 May 2020 The information contained in this document is the property of ATPCO. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means; mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of ATPCO. Under the law, copying includes translating into another language or format. Legal action will be taken against any infringement Copyright © 2020 by ATPCO. All rights reserved. 2 29 May 2020 ATIS-01 | The Standard for Standards Contents About this document .................................................................................................................................. 4 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 5 2. Document Scope ............................................................................................................................ 5 3. Terms and Definitions ................................................................................................................... 6 4. ATPCO’s Standards Approach ..................................................................................................... 9 4.1. The Purpose of Standards .............................................................................................................. -
Annex2: Glossary PDF 339Kb
Global Report 2015 A business, financial and sustainability overview Annex 2_Glossary 142 Amadeus Global Report 2015 Annex 2_Glossary Annex 2_Glossary Amadeus Global Report 2015 143 Ancillary services: additional services provided CMMI: Capability Maturity Model Integration, a process A to customers beyond the ticket. Typical examples improvement training and appraisal programme used A4A: Airlines For America of airline ancillary services include extra baggage, to guide process improvement across a project, division priority seating, catering on board, etc. or an entire organisation. AACO: Arab Air Carrier Organisation APAC: Asia-Pacific CNMV: Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, ACH: Airlines Clearing House API: Application Programming Interface, a language that the Spanish Securities Market Regulator. It is the agency ACO: Amadeus Commercial Organisation enables communication between computer programs. in charge of supervising and inspecting the Spanish Adjusted EPS (earnings per share): EPS corresponding stock markets and the activities of all the participants ASTA: American Society of Travel Agents to the adjusted profit for the year attributable to the in these markets. parent company. Calculated based on weighted average ATOC: Association of Train Operating Companies Code sharing: an aviation business arrangement outstanding shares less weighted average treasury where two or more airlines share the same flight, shares of the year. improving airlines’ network capacity and efficiency. Adjusted profit: the profit for the year adjusted -
A Chronological History
A Chronological History December 2016 Pedro Heilbron, CEO of Copa Airlines, elected as new Chairman of the Star Alliance Chief Executive Board November 2016 Star Alliance Gold Track launched in Frankfurt, Star Alliance’s busiest hub October 2016 Juneyao Airlines announced as future Connecting Partner of Star Allianceseal partnership August 2016 Star Alliance adds themed itineraries to its Round the World product portfolio July 2016 Star Alliance Los Angeles lounge wins Skytrax Award for second year running Star Alliance takes ‘Best Alliance’ title at Skytrax World Airline Awards June 2016 New self-service check-in processes launched in Tokyo-Narita Star Alliance announces Jeffrey Goh will take over as Star Alliance CEO from 2017, on the retirement of Mark Schwab Swiss hosts Star Alliance Chief Executive Board meeting in Zurich. The CEOs arrive on the first passenger flight of the Bombardier C Series. Page 1 of 1 Page 2 of 2 April 2016 Star Alliance: Global travel solutions for conventions and meetings at IMEX March 2016 Star Alliance invites lounge guests to share tips via #irecommend February 2016 Star Alliance airlines launch new check-in processes at Los Angeles’ Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT) Star Alliance Gold Card holders enjoy free upgrades on Heathrow Express trains Star Alliance supports Ramsar’s Youth Photo Contest – Alliance’s Biosphere Connections initiative now in its ninth year January 2016 Gold Track priority at security added as a Star Alliance Gold Status benefit December 2015 Star Alliance launches Connecting -
Prof. Paul Stephen Dempsey
AIRLINE ALLIANCES by Paul Stephen Dempsey Director, Institute of Air & Space Law McGill University Copyright © 2008 by Paul Stephen Dempsey Before Alliances, there was Pan American World Airways . and Trans World Airlines. Before the mega- Alliances, there was interlining, facilitated by IATA Like dogs marking territory, airlines around the world are sniffing each other's tail fins looking for partners." Daniel Riordan “The hardest thing in working on an alliance is to coordinate the activities of people who have different instincts and a different language, and maybe worship slightly different travel gods, to get them to work together in a culture that allows them to respect each other’s habits and convictions, and yet work productively together in an environment in which you can’t specify everything in advance.” Michael E. Levine “Beware a pact with the devil.” Martin Shugrue Airline Motivations For Alliances • the desire to achieve greater economies of scale, scope, and density; • the desire to reduce costs by consolidating redundant operations; • the need to improve revenue by reducing the level of competition wherever possible as markets are liberalized; and • the desire to skirt around the nationality rules which prohibit multinational ownership and cabotage. Intercarrier Agreements · Ticketing-and-Baggage Agreements · Joint-Fare Agreements · Reciprocal Airport Agreements · Blocked Space Relationships · Computer Reservations Systems Joint Ventures · Joint Sales Offices and Telephone Centers · E-Commerce Joint Ventures · Frequent Flyer Program Alliances · Pooling Traffic & Revenue · Code-Sharing Code Sharing The term "code" refers to the identifier used in flight schedule, generally the 2-character IATA carrier designator code and flight number. Thus, XX123, flight 123 operated by the airline XX, might also be sold by airline YY as YY456 and by ZZ as ZZ9876. -
Loyalty Programs: the Vital Safety Feature for Airlines to Survive COVID-19
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at: https://www.emerald.com/insight/2516-8142.htm Airline loyalty Loyalty programs: the vital programs safety feature for airlines to survive COVID-19 Manuel E. Pascual Chaplin School of Hospitality and Tourism, Florida International University, Miami, Florida, USA, and Received 9 March 2021 Revised 13 April 2021 Lisa Nicole Cain Accepted 14 April 2021 Hospitality and Tourism Management, Florida International University Biscayne Bay Campus, North Miami, Florida, USA Abstract Purpose – The airline industry has been severely impacted by COVID-19 due to widespread travel restrictions. Its current response is crucial to ensure continued operations after the global pandemic is resolved. One resource the airlines are leveraging is loyalty programs. This study aims to examine the viability of leveraging loyalty programs in times of crisis. Design/methodology/approach – This study employs a case study methodology to examine how one company, American Airlines, has used its loyalty program to survive a pandemic and alleviate the financial costs associated with limited and restricted travel. Findings – American Airlines’ AAdvantage loyalty program structure may be used as a benchmark to understand how airlines can anchor their loyalty base to reinvigorate travel interest and use these programs as safeguards in critical instances that may arise in the future. Research limitations/implications – The case was bound by the fact that the pandemic was still a threat during the time of analysis. The findings of this case study go beyond the airline industry and may inform other hospitality and tourism organizations on the benefits of loyalty programs in times of financial distress.