House of Representatives
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
HEARINGS Before The SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NON - IMPL ENTATION OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA Testimony by Hon. William H. Booth, President, American Committee on Africa Ms. Jennifer Davis, Research Director, American Committee on Africa Washington, D. C. March 22, 1973 AMERICAN CCWITTEE ON AFRICA 164 Madison Avenue New York, N.Y. 10016 TESTIMONY BY JUDGE WILLIAM H. BOCTH AND MRS. JEIIFER DAVIS TO THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON AFRICA OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE MARCH 22, 1973 Judge Booth: Mr. Chairman, We are here today to challenge the myth of concern for the rights of self-determination being built by the United States government in relation to its role in Southern Africa. It has long been the theme of the United States government that it is in sympathy with the right of self-determination of the black peoples of all Southern Africa, that it abhors apartheid, and th t it does not by its actions strengthen in any way the white minority :cr.ie of Southern Africa. In sipport of that contention, Administration s > :on repeal- ai nauseum the assurance that the U.S. adheres firmly to an .n embargo on all arms or equipment of military significanoe both in relation to South Africa and to Portugal south of the Tropic of Cancer. It is our contention that there is in fact a large gap between stated theory and actual practice in the U.S. role in Southern Africa today, and that by its behaviour on the ground in Africa the U.S. actually gives continual and important support to the minority regimes in a variety of ways, amongst the most important of which are the complex network of military and near-military relationships that have been built between the two areas. The U.S. is in fact making available a whole complex of militarily important equipment to the minority regimes, although most of this is never officially admitted to be military equipment. The U.S. Administration has not as yet reached the state where it openly admits to seeing the regimes of the South as its allies, and therefore hides its aid behind a low profile and a smoke screen of verbiage and complicated licensing requirements. The fact remains that allowing the sale of Boeing 747's for troop transport, computers for defense departments, light aircraft for defoliant spraying are actions which indicate quite clearly that the U.S. is taking the wrong side in the struggle that is now being fought throughout Southern Africa. The significance of this U.S. position can be seen most clearly against the background of the rapidly intensifying struggle for liberation being fought throughout Southern Africa. It is important fir us to put the U.S. stance into that context -- because it then becomes clear why the U.S. is gradually being for ed to take a more and more open position in support of its badly troubled friends in Southern Africa. The whole white Southern Bloc has been subjected to increasing pressure from the liberation movements in the past two years. The Portuguese, fighting a war on three fronts, now have over 160,000 soldiers in Africa. In Guinea-Bissau the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guin4 and Cape Verde) felt itself strong enough by the end of 1972 to actually hold national elections and it has escalated its attacks on the Portuguese-controlled urban centers in the months since the murder of Amilcar Cabral. In Angola new areas have been liberated, and late in 1972 the two major organizations MPLA (Peoples' Movement for the liberation of Angola) and FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) came together in a united front which will put all military efforts under one joint command and must inevitably strengthen their challenge to the Portuguese. In Mozambique FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) has continued to heighten its attacks on the Portuguese, particularly in the Tete province, the site of the giant Cabora Bassa Dam Project. The Portuguese are now forced to move all equipment needed for the dam in heavily guarded convoys, the roads are under constant attack, and there has been increasing recourse to the use of helicopters wherever possible. FRELIMO has in turn had considerable success in its attacks on aircraft; in an attack on the airfield at Mueda it destroyed nineteen planes. The Portuguese must replace these quickly. FRELIMO opened a new frontier further south than Tete in Manica e Sofala towards the end of 1972, and not only the Portuguese, but also the Rhodesian 3reeme has been quick to recognize the th:e'eat posed by this new expansion of the liberation movements strength. Rhodesian troopers have been killed inside Mozambique lately, and in October 1972 Ian Smith flew to Lisbon to hold talks with Prime Minister Caetano (the first top-level talks between the two countries since UDI in 1965). The end of 1972 saw another significant development in the reopening of armed guerilla attacks on various places inside Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), several in the North East, along the Mozambican border, and others near the Zambian border in the West. (It was these latter incidents which led the Smith Government totake reprisals against Zambia, including the closing of the borders.) Most recently has come the announcement of a new united front formed between ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), the two Zimbabwean liberation movements. There have been somewhat less dramatic but equally important developments inside South Africa itself -- the strike of more than 50,000 workers in Durban being indicative of the rising mcr~d of determination of the African people throughout the South to throw off their oppression and begin rebuilding their lives. In the face of this the three white regimes - Portuguese, South African and Rhodesian, have sought to strengthen their owm links with one another -- and to streamline their unity of action. The Rhodesian Army, severely strained by lack of men and money according to the 1971 annual report of the Chief of General Staff Lt. General K.R. Coster, is incapable of meeting the joint threat on two borders. Once the struggle comes home its days are numbered, and there are few amongst today's white South African rulers who do not recognize that fact. But South Africa is going to be hard-pressed to supply all the assistance demanded of it, and it dare not spread itself too thin. Particularly important in this context is the shortage of white labor-power, for at this point the South Africans rely almost entiiely on the white population for armed troops and there would be very great risks for it in changing that policy. Ground forces under arms at any one time comprise a 10,000 man professional force, a current intake of about 22,000 draftees, and a 33,000 police force. That could be reinforced within a few hours by the 15,000 man police reserve, the roughly 60,000 commandos and a citizen reserve force; but if that happens tho whole country would be in a state of total emergency. So the South Africans need to rely heavily on labor saving defense and war-making techniques. By 1972 South Africa had completed an extensive radio communications coastal network which enables it to keep track of aircraft and ships both along .. its immediate borders and all the waY from South Africa to Antarctica; it had erected a network of frontier-control checkpoints, all linked to a central computerized nerve center in the Eastern Transvaal; it had increased border patrols, and built many bush landing fields. South African aircraft carry out constant searches along the northern air-space, Rhodesian planes make observation flights farther east. Mr. Chairman, war is a reality in Southern Africa today, and the United States, despite its protestations to the contrary is increasingly helping to arm one side. It should not have to be the task of the citizens of the United States of America to act out the melodramatic role of intelligence experts in order to -_Lsurp that the United States adheres to its stated position of denying military support to the white regimes of Southern Africa. But that unfortunately is o:'actly the position into which we are constantly thrust. There appear to be consistent attempts to circumvent the official position;semantic games are played to define things in such a way that they fall outside the boundaries of control; secrecy is another weapon used to shield the flow of aid. It is difficult then, for concerned groups to do more than expose the very tip of an iceberg whose dimensions we can only guess at from our knowledge of a similpr series of events in recent years in South East Asia. What follows is an attempt to share with this Committee a few of the increasing indications we have of extensive U.S. military-type assistance to Southern Africa. Mrs. Jennifer Davis Aircraft The last time I testified before this Committee attention was focused on the important role of light aircraft in anti-guerilla type operations, and on the consequent implications of allowing the sale of several thousand of such aircraft to South Africa, even for ostensibly private use. These sales con tinue. Since 1971 the U.S. government has also allowed the sale of such aircraft to various purchasers in Mozambique. It has also continued to allow the sale of Boeings of various classes, some financed by Export-Import credits, to agencies of the Portuguese government - for example the airline companies of T.A.P.