Two Concepts of Meditation and Three Kinds of Wisdom in Kamalaśīla’S Bhāvanākramas: a Problem of Translation
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Buddhist Studies Review 23(1) 2006, 71–92 ISSN (print): 0256-2897 ISSN (online): 1747-9681 Two Concepts of Meditation and Three Kinds of Wisdom in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas: A Problem of Translation MARTIN T. ADAM Religious Studies Program, Department of Pacifi c and Asian Studies, University of Victoria, British Colombia, Canada [email protected] ABSTRACT: A close reading of the three Bhāvanākramaḥ texts, written by Kamalaśīla (740–795 CE), reveals that their author was aware of two competing concepts of medi- tation prevalent in Tibet at the time of their composition. The two concepts of medi- tation, associated with the Sanskrit words bhāvanā and dhyāna, can be related respec- tively to the Indian and Chinese sides of the well-known debates at bSam yas. The account of the Mahāyāna path outlined in these texts implies an acceptance of the precedence of bhāvanā over dhyāna. In this paper I argue that Kamalaśīla advocated bhāvanā – a conception of meditation which encompasses non-conceptual dhyāna, but which also includes a discernment of reality (bhūta-pratyavekṣā) that is conceptual in nature. Such conceptual discernment should not be understood simply as a process of ordinary rational understanding (cintāmayī prajñā) but rather as constituting a special kind of meditative wisdom (bhāvanāmayī prajñā). A failure to recognize the subtle dif- ferences between Kamalaśīla’s employment of the terms dhyāna and bhāvanā, along with his advocacy of the latter, could easily lead to mistranslation and, with this, a basic misunderstanding of his position. In particular, it could lead to a conception of insight (vipaśyanā) that is overly intellectual in nature. Given the historically impor- tant role that these texts played in the formation of Tibetan Buddhism, the implica- tions of such a misconception could be far-reaching. This paper attempts to clarify the key meditation terminology found in the Bhāvanākramas as well as demonstrate the rationale for using ‘meditation’ as the default translation for bhāvanā. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF MEDITATION The following pages contain an analysis of a constellation of meditation-related terms found in three polemical treatises, identically entitled Bhāvanākramaḥ (The Process of Meditation). It is not clear why their author, Kamalaśīla, wrote three texts with the same title.1 There is considerable overlap among the three, and not 1. The three texts were likely composed in Tibet between 792 and 794 CE, although see Taniguchi (1992) for an argument that the fi rst Bhāvanākramaḥ was composed somewhat earlier in India. © Equinox Publishing Ltd 2006, Unit 6, The Village, 101 Amies Street, London SW11 2JW 72 BUDDHIST STUDIES REVIEW infrequently repetition. That being said, the three treatises cover an extraordi- nary range of subjects, all united around the central purpose of providing guid- ance to new practitioners of the teachings of the Mahāyāna Sūtras.2 Historically, the Bhāvanākramas’ account of meditation has been enormously infl uential. Paul Williams has referred to the texts as ‘the principal systematic Indian sources for the integration of emptiness teachings into Madhyamaka med- itation practice’ (Williams, 1989: 72). Elsewhere they have been described as ‘the origin of Tibetan tradition of how to meditate’ (Taniguchi, 1992: 303). This paper argues that there are, in fact, two competing concepts of meditation present in the texts. These two concepts are identifi able with two specifi c Sanskrit words, both of which have been commonly translated into English as ‘meditation’ – bhāvanā and dhyāna. Because Kamalaśīla does not employ these terms as syno- nyms, a problem arises for the modern day translator: which word, if either, should be privileged in translation as ‘meditation’? While neither can carry the same range of meanings as the English word (on which, see below), in this paper it is argued that Kamalaśīla regarded bhāvanā as normative for the practice of beginners in the way of the Mahāyāna Sutras. As such, ‘meditation’ should be its default translation. For these texts, it is potentially misleading to translate dhyāna as meditation. The issue is more than academic. Depending on the choice made, Kamalaśīla’s account of the Mahāyāna Buddhist path to Awakening will be radi- cally altered. To that extent, our understanding of both the doctrinal and practi- cal foundations of Tibetan Buddhism will be aff ected. According to Edward Conze, ‘The fi rst explains the doctrine of the Mahāyāna, the second how it can be meditated upon, and the third what is the result of meditation’ (1975: 177). Conze is here following a description contained in a Tibetan record cited in Tucci (1958: 40–41). The account has it that the Tibetan king, Khri Srong lde btsan, requested these explanations follow- ing Kamalaśīla’s pivotal victory in debate over a Chinese rival of the Ch’an tradition (discussed below). The ‘doctrine’ of Bhk 1 is described as that of the three kinds of wisdom (śrutamayī, cintāmayī, and bhāvanāmayī prajñā). The way of meditation of Bhk 2 is explained in light of the realization that there is only one vehicle; it is the result of this meditation that Bhk 3 is said to explain. But such categorical statements are best made with caution; all three texts contain discussions of doctrine, meditation, and its result. 2. Perhaps it is as much due to the excellence of scholarship already devoted to their study as it is to the breadth of their concern that the Bhāvanākramas tend to be among the most widely quoted of Indian Buddhist texts. Tucci has provided critical editions of the Sanskrit and Tibetan of the Bhk 1 (1958) and the Sanskrit of the Bhk 3 (1971). Of the three texts, the original Sanskrit of the Bhk 2 is lost. As well, the fi rst folio of the Sanskrit of Bhk 1 is missing, as are the edges of many of the pages of the manuscript of Bhk 3 from which Tucci worked. All three texts are, however, fully preserved in the Tibetan Tanjur. A critical edition of the Tibetan text of Bhk 2 based on the Narthang (N), Peking (P), Derge (D), and Cone (C) editions has been prepared by K. Goshima (1983). The Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies has published an edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, which occasionally serves to clarify Tucci (Namdol, 1997). This contains a Hindi translation and Sanskrit reconstructions of Bhk 2 and the fi rst folio of Bhk 1. I have worked mainly from the editions of Tucci, Goshima, and the Derge Tanjur dBu ma KI (22a- 41b, 42a-55b, and 56a-68b respectively for the three texts). Unless otherwise noted, references are to Tucci for the Sanskrit texts and to D for the Tibetan. © Equinox Publishing Ltd 2006 ADAM KAMALAŚĪLA’S BHĀVANĀKRAMAS: A PROBLEM OF TRANSLATION 73 The three texts contain numerous instructions for the beginner in Mahāyāna meditation. Equally, the Bhāvanākramas constitute a kind of apology or justifi ca- tion for a particular approach to the Buddhist path. The Tibetan tradition regards them as containing a summary of arguments employed in the refutation of a Chinese Ch’an position being advocated at the time of the fi rst great transmission of Buddhism to Tibet. The debate has been characterized in terms of gradualism vs. subitism (Gomez, 1987). The gradualist view, associated with the Indian side led by Kamalaśīla, held that Awakening can only be attained after a long process of training in which one deliberately cultivates certain causes and conditions conducive to its occurrence. These causes and conditions are both moral and cog- nitive – one must cultivate specifi c moral virtues as well as a specifi c conceptual knowledge of the nature of reality. Such cultivation (bhāvanā) is a gradual process – it takes time and has defi nite steps. The subitist position, represented by a Ch’an monk (Hvashang) named Mo ho yen (Sanskrit: Mahāyāna), held that Awakening occurs suddenly, all at once. Awakening was understood as a state requiring only the practice of a non-conceptual concentration or absorption (dhyāna), wherein one’s mind is cleared from all obscuring mental activity. Attempts to cultivate specifi c moral virtues and views of reality were understood as counterproductive on the grounds that they accumulate karma and prolong one’s sojourn through cyclical existence.3 The contrary view, argued by Kamalaśīla, held that a particular kind of cogni- tive process – a ‘correct analysis’ or ‘discernment of reality’ (bhūta-pratyavekṣā) – is essential to the achievement of Awakening. Because Awakening involves a kind of knowledge (i.e. non-conceptual knowledge, nirvikalpa jñāna), and not merely concentration, it is essential to fi rst become established not only in concentration but also in a correct conceptual knowledge, which can then function to give rise to the sought after noetic state. The principle at work here is that like arises from like: one kind of knowledge arises on the basis of another. Kamalaśīla seems to have understood his opponent as arguing on the basis of the same causal princi- ple, but focusing on the other aspect of Awakening – its non- conceptuality. Thus, 3. Bhk 3 13.15–14.1: yas tu manyate / cittavikalpa samutthāpitaśubhāśubha-karmavaśena sattvāḥ svargādi karmaphalam anubhavantaḥ saṃsāre saṃsaranti / ye punar na kiṃcic cintayanti nāpi kiṃcit karma kurvanti te parimucyante saṃsārāt / tasmān na kiṃcic cintayitavyam / nāpi dānādikuśalacaryā kartavyā / kevalaṃ murkhajanam adhikṛtya dānādikuśalacaryā nirdeṣteti /; D 61b1: gang zhig sems kyi rnam par rtog pas bskyed pa’i dge ba dang mi dge ba’i las kyi dbang gis sems can rnams mtho ri la sogs pa’i ‘bras bu myong zhing ‘khor ba na ‘khor ro / gang dag ci yang mi sems ci yang mi byed pa de dag ni ‘khor ba las yongs su thar bar ‘gyur ro / de lta bas na ci yang mi bsam mo / sbyin pa la sogs pa dge ba spyad par yang mi bya’o / sbyin pa la sogs pa spyod pa ni skye bo blun po’i dbang du mdzad nas bstan pa kho na yin no snyom du sems shing de skad kyang smra ba des ni theg pa chen po mtha dag spangs pa yin no/: ‘But some consider, “Because they are subject to positive and negative actions generated by the conceptual mind, sentient beings spin around in cyclical existence experiencing the fruits of their actions, such as heaven.