Symbol and Reality
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CARL H. HAMBURG SYMBOL AND REALITY Studies in the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer • MARTINUS NIjHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1956 ISBN 978-94-011-8667-4 ISBN 978-94-011-9461-7 (eBook) DOl 10.1 007/978-94-011-9461-7 Copyright I956 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form SYMBOL AND REALITY PREFACE Since prefaces, for the most part, are written after a book is done, yet face the reader before he gets to it, it is perhaps not surprising that we usually find ourselves addressed by a more chastened and qualifying author than we eventually encounter in the ensuing pages. It is, after all, not only some readers, but the writer of a book himself who reads what he has done and failed to do. If the above is the rule, I am no exception to it. The discerning reader need not be told that the following studies differ, not only in the approaches they make to their unifying subject-matter, but also in their precision and thus adequacy of presentation. In addition to the usual reasons for this rather common shortcoming, there is an another one in the case of the present book. In spite of its comparative brevity, the time-span between its inception and termination covers some twenty years. As a result, some (historical and epistemological) sections reflect my preoccupation with CASSI RER'S eady works during student days in Germany and France. When, some ten years later, CASSIRER in a letter expressed "great joy" and anticipation for a more closely supervised con tinuation of my efforts (which, because of his untimely death, never came to pass), he gave me all the encouragement needed to go to work on a critical exposition of his "symbolic form" con cept. Since then, the book was re-written, partly pruned and partly expanded. This process, I am sure, could have gone on without damage to the manuscript, for years to come. In stead, overcoming the double vanities of publishing one's thoughts either too fast or not at all, the book is now readied in the hope that, even as it stands, it may serve as a somewhat more sustained examination of the philosophy of CASSIRER than is available so far. Edward G. Ballard, Richard L. Barber, Irwin Edman, James Gutman, Suzanne K. Langer, Eric Lenneberg, Ernest Nagel and VIII PREFACE John E. Smith, by criticism or suggestion, have helped to im prove such parts of this book as they have read. Thanks are due to The Library 0/ Living Philosophers (North western University), The Journal 0/ Philosophy and The Tulane Studies in Philosophy for permission to use some material previ ously published in their pages. Due acknowledgments to publish ers from whose publications I have quoted will be itemized in the bibliography. CARL H. HAMBURG TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII INTRODUCTION: Philosophy - Midcentury - Cassirer. I. SYMBOL REALITY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 10 Herakleitos - Plato - Aristotle - Descartes - Leibniz - Locke - Berkeley - Kant. II. REALITY AND SYMBOLIC FORMS 44 The Epistemological Issue - From a "critique of reason" to a "critique of culture". III. THE SYMBOL CONCEPT I 58 Definition and Exposition - Polarity and Correlativity of "meaning" (sense) and "senses". IV. THE SYMBOL CONCEPT II . • . •. 75 Objections and Defense - The Logical Issue - The Empirical Issue. V. THE MODALITIES OF THE SYMBOL CONCEPT • . .. 88 Illustration: The Space Concept on the Expression-level (Myth), the Perceptual level and the Theoretical level of symbolization. VI. SEMIOTIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS. 114 Areas of agreement - Issues in semantics and pragmatics. VII. THE SEMIOTIC RANGE OF PHILOSOPHY • . • .• 145 The semiotic scheme of formal, empirical and valuational sign-contexts. The case against positivist semiotics. Bibliographical Notes 166 Index . ..... 171 THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO MY MOTHER AND LONA INTRODUCTION As one moves into the second half of the twentieth century, backward glances over failures and achievements of the first half are hard to suppress. Depending upon what one is consider ing, different appraisals will be in order, ranging all the way from exultation to disillusionment or total indifference. What is the situation in regard to "the philosophy of our time"? Or better: what can one significantly say about it in all brevity? (1) On one conclusion both professional and non-professional observers may agree: while there are a good many philosophers about, there is at this time hardly yet anything sufficiently unified about their thinking to warrant the belief in the existence of a "contemporary philosophy" as a meaningful unit of classi fication. This is to make more than the trivial assertion that in the years since the turn of the century philosophers have failed any more markedly than at other periods to come out with one single rather than a variety of more or less systematically con nected conclusions on this presumably self-same world. The difficulty is rather with finding a set of characteristics which could serve as a criterion for deciding for any given philosophy whether it is - in approach, method, outlook or concern - of the "contemporary" kind or not. Supposing one were to construct such a criterion by concentrating on what one takes to be peculiar to our rather than to any previous age. Reference could then be made to the therapeutical purpose of the logical positivist, the social control outlook of the pragmatist, the destiny-pre occupation of the existentialist. To define "20th Century"-phi losophy in terms consonant with these three currents of thought would merely require specification of their common denominator. But even supposing that such a denominator could be found and formulated as a common secular, practical and individualistic concern, what would one have achieved? We would have a 2 Symbol and Reality definition too narrow to account for some of the most effective and widely-held philosophies of our time which, such as Dialec tical Materialism and Neo-Thomism, are either not individualist ic or not secular in orientation. In order to broaden our classifi cation, we could, of course, push on to even more ultimate concerns such as, e.g., the contemporary philosopher's preoccu pation with science, its method, reach and limitation; or his "quest for certainty" in a world rendered insecure by divided loyalties; or, finally, his self-consciousness in point of method and "justification". But we now would have avoided the danger of being narrow-minded only at the expense of creating a class so large that it would generously accommodate all that has ever historically appeared as an instance of the sort of reflection known as philosophy. A choice has thus to be made. Either one will dignify with the title "contemporary philosophy" only those intellectual efforts which are actuated by thought-motives peculiar to our, the 20th, rather than to any other century; or one will have to be satisfied with a purely chronological con notation of the term, making reference to all those philosophers, whether modern in outlook or not, whose work has been and is being done in this century. (2) What is said above permits of formulation in a highly paradoxical form: to the extent that 20th century philosophy proceeds in a manner markedly different from that of previous philosophical schools, it has (pragmatism excepted) had little, if any, effect upon its non-professional contemporaries; while to the extent that it has commanded the attention of its more or less enlightened contemporaries, it has (as Dialectical Material ism, Neo-Thomism and Oriental philosophies) remained intellec tually dependant upon thought-systems characteristic of earlier ages. Between the two extremes, there barely manages to survive a small group of metaphysicians who share the fate of the popu lar philosophical movements in not being taken very serio'J~ly by their professional colleagues (because of the metaphorical and un-scientific vagueness of their pronouncements) while, at the same time, sharing the fate of the up-to-date sign-analysts in being ignored by non-professional contemporaries (because of their aloofness from the pressing problems of the day. ) There opens up the fatal alternative for the 20th century philosopher Introduction 3 of either remammg incomprehensible to his non-professional contemporaries or to be marked as trivial by his professional colleagues. Is there an alternative to this sad predicament? (3) It may be best to start off with an acknowledgment of the various claims made upon the philosopher. As a specialist in matters of the most general, he has been and must continue to be an inquirer into the grounds and presuppositions of shared beliefs. Analysis as clarification of meaning, rather than dis covery or expression of new facts or values, remains an important part of his characteristic contribution to those who aim at an understanding of both what it is that the sciences and the arts discover or express and the method and validation by which their discoveries and expressions may be obtained and confirmed. In consequence, there can be no objection at all to the insistence of the logical positivists during the last few decades upon greater consciousness and control of precise reference by symbols in general and the written or spoken word in particular. The point to be borne in mind, however, is that while it is recommendable for the logician to be thus preoccupied with matters of syntax, semantics and general methodology, as a philosopher he is not yet done. It is still incumbent upon him to use his newly acquired precision tools beyond the realm of artificial or simplified natural and scientific sign-systems. There is also no denying the frequent claim that the philosopher is responsible to his contemporaries for the reasoned discharge of his social responsibilities.