John C. Greenway and the Bull Moose Movement in Arizona

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Authors Hunter, George Stanford, 1939-

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/551855 JOES 0. GHBEWAT AED THE BULL MOOSE MOVBMIII

IE AMZOEA

By George Hunter

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

B1PAETMBIT OF BISTORT

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In the Graduate College

THE UHIVSRSITT OF ARIZOHA 1966 SI1T3MMT IT 1UTI0H

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable with­ out special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholar­ ship. In all other Instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGHED:.

APPROVAL IT THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

-2- s ./9^ 5T Harwood P. Hinton date Assistant Professor of History PREFACE

The Progressive movement in Arizona was but part of a larger political phenomenon which existed precariously in the United States between 1910 and 1916. Revolt against the conservative leadership of the two older parties— Democratic and Republican-brought a third party into existance. Led nationally by Theodore Roosevelt, the new party lacked machinery and depended heavily upon its state organizations for support. A newcomer to Arizona, John Campbell Greenway, played a quiet but important part in sustaining the movement in that state. No professional politician, he was attracted to the movement by his admiration for its leader, under whom he had served in the Spanish-American War. Even when the

Progressive blossom was brightest in 1912, the Arizona off­

shoot was not healthy. Its root soon proved shallow, and

its strength was drawn away by the stronger organization of

the Republican party and the competing progressivism of the

Democratic party. Barely able to retain its identity in

the state election of 1914, the Progressive party of

Arizona had few supporters remaining in its ranks by 1916.

As the party died on the national level that year, so did

it perish in Arizona. Throughout, however, the movement

iii iv in Arizona was nourished by Greenway's friendship with

Roosevelt which, while hitherto unacknowledged, was the distinguishing feature of his own political thinking and personal life.

The author is indebted to Prof. J. A. Carroll, in whose seminar at the University of Arizona this study was undertaken, for his assistance in the preparation of the final manuscript, and to Prof. Herman E. Bateman for suggestions toward the improvement of the first draft. The author is grateful to Mrs. Edith S. Kltt, secretary emeritus of the Arizona Pioneers* Historical Society, for allowing access to the Greenway Collection under her care at that institution, and to Totsy Belle Beatson and Nell B. Hand for their valuable advice and criticism. ABSTRACT

The Progressive movement in Arizona was tied to the national leadership of Theodore Roosevelt. At its inception, the state organization led by John 0. Greenway and Dwight B.

Heard showed promise. Roosevelt’s successor to the White

House, William Howard Taft, had by his action on the Arizona

Enabling Act split the Republican party in the ’’baby" state, thus promoting the early successes of the Bull Moose Move­ ment in Arizona. At the same time Taft had unwittingly provided Arizona Democrats with an issue on which to further

establish their progresslvlsm. This proved to be the undoing

of the new party. Unable to win increased Democratic support

and to maintain a strong organization against the encroach­ ments of the Republican party, the Arizona Progressive Move­ ment was all but dead by 1916. In that year Roosevelt,

Greenway, and Heard decided to abandon the movement in the face of the European upheaval.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

PREFACE...... ill

I BIRTH OF A FRIENDSHIP...... 1

II BIRTH OF A PARTY...... 12

III THE SPIRIT OF BUNKER HILL...... 38

IV NO COMPROMISE, NO AMALGAMATION...... 6?

V DEATH OF A PARTY...... 93

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 125

vi CHAPTER I

BIRTH OP 1 PRIEHDSHIP

On Sunday morning, July 10, 1910, John Campbell

Greenway, thirty-eight years old, arrived in Bisbee as the new superintendent of the Calumet and Arizona mine,* His

coming had been preceded by rumors in financial and mining

circles, which had been given currency by the local press

late in January.* 2 One local resident reflected this unrest

in a letter to a friends “Things in Bisbee are almost dog­

gone quiet . . . everybody is wondering what is going to

happen next. There is evidently a great shake-up in the

Calumet and Arizona circles.Six months later such rumors

^Bisbee Dally Review. July 12, 1910, p. 1.

2Ibid.. January 30, 1910, p. 6. The occasion for the rumors was a sudden drop in the Calumet and Arizona stock. The Review pointed out that Thomas P. Cole, a director, and I. W. Powell, the superintendent, were to retire following a quarrel between themselves and the vice-presidents, James and Thomas Hbatson. A second rumor credited underground mining conditions as the reason for the impending change. ,

^Will E. Tester to Charles V. Hicks, January 28, 1910. Papers of Charles W. Hicks, Arizona Historical Pioneers’ Society, Tucson, Arizona. Tester was apparently quite alarmed as his informer, one Arnold, claimed that they were all “scared stiff over their jobs.” To the writer the inference seems warranted that Greenway’s arrival was no accident. Thomas Ho at son denied any imminent changes in the management of the Calumet and Arizona. Por Hbatson* s denial see the Bisbee Dally Review. February 13, 1910, p. 8.

1 2 were confirmed when Colonel 1. W. Powell resigned and announced Greenway' s appointmentThe choice of Greenway no doubt was made because of the outstanding ability he had shown in the development of the mining property of the

Calumet and Arizona on Minnesota's Iron Ridge and in the construction of the nearby towns of Coleraine, Marvel, and c Taconite. This appointment meant that he, like Powell, would be expected to exercise the political and economic prerogative of copper, to which he was no stranger, having served his apprenticeship as a monitor in Coleraine. He would now serve as prince, for in Arizona copper was king and suffered no equal.^

Position had come naturally to Greenway not by travel across the difficult terrain of experience, a course pursued by most men, but along the gentler slopes eased by a prepara­ tory education at St. Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachu­ setts, which his father, John Ohrlstain Greenway, a prominent

^Bisbee Daily Review. July 1, 1910, p. 1.

5James H. McOlintock, Arizona: Prehistoric. Aboriginal. Pioneer. M o d e m . 3 vols. (Chicago, I916), v. 3, pp. 48-50.

65. E. Williams, "Arizona's Territorial Governors: Governor Sloan," unpublished manuscript at Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, p. 162. Powell had taken part in the Republican Territorial Convention and was selected as a delegate to the Republican Rational Convention in 1908. For the statement about copper, see 0. P. Tolaan, "Copper in Arizona in 1901," Mining and Scientific Press. January 1. 1910, p. 72. 3 physician of Huntsville, Alabama, had been able to provide.

At Andover, Greenway continued the military tradition begun by the famed Colonel William Campbell on King's Mountain in

1780 and passed on to him by his father, who had been a

second lieutenant in the Confederate Army. Greenway's

further education at the University of Virginia enhanced

this heritage, as did the family removal to Hot Springs,

Arkansas, where the young man moved readily into polite

southern society and into increased contact with the new

masters of the North and South.?

A new spirit and a new energy was transforming the

South, and it was natural that its post-war generation would

turn to scientific arid technical persuits to restore its

land and to open up new avenues to wealth and prestige.®

Greenway reflected this change by enrolling in Sheffield

Scientific School of Tale University. At Yale the young man

soon came to occupy a conspiclous place. Harvard and

7James T. White to Mrs. Isabella Greenway, January 1, 1926. "Revision of Biographical Copy of General John Campbell Greenway as submitted to the National Cyclopedia of American Biography," Papers of John Campbell Greenway, Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society. See also The National Cyclopedia of American Biography (New York, 1922], p . 140. All Greenway correspondence cited in this thesis, unless otherwise indicated, is from the Greenway Collection.

®Paul H. Buck. The Road to Reunion 1865-1900 (New York, 1959), P. 1B3: 4

Princeton were perhaps the first to know of his great prowess on the gridiron and diamond. Greenway's position as right end on the famous "Dutch" Garter football team while also catcher at Yale, won him high acclaim. He was elected president of his class and voted the most popular man on campus. When Greenway left Yale in 1895 to begin his professional career in the machine shops of the Carnegie

Steel Company in Duquesne, Pennsylvania, as a laborer at

#2.50 a day, it was understood that this would be only tem­ porary, for a man of his background would soon advance.9

Three years later, when the Spanish-American War broke out in the spring of I898, Greenway was the foreman of the mechanical department.^ Like many other young men

"believing in the justness of our war," he was determined to

offer his services to his country. He jumped the train for

San Antonio and reported directly to Colonel Leonard Wood

because he felt that the regiment of cavalry being organized

there by Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt was

the one to his taste. Wood looked the young man over and

assigned him to Company I, 1st United States Volunteer* 10

^Greenway, "Business Record." This scrap of paper states that Greenway's salary at this time was #2.50 a day. McOlintock, o£. cit., v. 3, p. 49., states that his salary was even lower — #1.32 a day.

10McClintock, op. cit., 3, p. 49. 5

Cavalry, as a private.^ While In San Antonio, as Wood and

Roosevelt undertook to get the regiment in order, Greenway met the dynamic lieutenant-Colonel. Although almost fifteen years separated the two, each captivated the other, and suddenly Greenway was commissioned a second lieutenant.

Roosevelt delighted in "the football player," as he called him: Greenway, on his part, found the colorful New Yorker to be a "most enthusiastic man and very . . . companiable. ’A2

On May 29, 1898, the regiment set out for Tampa,

Florida. By the time the train had reached Tampa, Roosevelt and Greenway were fast friends. At Tampa, Greenway managed to secure a transfer from Troop I, which was to be left behind, to Troop G, a New Mexico unit, and slipped aboard the Yucatan as a temporary first lieutenant directly under

Roosevelt.In Cuba, during what Roosevelt called the

"worst days of the fighting and surge," Roosevelt's faith in Greenway1s ability did not diminish. Greenway and another rough rider, Dave Goodrich, were Roosevelt's "right

llGreenway, "Synopsis of Speech Before long Island Yale Alumni Association," March 3, I899.

12Theodore Roosevelt to Mrs. Tilden R. Selmes, July 31, 1898; Greenway to Mrs. Alice White Greenway (undated); Greenway's "Military Record". Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders and Men of Action (New York, 1926), pp. 27-251 l^Greenway'g "Military Record." 6 and left bowers." Greenway became an "invaluable officer" and one of the two or three to whom Roosevelt naturally turned when a duty of "peculiar hazard or • • • responsibility came up."*^ It the close of the war Roosevelt returned to politics as governor of New York and Greenway to the United States

Steel Corporation as assistant superintendent of the Oliver

Mining Company.15 While their paths separated, their personal friendship was to grow and broaden. In September of 1898 they attended a football game together at New Haven, and early in

1899 they complimented each other publicly at a meeting of the long Island Yale Alumni Association. On that occasion Greenway spoke of "the gallant Wood and Roosevelt," while Roosevelt assured the audience that Greenway could go without sleep for

"three days and three nights."I** A year later, when Greenway underwent surgery at the Presbyterian Hospital in New York

^Roosevelt to Mrs. Tilden R. Selmes, July 31, I898; Robert 0. Davis to Mrs. Isabella Greenway, June 12. 1926. Davis searched the records of the Adjutant General*s office and sent Mrs. Greenway an extract from a letter written by Roosevelt on September 15, I898.

■^Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York, 1931), p. 201. Greenway to A. B. Kenoshing, January 13, 1916.

l6(jreenway to Gilbert Greenway, September 23, 1898; Greenway, "Synopsis of Speech Before long Island, Yale Alumni Association," March 3» 1899• Roosevelt, "Yale Men in the Rough Riders," An address at the Yale Alumni dinner, March 3, 1899, contained in The Rough Riders, pp. 171-172. 7

City, the Roosevelt children sent flowers and Roosevelt inquired after his friend's health.^7 The day after the operation Roosevelt wrote: "I trust that it was only trifling and . . . you are on the road to recovery."^® Soon after,

Greenway inquired as to the political health of the President

McKinley's new running mate. "How is Teddy . . . these days?" he asked a friend, "Getting toughened up for the next two months, I hope I

Following the Republican landslide of 1900, Greenway wired his congratulations to the vice-president elect, who warmly replied: "Not only was there no man who sent me a

telegram which was more sincere on the part of the sender,

but also there was no telegram which gave more pleasure to me and the family than did yours."20 Within ten months

McKinley was dead and Roosevelt was President of the United

States. In October of 1901 Greenway was asked to come to

the White House on his way to Yale.21 JL year later he was

ITRoosevelt to Greenway, March 17 and March 29, 1900.

^Roosevelt to Greenway, April 4, 1900; Roosevelt to Greenway, April 14, 1900. Greenway's brother Gil was appar­ ently ill. Roosevelt sent letters from the oldest children to Greenway and wrote: "Poor Gill What a siege he has had . . . I guess the whole Greenway family is of good stuff." Roosevelt to.Greenway, May 1, 1900. "I am awfully glad you are getting along so well, and Gil, too."

•^Greenway to Robert H. M. Ferguson, August 19, 1900.

20Roosevelt to Greenway, November 9 , 1900. SlRoosevelt to Greenway, October 18, 1901. 8 advised to bring both his frock coat and dress suit with him to Washington, since he was to lunch with the President and CO to attend an evening banquet.

As Roosevelt's first term of office slipped by,

Greenway visited him often. In 1904 he went riding with his old colonel, and in the fall of the next year Roosevelt arranged for Greenway to accompany him on his southern tour.

"I had a great time in the South," the President wrote to his son Kermit. "it was very nice, indeed, having . • •

Mr. John Greenway with me."23 in a letter to Greenway in

1906, probably in reply to an inquiry as to the likelihood that the President would be a candidate to succeed himself,

Roosevelt told his friend: "No, John. You will have to vote for someone else in 1908, and while you must not quote me, I have exactly your view . . . Taft is the man." Teddy then characteristically added, "Do you know him?"^

late in 1906 the President, dissatisfied with the way the Department of the Interior had been operating, determined *2

22Nelson P. Rulet to Greenway, September 23, 1902.

23Will Irwin (ed.), Letters to Kermit from Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1946),“pp. 56, 119. There is also a copy of the invitation to Greenway, "Tour of the President Through the South, October 18, 1905 to October 28, 1905," in the Greenway Papers.

^Roosevelt to Greenway, October 19, 1906. 9 to remodel It and offered Greenway the position of Commissioner of the General land Office. Roosevelt felt that his friend could do the work " . . , right up to the handle,” but never­ theless expressed his own personal misgivings as to the wisdom of Greenway's accepting the position.Because Roosevelt felt certain that Greenway would want to see him, he asked his friend to come to Washington. "Unless we are unusually crowded, I shall expect you to stay at the White House,” the

President wrote. "The board is still good.”2^ Greenway was obviously flattered by the President's request but declined the position.27 At the end of January, 1907, Roosevelt notified Greenway that he had secured an able man for the i General land Office In Richard A. Ballinger of Washington, but in the President's opinion the appointee "can't be

25Roosevelt to Greenway, November 5, 1906.

^Roosevelt to Greenway, November 5, 1906.

27jhere is no evidence that Greenway consulted Roosevelt. Probably actuated by financial considerations, he thought it best not to accept the position. Thomas ?• Cole to Greenway, December 27, 1906. Cole's letter shows that Greenway* s salary at that time was $6,600 while the land office paid only #5,000. Moreover, in addition, either in 1905 or in 1906, Greenway was promoted to Super­ intendent of the Oliver Mining Company. Greenway to Kenoshlng, January 13, 1916, dates the year of his promotion as 1905, while the "Revision of Biographical Copy" dates it as 1906. 10 quite so good as the individual to whom I first offered it.1,28

Later that year Roosevelt determined that William

Howard Taft would be his successor. Acting in line with other Republicans, Greenway now sent Roosevelt a highly complimentary letter in which he supported the choice of

Taft. Roosevelt apparently showed it to Taft, for Taft replied the same day: MIt is a great comfort to feel that

I have the support of such a man as you.M The next year

Greenway went to the Republican convention at Chicago as a

Taft supporter. He wired Roosevelt during the course of the convention: "Danger to Taft's candidacy now lies in stampede to you. Strongly suggest your giving permanent chairman your final renunciation to reach him not later than twelve o'clock. Make it strong."* 2# Following Taft's inaug­ uration in March, 1909, Roosevelt sailed for Africa, not to return until June of 1910, one month before Greenway arrived xn in Arizona.

28Roosevelt to Greenway, January 30, 1907• See also Roosevelt to Hermit, August 31, 1907, Irwin (ed.), op. oit., p. 207.

29RooeeTelt to Greenway, May 7, 1907; William Howard Taft to Greenway, May 28, 1908.

30Henry ?. Pringle, The Life and Times of William .Howard Taft. (Hew York), 1, p. 399. 11

The Spanish-American War had been a turning point in the life of John Campbell Greenway, just as it was in that of Theodore Roosevelt. In the twelve years between the war and Greenway1 s arrival in Arizona, he had advanced in mining circles and had formed a strong friendship with a "strong friend."51 in the ensuing years this friendship would dominate Greenway's political thought to the point where he became almost a Roosevelt in cameo.

31vance McCormick to Greenway, March 27, 1902. CHAPTER II

BIRTH OP A PARTY

"l have received some very painful injuries due to an accident yesterday . . . . My shoulder is dislocated and I am badly bruised and cut up," wrote George ¥. P. Hunt, the rotund Democratic politician serving as president of the

Arizona Constitutional Convention, to Eugene V. Ives, a

Tucson attorney who aspired to be one of Arizona's first

United States Senators. Prom the vantage point of his large bed. Hunt feared that all his plans would be "frustrated," particularly just at a time when he was so "very anxious to get ahold of the wheel.Hunt's rest would have been more secure had he known that within the year he would be the first governor of the new state and Arizona Democrats every­ where triumphant. But this was 1911 and the political horizon was not yet clear. It was even more obscure in

July, 1910, when Greenway arrived in Arizona.

Greenway's first few days in Bisbee were probably spent in looking over the plant of the Calumet and Arizona, and

iGeorge Vf. P. Hunt to Ives, January 21, 1911. Papers of Eugene V. Ives, Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, Tucson, Arizona.

12 13 doing the thousand and one things required of a mining super­ intendent. Greenway directed Mike Curly, an employee of the

Oliver Mining Company, to send his saddle horse, a pregnant cow, and six dogs to Bisbee. If there was not enough room for all the dogs in the box oar, Greenway wanted Jeff, a black and white pointer, Julia, the English setter, and a white and tan puppy shipped. Greenway probably had a good

laugh when his collection arrived increased by one. "My cow

had a calf," he wrote Curly. "I beat the railroad."2 4*

On more important matters Greenway was perhaps not

quite so amused. "The political pot is boiling and will be

boiling stronger," he wrote to his friend Alexander 0. Brodle,

a major of the Bough Riders and Roosevelt's appointee as

territorial governor.3 Arizona had been waiting for statehood

since the mid-eighties. An enabling bill had passed the 67th

Congress on June 16, just two days before Roosevelt returned

to Hew York and not quite three weeks before Greenway's

arrival in Arizona.4 with the signing of the enabling act.

President Taft had provided Arizona Democrats with an issue

2Greenway to Mike Curly, July 18, 1910.

^Greenway to Alexander 0. Brodle, August 2, 1910; Greenway to Dann M. Gunn, July 29, 1910. 4 ^Congressional Record. 61 Cong., 2 sess., 15, 8, 8225-37; Hew York Times. June 19, 1910, p. 1. 14 powerful enough to ensure their almost complete control of the state government for the next decade. Even before the passage of the bill, 0. ¥. Hicks, the city treasurer of

Tombstone, pointed out to Bassett Watkins, then campaigning for city marshal of Bisbee, that "the coming campaign,

especially if we get statehood . . . is going to be a fight

to the finish for the political control of the new state."5

In February the Douglas Republican Club had warned the terri­

torial delegate, Ralph Cameron, that if statehood were denied

until the President and Congress had passed upon Arizona1s

constitution it would "greatly endanger" Republican chances

and would alienate thousands of voters. The Bisbee Daily

Review went even further by pointing out that it would sound

the "death knell" of the Republican party in Arizona.^

Just twelve days after the passage of the enabling

act. Governor Richard E. Sloan acted quickly to carry out

its provisions. Sloan and the Territorial Secretary, George

U. Young, apportioned the delegates for the several counties

and three days later issued a proclamation setting September

10, 1910, as the date for the election of delegates to the

SRlcks to Bassett Watkins, January 13, 1910, Hicks Papers, APHS,

^Bisbee Daily Review. February 12, 1910, p. 1: February io, 1910, p. 4. 15

Constitutional Convention.^ Evan before Sloan*s proclama­ tion, Democratic and Republican politicians, aware of Taft's attitude toward the proposed constitution, began conversations hoping for a non-partisan constitutional convention.® H. W.

Aiken, secretary of the lisbee Republican Campaign Committee, pointed this out to 0. V. Hicks, but Nthe ring,” according to

Aiken, wanted "party lines drawn . . . and . . . a constitu­

tion that Taft won't stand for.” The purpose of all this,

Aiken thought, was to "get the national government in dis­ favor with the rank and file.”9 Aiken's concern was justified.

When the Democratic Central Committee met in Prescott, all

hope for a non-partisan constitutional convention vanished.

The Democrats chose rather to make it a party contest.10

Shortly before the Democratic leadership had vetoed

the non-partisan idea, Will E. Tester, a lisbee stockbroker,

feeling a little uneasy about Republican prospects, began

closing his letters "God help the state." At the same time,* 910

7Arizona Republic. June 29, 1910, Sec. 2, p. 2.

^Presidential Addresses and State Papers of William Howard Taft. 5 volsZ(lew York, 1910), v. 1, pp. 552-355; Arizona Republic. October 14, 1909, p. 1. in his address at the Phoenix City Hall, Taft had called the Oklahoma Constitution a "zoological garden of cranks•"

9H. W. Aiken to Hicks, June 22, 1910, Hicks Papers, APIS •

10P. W. O'Sullivan to Ives, June 23, 1910; Ives to J. H. Langston (undated) Ives Papers, APES. Arizona Republic. July 18, 1910, p. 1. ------16

0. W. Hicks, taking his cue from the national headquarters, pointed out that he "stood solid" with the Republican party organization.11 By August it was apparent that the enabling act had clearly forced divisions within both parties, as county convention after county convention showed signs of dissension. Greenway found the political atmosphere "very interesting."1^ He had probably noticed that the Republican party in Cochise County had developed a liberal and a con­ servative wing. The liberal faction, led by the Bisbee attorney J. W. Ross, and E. J. Flanigan, City attorney and chairman of the Bisbee Republican committee, hoped to commit the Cochise convention to the "Oregon Plan" of the initiative, referendum, and direct primary. After a series of conferences, the Cochise convention accepted the direct primary but qual­ ified its endorsement of the initiative and referendum in a manner which would prevent its "misuse by special interests."

During the debate on the platform, one Republican warned that such a qualification would lead Cochise Republicans to a

"slaughter," and Flanigan predicted that failure to adopt liberal measures would lead the party to defeat.1^ *12

1;LWill E. Tester to Hicks, July 16, 1910; Hicks to Tester, June 7, 1910, Hicks Papers, APES.

12Greenway to Clarence B. Miller, August 24, 1910.

l^Bisbee Daily Review. August 14, 1910, p. 1; August 16, 1910, p. 1; August 21, 1910, p. 1. 17

If the Republicans would, not adopt liberal measures, the Democrats would. When the Cochise Democratic convention met, rather than commend Taft for securing legislation of the "most vital interest" to the people— as the Republican platform had done— the Democrats condemned him for an

"uncalled for and unjust" enabling act which was a "slander" to Arizona citizens. This act, according to the Democratic platform, declared Arizona voters to be "incompetent and unworthy" and was a "subterfuge to deprive us . . • of our inherent right to statehood." The Democratic platform con­ cluded by endorsing the initiative and referendum, but limited the application to the recall to state officials.1*

Arizona had now divided itself into two opposing camps, reflected Henry Fountain Ashurst, the silver-tongued orator from Coconino County. One, said Ashurst, "urges that our constitution be framed so as to Insure its approval at

Washington . . . the other . . . urges that the constitution be an expression of the people."15 other Democrats like

Moses Drachman, a Tucson city councilman, banker, and real *

i^Ibid.. August 21, 1910, p. 1.

ISoeorge F. Sparks (ed.). A Many Colored Toga. The Diary of Henry Fountain Ashurst. (Tucson, I962), p. 2. 18 estate dealer, felt that even the Initiative and referendum would give Taft an excuse to veto Arizona statehood.

Eugene V. Ives thought that the constitution should contain the initiative, referendum, and "nothing else."I? Charles

F. Hoff, a close friend of Drachman, then residing in

Rockport, Texas, believed that Taft "dare not veto" the statehood measure because "Roosevelt and the insurgents would not let him." Leading Republicans in Arizona, as well as most progressive platforms, Hoff reassured Drachman, now endorsed the initiative and referendum.^

Republicans were as much in the dark as the Democrats.

In late August, F. D. Smith, president of the Gila Republican

Club, in an effort to secure unity in his home county, wired

President Taft asking if the initiative and referendum would mitigate against executive approval. Taft refused to comment

at first, and then later replied vaguely that his attitude had been shown by his speeches in the territory.17 6

l6Drachman to Charles F. Hoff, July 8, 1910. Papers of Moses Drachman, Arizona Pioneers* Historical Society.

17Ives to J. F. Ross, August 15, 1910, Ives Papers, APRS. X8 Hoff to Drachman, August 16, 1910, Drachman Papers, APHS •

l9Bisbee Daily Review. August 18, 1910, p. 2. Gila County Republicans were divided into two camps, one of which was the Globe Young Men's Republican Club, reported to have 284 members, had endorsed the initiative, referendum, and recall. 19

Earlier the territorial governor, Richard E. Sloan, certainly no lover of the initiative, referendum, and recall, held numerous conferences with Republican leaders, such as

Ex-Governor Joseph 1. Kibbey, Thomas Armstrong, a Phoenix

attorney, Robert E. Morrison of Prescott, and Hovel E. Smith

of Blsbee. All counseled opposition to the initiative,

referendum, and recall. Dwight 5. Heard, the Phoenix

financier later to be the guiding light of the Bull Moose

movement in Arizona counseled opposition to the initiative

and recall, but exempted the referendum from his condemna­

tion.^0 On top of this general feeling of animosity on the

part of most Republicans toward the initiative, referendum,

and recall was the political unknown— the attitude of

Theodore Roosevelt, who, in the words of a local Blsbee paper,

was a Msmouldering volcano" ready to blow the Republican Party to "Kingdom Come".2^

When the election returns were complete, Arizona

Republicans found to their dismay that the destiny of the

Constitutional Convention had been placed in other hands.

Republicans had succeeded in electing only eleven of the

20Richard E. Sloan, Memories of an Arizona Judge. (Palo Alto, 1932), pp. 234-535%

21Bisbee Daily Review. August 25, 1910, p. 4. 20 fifty-two delegates and controlled only two county delega- CO tions, Pima and Coconino. The election had been a Repub­ lican disaster. Henry Fountain Ashurst, noting in his diary that the Democrats had secured a majority, felt that the

"insurgent” revolt had "swollen to such an extent" that the

Republicans might not carry the congressional elections in November.23

Greenway was in Hot Springs, Arkansas, probably seated on a speakers' platform with Roosevelt, when the Constitu­ tional Convention convened in Phoenix on October 11, 1910.^

By the time of his return, the magnitude of the Democratic victory was as obvious to him as to most political observers.

Ashurst happily noted that the Republican party was "torn with dissension" and that "its prospects looked gloomy."^5 Green­ way was much concerned. He asked Roosevelt what he though about the election returns, and tried to bolster Roosevelt's feelings by telling him that the election returns did not mean that the common people,had lost confidence in him as 2*

^ Arizona Republic. September 29, 1910, p. 4. The Democrats had carried Apache 1-0, Graham 5-0, Maricopa 9-0, Mohave 1-0, Pinal 2-0, Yuma 5-1, Yavapai 5-1, Cochise 10-0, Gila 4-1. Republicans controlled only Pima 5-0, and Coconino 2-0. Both parties divided Navajo and Santa Cruz's delegation, each receiving one delegate.

23fl.shurst, o£. cit., p. 3.

q c Greenway to Roosevelt, September 28, and November 30,

^Ashurst, ojd. cit.. p. 3-4. 21 they had in Taft. To Greenway the issue had become "clean cut" and the time ripe for a new party with Roosevelt at its head. Greenway assured Roosevelt that he could count on him for "support of any nature.

If the national scene looked menacing to Republicans like Greenway, state prospects now looked equally bad. 0. W.

Hicks thought that the constitutional convention had "rather put a crimp into any state aspirations." "Anyway," he con­ soled himself, "... the present constitutions as those cranks is putting up, will not go through." Hicks felt that the constitution would be "killed" by the people and, if not, the President "surely will" kill it.^? Ives warned Mulford

Winsor, the Democratic chairman of the rules committee of the rules committee of the Constitutional Convention, that Taft had always been "sensitive as far as the judiciary was con­ cerned," and that to place the recall in the constitution would give Taft an opportunity to veto it simply to place

"such an issue" between himself and Roosevelt. "We know,"

Ives pointed out, "that a contest between Roosevelt and Taft is inevitable."28 in reply Winsor expressed his belief

26Qreenway to Roosevelt, November 30, 1910. Two weeks later Greenway mailed Roosevelt a letter from Chester A. Cogsden, a member of the Minnesota legislature, whose remarks on the political situation Greenway felt would interest you. Greenway to Roosevelt, December 6, 1910.

27Hicks to Bill ?, Nov. 27, 1910, Hicks Papers, APHS.

28jves to Mulford Winsor, Nov. 1, 1910, Ives Papers, APHS 22 that the constitution would be ratified by the people.

Congress, and President. Ives* advice was disregarded, and

the Constitutional Convention held its last session on

December 11, 1910, and all eleven Republicans refused to

sign a constitution which contained the recall of judges.^9

Greenway, who was en route to Hew York as the Con­

stitutional Convention ended, saw Roosevelt between

December 15* and the 1st of January. Greenway was given the

impression that while Roosevelt "did not care for the job in

the same way," he would make the race if there was a "big

feeling" on the part of the voters that he should do so.

Greenway came home more convinced than ever that the country

needed a Roosevelt, rather than a Taft, in the White House.30

The day after his return, Greenway confided to an

Eastern friend that Arizona had adopted a constitution that

he was certain would not be accepted by Congress. Greenway

felt the recall provision was its "most objectionable

feature." "I am a radical," Greenway wrote, "but I cannot

stand for this."31 The measure also went hard with some 2

29Winsor to Ives, November 28, 1910, Ives Papers, APRS.

30(2,376enway to John A. Melllheny, January 1, 1910.

3lGreenway to Gunn, January 2, 1910. 23

Democrats. D. L. DeVane, a Yuma probate judge, wrote Ives that the Mulford Kinsor* s "bunch" had objected when he declared such a sweeping provision unwise, "in as much as hell has already been played," DeVane wrote, "the best thing to do would be to pile up an overwhelming majority for the constitution.Democrats moved to do just that by estab­ lishing a Statehood League in early December.33 Prank

DeSouza, secretary of the new league, predicted that the

constitution would be endorsed by seventy-five or eight

per cent of the people, but he felt that nothing should be left undone to ensure "this or even a greater percentage."3^

Hunt was actively campaigning. "The all-absorbing

topic of conversation," Ashurst noted, is: "Shall the

proposed Arizona constitution be ratified."35 Ives, during

the heat of the campaign for the ratification of the con­

stitution wrote Hunt that the action of the convention had made Arizona's "fitness" for statehood a national issue and 3

32D. L. DeVane to Ives, January 7, 1911. Ives Papers, APRS.

33Arizona Republic. December 11, 1910, p. 1.

•^Frank DeSouza to Ives, March 27, 1911, Ives Papers, APHS e

35jLshurst, og. cit., pp. 4-5. 24 had forced a division between Mthose who support . . . and those who oppose— “and that the latter, whether they were in the House, Senate, or in the White House itself, would

"superinduce their own political destruction."-^ The reason for Democratic activity was that opposition to the constitution stemmed from the Democratic party itself as well as from the

Republican. Conservative Democrats had come to believe that ratification of the constitution, particularly a constitution with the recall embedded in it, was to invite Taft*s veto.57

Nevertheless, the “enthusiasm for progressive ideas," accord­ ing to Governor Sloan, accounted for the overwhelming majority of 12,187 votes to 3,302 for the ratification of the constitu­ tion on February 12, 1911.58

While the campaign for ratification was in progress,

Greenway intensified his efforts to persuade Roosevelt to visit the Bisbee area while in Arizona to dedicate the

Roosevelt Dam on March* 18. Greenway wrote a former Rough

56Ives to Hunt, February 1, 1911, Ives Papers, A.PHS.

57por an extended list of Arizona Democrats who opposed the recall of the judiciary, see the Arizona Republic. February 1, 1911, p. 1, and the Bisbee Daily Review. January 31, 1910, p. 1.

38Sloan, oj>. cit., pp. 237-238. 25

Eider asking him to use his influence to induce Roosevelt to come to Bisbee to dispel the feeling of a "certain element

. . . that is unfriendly to him and • . • influences others."39

Greenway was "horribly" disappointed at Roosevelt*s inability to visit Bisbee. Roosevelt asked Greenway to join him in

El Paso. Greenway replied that he was afraid that he would be unable to go, but would try. A few days later Greenway sadly told Roosevelt that he was "quite positive" that he would be unable to come to El Paso or Albuquerque.^

Roosevelt arrived in Arizona at a critical period in

Arizona’s struggle for statehood. Roosevelt traveled to the

Grand Canyon, then to Phoenix, where his major policy address, even though unfavorable toward the recall, initiative, and referendum, seemed to throw the issue squarely in Taft’s face. Roosevelt termed objections to the Arizona constitution as "without warrant of justice," and pointed out to his

Phoenix audience that such objections were a matter for

Arizona’s own decision and not any "outsider.

39Greenway to Colton Reed, January 9, 1911.

^°Greenway to Roosevelt, August 10, 1910; Roosevelt to Greenway, December 8, 1910. Roosevelt wrote Greenway: I do not see how I can escape from going to Albuquerque, and from there the wise thing is to go to the Grand Canyon, then . . . to Phoenix." Roosevelt to Greenway, January 31, 1911; Greenway to Roosevelt, January 31, 1911.

^Arizona Republic. March 21, 1911, p. 1. 26

Greenway was unable to come to Phoenix, but one month later he wrote a long letter to Roosevelt describing a three- day battle In Agua Prieta between Mexican revolutionaries and

Pederals. The "ugly undertones" which had worried Greenway the previous January, had become a reality. The military situation along the Arizona border, joined with his growing disenchantment with President Taft, further convinced him ho that the Taft administration was hopeless. ^ Greenway wrote

Roosevelt that he had, after "much persuasion," succeeded in getting Governor Sloan to wire President Taft asking for protection for Americans In Douglas. The reply was "absolutely weak and unsatisfactory." Taft had in effect advised Ameri­

cans to "keep out of the way of Mexican bullets." Greenway

complained that the entire situation left him "humiliated and mortified,11 and he expected to vote for a Democratic President

unless something occurred to change his personal feelings.^3

Roosevelt hurriedly replied. He, like Greenway, was

"absolutely unable to understand" what Taft meant by allowing

the killing of Americans. He would have positioned the

troops in a threatening manner, and after "one unheeded

warning" would have taken Agua Prieta.Greenway felt that

^Greenway to T. E. House, January 30, 1911; Greenway to Roosevelt, March 15, 1911.

^%reenway to Roosevelt, April 20, 1911. ^Roosevelt to Greenway, May 12, 1911. 27

Americans residing in foreign countries accepted a certain

risk, but this risk did not apply to Americans residing on

the American side of the international b o r d e r . Greenway

did not want war, but Congress and the President, he told

Senator James B. Clark, of Minnesota, should not be deterred

from keeping inviolate American territory.Two months

later Greenway had not yet cooled down. He informed James P.

Hodgson, a manager of the Phelps Dodge Corporation, that the

entire incident had made him "hot" and that Taft should have

taken more "strenuous" measures.^? Greenway was still

unhappy with Taft when he wrote Alden Smith, Clark's Minnesota

colleague in the Senate, that the people of Arizona were

"above average grade" and should have statehood without

further delay. Greenway was quick to point out that "some

of us" do not approve of the recall provision, but our

desire for statehood "outweighs every other consideration."^-®

On July 14, 1911, Greenway left for Europe on vacation.

Before his departure, he had asked Roosevelt to have lunch

^Greenway to Roosevelt, April 20, 1911.

^Greenway to James B. Clark, May 8, 1911.

^7Greenway to Joseph P. Hoatson, June 13, 1911.

Greenway to Alden Smith, June 20, 1911. 28 with, him in New York, but they did not see each other there.*9

On August 15, while Greenway was in Europe, Taft vetoed the

Arizona Constitution. A week later the President signed a joint resolution which would confer statehood on Arizona after the recall provision was voted out in a general election.50 Democrats and Republicans marked time until

Governor Sloan*s proclamation, issued on September 21, 1911, set the date for the primary election on October 24 and the general election on December 1 2 . ^

When Greenway returned from Europe early in September, he notified Roosevelt that he had about made up his mind to vote for a Democrat in the next presidential election, but that he was much pleased to see that Taft had vetoed the

statehood bill on account of the recall. Greenway expressed

sympathy with the “feeling** which prompted the people of

Arizona to wish to recall judges, but felt that the provision itself was “vicious.“52 within the next two weeks the

political situation, in Greenway*s eyes, had begun to get warm, and he observed that there were candidates "galore.“53

*9Greenway to Bob Ferguson, July 11, 1911. Roosevelt to Greenway, September 19, 1911.

50oongreasignal Record. 62. Cong. 1 sess., 45, 4, PP. 3964-60; 4118-4141; 4217-4242; 4381.

SlPapers of Governor Sloan, Department of Archives, Phoenix, Arizona. Proclamation dated September 21, 1911. 52Qreenway to Roosevelt, September 13, 1911.

53(jreenway to Chester A. Cogsdon, September 25, 1911. 29

Republicans still lacked one candidate. The Republi­ can state conference meeting in Prescott on September 20, placed the names of Judge Edward ¥. Wells, an aging Prescott banker, and ex-Govemor Joseph Kibbey in circulation as

possible nominees for the governorship.^ Pour days later, more than one hundred Republicans met at the Odd Fellows'

Hall in Prescott, and chose a delegation to "wait” upon

Judge Wells. Wells was non-committal; the committee reported

that he had taken the matter "under advisement."55 j. j.

Sauders, a Prescott Democrat, was amused by the whole affair.

He wrote Eugene V. Ives, now campaigning for the United States

Senate, that Wells "could not be dragged out to run for

Governor by all the powers that the Republican party could

bring to bear." One lawyer had told the aging Judge that if

he ran "they would never be able to find him again, because

he would be buried so deep."*^ At the end of the month

Republicans were still working hard to get Wells to run, by making him,believe that the Socialists were apt to capture

the state unless he agreed to carry the Republican banner.57

^ Arizona Republic. September 28, 1911, p. 1.

55Arlzona Journal Miner. September 24, 1911, p. 4.

56j. j. Sauders to Ives, September 26, 1911, Ives Papers, APRS.

57sauders to Ives, September 28, 1911, Ives Papers, APHS 30

Wells finally consented. Judge Kibbey remained silent until he had taken an eight day political sounding, and then announced Wells to be the "ideal” candidate to oppose George U.

Young, the former territorial secretary who had announced his candidacy without the support of the party organization.58

Wells' name at the head of the ticket would make the issue between the Republicans and Democrats clear cut. Is a member of the Constitutional Convention, he had failed to sign a constitution which included the recall of the judiciary.59

Democrats had no trouble securing candidates. By the time Wells was safely in the field, George W. ?• Hunt, and

Thomas F. Weedin, owner of the Florence Weekly Blade, had already announced their candidacies, and a third. Dr. Henry A..

Hughes of Maricopa was yet to enter the field.6° While both

Weedin and Hunt campaigned on the constitution, Hughes cam­ paigned against both men personally. Advocating prohibition

Tucson Citizen. September 28, 1911, p. 1; Arizona Daily Star. October 4.1911, p. 4.

^ Arizona Journal Miner. September 29, 1911, p. 1.

^OWeedin announced his candidacy on September 2, while George W. P. Hunt entered the race on September 21. Henry A. Hughes declared his candidacy on October 1, and withdrew from the race on October 19. See the Arizona Republic. September 5, 1911, p. 4., and October 1, 1911, p. 2. for Weedin's and Hughes announcements. The Hunt candidacy dated from the issuance of his proclamation "To the Voters of Arizona,11 dated September 21, 1911, Globe, Arizona. George W. P. Hunt Scrapbook. University of Arizona Library. 31 and woman suffrage, he entered the Democratic contest with an open letter to the press labeling Hunt as the candidate of the Western Federation of Miners and Weedin as the candi­ date of the corporationsWeedin and Hunt paid little attention to Hughes. Weedin told a reporter from the

Tucson Citizen that he would demonstrate his advocacy of the constitution along Jeffersonian lines, urge the recall, promote conservation of state resources, and endorse a stricter state economy as well as the fair control, but not destruction, of the corporations.^ Hunt pointed out that as president of the Constitutional Convention he had devoted his "best energy toward securing the embodiment in our constitution of those principles of self-government by which the control of the government may really abide in and with the people." Hunt recommended that the best way the people could secure the "full effect" of the constitution would be

"to elect to the various offices of the state" not only honest men, but men in full accord and sympathy with our constitution.63

6ljLrizona Republic. October 1, 1911, p. 2.

62iuosoa Citizen. September 19, 1911, p. 1.

63h$o the Voters of Arizona,"Proclamation of George W. P. Hunt, loc. clt. 32

By October 1 every county and city had been turned into a political battlefield. George U. Young, the progress­ ive opponent of Judge Veils, had already announced his plat­ form as a "clean, square deal for every interest and every man."6* This contrasted sharply with the Judge's maiden announcement which passed as his platform: "I am wedded to no theories . . . I have no preconceived notions ....

What Arizona needs most at the present time is capital to develop her immense resources."^5 Young concluded his campaign on October 24 with a half-page announcement to the voters of Tucson and Pima County. He was the logical candidate of the Republican party, he declared, since his opponent, was not "a self-announced candidate" but only the "consented to be announced" candidate of what may be termed the Republi­ can machine.^ Young constantly represented himself to the voters as the real representative of the Republicanism in

Arizona, which stood for the protective tariff doctrines of

Grant, Garfield, McKinley, and Roosevelt— "a tariff which marks the difference in the cost between manufactured goods at home and abroad."G?

^Arizona Republic. September 22, 1911, p. 7.

^Arizona Journal Miner. September 29, 1911, p. 1.

^Arizona Bally Star. October 18, 1911, p. 1.

67lbid., September 30, 1911, p. 2. 53

Weedin and George U. Young were eliminated in the

primary contest, and on November 10, both Democratic and

Republican leaders met in Phoenix to promulgate and ratify

their respective platforms and to plan the general election

campaign.Republicans made an effort at progressivism.

When compared with the Republican platform, which was twice

as long and contained twice as many promises, the Democratic

platform was remarkably simple. The major differences lay

on the first few pages of each. Both platforms pledged

allegiance to the Constitution of Arizona, but here the

resemblance ended. The Democrats denounced President Taft

for "dictating . . . and compelling Arizona to eliminate

the recall," delegate Ralph Cameron for "aiding and abetting

the enemies of . . . the Constitution," and the "standpat"

element of the Republican party for their "determined

opposition" to progressive ideas. The Republican platform,

on the other hand, paid glowing tribute to the administration

of President Taft for its "powerful aid and influence” in

furthering the enabling legislation which would make state­

hood possible. The next paragraph congratulated Ralph

Cameron for his efforts to make good a 1908 platform which had

68weedin polled 3,532 votes against Hunt’s 5,24-1, while Young polled 1,985 against Wells’ 3,059. Special Collection Division University of Arizona Library. 34 promised statehood. Republicans then concluded by endorsing the administration of Richard E. Sloan for Its record of 6q efficiency.

The state campaign which followed was an extension of the primary. Following the Democratic convention. Hunt held an Interview with G. A. Martin, a reporter for the El Paso

Times. "First of all," Hunt promised, "my administration will be economical. I have been giving much thought to the subject of late, and have numerous plans for putting the state's affairs on a business basis." Hunt made it clear that his conception of a "business" administration was progressive: "I want to have for the people surrounding me in the conduct of state affairs, men who are thoroughly in accord with this movement, but first of all they must be capable, truly progressive, and honest men." Hunt then went on to outline a sweeping and comprehensive program which included railroad and corporation regulation, conservation of resources, as well as irrigation canals, damns, and a canal system, the latter two being paid for out of the national treasury. In addition. Hunt advocated the extension of the territorial highway from Globe through Solomonville

69Ibid., November 12, 1911, p. 7. 35 to El Paso, and promised to Improve sanitary conditions and provide Arizona school children with free textbooks.^0

Wells did little to improve his prospects. Speaking in Tucson on November 22, the elderly judge admitted that he had been asked by "many people and business interests" to define his policy. "My response," he stated, "has been: I have no policy." The reason for his silence. Wells explained, was that he did not wish to be handicapped by any conditions in fulfilling the duties of the governorship. About the only thing the crowd learned from Wells was that he had a

"sort of policy." This amounted to the pious declaration

that the state should provide free education and free text­ books. Wells did point out that if elected governor he would

develop the resources of the state. The key to the situation he thought was to invite "men with capital to come to the territory."71

The ebullient Hunt had several keys which he continued

to insert in the Arizona lock, "if you believe in the

constitution," he told his audiences, "you can do nothing but

vote the Democratic ticket." Hunt easily countered the Wells*

prosperity slogan with his own declaration: "I believe in

TOArizona Daily Star. November 21, 1911, p. 10.

7lArizona Republic. November 4, 1911, p. 2. 36 holding the door open to Investment and inviting capital to help develop Arizona."72 The citizens of Arizona went to the polls on December 12, 1911 and elected a Democratic governor, two senators, a representative, and all the lesser officials,

Including a Democratic house and senate. Democrats had carried majorities running from 500 to 3,500, over Republican opponents. Taft had achieved his victory at the expense of the Republican party in Arizona. Arizona voters cast

14,963 ballots in favor of the elimination of the recall, while only 1,980 voted against its elimination and thus against statehood. It is significant that 5,766 signaled their sympathy with the constitution by refusing to vote on the elimination proposition.73 Ashurst* s fears that the

"opponents of any kind of statehood" would coalesce with those who desire the "judicial recall or no statehood" had failed to materialize.7^

In October, when the primary contest was in full swing,

Greenway had written Roosevelt that it seemed to him that the 7

72Pouglas Daily International. November 22, 1911, p. 2.

73&rlzona Election Returns, 1911-58", loc. cit., Henry F. Ashurst and Mark A. Smith polled 10,575 and 10,598 respectively against Ralph H. Cameron and H. A. Smith's 9,640 and 9,228, for Senator. George ¥. P. Hunt defeated Edward W. Wells 11,123 to 9,166 to become the first Governor of the new state.

74ishurst, oj>. cit.. p. 8. 37

Democrats would win the next presidential election. In this case, Greenway reminded Roosevelt, it would be up to him to lead the party back to victory four years hence.75 But by now Roosevelt had convinced himself that if the nomination should come as the result of "a genuine popular movement" he could not refuse it. Roosevelt did not really believe that it would come, and felt that he had done all that he could do to discourage any such movement. 111 cannot make a promise that I will not take it under any conceivable circumstance just because there might come a circumstance where I should have to." Roosevelt felt that even to "admit the possibility" would be interpreted by "a large number of gentlemen" that such a nomination should come.76 Greenway was one of these gentlemen, and there were other Arizona Republicans who were ready to sacrifice President Taft as they felt they had been sacrificed at Taft's whim on the altar of the enabling act.

75&reenway to Roosevelt, October 11, 1911.

76Roosevelt to R. H. M. Ferguson, January 12, 1912. CHAPTER III

"THE SPIRIT OP BUNKER HILL #. *. »

Poliowing the Democratic victory, a local Blsfcee paper remarked that: "On the surface of the Democratic party all is serene • • • a covey of doves is flying over the peaceful calm, and tender green sprouts of grass show on the meadow surrounding the lake. In the meadow cows are browsing and the tinkling of the bells . . . banish bogies making a scene of beatific, bromidic, and blessedness.In the Republican party, there were no meadows, cows, or doves flying overhead.

Two weeks after the Republican defeat, the Roosevelt forces had been at work to secure the Arizona delegation for 2 Roosevelt. Warnings were heard that there would be need of an extra police force in the city where the next Republic-

can convention met.^

On January 26 the "biggest political news event • . .

in many a day" was announced when Dwight B. Heard and

Joseph A. Klbbey, Roosevelt*s former territorial governor,

iRisbee Daily Review. January 18, 1912, p. 8.

2Ibid.. December 28, 1911, p. 8.

^Douglas Daily International. January 10, 1911, p. 2.

38 39 raised the flag of revolt against Taft by the organization of an Arizona Roosevelt Club.^ Prom the very beginning, political leadership of the Arizona Progressive movement seemed to lie in Heard*s hand. In any case, five days before the organization of the Phoenix club, Greenway had been called to Hot Springs, Arkansas, to attend his father* s funeral.5 Heard was perhaps the ideal man to head the state organization. His ancestors had crossed the Atlantic in

1638 to settle in Sudbury, Massachusetts. Combining their

Puritanism with commercial pursuits, they had early become men of large public affairs. Richard Heard had stood at

Concord against the British, another attended the sessions

of the Continental Congress. Horace Heard, a member of the

Massachusetts legislature and administrator of the estate of

Ebenezer Hubbard, utilized the funds left by Hubbard to

commemorate the Battle of Concord. The statue of the

Concord Minute Man enshrined for the ages his ancestor's

feeling for revolution in a righteous cause.

^Arizona Republic. January 26, 1912, p. 1. Ssisbee Daily Review. January 21, 1912, p. 8. The Review carried a notice that the Greenway's father died suddenly. Greenway*s correspondence resumed on February 15, 1912. There is only one letter in the Greenway Collection which indicates that he might have participated in conversa­ tions to aid Roosevelt politically before his return, and even this letter was written shortly after his return. See letter cited in text above footnote 14. 40

Business and reform, were bred in Dwight B. Heard* At

seventeen, he had begun his career in the employee of an

eastern firm. While assistant manager of credit, he had

become ill and had come to Arizona in 1895* Shortly after­ ward he formed the Bartlett-Heard Land and Cattle Company,

and began to develop a 7,500 acre tract of land south of the

Salt River Valley. An early supporter of conservation, he

favored the National Reclamation Act of 1902, and as one of

the water commissioners of Maricopa County he helped to work

out the preliminary plans for the Roosevelt Dam. In 1907 and

1908, he led the fight against joint statehood with New Mexico.

In May of 1908 he attended the Conference on the Conservation

of Natural Resources, called by President Roosevelt. Through­

out, he had remained a Republican, but when conditions

changed Heard changed with them.**

The day after its formation, the Phoenix club demanded

that the Republican party choose its delegates to the state

convention by the primary system.? Following closely on the

heels of the Phoenix clarion call, a Roosevelt club was

formed in Globe, where William Sparks, a follower of Roosevelt

^Mc Clin took, oj>. cit., v. 3, p. 434-436.

7Arizona Republic. January 27, 1912, p. 1. 41

Q in Cuba, collected almost immediately some 200 signatures.0

In Pima County, another Bough Rider and recent graduate of the territorial prison, the rotund Ben Daniels, was currently circulating a Roosevelt petition and Charles P. Jones of

Mesa, claimed over 200 members for the club in Mesa.9 Within the month, Roosevelt clubs were to be formed elsewhere around the state.

To keep the momentum derived from the formation of the first few Roosevelt clubs, Heard issued a circular letter on

February 3, 1912 signed by "Some of the Bunch." This letter

called on Republicans to unite behind Roosevelt, the "one man" who could unite the party and end the "factional strife"

and "uncertainty" which had overtaken it. The circular

concluded by announcing that a "Roosevelt to Win" rally would

be held in Phoenix on February 5 . ^ Following the Phoenix

rally, Heard left for a conference of third-term Roosevelt

boosters in Chicago. On February 13 Heard telegraphed the

Arizona Republic that the Chicago conference was a "great

success" and that a complete organization had been perfected.^10 8*

8Pouglas Daily International. January 31, 1912, p. 1.

9Blsbee Dally Review. February 1, 1912, p. 8; Arizona Republic. February 1, 1912, p. 8.

10Blsbee Daily Review. February 3, 1912, p. 3.

^Arizona Republic. February 13, 1912, p. 8. 42

Before Heard had returned from Chicago, Greenway had gone from Arkansas to New York to see Roosevelt. On his return to Arizona, Greenway wrote to a former Rough Rider,

Rock Channing of New York. Channing had written that

Roosevelt was willing to wannounce” his acceptance of the TO nomination if the sentiment of the party demanded it.

Greenway replied that Roosevelt had told him, a few weeks before, about the same thing but said nothing about making an "announcement." He then asked Channing about instructing

the delegates for Roosevelt. Greenway believed that it would

be possible to instruct if Roosevelt would make the announce­ ment; but his silence, Greenway felt, had complicated the

effort to instruct delegates for him. "What we had deter­ mined to do here," Greenway told Channing "was to fight any

attempt to instruct delegates for Mr. Taft and try to select delegates who will be friendly to Colonel Roosevelt.

Two days later, Greenway wrote Roosevelt that he felt the

country needed him in the White House. Greenway now thought

that if Roosevelt were convinced of a "general and universal"

demand he would make the race against Taft.^

ISRock Channing to Greenway, February 7, 1912.

l^Greenway to Channing, February 15, 1912.

Greenway to Roosevelt, February 15, 1912. 43

To make such a demand materialize in Arizona, Greenway traveled to Phoenix on February 21 to attend a conference of a select group of Progressives Including Heard, Kibbey, and the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, Judge

Edward Kent. The consensus of opinion was that Roosevelt would win in a primary election against Taft. Greenway informed George W. Perkins, formerly associated with the banking house of J. P. Morgan and Company, and soon to use his millions to support Roosevelt's national campaign, that he had suggested to his conferes that they ask the chairman

of the Republican state committee to issue a call for a

primary to determine who would be the choice of the electors in Arizona.^5

Following the Phoenix conference, Greenway began the

work of organizing the Bisbee and Douglas clubs. On

February 23 he and James B. Speed, a Justice of the Peace

in Douglas, determined to form a Roosevelt club in that town

ISGreenway to George Perkins, February 22, 1912. Perkins gained fame in financial circles for his work in the formation of the International Harvester Company, International Mercantile Marine Company, and the Northern Securities Company. He believed that competition should be replaced by cooperation in the business world; that great corporations were more efficient than small competing units; and that Industrial workers should receive retirement pen­ sions and a fair share in corporate profits. Perkins philosophy "colored* the "new nationalism" of Roosevelt. New York Times, June 19, 1920, p. 13. 44 the next afternoon.On Saturday morning, the 24th, some sixty followers met In Douglas and elected Speed as presi­ dent and H. L. Nobel as secretary. While the Douglas meeting was In progress, Greenway called on Arizona Demo­ crats to turn to Roosevelt In the event that Champ Clark of Missouri should fall to obtain the Democratic nomination.

That evening some forty Progressives formed a Roosevelt club in Blsbee. E. J. Evans, elected as president, promised that within the week Roosevelt clubs would be formed In Tombstone,

Benson, Wilcox, and Courtland. The next day Greenway left for New York.

When Greenway returned from the East, he refused to comment publicly whether he had seen Roosevelt but stated that the Colonel would surely win if the people were allowed to vote in primaries. Greenway expressed his hope, when informed that Arizona Democrats had espoused the direct primary, that the Republicans would follow this "good example.A few days later Greenway wrote George A.

l^Douglas Daily International. February 24, 1912, p. 5; February 26, 1912, p. 4.

l^Blsbee Daily Review. February 25, 1912, p. 5; February 27, 1912, p. 6. The Tombstone club was not formerly organized until March 27. The International stated that clubs were being formed In Pearce, Gleeson, and Courtland, while several others were contemplated in the Sulpher Springs Valley. Douglas Daily International. March 27, 1912. p. 1.

IGsisbee Dally Review. March 14, 1912, p. 10. 45

He Carter of Red Bluffs, California, that he had visited

Oyster Bay and that the Colonel had all his "clothes" In the ring and would win "hands down" If It were not for the federal patronage which Taft controlled

The President’s control of the patronage meant that

Taft would hold the Arizona delegation if party ranks remained firm. Greenway, realizing this, wrote James T.

Williams, owner of the Tucson Citizen, that he hoped to see it swing in line for Roosevelt.* 20 * Greenway was now in charge of the Roosevelt interests in Cochise County: Heard, whom he described as a "live wire . . . but who lacks system and experience," had general responsibility for the state campaign. All the "bread and butter politicians," he thought were lined up with the administration, but the rank and file were for Roosevelt. This was clearly shown by Greenway’s

postal card canvass of Cochise County, which gave Roosevelt

160 votes to Taft’s forty and thirty for the leader of the

insurgent Republicans, Senator Robert R. LaFollette of

Wisconsin. Greenway was confident that Roosevelt would get the LaFollette vote.2^

^Greenway to George McCarter, March 20, 1912.

20Greenway to A. 0. Brodie, March 28, 1912; Bisbee Bally Review, March 30, 1916, p. 6; Douglas Daily Inter­ national. ICoril 17, 1912, p. 4. ------46

Roosevelt was soon Informed that he had a lead of four to one In Oochise County. Greenway went on to describe the political situation In Arizona and Arkansas, but he thought that Roosevelt's continued silence was preventing

Republican leaders from coming to his support for fear of

"getting in wrong" with the Taft administration. What was needed was a statement "direct" to the people. Greenway was afraid that the will and desire of the voters would be frustrated if this announcement was not soon forthcoming.

"Please let me hear from you," Greenway asked, "as the sit­ uation is fast coming to a head . . ."22

Greenway had come to feel that the disruption of the party was imminent in Arizona unless Republican leaders allowed the issue between Roosevelt and Taft to be settled by a presidential primary. He believed, too, that a political realignment was underway between the forces of LaPolette and those of Democratic elements still under the sway of William

Jennings Bryan. The only hope of it all was Roosevelt, and with the county committee of Cochise now committed to

Roosevelt by a count of forty-four to seventeen Greenway thought that it might be possible to carry the state convention.23 2223

22Greenway to Roosevelt, April 3, 1912.

23Greenway to Williams, April 13, 1912; Greenway to John A. Savage, April 13, 1912; Greenway to P. D. Ward, April 13, 1912. 47

While Greenway labored to carry Cochise County for

Roosevelt, Heard at Phoenix issued a long statement addressed to Arizona Republicans in general and to the executive committee of the Republican state organization in particular.

Heard optimistically pointed to the results of the Illinois and Pennsylvania primaries, which had shown the Hoverwhelming" demand for Roosevelt. He completed his argument by stating that Roosevelt, in a series of "masterful addresses," had placed the real issues of social and political justice before the people. "The spirit of Bunker Hill," Heard declared,

"would not allow the people of Arizona to suffer 'boss dictation*." Heard concluded: "They demand a direct primary."24

The "spirit of Bunker Hill" to which Heard alluded was sadly lacking when the Republican executive committee met in Phoenix on May 1 to set the date and consider the method by which the delegates to the state convention would be selected. The committee announced that the convention would be held in Tucson on June 3, 1912. The call provided for the meeting of the various county committees on May 15 to determine whether to adopt the primary system or whether the county committees themselves would designate the

24jLrlzona Republic. April 21, 1912, p. 4. 48 delegates to the convention.^5 At the same time the executive committee issued a resolution endorsing "without reservation" the administration of William Howard Taft.* 2^

Thus had Chairman Lorenzo Hubbell, in the words of a Cochise paper, "named the weapons of the game and the date of the fight."27

The two resolutions adopted by the Taftites met with scant approval on the part of most of the Progressive

Republicans in Arizona. These resolutions certainly contra­ dicted those adopted the day before by Phoenix Progressives endorsing Roosevelt and the direct primary.2®

25"Minutes of Republican State Convention, held June 3, 1912, at Tucson, Arizona, to elect delegates to National Republican Convention, June 18, 1912," Special Collections Division of the University of Arizona Library, pp. 1-3.

2^Arizona Republic. May 2, 1912, p. 5* Secretary Hays according to the Republic recorded a vote of 9 for the measure, although it was rumored that 13 votes had been cast. The Elsbee Dally Review claimed that Taft had been endorsed 9 to 3 with three delegates not voting. The Review in addition claimed that 8 of 14 of those present were present by proxy. Blabee Dally Review. May 12, 1912, p. 1.

27Greenway always attributed the action of the Executive Committee to its "color" which he described as follows: J. L. Hubbell of Apache County enjoying valuable store licenses on the Indian Reservation; R. A. Franz of Greenlee • • • U. S. Deputy Marshall; Allan T. Byrd of Santa Cruz . . . U. S. Commissioner at Nogales; R. E. Morrison of Coconino, has a brother on the Taft payroll as U. S. District Attorney in Cochise County; Allen T. Jayne . . . Clerk of the Federal Court; Robert Smith of Coconino County on the Taft payroll as postmaster. Greenway to Roosevelt, June 4, 1912.

28Arlzona Republic. May 1, 1912, p. 5. 49

Greenway was disconcerted. He still believed Roosevelt would carry Arizona but victory was "not certain by any means," because the "element in control of organization" was for Taft. On the morning of May 15 Greenway wired

George W. Perkins that "we are doing all possible . . . here . . . expect to carry county committee tonight."^9

Roosevelt boosters had indeed not been idle. The Bisbee

Daily Review reported that they had been campaigning through­ out Cochise County by automobile to secure proxies for the committee meeting. The editor was also quick to point out that if the Roosevelt men could control the committee there would be no need for a primary.-^

Of the sixty-nine Cochise committeemen who met in

Benson on the evening of May 15, thirty-three were Roosevelt men who controlled thirteen proxies while the 9 Taft men held 14 proxies. After an unsuccessful attempt to exclude nine of Roosevelt's supporters. Chairman A. H. Gardner with­ drew, taking with him the records of the meeting. Progressives went ahead to effect a temporary organization and selected

Bisbee as the site for the county convention.^ Following the Benson meeting, Greenway wrote James T. Williams of the

Tucson Citizen that he hoped the newspaper man was now 2

29Greenway to Perkins, May 14, 1912; Perkins to Greenway, May 14, 1912; Greenway to Perkins, May 15, 1912. SORisbee Daily Review. May 12, 1912, p. 2. 31ibid., May 16, 1912, p. 1. 50 satisfied that Taft's chances were "nil." Williams should now come back where he belonged— to the “decent" Progressive element of the party.

Between the Benson meeting and the Bisbee meeting, rumors were circulated that a compromise was in the offing with ten Roosevelt delegates and six Taft delegates to be seated at the forthcoming Tucson convention.^3 The night

before Progressive Republicans met in Bisbee, Greenway wired

Perkins that the situation did not look very good as the

Taft forces were contesting Roosevelt delegations throughout

the state without "justification.“ Greenway thought that

Roosevelt forces would control the state convention, fifty-

three to forty-three, if they received fair treatment, "if

we do not," Greenway declared, "we will send a contesting

delegation."3^

On Saturday evening May 25, two conventions met in

Cochise county. At Douglas the regular Republicans assembled

and endorsed Taft, while in Bisbee the Roosevelt faction

selected their delegates to the state convention. George Jay

of Waco was elected chairman of the central committee, and

32(jreenway to Williams, May 23, 1912.

33Blsbee Daily Review. May 21, 1912, p. 1; May 24, 1912j P# Oe

34creenway to Perkins, May 24, 1912; Perkins to Greenway, May 24, 1912. 51

E. 0. Hicks of Bisbee chosen as secretary. Greenway arrived late and made a short speech. NSocialism is the worst thing

In this country,11 he told his fellow delegates, “but if the people are not allowed to run the government through the presidential primary, socialism is what will happen. I believe in giving all an equal chance and an equal opportun­ ity, and we must guarantee these to every generation.“35

Three days after the Bisbee convention, David Benshimol, a former Rough Rider, asked Greenway to send him a list of committee members of 1908 and a signed statement that the majority repudiated the action at Douglas.36 The Taft leaders were also preparing their plans. Three days before the state convention met in Tucson, Greenway wired Perkins that the

Roosevelt forces controlled some sixty-five votes out of ninety-six. These included Maricopa* a twenty, Cochise*s sixteen, Yavapai’s eleven, Greenlee’s five, Pinal’s four.

35Blsbee Dally Review. May 26, 1912, p. 3.

^^Davld Benshimol to Greenway, May 28, 1912. There is no evidence that Greenway complied with the request. What happened in Cochise County was that JL. H. Gardner, chairman of the central committee both in 1908 and 1911, assembled the 1908 members after losing control of the 1911 committee. This committee elected Taft delegates to the Tucson convention. Gardner justified his action on the grounds that the 1911 committee had no legal existence whatever as it was in the same category as precinct officers for whom no election had been held in the last territorial election. Consequently the 1908 committee was a hold-over committee. Bisbee Daily Review. May 26, 1912, p. 1. 52

Gila's three and Santa Cruz's two* Greenway again told

Perkins that the Progressives planned to hold a separate convention if their delegates were excluded.3? Roosevelt promptly wired hack: "Heartiest congratulations. If our delegates are unseated, I hope they will hold a separate convention.M 28

This decision was wise, for the Tucson Citizen reported that the Taft forces controlled the nine votes of

Pima, four of Gila, two of Santa Cruz, four of Havajo, two of Mohave, and four of Coconino, making a total of twenty- nine, while the Roosevelt forces had the three votes of

Gila, four of Yuma, five of Greenlee, and three of Pinal— a total of fifteen. The allegiance of forty-seven delegates was said to be questionable— Maricopa's twenty, Cochise's

sixteen, and Yavapai's e l e v e n . The Citizen report did not

agree with Greenway*s estimates. The two seats from Santa

Cruz were claimed by Greenway, as the voters of that county had elected two Roosevelt delegates at the primaries; and

Pinal, awarded to the Roosevelt faction, was entitled to

27sreenway to Perkins, May 31, 1912. Greenway forgot to include Yuma's 4 votes in the Progressive totals, and his report to Perkins seems in error. Greenway himself later corrected this estimate.

28Roosevelt to Greenway, May 31, 1912.

29Tucson Citizen. May 29, 1912, p. 1. 53 four delegates, not three.Greenway realized that the contested delegation from Maricopa County would decide the fate of the state convention. While Greenway did battle for

Roosevelt in Cochise, P. H. Hays, secretary of the Maricopa

Central Committee, packed the credentials committee with

Roosevelt supporters. This committee seated forty-one delegates plus two proxies held by the Roosevelt men, exclud­ ing eight proxies held by Taft delegates. The Maricopa convention then declared for a primary where Roosevelt received 950 votes against twenty-five for Taft.^

On Sunday morning, June 2, 1912, Greenway left for the Tucson convention. The chairman of the Republican

executive committee, Lorenzo Hubbell, had issued a call on

May 28 for the executive committee to meet on June 1 to

decide all contests in the county delegations. Rather than

have this happen, Greenway saw Hubbell, shortly after his

arrival, and proposed a compromise. Greenway*s compromise

would have allowed a committee of three from each side to

select a seventh; this committee would then make up the

temporary roll call. Hubbell declined the proposal, and at

*°Greenway to Roosevelt. June 4, 1912; "Minutes of the Republic State Convention," loc. clt., p. 5.

^ Arizona Republic, May 16, 1912, p. 1; May 24, 1912, P* 2e 54 this juncture the Roosevelt forces decided to place only the

Cochise contest before the executive committee. It decided to seat both delegations, giving each a half vote. In making up the temporary roll call, the committee excluded the Roosevelt delegates from Maricopa, Greenlee, Pinal, and

Santa Cruz. When the temporary roll call was read, Klbbey vigorously protested but was overruled. Thus two conventions

took place at the same time, the regular Republicans endors­

ing "the Cato of American politics," William Howard Taft, while the Progressives pledged themselves to Roosevelt.

The day after the convention, Greenway wrote Roosevelt

that Republicans had tried to put the "road roller" over the

Progressives but it "wouldn* t roll." To Greenway the exclusion

of the Roosevelt delegations was without "precedent" or

"authority" as the Maricopa and Cochise delegations were

"absolutely incontestable." Greenway considered the Yavapai

delegation questionable while Pima, raised by Ben Daniels,

was illegal. "l repudiated this act,” Greenway stated.

Greenway then told Roosevelt that he would leave for Chicago

on the 15th, and could go sooner if "absolutely advisable";

but he had insisted on Heard being named chairman of the

42"Mi%utes of the Republican State Convention," loc* cit., Greenway gave an account of his compromise proposal to Roosevelt. Greenway to Roosevelt, June 4, 1912. 55 delegation because, while “Inexperienced,M he was a great

Mhustler" and could go at once

Heard was already preparing for the Chicago battle.

He had assembled a brief sustaining the validity of the

Cochise, Maricopa, and Yavapai delegations as well as the 44 validity of the Roosevelt convention. Armed with this brief, the Roosevelt delegation left to contest the Tucson results in Chicago— but to no avail. The Rational Republi­ can Committee accomplished on the national level what the

Arizona Executive Committee had done on the state level: the wholesale exclusion of Roosevelt’s delegates. Heard,

Greenway, Kibbey, Tom Molloy of Yuma, and MoRedman of Pinal were only spectators when Roosevelt allowed Henry J. Allen

of Kansas to read a message to his pledged delegates asking

them to participate no longer in the deliberations of the

Republican party

On the evening of June 22 Theodore Roosevelt entered

Orchestra Hall in Chicago, escorted by Greenway, and other

^^Greenway to Roosevelt, June 4, 1912. Greenway told Roosevelt that 9 votes out of 14 were cast by men receiving pecuniary benefits from Mr. Taft.

^ J . 1. B. Alexander to Greenway, June 4, 1912.

^George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement (Madison, 1946), pp. £157-239. 56 friends.Four days later the Arizona Progressive delega­ tion announced its official position to the citizens of the state and asked for their support in the "uprising" against the reactionary elements in the two older parties.^7

Greenway returned from Chicago believing that Taft* s support­ ers had accomplished the "assassination" of the Republican party, and that it could count on its repudiation by the people. He told a reporter of the Blsbee Dally Review that a new party, based on "sound" and "sane" Progressive prin­ ciples, would arise out of the great moral question, "Shall JN O the people rule?" That afternoon Greenway sent J. L. B.

Alexander a copy of his interview, declaring that he was

through with the Republican party for the "stealing of a nomination . . . is something I will not stand for." Greenway

then advised Alexander to work on Kibbey and Judge Kent, who were apparently wavering, as the Progressive cause depended upon an "absolutely" new party."^9* 4

^^World Today, July 15, 1912. This reference is drawn from a source in the Greenway papers. Greenway never referred to the matter.

^ Blsbee Daily Review. June 26, 1912, p. 4.

48Ibid., July 2, 1912, p. 5.

49Greenway to Alexander, July 2, 1912. 57

The Arizona Progressives “crossed the river” in mid-July when some thirty-eight Tucsonans signed a call asking all interested people to meet in Phoenix on July 30 to form a state party.50 As it happened Graham, Greenlee,

Apache, and Navajo counties did not send representatives.

Undaunted, the organizers of this first state convention declared that the time had come for a "national Progressive movement on nonsectional lines" since the "sordid" interests which controlled the Republican convention at Chicago were equally present in the Democratic convention at Baltimore; and both had shown the need for a new party based on the

"actual right and capacity of the people to rule themselves."

The Progressives capped their resolutions with a twenty point platform and two special resolutions; one of which

condemned Taft's "weak" and "vacillating" policy while the other endorsed Roosevelt. The convention concluded by

selecting Heard, Greenway, and E. S. Clark, a Prescott

attorney, as presidential electors and named a fifteen-man

delegation to attend the National Progressive convention

scheduled to meet in Chicago in the first week of August.5^ 5

50Arizona Republic. July 21, 1912, p. 12. The call was dated July 18, 1912.

51lbid., July 31, 1912, pp. 1, 3. 58

The delegation left without Greenway. Development of the new smelter for the Calumet and Arizona mine kept him from attending the Chicago convention, but soon he was able to report a "great improvement" in Progressive affairs in

Arizona.52 This was an option to purchase the Phoenix

Gazette which he had taken in response to a telegraphic request from Heard, "it will help us greatly to have a

Progressive paper at the State Capitol," Greenway wrote

George W. Perkins, now the chairman of the National Executive

Committee.55 $he next day Greenway wrote David Goodrich, a former Rough Rider, that Roosevelt's National advisors had foolishly routed Colonel Roosevelt through Arizona by way of

Tucson, Phoenix, and Ashfork— and then on to Albuquerque— rather than through Bisbee. On September 9 Greenway came to

Tucson to meet Roosevelt and continued with him to Albuquerque before leaving for the East on business.5^

Citizens of Arizona were able to hear the promises of

Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" from the Bull Moose himself.

52Bisbee Daily Review. July 30, 1912, p. 3. There is a gap in the Greenway correspondence between the Progressive State Convention and August 14, 1912. Greenway was not named a delegate to the National Convention; the presumption is that Greenway was preoccupied with the Calumet and Arizona mine.

S^Greenway to Perkins, August 30, 1912. The paper later purchased was the Arizona Republic.

_52 *54Greenway to David Goodrich, August 31, 1912; Bisbee Daily Review, September 9, 1912, p. 2. ------59

Roosevelt* s major policy address came at Phoenix on

September 18, here he devoted a major portion of his speech to the recall of the judiciary, which illustrated what he meant by the right of the people to rule. When he was in

Arizona some eighteen months before he reminded his audience he had opposed the recall of the judiciary, but if the people of Arizona wanted it they had a right to have it. Had he been in Arizona after Taft had demanded that the recall provision be stricken from the constitution "we would have put it in as soon as we had the chance."55

As Roosevelt labored to convert Arizona citizens to the Progressive cause. Heard, spurred by his candidate*s visit, offered S. M. Elgley #20,000 for the Arizona Republic.5^

Two days later the arrangements were complete, and Heard wired Greenway that the Republic was now giving the Progres­ sive cause statewide support. Heard*s idea of the Republic*s mission was twofold: the championing of Progressive prin­

ciples and the development of the state*s resources. Heard wrote a close friend that the "wretched” and "vacillating"

policies of the paper were now ended, and that as publisher

he would uphold decency, good government, and justice, and

55jLrlzona Republic. September 19, 1912, p. 1 .

56]), B. Heard to S. W. HLgley, October 5, 1912; George B. Wilkinson to Greenway, October 7 , 1912. 60 would run the paper In the Interests of the public welfare.57

The purchase of the Republic^ Heard felt, had put the local

situation In "splendid shape."58

These private assurances of Heard were publicly

printed on October 6, 1912, when in a signed statement he

told Arizona readers that the Republic, which had just

announced itself as an "independent Progressive Journal,"

would support Roosevelt and Hiram If. Johnson of California,

the vice-presidential candidate, because of their ability,

efficiency, integrity, and high purpose and the "great

constructive platform” on which they stood. The next day

the Republic began its campaign of education. Heard almost

daily printed the Progressive platform and attempted to

explain it through the columns of his editorial page.59

With the Arizona Republic now in the Progressive

field, Greenway was no doubt happy on his return to Arizona.

He wrote Prank Knox, a former comrade in arms, that the

paper was a "live one," and while the race would be close

he expected Roosevelt to carry Arizona.^ Greenway had

earlier stated to a reporter from the Blsbee Daily Review

57Heard to Greenway, October 7, 1912; Heard to A. 0. Bartlett, October 8, 1912.

SSneard to Greenway, October 9, 1912.

59Arizona Republic. October 6, 1912, p. 1 ; October 7 , 1912; pe 4e 6°Greenway to Prank Knox, October 14, 1912. 61 that Roosevelt was the popular candidate in Hew York whereas

Taft and Wilson were in favor in the offices of the banks and the big manufacturing houses.His eastern trip had led Greenway to believe that Roosevelt would carry Hew York,

Pennsylvania, and Illinois, which would give him the election.62

Arizona Progressives began their campaign for

Roosevelt and Johnson and their lone candidate for repre­

sentative in Congress, Robert S. Fisher, a Phoenix attorney,

by establishing a local headquarters in Phoenix where they

received contributions and sold certificates showing a

picture of Roosevelt and Johnson. The Republic was quick

to call on women to join the cause since only by cooperation

with Progressives could women hope to achieve suffrage.63

Heard offered to send one copy of the Arizona Republic,

containing the Progressive platform, to citizens who were

not subscribers to the paper. His circulation department

offered, as well, a special "campaign rate" to all new subscribers.64 6

61Bisbee Daily Review. October 10, 1912, p. 1.

62Greenway to E. R. Helson, October 14, 1912.

^Arizona Republic. October 9, 1912, p. 4; October 9 , 1912, p. 1 .

64lbid.. October 13, 1912, p. 8 . 62

Progressive speakers conducted an extensive campaign throughout the state while the Arizona Republic was attempt­ ing to spread Progressive doctrine while increasing circula­ tion. The same night that Heard, and J. L. B. Alexander, the State campaign chairman, spoke in Osbom, Fisher spoke in Nogales, after having addressed an audience in Yuma the night before. Fisher was scheduled to swing through to

Bisbee and Douglas.^5 in the middle of their state campaign,

Progressives received a shock. On October 15 Roosevelt was shot while speaking in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Greenway immediately wired the candidate: "Thank God it wasn*t worse. Your conduct was splendid."66 At a rally in Phoenix that very night the Progressives made the most of the

"assassin's bullet" and the vigor of their candidate, who

though wounded had remained to finish his speech. Voters were told also that Roosevelt was personally responsible for

the new dam bearing his name and for the increase of land values in the Salt River Valley. Fisher, in an open letter

to the Arizona Republic, reminded voters of "the silvery

flow" that "by the chemistry of his courage" was making

"golden harvests for this valley" Such a man deserved the66 *

65lbid., October 10, 1912, p. 1; October 15, 1912, p. 12.

66Greenway to Roosevelt, October 15, 1912. 63

vote of Arizonians.67 Although Greenway did not speak

publicly for Roosevelt, his private letters expressed deep

concern for the candidate. Greenway felt that the Milwaukee

shooting would convince many who were "wavering" of his

absolute sincerity if not of his great physical courage.

"My admiration deepens for him every day," he wrote one friend,

and to another he declared: "Take it from me, Ed, that you

need not hesitate in your allegiance . . . I am supporting

Roosevelt, after fourteen years close acquaintanceship, with

purse, voice, heart, and action,' I think more of him today

than I have at any time during my acquaintance with him."

Greenway was concerned with the campaign of slander and

character assassination directed against Roosevelt. The only

argument, Greenway thought, that his opponents had was that

Roosevelt was "too big" with "too much honor."^8

Late in October Greenway conducted a poll at his

country club which gave Roosevelt twenty-five votes, Wilson

nineteen, Taft seven, and the Socialist candidate, Eugene V.

Debs, one. To one newspaper this poll was nothing more than

a "personal compliment," but to the Arizona Republic it was

a "striking illustration" of the progress the Progressive

^ Arizona Republic. October 16, 1912, pp. 1, 8 ; October 15, 1912, p. 5.

^Greenway to Fred Ekman, October 21, 1912; Greenway to Edward B. Ryan, October 24, 1912.

'1 64 movement was making•^9 on November 2 Greenway sent telegrams to Roosevelt, Perkins, and Heard expressing the traditional hope for victory. Later that day Greenway wrote Goodrich that he expected Arizona and Cochise to vote for Roosevelt, and that every friend of Roosevelt was working overtime.70

The Arizona Republic reminded Its readers on Novem­ ber 4 that within a day It would be known just how many

Arizona voters were truly Progressive. The test was simple.

There would be as many Progressives In Arizona as there were

votes for Roosevelt and Johnson and no more.71 The next day

the Republic hit the streets with Its front page headline

screaming "Progressives of Arizona See Victory Today," and

Its columns filled with Inspired telegrams. Alexander pre­ dicted victory for the Progressive party since UG0% of the great silent vote will go our way." Perhaps the most inspired

forecast, however, was made by Charles E. Arnold, the campaign

chairman of the Republican party, who beginning with Apache County went alphabetically through the Arizona counties

predicting either victory or second place for William

^ Blsbee Dally Review. October 26, 1912, p. 3; Arizona Republic, October 27, 1912, p. 4.

7°Greenway to Perkins, November 2, 1912; Greenway to Roosevelt, November 1, 1912; Greenway to Heard, November 2, 1912; Greenway to Goodrich, November 2, 1912.

7lArizona Republic. November 4, 1912, p. 4. 65

Howard Taft.72 Such sanguine expectations had no substan­ tiation on the national level. Taft finished a bad third In

1912, ending with only eight electoral votes to Roosevelt's

eighty-eight and Woodrow Wilson's record-breaking majority of

435. In point of the popular vote, however, the victorious

Wilson was a minority President, since his 6,286,214 votes

were not in excess of Roosevelt's 4,126,020 plus Taft's 3,483,922.

When the results became clear, Greenway wired Roose­

velt: "You made a great fight . . . the honors must go to

you." Greenway could at least tell Roosevelt that his town

of Warren had voted for him.^'* Heard told his readers that

the results proved that the Progressive party would soon

absorb the faltering Republican party. Heard was gratified

that in Arizona the Progressives had received three times as

many votes as did the "reactionary" Republicans. Els editorial

page termed the defeat a Progressive "triumph" for it spelled

the end of the Republican party and it insured the ascendancy

of the people.7^ Greenway told a reporter from the Bisbee

72ibid.. November 5, 1912, pp. 1, 7, 8.

7%reenway to Roosevelt, November 6, 1912.

^ Arizona Republic. November 6, 1912, pp. 1, 3. Roosevelt electors B. S.Clark, Greenway and Heard polled 6,949, 6,849 and 6,873 votes respectively. Republican electors received 2,986, 3,021, and 2,975. Socialists electors outpolled the Republicans, securing 3,163, 3,139, and 3,132. Democratic electors received 10,324, 10,174, and 10,130 for their candidate, Woodrow Wilson. 66

Daily Review that he was not disappointed but was satisfied to look to the future. He reminded the reporter that at least one good thing had happened: "The . . . Barnes, Root,

Penrose, and Guggenheim ring has gone to a most crushing defeat."75 He accepted the results with a "cheerful mind," hoping that Wilson would make good on his campaign promises.76

75Bisbee Dally Review. November 8, 1912, p. 2.

7^Greenway to W. W. Heffelfinger, November 9, 1912. OHA.PIER IV

NO OOMPROECSB, NO 1MA.LG1MA.TION l

Six days after the election of 1912, Heard pointed the Progressive party of Arizona on a course of Independent political action, the objective of which was to achieve a three fold program outlined In the Arizona Republic.

Characterizing partisan politics divisive. Heard wished to purge the Progressive program from partisan considerations.

MAs a matter of fact," declared his editor, "no question can possibly arise within the next eighteen months into which a question of party politics can be legitimately Introduced.

Toward the middle of November, leading Progressives assembled at Gunther* s Cafe in Phoenix for a "victory" celebration.

Greenway had been billed as the chief speaker but was unable

to attend, and instead J. Fred Cleveland and Robert S. Fisher made short speeches. Heard read a telegram from Joseph M.

Dixon, Montana* s State Senator and head of the Roosevelt

national campaign, congratulating Arizona Progressives for

^Arizona Republic. November 10, 1912, p. 4. The program called for an extension of time for the reservoir payments, a transcontinental main line railroad to Phoenix, and improvement in the methods of city, state, and county administration.

6? 68 their Msplendid fight'* and exhorting them to even "greater accomplishments" in the next campaign.2 Shortly after this meeting, Heard* s papexj in an editorial entitled "After Two

Weeks," declared that the Progressive party, which had begun its state campaign without an organization, had captured the

Republican seats on election boards. The Republic promised a full organization for the next campaign.^

Greenway now turned his attention again to his business.

When Alexander, the state chairman, asked Greenway to attend the Progressive National Committee conferences in Chicago in

December, Greenway replied that he was not at all certain he would be able to come.* Alexander also sent Greenway a bill for the state campaign which had been calculated as $368, of which Greenway* s share would be $100.5 George Perkins, in

the dying days of November, wrote Greenway asking "somebody"

to raise the question why the Republican National Committee

^ibid., November 12, 1912, p. 1; November 13, 1912, p. 5; November 14, 1912, p. 1.

^Ibld., November 21, 1912, p. 4; November 13, 1912, p. 4. The Republic explained to its readers that only the party with the highest and next highest number of votes at the recent election was entitled to representation on election boards.

^Alexander to Greenway, November 26, 1912; Joseph M. Dixon to Alexander, November 21, 1912; Greenway to Alexander, November 29, 1912.

^Alexander to Greenway, December 6, 1912. 69 had refused to allow the Arizona delegates to go to Roosevelt, but Greenway did no thing. ^ The Arizona Republic was silent until January 10, 1913, when quoting Roosevelt, it announced that there could be no unity between the Progressives and regular Republicans until the latter* s managers learn that

“theft and fraud and swindling people" was not the way to achieve a triumph. The next day the Republic, applying the

doctrine of independent action, announced its policy of non- partisanship in the forthcoming May election of Phoenix municipal officers, while at the same time calling upon

Progressives to build up their local organizations.

As Heard pursued this contradictory line, Greenway

told a reporter in Tucson that he was through with politics

but that he hoped Wilson would "make good."? He proceeded

to Sonora to investigate some mining properties; and on his

return he answered a letter from Captain Richard W. Walker,

an Army officer stationed on the border, who had written to

ask if Greenway might raise a volunteer regiment in the event

of trouble with Mexico. Greenway replied that he had no such

plans, but left the question open when he told Walker: "If

^Perkins to Greenway, Movember 30, 1912.

^Arizona Republic. January 10, 1913, p. 1; January 11, 1913, p. 4; Greenway to Roosevelt, December 3, 1912. 70 things turn out as you suggest, your proposition would be most agreeable.Greenway actually hoped that things would

“liven up" under Wilson, and that the new President would protect the lives of Americans along the border by using

American troops. After seeing the fighting at Cananea,

Greenway was convinced that the revolution would continue . unabated as the Mexican people unfortunately had no apprecia­ tion of strong government.9

As the Mexican situation darkened in Greenway's eyes, merger with the Progressives loomed larger in the thoughts of Arizona Republicans. In April the Bisbee Daily Review reported that Dwight B. Heard had been approached by

Republican leaders looking toward unity between the two parties."*"® The report was true. The first overtures were made by Lorenzo Hubbell, the Indian trader of Navajo County, who saw Heard on April 22. Hubbell proposed that the executive committees of both parties meet in Phoenix to discuss unity. As the basis of a merger, Hubbell outlined a plan whereby the Republican party would accept the Progressive* 10

^Richard W. Walker to Greenway, February 1, 1913; Greenway to Walker, March 1, 1913.

^Qreenway to Margaret Gunn, March 23, 1913; Greenway to W. 0. Gilbert, April 7, 1913.

10Blsbee Daily Review. April 24, 1913, p. 1. 71 platform and would submit to whatever leadership both parties might select at a joint primary election to be held for that purpose. In return, Hubbell wanted the Republican name maintained and the reorganized party called the Progressive-

Republican party. Hubbell than admitted to Heard that he had made a serious mistake, and now wished that he had yielded to the progressive demand for primaries which would have made the Republican party "progressive* before the election.

Heard told Greenway that he had made it "very clear" that such a plan was "not desirable," and had suggested to Hubbell that the Progressive party would welcome any Republicans as

"individuals" who wished to join it. Hubbell declined the invitation.11

Greenway felt that Heard*s reply was "exactly right," since in Oochise the feelings of the Progressives against the Hubbell faction were still very strong. Greenway told

Heard that he would never align himself with the Republican party as "now constituted" but would join the Democratic if he had to choose between the two. Greenway doubted if

Hubbell*s allegiance would help the Progressive cause, "it would be more hurtful than otherwise," he wrote, and asked that his letter be destroyed.12

^Heard to Greenway, April 23, 1913.

12Greenway to Heard, April 28, 1913. 72

Progressives in Arizona were treated to much the same news: there would be no merger. Heard's paper took the opportunity to reply to the intimation of the Arizona Record that independent political action on the part of Progressives might destroy the Democratic party in Arizona. The Arizona

Republic felt this insinuation was unfounded, and quickly stated that the Progressive party was not the "Cave of Adullan" and that its leaders did not expect any "professional politic­ ian, spoilsman, or any disappointed partisan" to join its ranks.

In May of 1913 the Progressives of Arizona welcomed the famous editor of the Emporia Gazette. William Allen

White, whose message that the "Progressives have no thought of merging" was prominently displayed on page one of the

Arizona Republic. In its editorial column the next day the paper even more bluntly declared: "There can be no compromise, no amalgamation."1^ Heard, possibly prompted by White's visit, wrote Greenway asking about a proposed "plan of organ­ ized work" for Progressives.1^ In July Greenway finally replied that he thought Progressives should not delay in

^ Arizona Republic. April 25, 1913, p. 4.

l^ibld.. May 31, 1913, p. 1; June 1, 1913, p. 4.

^Heard to Greenway, June 3, 1915, and June 25, 1913. 73 perfecting an organization. “Hew is the time to get organ­ ized,M he wrote, so that the party might he strengthened and broadened for the state campaign of 1914. loth Heard and Greenway were disappointed in their state chairman,

J. 1. B. Alexander, and Greenway suggested Mwe should appoint a successor" if Alexander did not show greater interest in his joh. Greenway thought that the replacement should he hy a "good, live, active young man, preferably an ex-Democrat."

He could foresee the possible defeat of Governor Hunt, and it was possible that Hunt and his followers might come to the Progressive party. "We . . . should welcome Mr. Hunt and his friends to the Party" wrote Greenway, "but not the

Party to Mr. Hunt."1^

In September Greenway asked Heard what the Progres­ sives were going to do for a candidate for governor.

Greenway suggested the former territorial governor, Alexander

0. Prodie, as one who would make a "strong race." Regardless of whom the nominee might be, Greenway wanted to be in agreement with Heard in case the party even had a candidate.^*7

In October, Greenway left for the Orient with Heard* s reply unanswered. The publisher felt that the Progressives

l^Greenway to Heard, July 16, 1913.

^Greenway to Heard, September 4, 1913. 74 should put all the "ginger" possible in the next campaign, and the Republic soon announced that a recent address by

Roosevelt in New York had brought discouragement and dismay

-i Q to those who hoped that a merger could be effected. To the true Progressive, Roosevelt had declared, more was at

stake than the success of the party; the principles of the

Progressive party were far more important and must not be

temporarily compromised or abandoned.The Republic.

Heard insisted, stood for Progressive principles and the

promotion of legitimate enterprise and industry in Arizona.

Specifically, he told his readers that his paper would support

both Wilson and Governor Hunt in national and state matters

when their policies were based on "justice and common sense,"

The Republic stood for the "square deal" for every interest

"big or little" in Arizona.18 *20

While Greenway was in the Orient, Phoenix Progressives—

under the leadership of Heard and stimulated by a visit of

William E. Cadmus, National Progressive organizer— raised some $500 for the initial expense of opening a Progressive Head­

quarters and employing of a full-time organizer. This group

passed a series of resolutions endorsing the local club

18Heard to Greenway, October 13, 1913.

^ Arizona Republic. October 5, 1913, p. 4.

20Ibid., October 6, 1913, p. 1. 75 movement, as well as a plan of thorough organization of the party in all the counties and precincts through the appoint­ ment of precinct committeemen. The meeting concluded with resolutions endorsing National Progressive principles and a denial of amalgamation.^ While the Progressives were still trying to promote something in the way of organization for the state campaign of 1914, a small group of regular Repub­ licans assembled in Phoenix. The genesis of this meeting, according to a Bisbee paper, was a small business card bear­ ing the name "Ralph Cameron, Governor of Arizona." With the well-known former territorial delegate on the ticket, the

Republicans hoped to recoup their losses.* 22

In the middle of December, 1913* the chairmen of the several Progressive county committees met in Phoenix under the chairmanship of J. Fred Brackett of Mesa. Vacancies among the county committeemen were filled, and the precinct committeemen were authorized to appoint deputies and to hold conferences with women so that they might name representatives to cooperate with the county committee. An executive

committee was appointed to cooperate with J. F. Cleveland,

the national committeeman, and J. L. B. Alexander, state

21lbld.. October 23, 1913, p. 2.

22Bisbee Daily Review, November 12, 1913, p. 1. 76 chairman.25 In the closing days of December, the Republic critized the leading Democratic orga^ the Arizona Dally Star of Tucson, for publicizing rumors of the merger of Progres­ sives with Republicans. The Progressive party. Heard declared, could not effect a combination with any faction,

Democratic or Republican. Office was sought only to give effect to party principles; compromise accordingly could never be undertaken, since compromise meant surrender of these principles. "Progressivism must be wholly merged into

Republicanism," Heard reiterated, "or Republicanism . . . merged into Progressivism . . • or each party must work out its own course alone.

When Greenway returned from the Orient in December,

Progressive prospects was not much better than they had been in October. Progressives had yet to perfect an organization and the rumor of amalgamation would not lie down.25 Almost as soon as Greenway had returned, Heard made an unsuccessful effort to try to see him. Heard asked Greenway to come to

Tucson but Greenway could not make It.26 Finally on* 26

2^Arizona Republic. December 17, 1913, p. 4.

24ibid., January 11, 1914, p. 4.

25Greenway to W. B. Mershorn, December 22, 1913; Greenway to Eugene Meyer, December 24, 1913.

26Heard to Greenway, December 29, 1913; and December 30, 1913; Greenway to Heard, January 6, 1914. 77

January 9, 1914, Heard wrote Greenway that he must see him within the next ten days. While he was in Tucson, Heard said, he had met with a "good live bunch of Progressives" who were "strong" to go ahead with "our flag nailed to the mast." The next day Heard wrote that he had just talked to # David Henshaw of the Progressive National Committee, and that it was decided to organize at once and open a headquarters in Phoenix.27 on February 11 George B. Wilcox, a former Rough

Rider who had been appointed secretary and organizer of the state office, sent out a form letter announcing the estab­ lishment of a permanent office in Phoenix. Thus by February, a little more than two years after the first Roosevelt club had been formed, Arizona Progressives had made their first OQ step toward a permanent organization.

Heard* s policy of independent political action received a mild setback in February when George U. Young narrowly defeated Judge E. W. Lewis in a primary election for mayor of

Phoenix, polling 1,729 votes to the Judge's 1,594. The

Arizona Republic had denied Young its active support in his race against Lewis. Nonetheless, it praised him lavishly as an "eminent" Progressive surely destined to receive "high

^ 27Heard to Greenway, January 9, 1914, and January 10,

28 George B. Wilcox to Greenway, February 11, 1914. 78 honors" from his party. The Republic gave as its reasons for not supporting Young his lack of legal training, and the argument that such support might be construed as "partisan" since there were two Progressives on the Good Government

League. On March 19, Young successfully defeated Lewis,

2,336 to 1,825, in the only municipal victory that Progres­ sives had to show between 1912 and 1914. Joseph Cope, a local druggist and a Democrat, was the only member of the

Good-Government League to be elected, while two Progressives went down in defeat.^9

Along with Progressive efforts to revitalize and reform their ranks came new efforts to put their policies before the public. Secretary George B. Wilcox began a series of articles on Progressivism in the Republic in March. His first effort was devoted to the cause of Arizona women seeking to obtain the suffrage. Wilcox pointed out that the Progres­

sive party was the only political party that had consistently worked for nationwide suffrage. He invited all women to

attend Progressive meetings to criticize and to condemn all Progressives who were not living up to party principles.

On the first day of April, Greenway was notified by

David Benshimol that there would be a conference of Progressives

^ Arizona Republic. February 5, 1914, p. 4; March 20, 1914, p. T.

30ibid., March 14, 1914, p. 1. 79 in Phoenix on April 20.51 A few days later Wilcox publicly issued the call, which had been widened to include women.

Wilcox took this opportunity to remind the prospective

Progressives that now was the time to "get off the fencd'and into the Progressive Blysian fields where "the sun shines brightly and the cool and refreshing waters are running in abundance for all."^2 Wilcox then asked Greenway what he thought about the idea of securing an outside speaker for the conference. As far as he was able to ascertain, Wilcox said, "all who were with us in 1912 are still with us," and the Progressive party was gaining in strength.v

L. L. Hayden, a Globe Republican, felt quite the same.

The Republicans should "get busy," he wrote John H. Campbell, formerly an associate Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, since the only chance that his party had was to make some arrangement to win back the Bull Moosers. Hayden stated

that he could answer for "every Bull Moose in Gila," and

that "a very small concession will make them Republicans."

Peeling that the same conditions existed all over the state,

Hayden suggested as a possible solution of Progressive-

Republican difficulties a unified stand on "one side or

^David Benshimol to Greenway, April 1, 1914; Greenway to Benshimol, April 2, 1914.

32Arizona Republic. April 3, 1914, p. 4.

33wilcox to Greenway, April 2, 1914. 80 another11 of the prohibition question. Hayden advised that something be done before the Hfanatics" in the Progressive party start something in the way of an organization.^

On April 3 the Republic declared that all except

"office-seekers" were invited to the Phoenix conference,

and that the call was to be construed as an open invitation

to all who had not heretofore been Progressives. Five days

later Heard* s newspaper took another opportunity to declare

that there would be no step taken toward merger, but still the conference met under this onus.^ On the day that the conference convened the Republic asserted again that there

was no basis for merger except what some Republicans and

Progressives regarded as "our common desire to secure the

offices." The Republic maintained that "offices mean

nothing to the real Progressive except as they give oppor­

tunity to carry out Progressive principles," and that the

new party would gain strength from "accretion" rather than from "combination."3^

As the conference convened, it was clear from the

start that there would be no merger. J. L. B. Alexander

^I». L. Hayden to Campbell, papers of John H. Campbell, Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, April 2, 1914.

^ Arizona Republic. April 3, 1914, p. 4; April 8, 1914, p. 4.

36rbid., April 20, 1914, p. 1 81 opened with a short speech warning Progressives that they would lose their "identity, respect, and strength" if the

Republican proposal of merger was adopted. When Wilcox introduced a resolution against merger, however, one delegate attempted to amend it to permit amalgamation in the counties

"when practicable or desirable." Thomas D. Molloy and

Charles W. Allen, both of Yuma, thought an restrictive amendment unnecessary. Heard supported Wilcox's resolution because it provided a "definite answer to an inquiry gener­ ally being made." As the resolution was finally read into the minutes, however, it was far from definite. Weak as it was, Heard was pleased.

The conference went on to promulgate a platform which

condemned the non-exemption of American vessels from the

Panama Canal, called for a constitutional amendment to the

Arizona constitution which would effectuate the initiative

and referendum, and demanded the maintenance of the American

rights in matters of border diplomacy. The platform con­

cluded with resolutions favoring a protective tariff, trust

37ibid.. April 21, 1914, p. 5. The full text of the resolution read: "Be it resolved that we the members . . . hereby declare that it is the purpose and intent of the Progressive party of Arizona to nominate true Progressive party men for all State and United States offices to be filled at the next general election, pledged to enact and support Progressive platforms. And further, we earnestly recommend to Progressives of the several counties that they put full county and precinct tickets in the field at the coming elections." 82 legislation, and an eight hour law in industrial labor as well as legislation to improve labor conditions and to permit teq the suffrage to all citizens regardless of sex.''

While the Progressives were in conference, Arizona

Republicans made strenuous efforts at amalgamation. Greenway reported to George W. Perkins that they had offered "all the

offices" in exchange for the name Progressive-Republican.^

Had Greenway waited five days, he might have told Perkins

that when local Progressives entered the Bisbee primary on

a separate ticket they had been disastrously defeated.

Their candidate for mayor received only seventy-two votes

out of 1,005 cast. The Republican State Committee now

claimed that the Progressives membership had shrunk to only

twenty-nine per cent of the Roosevelt vote seventeen months

earlier.* *0

Progressive prospects, regardless of what the Republic

might maintain, were not bright. John 1. Campbell thought

that the herd of lull Moo sera was rapidly thinning out.*^-

Greenway, on the other hand, could see little future for the

38ibld.. April 21, 1914, p. 5.

39Greenway to Perkins, April 21, 1914.

*Qllsbee Dally Review.. April 25, 1914, p. 5? April 26, 1914, p. 4.

^Campbell to Hayden, May 2, 1914, Campbell papers, APIS. 83

Republican party. "Perhaps with Barnes, Penrose, Root,

Devine, Guggenheim and others out of control," Greenway informed a friend, "there might be some hope for the

Republican platform, but I doubt even that."*2

In mid-Hay Perkins asked Greenway to inform Roosevelt on Progressive affairs in Arizona. On the 21st he sent a long letter which dealt almost exclusively with the Mexican situation and foreign affairs. Greenway1s first objection was to the Democratic policy of "loving everybody" and the offer of "blackmail" to Columbia. As far as he could tell,

Greenway said, the Mexican policy was being handled without any "tangible plans" and its only purpose was to "moDify"

the Latin Americans. In the end, he thought, "we must take

Mexico," since the only way to end the chaos there was to

take the capitol and put in a "strong right-minded Mexican" with a constabulary behind him. Turning to Progressive

politics, Greenway predicted that he felt industrial con­

ditions, "now bad," would soon be "so much worse" that the

rank and file of the Republican party would turn to Roosevelt

in 1916.^ In a letter on the same day to Heard, Greenway

^Greenway to H. 0. Dudley, May 5, 1914.

^Perkins to Greenway, May 13, 1914; Greenway to Perkins, May 18, 1914; Greenway to Roosevelt, May 21, 1914. 84 suggested that the Republic take some stand on the Panama

Canal question and above all attack Wilson*s policy of

"denationalization." Greenway also added to his forecast

that the rank and file of the Republican party would nominate Roosevelt in 1916 rather than allow the Democrats

to stay in power under Wilson. This would probably work

out with the Progressives first nominating Roosevelt and

the Republicans later ratifying this action.

In June Roosevelt refused a request from Heard to

advise in local matters, but he did suggest that Heard take

his public utterances and apply them "as far as possible" to

the local situation. Roosevelt then counseled a policy which would make it easier for Republicans to act with the Progres­

sives separately or as independent Republicans. In any case.

Heard was to oppose the Wilson administration and to stand

like "flint" against amalgamation.^

Storm clouds were already on the horizon for the

Progressive party in Arizona. Republican leaders had

scheduled a conference in Prescott on July 4 to take advantage

of the Frontier Days celebration in that city. The object

^Greenway to Heard, May 21, 1914.

^Roosevelt to Heard, June 26, 1914. 11 ting 1. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vole. (Massachusetts,^1954), 7, p. 767. 85 of this meeting, the Republic charged catagorically, was amalgamation. His paper, Heard said, did not speak for

Progressives around the state but only for itself, and it would not support a Republican-Progressive fusion ticket.

If Heard and the Arizona Republic were concerned, Greenway had become doubly worried over the prospect of merger. "It would be suicide for us to consider this at this time," he wrote J. L. B. Alexander, and suggested that perhaps a non­ partisan ticket could be secured. Greenway wished for "a good fair Democrat at the head for Governor, a Republican like Kibbey for Senator, and a man like Tom Molloy or some other good Progressive for Congressman." This could be done only if both the Republicans and Progressives refrained from putting up a state ticket under their respective banners.

Then at least the Progressive party would not have compromised

itself and would be free to take any measures it wished in

1916. That same day he wrote Tom Molloy of Yuma his plan for

a non-partisan ticket if the "proper timber" could not be

secured for a strong Progressive campaign.2^

Perhaps Greenway had just realized how dangerously

close to merger the Progressives and Republicans were coming,

^Arizona Republic, June 24, 1914, p. 4.

^Greenway to Alexander, June 30, 1914; Greenway to Tom Molloy, June 30, 1914. 86 for he now wrote also to David Benshimol, the Oochise

County chairman, demanding that the Progressives get

together immediately to put up a strong county ticket.^8

Two days before the Republican meeting In Prescott,

Heard1s paper carried on its front pages a telegram which

evidently had just arrived from the Bull Moose himself.

"Only by fighting under the Progressive banner for the

principles enunciated,M Roosevelt declared, " . . . will it

be possible for the people to come to their own." Roosevelt

told wavering Progressives that the Democratic policy had

reduced the Uhlted States to "impotence" abroad and

"disaster" at home.^9

At Prescott the Republicans immediately appointed

Robert E. Morrison of Yavapai to confer with Alexander,

Molloy, and E. S. Clark. Morrison was instructed to extend

an invitation to the Progressives to aid the Republicans

at the primaries. Morrison conferred with the Progressive

leaders, but his efforts were in vain because the Progressives

would not accept the hyphenated name "Progressive-Republican"

and Republicans would not accept the "unreasonable" plan

concocted by Greenway.50

48Greenway to Benshimol, June 30, 1914.

49Arizona Republic. July 2, 1914, p. 1. 5°Ibid.t July 6, 1914, pp. 1, 3, 87

Shortly after the Prescott fiasco, Heard left for

Hew York to see Roosevelt. Prom there he wired local

Progressives that Roosevelt wished them "Godspeed In their fight for the principles for which the Progressive party

stands." Heard also held out "strong hopes" that Roosevelt would visit Arizona. While Heard made his way back to

Arizona, Hubbell and Morrison were touring the state to see

if they could make further inroads into the Progressive

organization and to promote merger at the county level. Both

traveled through Yuma, Pima, Pinal, and Santa Cruz.51 At

Yuma, Hubbell and Morrison seemed to meet success. Molloy

wired Greenway to report that the "Progressive-Republican"

Yuma committee had agreed upon "progressive platform,

republican principles," and Roosevelt for President. Molloy

wanted "immediate concurrence" by all county committees.

Greenway replied the next day that the Republican action in

Prescott had rendered any such merger impossible. "Any

amalgamation," he declared, "would be fatal." Greenway

advised that there was only one line of action— a straight

out and out state ticket and, wherever possible, a county ticket.52

51lbid.t July 9, 1914, p. 1; July 18, 1914, p. 4; Blsbee Daily Review. July 23, 1914, p. 1.

52Molloy to Greenway, July 22, 1914; Greenway to Molloy, July 22, 1914. 88

Even in Greenway* s home county of Cochise there was almost a merger. Heard, Greenway, and others issued a call for the Progressive Central Committee to meet in

Douglas on July 29. Two days before this meeting, Hubbell and Morrison arrived in Bisbee. Hubbell talked with Greenway but achieved nothing.*^ The Progressive Central Committee declared for a "straight Progressive state and county ticket." However, at a later meeting in Bisbee, local

Progressives and Republicans decided on a fusion ticket.

This fell through when Cochise Republicans repudiated the compromise, but both later agreed to a "non-conflict, two- one party ticket" where both parties agreed not to run an opposing candidate against each other.^

On August 3, Hubbell reported that his and Morrison's trip, which included almost every county, had assured local

Republicans of success. Both were convinced that most

Progressives had already realigned themselves with the

Republican party. Hubbell charged that "a few" leaders in

Phoenix were still trying to place a state ticket in the field, but predicted that it would attract little support.55

^ Douglas pally International. July 27, 1914, p. l.

54Bisbee Daily Review, July 30, 1914, p. 1; August 7, 1914, p. 1; August 9, 1914, p. 1; August 13, 1914, p. 1; September 23, 1914, p. 2; Douglas Daily International. September 23, 1914, p. 1.

55ibid., August 3, 1914, p. 2. 89

Hubbell was probably right, as Progressives had adopted the

"Yuma plan" in Yuma, Santa Cruz, Gila, and Graham. Cochise had agreed to open tickets. Only Pima and Maricopa nomin­ ated full straight county tickets.5^

The Progressives meeting in Phoenix, nominated

George U. Young for Governor, Dr. J. Bernard Nelson for

United States Senator, J. 1. B. Alexander for Attorney

General, Frank P. Moore, for Corporation Commissioner,

Frank P. Parker and J. B. Suits for Tax Commissioner, and

J. H. Marcia, Norman McKenzie, and R. L. Stallings for

Mine Inspector. Progressives promised to name, in the near future, candidates for Secretary of State, Treasurer,

Auditor, and Superintendent of Public Instruction.57

Progressives began their state campaign in a weakened condition. "Our flag is nailed to the mast," Heard reiterated in a speech to Gila Progressives, declaring that he would fight every effort at amalgamation to the "last ditch."

He was a Progressive^ Heard told his audience because he had watched the "wretched" manipulation of the 1912 Chicago convention and because the Progressive candidate polled four million votes.58 But regardless of how much Progressives

-^Douglas Daily International. August 1, 1914, p. 1.

57Arlzona Republic. August 2, 1914, p. 1.

58ibld.. August 2, 1914, p. 1. 90 might resist amalgamation, Republicans kept the issue before them and particularly before the voter# In September, both of the major Progressive candidates. Young and Nelson, were forced to deny the charge of the Tucson Citizen that they favored merger. Nelson replied that he did not seek

"amalgamation" with "any party or parts of parties." Young took this opportunity to state his belief that "politics should be of no moment" in Arizona, for capital was vanishing from the state and labor stood "helpless, wasted . . . con­ fused." The "greatest and wealthiest state" lay prostrate, and all of this was due to the present Democratic Adminis­ tration.^

Ralph H. Cameron, the Republican nominee for Governor, had not been idle: Cameron claimed that he had conducted a canvass and the results showed that seventy-five per cent of the state's 10,000 dissatisfied Democrats, would vote for him, only five per cent would vote for the candidate of the

Progressives, and twenty per cent would remain indifferent.

A vote for either the Progressive party or the Socialist

party, Cameron said, would be an indirect vote for Hunt.^

59ibld.. September 15, 1914, p. 1.

6oBlsbee Dally Review. October 27, 1914, p. 1. 91

In September both the Progressives and the Republicans met In Phoenix to promulgate their platforms. The Progres­ sive party proclaimed a twenty-four point platform. Its most notable feature was an attack upon Governor Hunt* s sus­ pension of capital punishment and upon his administration for

"scandal in mismanagement" and extravagance. The Progressives also adopted a "dry" plank and endorsed woman suffrage. The

Republican platform likewise endorsed equal suffrage and also charged that the history of Democratic control of the govern­ ment was one of "inefficiency, mismanagement, and extrava­ gance" The Republicans pointed directly to the Governor* s

"luxurious" automobile, and the increase of one million dollars in the state expenditures by the addition of unnec­ essary officers. The whole document was capped with a charge against the Democrats for its expensive special sessions.^1

Regardless of what Republicans and Progressives might say. Governor Hunt effectively neutralized the hue and cry with the publication of a pamphlet containing a "partial record" of his administration which was designed to refute

"erroneous" and "distorted" reports. Hunt wisely concluded his campaign for a second term on the capital punishment issue, to the excluding of every other issue except economy.62

Glirizona Republic. September 30, 1914, p. 6.

62(jeorge W. P, Hunt, "Partial Record of the First State Administration; Winsor to Ives, October 15, 1914; 92

Before the ballots had been counted, It was apparent

that the Democrats had made a complete sweep. Hunt had failed to carry his amendment abolishing capital punishment,

but had defeated Cameron by 7,624 votes. Cameron in turn

had polled 12,396 votes more than the Progressive candidate,

George U. Young. Republicans had averaged 7,000 votes more

than Progressives, who in turn had generally outpolled the

Socialists. Where Progressives and Socialists had run

candidates for the same office, however. Progressives

averaged only 200 votes more than the Socialists. Progres­

sives had failed to run candidates for United States

Representative, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, or

Superintendent of Education. Republicans, on the other

hand, would have had to have the combined vote of both the

Socialist party and the Progressive party to have elected any candidate.^3

Ives* papers, APRS. See also the Arizona Republic. August 25, 1914, p. 1 .

63*»Arizona Election Returns, 1911-1958.H loc cit. CHAPTER V

DEATH OP A PARTY

Even though Victor Murdoch, a Kansas Progressive, might declare his party far from dead at the national level, in the new state of Arizona it had run its best candidates and had gone down to defeat.1 2 The Republican party had replaced the Progressive with the second largest constituency in the state while the votes had returned the Democratic

candidates in one of the most solid sweeps anywhere in the

country, electing a Democratic House and a Senate marred by 2 the presence of only one Republican, D. D. Crabb of Navajo.

Prom the standpoint of Republican prospects for the future,

unity with the Progressives was imperative— and unity could

be achieved only after dealing with Theodore Roosevelt and < the several state leaders.

In January of 1915 Heard moved to clear up the debts

of the abortive campaign and to ascertain Roosevelt* s view

as to the future policy Arizona Progressives should pursue.^

1Arizona Republic. November 7, 1914, p. 1.

2Ibid.. November 11, 1914, p. 7.

^Heard to Greenway, January 15, 1915; Greenway to Heard, January 20, 1915. 93 94

Heard suggested a "do nothing" policy, and Roosevelt agreed with him that It would he mere "silliness" to try another

straight ticket unless there was a "complete change" In the

political situation. At this time, Roosevelt thought the

country simply was not ready to accept, since the voters

felt that Progressives had presented "reform as an alterna­

tive to prosperity." In any case, Roosevelt advised Heard

to sit "tight" and "await events."4

Even before Heard*s letter, Greenway had seen Roosevelt

early In January.5 What took place at this meeting Is uncer­

tain, but both probably discussed Arizona politics and more

than likely the European and Mexican situations. Roosevelt

had come to feel that Germany was at fault in the European

conflagration, and that a strong policy would be necessary

to curb German military pretentions. A strong policy might

serve to unite the Progressives and Republicans under his

leadership in 1916; or, failing this, with the party organ­

ization still intact, Roosevelt could bargain to secure a

candidate acceptable to him and the rank and file of the Progressive party.^* 6

4Roosevelt to Heard, January 29, 1915. Morison, op. clt.. v. 7 , pp. 884-885.

^Greenway to Heard, January 20, 1915.

6Mowry, o£. clt., pp. 305, 311, 312. 95

In April of 1915 Greenway prematurely tried to find out how the call for the election of delegates to the State

Republican Convention would be made in the next year.

Greenway hoped, if possible, to be able to select delegates favorable to Roosevelt or to enter his name in the primaries.?

At almost the same time, Heard tried to promote Roosevelt's availability by holding him out to the voters as a leader who would have avoided the trouble with Mexico and Germany.

On the local level. Heard seized an opportunity to call for a non-partisan organization of good citizens to combat

Republican control of Phoenix. When this failed to material­ ize, Heard doubtless began to realize that reform stood no chance unless both parties could get together on a Progres­ sive candidate and platform.®

Heard soon requested a conference with Greenway, suggesting that it would be a good idea for both of them to see Roosevelt together. Heard felt that nationally there was danger that James R. Mann, a regular Republican from Illinois, would be nominated for the presidency on the Republican ticket; Mann, according to Heard, had "no sympathy" with

Progressive principles and was being boomed by the Palrbanks-

Cannon crowd. Heard warned Greenway that Roosevelt had

?Greenway to Williams, April 20, 1915, p. 4. ®Arizona Republic. April 8, 1915, p. 4. 96 described the situation as a "hair trigger," and that

Governor Hiram Johnson of California felt it "equally delicate."9

Heard hastened to enclose his letter to Roosevelt asking him to hold a conference of Western Progressives.

The purpose of this, according to Heard, would be to make clear to Republican leaders— as well as half-hearted

Progressives— that there would be "no earthly use . . . to slip over . . . a reactionary candidate or . . . platform."

Such a move, Heard felt, would be "suicidal" and would drive him and others into the Democratic fold even though they opposed Wilson’s foreign policy, particularly with Mexico.

Even though there was a great deal of Western interest in the possible candidacy of Senator William E. Borah of Idaho,

Heard had never been convinced of his "complete sincerity" but favored Charles Evans Hughes and Johnson running together

on a Progressive platform.3,0

Greenway agreed completely. He had come to feel that

Wilson’s recent action in the Lusitania crisis had indicated

that he was basically "sound and patriotic," and with the

removal of one cabinet member, Secretary of State William

Jennings Bryan, better things could be expected. Greenway *10

9Heard to Greenway, June 8, 1915.

10Heard to Greenway, June 5, 1915. 97 did not think that he would he able to go to New York for the launching of the battleship Arizona because he was in the process of awarding the contract for the construction of the Tucson, Cornelia, and Gila Bend Railroad.^ What

Greenway thought about a Progressive platform or candidate

for 1916 he never revealed to Heard, but he did tell another

friend that he was still a great believer in Roosevelt.

What the United States needed most, he thought, was a strong

hand in Mexico, as both the Taft and Wilson policies were "intangible" and "ridiculous.

Heard might privately keep the faith, but the policy

of the Arizona Republic was coming under criticism from

Tom Molloy of Yuma. Molloy asked Heard why his paper was as

"quiet as a mouse." Molloy particularly wanted to know if

the Progressives intended to "lie down" and be devoured by

the reactionary Republicans.^

■^Greenway to Heard (undated) Greenway‘s change of heart toward Wilson is supported when he indicated to Wendell McCormick that he would not care to join a call for volun­ teers, as he felt the Mexican and European situation "until a few days ago," would lead to War. Greenway to Wendell McCormick, June 11, 1915.

-^Greenway to G. P. Sawyer, September 2, 1915; Greenway to Walter Wakefield, August 10, 1915.

l^Molloy to Heard, October 10, 1915• 98

Molloy* a criticism was well founded. Heard had failed to publish his yearly report to Arizona Progressives, traditionally due on October 6, the date of Heard's purchase of the paper. Moreover, the editorial columns of the

Arizona Republic were now given over almost exclusively to the European war.1* The truth of the matter was that Heard* s Progressiv- ism was wavering; the European War had forced him, like other publishers, to forsake domestic objectives in the face of foreign realities. Heard wrote that he had seen Theodore

Saal, the Arizona organizer of the Naval league, in Phoenix, and Saal had passed along Greenway* s idea that the league hold a "good sized" meeting in Phoenix while the State Pair was in progress. Heard was glad that Greenway was "so thoroughly interested" in the league. "I am becoming more and more Independent politically and am more interested in what a man stands for," Heard wrote Greenway, and then went on to outline what he thought would be good Progressive strategy. Heard felt that Progressives, by working together

l4prom the outbreak of war in 1914 to the end of 1915, the Arizona Republic was favorable to defense, favorable to Wilson's European policy, but anti-Wilson on his Mexican policy. At no time during 1915 did the Republic call for war with Germany; rather it always believed that there would be no war. For examples see the Arizona Republic, May 9, 13, 16; June 6, 21; July 11, 15, 10; August 20, 22; Septem­ ber 2, 4; October 9, 10, 28; December 18, 1915. 99 at both the state and national levels "whether they put up a separate ticket or not" would be able to exert a "deciding influence" in favor of a genuine American policy which would include national preparedness and the elimination of the tariff from politics. In local politics, Heard thought, there was altogether too much partisanship; what was really needed was "level headed" leadership and an "independent movement," since there seemed to be no chance of securing improvements from the old Republican ring. Heard then asked

Greenway to come to Phoenix to discuss state politics.^5

Greenway, replying that he would be in Phoenix for the

State Fair in November, remarked that Governor Hunt seemed a "distinct drawback" to the development of the state.^

When Greenway came to Phoenix late in November, he spoke at a banquet launching the Arizona Naval league.17 While in

Phoenix, perhaps Heard and Greenway conferred on state politics and made the decision to abandon the Progressive party in favor of a non-partisan independent movement to champion the nomination of Roosevelt on the regular Republi­ can ticket. From the beginning of 1916, in any case the actions of John 0. Greenway and Dwight B. Heard, were directed to these ends.

ISHeard to Greenway, October 2$, 1915.

l^Greenway to Heard, October 29, 1915.

•^Arizona Republic. November 17, 1915. 100

In an editorial on January 1, 1916, the Arizona

Republic publicly professed what Heard had written Greenway the previous October: that the policy of his paper in state and county affairs would be a thoroughly independent one which called for the formation of an independent move­ ment based on the needs of a "thoroughly efficient, econom­

ical, clear-headed, business-like government." In national matters the paper professed the old Progressive hope that the

Republican party may become "really" Progressive with a plat­

form which recognized the economic, social, and industrial

needs of the United States. If such objectives were to be

attained— and, most important of all, the Republican leader­

ship was to be in the hands of men such as Roosevelt or

Hughes— then the Republican party would have the "vigorous

support" of Heard*s paper. Otherwise, the editorial was

quick to point out, some four million Progressives who had

supported Roosevelt would certainly not endorse a reactionary

platform and would again be forced to put up their own candidate."*"®

Some four days later Heard*s paper backed away from

the name "progressive" by declaring that "Progressive lead­

ers are not insistent upon the name of their party." Heard

X8 Ibid.. January 1, 1916, p. 1. 101 almost, but not quite, asked for an understanding with the

Republican party. Such an understanding must not sacrifice progressive principles.^ Greenway felt the same way. He believed that it would take "every ounce" of combined

Republican and Progressive strength to defeat Wilson. The younger element of the Republican party, Greenway hoped, would be able to straighten out the "old timers" in time for the Chicago convention.20

By January of 1916, therefore, it was evident that the Progressive party was dying and the only thing that remained was to set the date of its burial. When the Progres­ sive Central Committee met in Phoenix during the early days of January, it recommended that the state organization be kept intact "to await" the action taken by Republican leaders in Chicago. That same day Heard*s paper began a further retreat by distinguishing between policies and underlying principles as embodied in the 1912 platform. As long as

Progressive principles were maintained in the Republican platform, regardless of the language used, "we will not stick at details," the Republic stated; and Progressives would consent to hold certain policies in abeyance.21

19lbid., January 5, 1916, p. 1.

SOGreenway to Prank Hitchcock, January 13, 1916.

2lArizona Republic. January 13, 1916, p. 4. 102

Early in February Greenway tried to advise Roosevelt on a specific course of action. Since the voters felt that he was not seeking the presidency, he could consent to run again only at the entreaty of the people. Greenway explained that by "people" he meant the "anti-Wilson forces." Greenway then proposed that Roosevelt should allow the Progressives to go ahead and nominate him, but that after this had been accomplished he should notify the Progressive convention that he would accept the nomination only at the hands of all the

"anti-Wilson forces." Greenway felt that such a course would reinforce his supporters at the Republican convention to overthrow the "Old Guard" elements. In any case,

Roosevelt should not accept the nomination solely from either party.22

Toward the end of the month Heard moved to ascertain the remaining strength of the party in Arizona. On Febru­ ary 21 he sent out a call for a general meeting of Progres­ sive leaders around the state. The response was discourag­ ing. W. R. Chambers wrote to say that a Progressive organ­ ization no longer existed in Graham County, and that he himself was going to vote the Republican ticket.* 2^ From

22Greenway to Roosevelt, February 9, 1916.

23w. R. Chambers to Heard, February 24, 1916. 103

Pinal came the news that most Progressives were ready to merge with the Republicans. 0. J. Baugh blamed the general drift throughout the country for the forthcoming merger in his county; but he felt that to Heard that merger was necessary to "accomplish anything," and therefore the only thing to do was to join forces and attempt to "purify" the

o /l Republican party from the inside. Eli Hilty in Oatman,

Arizona, wrote Heard that he had "no time for politics" and that Mohave County did not have a representative of the

Progressive party even in 1914.25 p. Lathrop, another

Graham resident, thought that "the continuance of the

Progressive party . . . can have but one result • • • the

continuance in power of the Democratic party." Lathrop felt

that it might be possible, "if we are a majority," to remain

in the Republican party and ultimately triumph.

Heard forwarded these letters to Greenway, commenting

that he had seen Tom Molloy of Yuma on February 28, who was

now leaning toward the Republican bandwagon though still

loyal to Roosevelt. Heard also had talked with H. B.

Wilkinson of Phoenix and Thomas Marshall of Tucson, and

both felt that the thing to do was send a representative

2^0. J. Baugh to Heard, February 26, 1916.

25e i i Hilty to Heard, February 25, 1916.

26W. P. Lathrop to Heard, February 26, 1916. Other letters came from Fred 0. Backett and David Benshimol on the 23rd. 104 delegation to the Progressive convention. "If we do,"

Heard remarked, "you and I will have a great deal of hard work ahead of us." Heard then informed Greenway that he had told Judge Klhbey frankly that the Progressives were not going to Chicago with any "antagonistic" spirit toward

Republicans, but rather with the firm determination to secure Roosevelt as the candidate on a liberal platform.

Heard further assured Kibbey that Progressives would cooperate with Republicans of his "type," and intimated that the Pro­ gressives would not run a state ticket in 1916.27

By the second week of March, Greenway had already

determined to remain in the Progressive party until the

Republicans nominated Roosevelt. He recognized, however,

that there was a "question of doubt" on the wisdom of remain­

ing in the Progressive ranks, and advised Tom Molloy that

perhaps as much good could be done by working within the pQ Republican party. Two days later Heard moved to make

public what had already been discussed privately with Kibbey

as he sent Greenway a copy of a general letter dated March 13

which would make it "very clear" that there would be no state

Progressive ticket and that Arizona Progressives were prepared

to unite with Progressive-Republicans and Independent Democrats,

27Heard to Greenway, February 29, 1916.

Z^Greenway to Molloy, March 11, 1916; Greenway to John A. Stuart, March 11, 1916. 105 but Heard remarked that the "national situation presents an entirely different aspect."^9

On the 13th of March Heard released a general letter to Arizona Progressives. The letter carried a dual message.

The party. Heard declared, had only one first choice—

Colonel Roosevelt— but if the Republicans nominated another man whose record was unquestionably Progressive, the party would consider such a candidate favorably. Secondly, there was a "general" inclination among Progressives not to put a state ticket in the field.

On March 15 some thirty of the Progressive faithful met in Tucson and nominated Greenway, who was absent, as the state chairman to replace George McBean, who had resigned

The chairman*s sole responsibility was to call a state conven tion to select delegates to attend the Progressive National

Convention. Paul P. Feraald, chairman of the Pima Progres­

sives, recommended that Bisbee be chosen for the convention as a statewide reunion of Elks would be meeting at the same

time and it would be possible to secure attendance from all

2^Heard to Greenway, March 13, 1916.

3°Heard to Greenway, March 13, 1916. Republicans could have read almost the same thing in the editorial columns of the Arizona Republic on March 3, 1916, some ten days before the general letter of Heard. Arizona Republic. March 3, 1916, p. 4. 106 parts of the state.51 on March 21 Greenway declined, giving as a reason his duties at the mine, to accept the state chairmanship and recommended J. L. B. Alexander for the position.52 Alexander accepted and Issued the call for the

Progressive convention to he held In Bisbee on April 8 .

On the 18th of March the Republican State Committee met In Phoenix in an atmosphere, according to the Arizona

Republic, where the word "harmony" was so earnestly spoken that it lost its triteness. Republican leaders selected

May 5 as the date and Tucson as the site of this convention.

That night at a smoker the former Republican state chairman,

Lorenzo Hubbell, moved to narrow the breach between Republi­

cans and Progressives by guaranteeing that any "good man" would be certain to receive his support and suggested Joseph

H. Kibbey and Dwight B. Heard as possible candidates for the

regular nomination for governor.5^

The Arizona Republic remarked that the Republicans

had made a "good beginning," but whether or not they would be successful would depend on their state convention.55

5lArlzona Republic. March 16, 1916; Bisbee Dally Review. March 18, 1916, p. 1. Paul P. Feraald to Heard, March 16, 1916. Femald suggested Alexander in case Greenway could not accept.

52Greenway to Femald, March 18, 1916. 55"To the Progressives of Arizona," a copy of which is in the Greenway Papers. 3^Arlzona Republic. March 19, 1916, p. 8 . 55lbid., March 20, 1916, p. 4. 107

With the aid of the like convention the Progressive

State Convention opened at lisbee with some fifty delegates present, and like the Republicans, the Progressives now spoke of harmony. Greenway believed that the Progressives would

"talk" if the Republicans would meet them half way, and that diplomacy should be used to make it easy for the Republicans to make advances. "What we want," Greenway said, "is a

Progressive nominee on the Republican ticket." Heard read

a telegram from Roosevelt stating that he had withdrawn his name from the Michigan primaries. He would stand "straight"

for what the country needed, Roosevelt declared, for while

he did not believe that the nation would turn to him, it would turn to his principles. The convention then went on

record as favoring the nomination of Roosevelt, but Charles

Thomas, the sponsor of the resolution, explained that it was

not intended as binding the delegates but merely as an

expression of esteem. H. B. Wilkinson of Phoenix then intro­

duced a resolution endorsing "preparedness and efficiency."36

SSllsbee Daily Review. April 8, 1916, p. 1. The dele­ gates present by counties were Cochise 30, Pima 6, Maricopa 9, luma 1, Graham 1. Heard, Greenway, Alexander, John 0. Compton and Thomas K. Marshall were selected to attend the national convention. Ibid.. April 9, 1916, p. 1. Roosevelt endorsed the Progressive action at lisbee. "I am very glad you limited your resolutions to Americanism, preparedness, and efficiency, we must not let our Progressives at Chicago go off on a mass of resolutions . . * about social and industrial justice to which no human being will pay the slightest attention." Roosevelt to Heard, April 17, 1916. Morrison, op. cit., v. 7, p. 1033. --- 108

Following the Blsbee convention, David Benshimol, the county chairman, raised the question which was uppermost in some Progressive minds. What would the party do in the event

Roosevelt was not nominated in Ohioago? In that case,

Benshimol felt that the Progressive organization should remain intact and either Heard, Frank P. Moore, or himself

should run for governor as a "sacrifice" to keep the party

alive.37 Heard counseled a "wait and see" attitude, replying

to Benshimol that "it was a good policy not to cross bridges

until we come to them." Heard hoped simply that the Repub­

lican party would nominate a Progressive candidate and adopt

a liberal platform. He felt that each passing day made this

more probable; and if Progressives and Republicans could

unite in Chicago it would be an "easy matter" in Arizona to

unite on a man whose "character, ability and record" would

cause him to lead a successful fight for a "progressive,

clear-headed, economical government"^® Greenway concurred

in Heard1s position. "The whole thing," he wrote, hinges

on the action in Chicago .... There is a tremendous trend

of sentiment toward preparedness and incidentally toward Mr. Roosevelt.39

37Benshimol to Heard, April 10, 1916.

38neard to Benshimol, April 11, 1916.

39areenway to Heard, April 14, 1916. 109

Toward the end of April Greenway notified both

Roosevelt and Perkins that he was chairman of the Arizona delegation and would make every effort to have the Repub­ licans send a delegation to Chicago which would support

Roosevelt. To Perkins he confided that he had friends in

the Republican party, whose assurances had led him to believe

that Arizona Republicans would be for Roosevelt, though not instructed.

Several days later, Tom Molloy wrote Greenway that he had carried Yuma County for Roosevelt by five to one. Molloy, who had re-entered the Republican party, justified his stand

by reminding the Progressives that his proposed course of

action might have been possible to carry all the county

delegations for Roosevelt. Molloy doubted the wisdom of the

course pursued by Greenway, Heard, and Alexander. "Your

influence and energy were missing from the Roosevelt fight

within the Republican ranks," Molloy wrote, and as a result

"many counties . . . have been carried . . . by the old

gang of reactionaries." He felt that Ralph Cameron's control

in Maricopa, and his winning the nomination for National

Committeeman from that county, had made it impossible for

the Progressives to secure a single delegate.

^°Greenway to Roosevelt, April 21, 1916; Greenway to Perkins, April 21, 1916.

^-Molloy to Greenway, April 25, 1916. 110

Greenway admitted that as much work could be done from within the Republican ranks, "possibly more" inside

than out, but nevertheless, he would not re-enter the fold until its leadership was "cleansed." Greenway advised

Molloy to try to work for an "uninstructed" but pro-Roosevelt

delegation. The men slated to go to Chicago, he thought, were Kent of Maricopa, Breen of Coconino, Richey of Pima,

Overlook of Cochise, Molloy of Yuma, and one other. He

thought that Kent would do, but Overlook was a "standpatter."

Greenway hoped that Molloy and John Gatti, the other liberal

Republican from Morenci, would combine to send Ralph Zeisemer

of Oochise, a strong Roosevelt man, in place of Overlook.

While Ralph Cameron and Michael B. Cassidy were the two

candidates for national committeemen, Greenway personally

preferred Judge Kent or Molloy.

As the Republican State Convention met, assembling in

Tucson on May 5, Greenway received news from J. B. Speed of

Kingman. He was "falling in line with the better element"

in Mohave County, Speed wrote, and he and another good

Roosevelt man would pay Ban Worth's way to Tucson as he was

^2Greenway to Molloy, May 2, 1916. Greenway did not trust Cameron. Cecil A. Lyon had written that he had seen Cameron "drunk making a perfect ass out of himself," but regarded him as "straight out" for Roosevelt. Lyon to Greenway, February 24, 1916; Greenway replied: "I have no confidence in him whatsoever . . . his word is no good." Letter to Lyon, March 13, 1916. Ill the Republican "bull cow" of Mohave County and could possibly hold the other delegates in line. Mohave Republi­ cans were not of the "standpat variety" and would support

Roosevelt if he were nominated.^3 Greenway thought that

Worth should contact Molloy, Gatti, Zeisemer of Cochise, and

Abbott of Maricopa as well as Allen Jaynes of Tucson. Green­ way wrote that he was not certain of Jaynes' loyalty but was sure "he will be all right if he says he will be." Greenway preferred to see Ralph Zeisemer, Kent, Gatti, Jaynes and

Judge Smith of Prescott selected as delegates to the Repub­ lican Convention. He was only interested in the election of a president who would stand for Americanism and constructive statesmanship, and therefore was willing to sacrifice all the state offices to the Republicans provided they nominate a "courageous" man.44

Arizona Republicans were as interested in the presi­ dential nomination as Greenway. When the state convention met in Tucson, the proceedings were dominated by predictions of what would happen in Chicago. Ralph Cameron lost his place as national committeeman as the convention decided to allow the delegates to the Chicago convention to select the

43j. b . Speed to Greenway, May 3, 1916.

44Greenway to Speed, May 5, 1916. 112 committeeman after the designation of a presidential can­ didate. Thus Arizona Republicans, as well as Progressives, preferred to await the verdict of the Chicago convention.^

After the state convention, John Gattl wrote Greenway that the six delegates to Chicago were progressively inclined. Five of them were Hughes men but four would vote for Roosevelt "at the drop of a hat." The other man was not anti-Roosevelt, but would vote with the majority. Gattl then went on to give a long account of the state convention.

Allen B. Jaynes had toured the state to secure delegates for

Hughes or Roosevelt and to defeat Robert E. Morrison, an;.

"old guard” leader in the North. Gattl had worked with

Jaynes and other liberals to effect the overthrow of Cameron as national committeeman. Cameron, Gattl stated, had described himself as "anti-Roosevelt," even while trying to make a combination with the Roosevelt forces. "As the situa­ tion now stands," Gattl wrote, "if the Colonel is nominated.

Senator Hubbell or some other prominent Roosevelt man can be selected as National Committeeman. It would have been inconsistent, to say the least, to have Cameron for National

^ Arizona Republic. May 6, 1916. pp. 1, 5. According to the Republic. Cameron seemed to be representing the Pro­ gressive wing of the Republican party as it appears that he tried to form a coalition with Conservative Republicans. 113

Committeeman with Roosevelt our candidate.Greenway replied to Gattl by asking If it would be possible for him to go to Chicago to help some of the Arizona delegates

"make a decision at the crucial moment."^? In a letter to

George W. Perkins he assessed the six delegates— Judge

Edward Kent of Phoenix the chairman, C. A. Overlook of

Douglas, John B. Wright of Tucson, P. H. Freund&nthal of

Solomonville, P. S. Breen of Flagstaff, and Leroy Anderson of Jerome. None were strong Roosevelt men, but at least they were not violently opposed to him. Greenway felt that

Kent, already a firm friend of the Colonel, would support him, as would Freundenthal and Wright without much work.

"We will attempt," Greenway said, "to do what we can with the other three."4# A few days later he wrote Guy Emerson, secretary of the Roosevelt Non-Partisan League, to suggest that Judge Kent be invited to membership in the league since he had "leanings" toward Roosevelt but "has not made up his mind." Failing this, Greenway suggested John B. Wright of Tucson for membership.^9 The next day Greenway reported to

46Gatti to Greenway, May 9, 1916; Arizona Republic. May 30, 1916, p. 1 . The Republic stated that the Republican delegation contained only two Roosevelt supporters.

^Greenway to Gattl, May 9, 1916.

^Greenway to Perkins, May 8, 1916.

49Greenway to Guy Emerson, May 10, 1916; Emerson replied: "We are not disposed to excuse you either and are going to ask the men you mention to serve . . . also." Emerson to Greenway, May 10, 1916. 114

Perkins that Kent was still “cautious," Kent and ex-Governor

Kibbey could do more to get Roosevelt votes in Arizona than all other supporters for the Colonel.

Greenway now persuaded a close friend, Doctor ?. E.

Shine, a great-great grandson of Thomas Jefferson, to write a letter to Guy Emerson in support of Roosevelt. Such a letter released by Emerson to the New York dailies, would have great effect.^ Shortly before his own departure Green­ way sent George Curry $100 to travel from Minnesota to Chicago

to help in lining up the Arizona delegation for Roosevelt.

The last time he saw Curry, Greenway said, he was trying to

start a war with Mexico over the dead body of a Britisher.

"I approve of your sentiment" Greenway remarked, "but if you

start something please be careful to do it over the dead body of an American."52

On June 7» 1916, the Republican and Progressive conven­

tions opened in Chicago, and from the start it was clear that

Roosevelt would not be acceptable to Republican leaders. The

nomination went to Charles Evans Hughes. Greenway wrote a

very close friend that Senators Reed Smoot of Utah and Murry

Crane of Maine had stopped Roosevelt by telling the delegates

50(}reenway to Perkins, May 11, 1916.

SlGreenway to Fred E. Shine, May 19, 1916; Greenway to Emerson, May 23, 1916; Shine to Greenway, May 23, 1916.

SlGreenway to Curry, May 14, 1916; June 1, 1916. 115 that if they would nominate a progressive like Hughes they could ignore Roosevelt.55 After Roosevelt had declined the

Progressive nomination, Greenway traveled to New York to see him. Roosevelt, Greenway felt, was ”harder hit" than he would let his friends know, but he justified his withdrawal on the belief that he was acting for his country. Greenway

then told John M. Parker, of Louisiana, the Progressive

Democrat who had been chosen as Roosevelt's Vice-presidential running mate, could not vote the Democratic ticket because

Wilson was "hopeless." "I have seen his intangible policy

on Mexico at too close range for four years to support him,"

Greenway wrote Parker.5^ To an old friend of the Spanish

American War he commented acidly that it looked funny to see

Wilson "shouting his head off now for preparedness when a

few months ago he was talking about 'being too proud to fight*, 'hysterical to prepare*."55

While Greenway was not yet ready to vote for Charles

Evans Hughes, Heard moved quickly to his support. Heard had

remained in Chicago to attend a session of the Progressive

National Committee on June 26, to decide the fate of the party.56

53&reenway to Dave Goodrich, June 22, 1916.

S^Greenway to John M. Parker, June 22, 1916; New York Times. October 10, 1916, p. 8 .

55(jreenway to Channing, June 22, 1916.

56ifowry, o£. cit., pp. 358-359. 116

The committee session pledged the party to Hughes, and

Heard wired Greenway that Roosevelt would support Hughes.

If he had to decide "at this moment," Greenway replied, he would vote for Hughes.5? Roosevelt*s endorsement of Hughes certainly proved that the Colonel was no "self-seeking egotist."58 one day after the Progressive party had been formally pledged to Hughes, Roosevelt notified Greenway to proceed with plans for a regiment of volunteer Cavalry on the Rough Rider model.59

On July 7» the Republicans of Arizona met in conven­ tion at Prescott. The Republic had predicted that Heard would be offered the chairmanship of the Republican State

Committee and Greenway was to serve as a presidential elector.80 $he delegates elected Thomas Maddox as state chairman and Greenway as one of the three presidential electors.

57Heard to Greenway, June 26, 1916; Greenway to Heard, June 27, 1916.

5®Greenway to Allen B. Jaynes, June 28, 1916.

59Roosevelt to Greenway, June 27, 1916; Mo wry, ojd. cit., pp. 355-357. Mowry fails to point out that Roosevelt had an additional reason to support Hughes. Greenway wrote Roosevelt: "Once Mr. Hughes is elected, I think you can then proceed with the organization of a division with almost certainty that it will be accepted and given the opportunity for real service." Greenway to Roosevelt, July 7, 1916.

60Arizona Republic. July 5, 1916, p. 4. 117

An olive branch was extended to Arizona Progressives with a resolution to send this message to Theodore Roosevelt: "For his constant advocacy of advanced ideas in respect of the common people of the nation, which has materially affected the policies of both the great parties of our nation and that we assure him of our full appreciation of the unqualified

support he has extended to Charles Evans Hughes?^

While the Prescott convention was in session, John

Gatti wired Greenway asking him to accept the Republican

chairmanship. Greenway refused, but Gatti went ahead after waiting until the last moment and presented his name as a

presidential elector.^2 Greenway did not know that his name

had been presented. On August 24 Greenway wrote Maddox, the

new state chairman, that he had just received a nomination

petition for presidential elector and that there must be

some misunderstanding. He asked Maddox to have his name

withdrawn, and so notified he was sending a copy of this

letter to the Secretary of State Sidney P. Osborn. But

Greenway* s request had reached Osborn two days after the

names of the candidates had been certified. Osborn told

6lIbid., July 7, 1916, p. 1.

62Gatti to Greenway, July 5, 1916; Greenway to Gatti, July 6, 1916; Gatti to Greenway, July 6, 1916. 118

Greenway that it was not impossible to comply with his request, but he could resign any time after the primary.

Almost from the beginning, Greenway was placed under pressure to remain on the ticket. Allen B. Jaynes urged him to do so, and that "it would have a very bad effect for the party.Gatti asked Greenway to "reconsider" since his resignation would be "misinterpreted" by the Democrats and would "embarrass us."^5 Heard had the strongest argument.

Roosevelt had suggested that he see Hughes, Heard told

Greenway, and in a "straight-forward" conversation the

Republican candidate had convinced him that he was sound on

"Americanism and Preparedness" and would give the country a

"clean progressive administration." Heard, therefore, had decided to accept the state leadership of the Hughes Alliance, and now asked for Greenway's support. He hoped that there might be "some way in which the present embarrassing situation may be adjusted . . . without handicapping the Hughes campaign."

Heard warned Greenway that his refusal would hurt Hughes nationally as Vance McCormick, Wilson's campaign manager, would not hesitate to advertise the matter.

G^Greenway to Maddox, August 24, 1916; Osborn to Greenway, September 2, 1916.

Jaynes to Greenway, August 29, 1916.

GSGatti to Greenway, September 14, 1916.

G^Heard to Greenway, September 10, 1916. 119

Greenway replied that he would withdraw his resigna­ tion, even though he felt that his friends were taking advantage of him and asked Heard to convey this information to Maddox.^7 Greenway1s anguish was partly eased when

James T. Williams of the Tucson Citizen flattered him with this remark: “As you no doubt are aware, there have been numerous instances where one or two popular electors have been elected where the remainder from the same state have been defeated.Greenway had already told Allen B. Jaynes, the Republican National Committeeman, that he would try to get Roosevelt to speak in behalf of Hughes in Arizona.^9

That same day he wrote Roosevelt that things were going

"swimmingly" and asked the Colonel to speak in Douglas,

Bisbee, and Phoenix. Things were quiet in Mexico since

Wilson's show of force, but Greenway thought that "we must ultimately intervene." Declining the invitation to speak in Arizona, Roosevelt commented that the Wilson's use of some

150,000 troops on the border was like a "chief of police" placing some six men in a house to sit up all night to prevent burglaries. Such action was hardly "a satisfactory permanent arrangement•"70

^Greenway to Heard, September 14, 1916.

^Williams to Greenway, September 29, 1916. 69Greenway to Jaynes, August 23, 1916. TOGreenway to Roosevelt, August 23, 1916; Roosevelt to Greenway, September 7, 1916. 120

In the early days of October Heard wrote Greenway that he was now president of the Hughes Alliance and was working to get Democrats to vote for Hughes.71 Jaynes, on the other hand, was working to secure a victory for Thomas

E. Campbell over Governor Hunt. Republicans had organized the "hundred club," which would be composed of individuals who felt it worth one hundred dollars each to get rid of Hunt. Greenway enrolled.72 Like Heard, he had "pocketed" his disappointment over the failure of the Republican party to accept Roosevelt, and was now "heart and soul" in the Hughes movement.73

With unity thus achieved in Republican ranks, Thomas

E. Campbell almost unseated Hunt in the election of 1916.

On the first count of the ballots, Campbell had 27,976 to

Hunt's 27,946; but on a recount and a decision by the Arizona

Supreme Court, Governor Hunt retained his office by forty- three votes. In the national contest Charles Evans Hughes had lost in Arizona by a substantially wider margin. Woodrow Wilson polled 12,654 more votes than the Republican candidate.74* 7

7lHeard to Greenway, October 3, 1916.

72Jaynes to Greenway, October 10, 1916. Jaynefs list of the "hundred club" contained some 32 names.

73(jreenway to Heard, October 10, 1916.

7411 Arizona Election Returns 1911-1958." loc. cit. 121

Even unity could not "bring victory to the Republican party. In July, after the decision had been made to abandon the Progressive party, Roosevelt had written Heard a long letter in which he had depreciated the efforts of the

Progressives in the South, and the Eastern States of Rhode

Island, Massachusetts, Hew York, and Hew Jersey. In those states, Roosevelt declared, the Progressives had only *small derelict political organizations* which had become, a Hgrave detriment to the country.N75 it was natural to ask that they be abolished, and Roosevelt was at least kind by not includ­ ing Arizona in his list, but the Progressive movement in the

"baby state" had traveled the same road. The year 1912 had been the time of high tide. With Roosevelt as their candi­

date, Arizona Progressives had made a good showing. Even

their lone candidate for Congress, Robert S. Fisher, had

secured more votes than the Republican, Socialist, or

Prohibition candidates. Without Roosevelt in 1914, the

Arizona Progressives polled barely more votes than did the

Socialists, ly 1916 all that remained was a "strict

Roosevelt following."76 Roosevelt was indeed kind to let

the Progressive party die a natural death in Arizona.

75Roosevelt to Heard, July 3, 1916. Mbrison, op. clt., v. 8, pp. 1083-1084. ---

76(jreenway to Harold L. Ickes, October 3, 1916. 122

The Progressive movement in Arizona from its birth was stillborn. Roosevelt might conclude that the people were not sufficiently advanced to follow the lead of the

Progressives and his reasoning may have had some validity at the national level, but in Arizona, the Progressive party had been only one of four political parties.?? Further, it was an off-shoot from a party which had traditionally failed

to secure offices by the ballot. For almost fifty years

Republicans had secured their offices largely by appointment.

Democrats had traditionally controlled the territorial legis­

latures.?® In 1908, Republicans had succeeded in electing

Ralph Cameron as delegate to Congress. Cameron had promised

statehood, but when statehood came it came only with a condi­

tion attached. This was that Arizona make a constitution

which did not contain the recall of the judiciary. The

enabling act proved a Republican nightmare. It ruined any

Republican chances by giving the Democrats an issue on which

??Roosevelt to Heard, July 3, 1916. Morrison, op cit., v. 8, pp. 1083-84.

?®George H. Kelley, legislative History of Arizona. 1864-1912,:(Phoenix, 1926), pp. 262-263, 247, 147. Kelley claims that the 25th, 24th, 23rd, 17th, 16th, l4th territor­ ial legislatures were dominated by the Democrats, while the Republicans controlled only the 15th and both parties equally divided the Council and House in the 13th. In addition, the 22nd, 21st, 20th, and 11th legislatures, were controlled by the Democrats. The 10th had a Republican Speaker and a Democratic President of the Council. See the Arizona Republic, January 15, 1901, p. 1; January 15, 1899, p. 4; Arizona Miner. January 12, 1881, p. 4; January 6, 1879, p. 2. 123 to advertise their progress!visa. When the Progressives launched their movement in Arizona the logic of the situa­ tion demanded that they control the Republican organization.

This they could not do. Progressives, led by Heard and

Greenway, chose to set up a rival organization. Thus the

Progressive party from the start was forced into a position where it was not progressive. It became merely another right wing party taking its place beside the Republican party,

out-distanced in liberalism by the Democrats. Heard*s

doctrine of Independent action seemed the only way out of a

dilemma, for only by accretions of voting strength from the

Democratic, Socialist, Prohibition, and Republican parties

could the Progressive party hope to win in any political

campaign at the state level. When independent action failed

to bring increased voting strength to the Progressive party,

it faltered. Greenway, Heard, and Roosevelt had no medicine

strong enough to revive it short of amalgamation with the

Republican party, and even such unity left the Arizona

balance of power temporarily with the Socialists.^9

79Morlson. op. oit., v. 7, p. 767. Mori son maintains that in Arizona "the Republican-Progressive schism in 1914, as in 1912, insured Democratic victory.M nothing could be further from the truth. In the first state election, held in 1911, Republicans would have had to have the entire Socialist vote to have elected any state official. In 1912, with the Progressive-Republican schism. Republicans still needed about half of the Socialist vote and the total Pro­ gressive vote to have carried their candidates. In 1914, 124

Republicans would have needed the combined total vote of the Progressive, Socialist, and Prohibition parties to carry even a few offices in the general election. ’’Arizona Election Returns, 1911-1958." loc. cit. I. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Papers of John H. Campbell. Arizona Pioneers* Historical Society, Tucson, Arizona.

Papers of Moses E. Drachman. Arizona Pioneers’ Historical Society, Tucson, Arizona.

Papers of John Campbell Greenway. Arizona Pioneers’ Historical Society, Tucson, Arizona.

Papers of Charles W. Hicks. Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, Tucson, Arizona.

Papers of Eugene V. Ives. Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, Tucson, Arizona. Letterbooks of Eugene V. Ives, Spedial Collection Division of the University of Arizona Library, Tucson, Arizona.

Papers of Richard B. Sloan. Department of Library and Archives, Phoenix, Arizona.

William, E. E. "Arizona's Territorial Governors: Governor Sloan." Typescripts, Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, Tucson, Arizona.

"Arizona Election Returns, 1911-1958." Collected Miscellany. Department of Library and Archives, Phoenix, Arizona.

II. NEWSPAPERS

Arizona Dally Star (Tucson)

Arizona Journal Miner (Prescott)

Arizona Republic (Phoenix)

Bisbee Daily Review

Douglas Daily International

New York Times

Tucson Citizen

125 126

III. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Minutes of Republican State Convention, 1912, Held June 3« “ 1912, at Tucson. Arizona to klect Delegates to National Republican Convention June l8T l9l^. Special Collection Division o£ the University of Arizona Library, Tucson, Arizona.

U. S. Congressional Record. Vol. 45, Vol. 47.

IV. PUBLISHED PRIMARY MATERIALS

Ashurst, Henry Fountain. A Many Colored Toga, The Diary of Henry Fountain Ashurst. edited by George F. Sparks. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962.

Morison, Siting E. and John M. Blum (eds.). The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. 8 vols. Harvard University Press, 1951-54.

Roosevelt, Kermit. Letters to Hermit from Theodore Roosevelt. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946.

Roosevelt, Theodore. The Rough Riders and Men of Action. Vol. 11. National Editor. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926.

Sloan, Richard E. Memories of an Arizona Judge. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1932.

Taft, William Howard. Presidential Addresses and State Papers of William Howard Taft. 3 Vols. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1910.

V. SECONDARY MATERIALS

Buck, Paul H. The Road to Reunion. New York: Boston, Little, Brown and Company,1934.

Kelley, George H. Legislative History, Arizona 1864-1912. Phoenix: The Manufacturing Stationers, Inc., 1926. 127

McGlintock, James H. Arizona: Prehistoric. Aboriginal. M o d e m , 3 Vols, Chicago: The S, J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1916.

Mowry, George E. Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946. Pringle, Henry 3?. The Life and Times of William Howard Taft. 2 VollTI Hew York: Farrar and Rhlnehart, Inc., 1939.

Pringle, Henry F. Theodore Roosevelt. A. Biography. Hew York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931. Sloan, Richard E., and Ward R. Adams. History of Arizona: 4 Vols. Phoenix: Record Publishing Company, 1930.