US-Qatar Relations
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
US-Qatar Relations: A Summary of a Virtual Dialogue June 2-3, 2021 Editors: Geoffrey Kemp, Matthew Reisener, Rachel Bernstein, & Harry Stevens Center for the National Interest The Center for the National Interest is a nonpartisan public policy institution established by former President Richard Nixon in 1994. Its current programs focus on American defense and national security, energy and climate security, regional security in the Middle East, and U.S. relations with China, Japan, Europe, and Russia. The Center also publishes the bimonthly foreign affairs magazine The National Interest. The Center is supported by foundation, corporate and individual donors, as well as by an endowment. Copyright 2021. Center for the National Interest. All Rights Reserved. US-Qatar Relations: A Summary of a Virtual Dialogue Edited by Geoffrey Kemp, Matthew Reisener, Rachel Bernstein, & Harry Stevens Center for the National Interest 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 1200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Phone: (202) 887-1000 E-mail: [email protected] www.cftni.org Cover design by Gabriella Turrisi US-Qatar Dialogue: Center for the National Interest: June 2-3, 2021 On June 2 and June 3, 2021, scholars, policy experts, and former officials from Qatar and the US met virtually to discuss the current state of relations between the two countries in the context of global and regional changes. Since the Center for the National Interest’s last US- Qatari dialogue on September 26, 2019, a new American president has taken office, the Saudi- Emirati blockade of Qatar has been lifted, two Gulf states have normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, and every country in the world has experienced major disruptions as a result of COVID-19. Accordingly, there was much to discuss. The first two sessions of dialogue on June 2 covered the changing political environment in the Middle East and United States and regional security challenges, including the effects of great power rivalry on regional dynamics. The sessions on June 3 focused on climate change (specifically the role it plays as a potential security challenge), social movements, and broader US-Qatari relations. Day 1 (June 2) Session 1: Changing Political Environment in the Middle East and United States The regional development with the greatest potential to affect US-Qatari relations is America’s plan to reduce its military presence in the greater Middle East, best characterized by President Biden’s plan to withdraw all US troops from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. A reduced presence could create a power vacuum enabling other powers including Russia, China, and Turkey to increase their activity in the Middle East. Regional countries are increasingly looking to diversify their relationships with outside powers, which could complicate American involvement in the region due to its geopolitical rivalries with Russia and China (a solidification of the growing partnership between China and Iran could particularly threaten American interests). Furthermore, great power relationships with regional players could create new geopolitical dynamics and interest convergences; for instance, the proposed F-35 sale between US and UAE was first opposed by Israel but is now also opposed by China. Decreased US military involvement in the Middle East suggests regional states will become less reliant on outside powers to solve regional issues. Recently, the Middle East has seen a rise in indigenous efforts to broker peace and a decline in great power-led negotiations. The Abraham Accords (which normalized Israel’s relations with Bahrain and the UAE), the end of the Saudi-Emirati blockade of Qatar, and the recent Egyptian mediation of the Israeli-Hamas ceasefire in Gaza all hint toward a future Middle East that relies more on regional instead of global powers to broker regional conflicts. However, regional players still have ties to outside powers and may still be inclined to pursue agendas in line with outside states’ goals, even if those powers are not the United States. Furthermore, America’s role in facilitating the Abraham Accords shows that it is likely to remain an important player in regional geopolitics. The Middle East is experiencing rapid changes beyond the potential retreat of American power. Regimes which were destabilized by the Arab Spring ten years ago are now attempting to reestablish their former domestic power and regional influence. The resurgence of autocratic states could complicate America’s efforts to reduce its role in the region, particularly if those states’ goals run contrary to America’s. Furthermore, non-state actors continue to pose a threat to regional stability by undermining existing regimes and attempting to claim sovereignty in isolated geopolitical areas throughout the region. Several Middle Eastern countries face internal debates between advocates for greater representation and freedoms and those who favor stricter rule and greater authoritarianism. The increasing politicization of citizens, spurred on by social media echo chambers and spread throughout an increasingly online public, exacerbates existing political divides. Some in the Middle East still believe that revolution is the only way forward since the status quo has remained unchanged post-Arab Spring. Many of the divides in the Middle East are focused on the relative merits of various institutions and structures of power, as evidenced by the debate surrounding the current consolidation of power in Saudi Arabia which stands in stark contrast to traditional forms of government throughout the region. The primary focus of US Middle East policy has changed under recent American presidents. Under Barack Obama, the US pursued policies with a key goal of limiting Iranian nuclear enrichment. Obama’s policy saw the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in January of 2016. Under Donald Trump, the US withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions that predated the deal. Trump’s administration also demonstrated less focus on human rights abuses in the Middle East and allowed some regional actors and regimes to pursue more repressive agendas without rebuke. The Biden administration’s primary focus is domestic policy, but that could change if America’s 2022 midterm elections result in bipartisan legislative control. Regardless of the midterm outcomes, America’s Middle East policy is likely to remain schizophrenic since it lacks a coherent strategy for the region and sometimes takes actions and pursues policies that do not fit with its stated Middle Eastern agenda. For example, despite Biden’s commitment to withholding US engagement from governments that commit human rights violations, close relations with Egypt continue without Biden airing any objections to al-Sisi’s repressive domestic policies. Meanwhile, US-Israeli relations have become a partisan issue in the United States, and domestic politics could see future shifts of American policy depending on what if any changes are made to Israel’s foreign policy under its new government. Social media has increased the speed and volume of news distribution from Israel and Palestine to other parts of the world, while conversations about racial injustice in America have sparked a renewed domestic interest in the conflict. More Americans are critical of Israeli treatment of Palestinians, which contributes to the impassioned rhetoric surrounding the conflict in the US. A growing number of Democrats are criticizing America’s ideological and military support for Israel. Most American Jews identify as members of the Democratic Party and demonstrate both a lack of support for former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a commitment to a two-state solution. Although there are deep divides over the question of American support for Israel among the Democrats, Biden has thus far given no indication of any desire to move the American embassy back to Tel Aviv or to back away from the Abraham Accords. Do the Abraham Accords signify a step toward de-escalation of historic regional tensions? A majority of Middle Easterners see the Abraham Accords more as a reflection of the Trump administration’s support for Israel than a change in the status quo, since most regional governments had already established some level of relationship with Israel to gain favor with the US. Additionally, the recent violence in Gaza and Israel has hardened Israeli public opinion of Arabs and Arab public opinion of Israelis. Given this context, the hope that the Abraham Accords could expand beyond the current signatories and seek to address other regional tensions seems unlikely. In this context, the JCPOA could ultimately have a greater impact on Middle Eastern politics than the Abraham Accords. While the US withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018, Biden’s efforts to revive the deal have been complicated by the recent Iranian election in which the agreement became heavily politicized. Biden has publicly stated that he will not return to the JCPOA unless Iran further curbs its uranium enrichment. Trump’s reinstatement of pre-JCPOA sanctions had a crushing effect on the Iranian economy, and the removal of sanctions would be a popular bonus for new Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Talks are currently underway in Vienna to negotiate a return to the JCPOA, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has demonstrated a generally supportive attitude toward the agreement. Negotiations face larger obstacles now than under Obama, since the original deal took place before Iran had crossed the 60% uranium enrichment