US- Relations:

A Summary of a Virtual Dialogue

June 2-3, 2021

Editors: Geoffrey Kemp, Matthew Reisener, Rachel Bernstein, & Harry Stevens

Center for the National Interest The Center for the National Interest is a nonpartisan public policy institution established by former President Richard Nixon in 1994. Its current programs focus on American defense and national security, energy and climate security, regional security in the Middle East, and U.S. relations with China, Japan, Europe, and Russia. The Center also publishes the bimonthly foreign affairs magazine The National Interest. The Center is supported by foundation, corporate and individual donors, as well as by an endowment.

Copyright 2021. Center for the National Interest. All Rights Reserved. US-Qatar Relations: A Summary of a Virtual Dialogue Edited by Geoffrey Kemp, Matthew Reisener, Rachel Bernstein, & Harry Stevens Center for the National Interest 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 1200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Phone: (202) 887-1000 E-mail: [email protected] www.cftni.org

Cover design by Gabriella Turrisi

US-Qatar Dialogue: Center for the National Interest: June 2-3, 2021

On June 2 and June 3, 2021, scholars, policy experts, and former officials from Qatar and the US met virtually to discuss the current state of relations between the two countries in the context of global and regional changes. Since the Center for the National Interest’s last US-

Qatari dialogue on September 26, 2019, a new American president has taken office, the Saudi-

Emirati blockade of Qatar has been lifted, two Gulf states have normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, and every country in the world has experienced major disruptions as a result of COVID-19. Accordingly, there was much to discuss.

The first two sessions of dialogue on June 2 covered the changing political environment in the Middle East and United States and regional security challenges, including the effects of great power rivalry on regional dynamics. The sessions on June 3 focused on climate change

(specifically the role it plays as a potential security challenge), social movements, and broader

US-Qatari relations.

Day 1 (June 2)

Session 1: Changing Political Environment in the Middle East and United

States

The regional development with the greatest potential to affect US-Qatari relations is

America’s plan to reduce its military presence in the greater Middle East, best characterized by

President Biden’s plan to withdraw all US troops from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. A reduced presence could create a power vacuum enabling other powers including Russia, China, and Turkey to increase their activity in the Middle East. Regional countries are increasingly looking to diversify their relationships with outside powers, which could complicate American involvement in the region due to its geopolitical rivalries with Russia and China (a solidification of the growing partnership between China and Iran could particularly threaten American interests). Furthermore, great power relationships with regional players could create new geopolitical dynamics and interest convergences; for instance, the proposed F-35 sale between

US and UAE was first opposed by Israel but is now also opposed by China.

Decreased US military involvement in the Middle East suggests regional states will become less reliant on outside powers to solve regional issues. Recently, the Middle East has seen a rise in indigenous efforts to broker peace and a decline in great power-led negotiations.

The Abraham Accords (which normalized Israel’s relations with Bahrain and the UAE), the end of the Saudi-Emirati blockade of Qatar, and the recent Egyptian mediation of the Israeli-Hamas ceasefire in Gaza all hint toward a future Middle East that relies more on regional instead of

global powers to broker regional conflicts. However, regional players still have ties to outside powers and may still be inclined to pursue agendas in line with outside states’ goals, even if those powers are not the United States. Furthermore, America’s role in facilitating the Abraham

Accords shows that it is likely to remain an important player in regional geopolitics.

The Middle East is experiencing rapid changes beyond the potential retreat of American power. Regimes which were destabilized by the ten years ago are now attempting to reestablish their former domestic power and regional influence. The resurgence of autocratic states could complicate America’s efforts to reduce its role in the region, particularly if those states’ goals run contrary to America’s. Furthermore, non-state actors continue to pose a threat to regional stability by undermining existing regimes and attempting to claim sovereignty in isolated geopolitical areas throughout the region.

Several Middle Eastern countries face internal debates between advocates for greater representation and freedoms and those who favor stricter rule and greater authoritarianism. The increasing politicization of citizens, spurred on by social media echo chambers and spread throughout an increasingly online public, exacerbates existing political divides. Some in the

Middle East still believe that revolution is the only way forward since the status quo has remained unchanged post-Arab Spring. Many of the divides in the Middle East are focused on the relative merits of various institutions and structures of power, as evidenced by the debate surrounding the current consolidation of power in which stands in stark contrast to traditional forms of government throughout the region.

The primary focus of US Middle East policy has changed under recent American presidents. Under Barack Obama, the US pursued policies with a key goal of limiting Iranian

nuclear enrichment. Obama’s policy saw the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action (JCPOA) in January of 2016. Under Donald Trump, the US withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions that predated the deal. Trump’s administration also demonstrated less focus on human rights abuses in the Middle East and allowed some regional actors and regimes to pursue more repressive agendas without rebuke.

The Biden administration’s primary focus is domestic policy, but that could change if

America’s 2022 midterm elections result in bipartisan legislative control. Regardless of the midterm outcomes, America’s Middle East policy is likely to remain schizophrenic since it lacks a coherent strategy for the region and sometimes takes actions and pursues policies that do not fit with its stated Middle Eastern agenda. For example, despite Biden’s commitment to withholding

US engagement from governments that commit human rights violations, close relations with

Egypt continue without Biden airing any objections to al-Sisi’s repressive domestic policies.

Meanwhile, US-Israeli relations have become a partisan issue in the United States, and domestic politics could see future shifts of American policy depending on what if any changes are made to Israel’s foreign policy under its new government. Social media has increased the speed and volume of news distribution from Israel and Palestine to other parts of the world, while conversations about racial injustice in America have sparked a renewed domestic interest in the conflict. More Americans are critical of Israeli treatment of Palestinians, which contributes to the impassioned rhetoric surrounding the conflict in the US. A growing number of Democrats are criticizing America’s ideological and military support for Israel. Most American Jews identify as members of the Democratic Party and demonstrate both a lack of support for former

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a commitment to a two-state solution. Although there

are deep divides over the question of American support for Israel among the Democrats, Biden has thus far given no indication of any desire to move the American embassy back to Tel Aviv or to back away from the Abraham Accords.

Do the Abraham Accords signify a step toward de-escalation of historic regional tensions? A majority of Middle Easterners see the Abraham Accords more as a reflection of the

Trump administration’s support for Israel than a change in the status quo, since most regional governments had already established some level of relationship with Israel to gain favor with the

US. Additionally, the recent violence in Gaza and Israel has hardened Israeli public opinion of

Arabs and Arab public opinion of Israelis. Given this context, the hope that the Abraham

Accords could expand beyond the current signatories and seek to address other regional tensions seems unlikely.

In this context, the JCPOA could ultimately have a greater impact on Middle Eastern politics than the Abraham Accords. While the US withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018,

Biden’s efforts to revive the deal have been complicated by the recent Iranian election in which the agreement became heavily politicized. Biden has publicly stated that he will not return to the

JCPOA unless Iran further curbs its uranium enrichment. Trump’s reinstatement of pre-JCPOA sanctions had a crushing effect on the Iranian economy, and the removal of sanctions would be a popular bonus for new Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Talks are currently underway in Vienna to negotiate a return to the JCPOA, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has demonstrated a generally supportive attitude toward the agreement. Negotiations face larger obstacles now than under Obama, since the original deal took place before Iran had crossed the

60% uranium enrichment barrier. A deal now would require a rollback in enrichment for Iran.

Furthermore, a hardliner like Raisi is more likely than a reformer to demand broader American concessions in any new deal.

Session 2: Security Challenges in the Region

One of the biggest security issues facing the Middle East is the role of Iran and its proxies in the region. While there has been little substantive change to the frequency of Iranian incursions into the Arab world, there have been changes in the purpose and methods of these activities. Following the assassination by the US of General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, many predicted significant setbacks to Iran’s ability to influence regional affairs due to the unique role and experience that Soleimani had in coordinating proxy operations. While his death may have destabilized Iran’s proxy network (as demonstrated by a temporary degradation in relations between Iran and some of its associated militia groups), recent events have seen Iranian behavior grow more active and aggressive in an attempt to demonstrate Iranian power to the

Biden administration. Regime-backed militias have been encouraged to step up activity and be more vocal about their support for the Iranian position on regional security. These efforts are designed to strengthen Iran’s position in negotiations with the United States regarding the

JCPOA.

The Biden administration is working to craft its Iran policy based on a consensus of its regional partners. Unfortunately establishing a uniform position in opposition to Iranian interference is complicated by the positive effects such interference has had for certain countries in the region. For example, Iran offered significant support to Qatar during the Saudi-led blockade, making it politically difficult for Qatar and other countries who have benefited from

Iranian patronage to adopt an anti-Iran stance. Additionally, Iran operates differently in each

country in terms of its form and level of interference. Some countries are used as battlefields, some as strategic partners, and others are used for leverage. Because of the diversity of opinions and experiences regarding Iran, attempts to find a solution to deal with Tehran among all Arab states are unlikely to succeed.

Future negotiations between the United States and Iran must address three major issues:

Iran’s active support for militias in the Arab world, its growing missile program, and an economic plan creating mutual dependency between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC), as well as other Arab countries. The prospects for such an agreement are presently unclear. Meanwhile, current efforts at de-escalation by Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the result of fears that a renegotiated JCPOA will leave the two in an awkward position, having adopted an aggressive position during the Trump administration only to lose American support for that stance. However, this de-escalation is unlikely to meaningfully change Iran’s relationship with these states. Iran engages with the GCC states as though they are non-institutional proxies of the

United States and places little independent value on its relationships with the GCC, viewing them as tools with which to pressure the United States and exploit conflicts between Gulf States.

Another security issue facing the region is linked to economics. Saudi Arabia and the

UAE have historically served as economic stabilizers and funded many of the region’s major social and political initiatives. They have been forced to reduce their financial commitments due to the economic downturn. Accordingly, there is a concern that militia groups supported by these states that see their funding reduced or stopped will turn to more dangerous, destabilizing or unpredictable behaviors to find money elsewhere.

The internal stability of several Middle Eastern states remains a security concern. Areas of the Middle East embroiled in conflict have seen a collapse of both the social contract and the sense of identity surrounding a shared national citizenship, and few solutions have been posited for how they can be effectively restored. Natural geographic dividing lines like mountains and deserts encourage the segmentation of populations and the development of discrete ethnic and regional identities which often run deeper than any shared national identity, while the unequal distribution of natural resources can fuel deep social tensions within state borders. These are the conditions which allow civil conflicts to begin, and finding ways to heal these divisions caused by geography are essential to ending civil conflicts and preventing future ones.

One question posed to the Qatari participants was whether security cooperation between members of the GCC has returned to pre-blockade terms and whether tensions continue to exist?

Qatar’s security relationship with the United States remained both strong and stable during the blockade. However, the Trump administration viewed the blockade through the lens of countering Iranian influence, and therefore formed a functional alliance with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Still, Qatar’s security is inexorably linked to America’s. Qatar chose to reorient its military acquisitions almost entirely towards the United States, meaning threats to American access to the region threaten Qatari security, along with the security of other powers.

Rockets, Missiles, and Drone Threats:

The threats posed by rockets, missiles, and drones continue to dictate military acquisition needs. Each of these categories of weapons has unique capabilities and requires unique defenses.

The United States has developed reasonably effective anti-missile technologies, Israeli and

American developments have created effective anti-rocket systems, and the U.S Marine Corps

currently fields defenses against drones, as do some Chinese units. The importance of drones has been highlighted by drone attacks against Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, as well as the extensive usage of drones in the recent Armenia-Azerbaijan War. There are also concerns about the costs associated with defending against drone attacks. Many existing and proposed countermeasures against drone warfare are significantly more expensive than the drones themselves, forcing nations that are threatened by such weapons to bear a disproportionate financial burden relative to their potential attackers. Following the most recent exchange between Gaza and Israel, Palestinian militant groups will likely acquire the capability for more accurate targeting, and any future conflict with Hezbollah would see Israel targeted by drone strikes and by more advanced and more accurate long-range missiles.

Great Power Competition in the Middle East (Russia, China, & Turkey):

Russia’s main goal in the Middle East is to reestablish its power and influence in the region, while ensuring that political disorder within or between states in the region does not produce dangerous instability. Despite its strong interests and significant military capabilities in the region, it lacks a clear strategic vision or plan for the region beyond undercutting US interests or opposing what it sees as destabilizing change. Russia has no meaningful ties to the GCC, and while some states might use the threat of Russia as leverage for negotiations with the United

States, there is no history of significant relations between GCC members and Russia, and the

United States is regarded as the natural ally. Still, Russian interests and strength in the Eastern

Mediterranean should not be underestimated. Russia has important air bases in Syria and has demonstrated its desire to maintain a powerful regional military presence. Russia has cultivated a good relationship with Israel, invested heavily in Egypt, funneled money into Cyprus, made

overtures to Greece, and supplied Turkey with weapons. Russia’s push into this region is, in part, prompted by NATO’s efforts to limit its expansions to the west and US-Chinese restrictions to its activities in the east. While America’s capacity for action in the Middle East has been hampered largely by its lack of will, Russia is constrained not only by material limitations, but by the desire to maintain friendly relations with the region at large.

China’s global foreign policy is guided by a clear vision and a desire to challenge the

United States economically, and to a lesser extent militarily. However, that vision does not appear to include the Middle East as a key sector. Chinese interests are more focused on Africa as well as the ever-present issue of Taiwan. Still, given China’s efforts to promote its influence through economic means, it would be unwise to write off their involvement in the region. While a domestic oil boom has reduced America’s economic stakes in the gulf, China heavily depends on oil imports from the Middle East. Historically China has relied on the US Navy to protect its sea lines of communication from the Gulf to East Asia, but with America’s Navy becoming a growing threat to Chinese interests in East Asia, Beijing may ultimately have to deploy its own naval assets to protect these imports, possibly establishing naval bases in Pakistan that can be used to project power into the . Attention should also be given to Chinese infrastructure developments that aim to minimize naval vulnerabilities by expanding overland links from the region to China, such as the prospective Pakistani-Chinese oil pipeline.

Turkey also has a clear foreign policy vision, with Erdogan working to make Turkey an influential power once again. While Erdogan originally practiced a policy built on establishing friendly relationships with Turkey’s neighbors, he altered this strategy after 2009 to pursue a more aggressive track. Turkey has adopted an anti-Israel policy, has become increasingly

confrontational towards its neighbors, and has involved itself in several conflicts throughout the

Middle East. Turkish policy is unlikely to change, and Erdogan may indeed double-down should the country’s economy deteriorate. Erdogan is not just antagonizing regional powers, but also the

United States and NATO through its defense of Belarus and purchase of S-400s from Russia.

The dynamics of the region have transformed dramatically over the past few decades, going from a bipolar Cold War-era competition to a unipolar moment during the 1990s. A new multipolarity is now emerging in the region consisting of a Western element, an Arab tier,

Turkey, and Iran on the margins of the system. It is not useful to think of China or Russia as players in the region on par with the USSR during the Cold War. Rather, the two are outer rim powers, and their interventions into the Middle East should be considered limited expeditions into the region.

Day 2 (June 3)

Session 1: Energy Outlooks & Environmental and Health Issues

The increasing focus on climate change and its security implications has led states to consider alternate energy sources. For states whose economies rely on the production and sale of fossil fuels, such considerations could bring seismic changes. In Qatar, the energy sector is responsible for 60% of the country’s greenhouse emissions but is also a main contributor to the national economy. However, with growing concerns about the contributions of fossil fuels to anthropogenic climate change, there are questions surrounding the sustainability of the West’s current appetite for fossil fuels.

America’s energy needs are intrinsically tied to its foreign policy. Biden has framed the

United States’ energy policy in the context of economic competition with China and hopes to apply pressure on China to stop building coal-fired power plants overseas, though the low-cost of coal makes it a compelling solution to meet the rising global demand for energy. Domestic politics also affect America’s energy priorities. While America recently became a net exporter of petroleum, the Biden administration’s emphasis on environmental protection and emissions reduction coupled with its promotion of electric vehicles may reduce the importance of petroleum to America’s transportation sector. However, history shows that these trends may not persist under future administrations.

In the Middle East, energy policy is dictated by growing domestic energy needs and vital foreign exchange earnings. While America is fortunate to have several viable energy sources at its disposal, countries like Qatar are constrained by the energy sources located within their

national boundaries, despite the pressure they receive from the European Union and Japan to phase out the use of fossil fuels. Besides its fossil fuel resources, Qatar only has access to solar power, which limits its capacity to transition away from fossil fuels.

The Middle East also experiences its own unique environmental challenges. The region has been disproportionately affected by global warming due to the region’s climate and geographic location. Hot and arid regions like the Middle East face scorching heat when temperatures rise as a result of increased global greenhouse gas emissions. The Middle East also faces the challenge of high levels of gas flaring, which further pollutes the atmosphere. While gas flares are not unique to the Middle East, they tend to be concentrated in a much smaller geographic area than in countries like Russia or the United States and therefore have a disproportionate effect on the local environment. Flaring is much less common now than in the past, but there are still very few policies in place in the region to limit carbon dioxide emissions.

Qatar is particularly susceptible to rising sea levels. Despite 95% of Qatar’s population living on the coast, the country has no regulations in place designed to address sea levels. This is not to say that Qatar does not care about climate change, however; individual consumers are reducing their energy and water footprints, and the government has put considerable resources toward upgrading desalinization structures.

The small size of some Middle Eastern countries like Qatar make them strong candidates for green initiatives. The Gulf possesses a large market for electric vehicles from North America,

Europe, and China, and the small size of several Gulf states makes it easier to create comprehensive infrastructures for electric cars than it would be in a large country like the US.

One can argue that investment in electric car infrastructure is less effective in the long run than

alternate strategies such as investing in carbon capture for power plants, as the relatively short life cycle for vehicles means that many consumers could switch back to vehicles that use fossil fuels after a handful of years. Still, it is clear that as new green technology emerges in the coming years, several Middle Eastern states are well positioned to become global leaders in the use and implementation of these solutions.

Food and water security remain major concerns throughout the Middle East. The Gulf countries desalinate water, but they cannot produce the necessary volume and variety of food products to achieve food independence. Rising sea levels also carry the potential to salinate food- producing areas, further increasing the risk of future food insecurity.

Fresh water is scarce and is therefore considered a strategic resource. Population growth is increasing the demand for clean water in the region, but climate change is decreasing the natural supply. Qatar currently has the capacity to store three days’ worth of fresh water and is working to increase storage capacity to seven days, but this is still insufficient to meet the country’s needs. Water availability in the region is further affected by the threat of cyber attacks.

Because fresh water is so scarce, the regional supply is highly reliant on computerized technology to ensure public access to this resource. The recent attack on the Colonial Pipeline in the US revealed how easily cyber attacks can disrupt access to natural resources by taking down critical digital infrastructure, and the region must be prepared for similar attacks designed to disrupt access to clean water.

This new dimension of modern warfare poses a growing threat to regional security. If a cyber attack were to occur that targeted Middle Eastern desalinization infrastructure, the resulting food and water insecurity would be catastrophic. Cyber attacks are cheaper than

conventional military operations and require less manpower, and while Israel has demonstrated that cyber defense can be significant, widespread vulnerabilities remain. There is also historical precedent in the region for targeted attacks on critical infrastructure with conventional weapons on natural resources during war (Saddam Hussein attacked oil fields in Kuwait in 1991). The

Colonial Pipeline hack caused oil prices in the United States to skyrocket, and a similarly successful cyber attack that limited the availability of food or water in the region could cause spikes in food and water prices in addition to the widespread hoarding of these resources throughout the Middle East. When natural resources are scarce, most states look to secure access to them, and few states would be likely to release or sell critical resources that are scarce at home.

Water further affects regional security through conflicts over water rights. Such a conflict is currently playing out between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in the form of the proposed Blue

Nile Dam. Ethiopia is constructing a large dam along its regional stretch of the Nile to generate much-needed electricity for its citizens. The dam, however, poses a threat to Egyptian and

Sudanese citizens downstream who rely on the flow of the Nile for their water supply and has sparked nationalistic responses from all parties involved. Further complicating the matter is the agricultural land in Ethiopia that Gulf states have purchased in hopes of producing critical foodstuffs for use in their own countries, giving these states a clear interest in Ethiopia prevailing in this dispute since this land is only productive if Ethiopia retains enough water to irrigate it.

The conflict is not simply political – it is hydrological as well. Legal precedent gives international rights to the downstream riparian area, but supply depends upon where water is

sourced and its fluctuations of flow. Qatar, in line with regional precedent, has emerged as a mediator in the conflict, but the eventual outcome of the dispute remains unclear at this time.

As the Nile River dispute shows, water insecurity, food insecurity, and political relationships are intertwined in arid regions such as the Middle East. Such was also the case with the Saudi-Emirati blockade of Qatar, which put significant stress on Qatar’s food supply chain.

Qatar imports over 80% of its food with a large portion of those imports coming from the shared land border with Saudi Arabia, and the blockade caused those food imports to disappear overnight. Qatar’s relationships with Iran, the United States, and partners in Europe and Asia helped supplement the imports cut off by the blockade and revealed why diversification of the supply chain is critical due to the danger political conflicts pose to natural resource supplies.

Like the environment, global health concerns are also creating new security challenges.

Indeed, these two issues are often intrinsically linked, as food and water insecurity threaten the health of already-malnourished areas while heat waves and droughts which are exacerbated by climate change create food and water scarcity crises which can negatively impact health (see

Yemen as an example). Furthermore, just as population growth places a stress on the environment through anthropogenic climate change, it also stresses the health of local, regional, and global populations.

The past year revealed the extent to which a global pandemic can disrupt life locally. Not only have countries experienced outbreaks resulting in loss of life, but the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the economy, social life, and mental health. In Qatar, the pandemic had both positive and negative effects on mental health. Domestic violence, divorce, and suicides all decreased during the pandemic, despite increasing the time Qatari citizens spent at home.

However, preferences for spending time online rather than with family increased during the pandemic, which could potentially weaken an important social institution even after the threat of

COVID-19 subsides. In both the United States and Qatar, online education during the pandemic posed a unique challenge to individuals, families, and communities which were forced to consider the tradeoffs involving physical and mental health. While in-person schooling allows for greater socialization and an easier learning environment, it also can pose a threat to physical health by increasing the potential spread of COVID-19 Online learning, by contrast, is physically safe but both literally and figuratively isolating.

The impact of COVID-19 was also felt on a broader scale, as evidenced by the damage done by the pandemic to the credibility of public institutions. Major health institutions such as the WHO and CDC faced increased scrutiny and criticism due to their handling of the pandemic.

International institutions function only as long as member nations and their citizenry retain faith and trust in their efficacy. While the Biden administration restored the American government’s support for organizations like the WHO, the popular backlash against American participation in global health institutions that occurred under President Trump shows how quickly such entities can lose credibility.

COVID-19 also affected states’ security efforts. While the scientific community believes another pandemic of this scale may not occur for several years, it may have a shorter recurrence interval than the near 100 year gap between COVID-19 and the Spanish Influenza pandemic of

1918-1920. Accordingly, America’s defense budget has made defeating COVID-19 and increasing pandemic preparedness national defense priorities. Vaccines must now be viewed as

tools of both security and diplomacy, as vaccinating one’s population quickly and safely can prevent further loss of life and expedite a return to normalcy.

“Vaccine diplomacy,” which refers to the use of vaccine distribution as a means to improve a state’s diplomatic relations with other countries, comes with its own set of challenges.

States must decide to whom they want to distribute vaccines and how many they are willing to send abroad and must also confront foreign skepticism about the safety and effectiveness of their vaccines, a problem encountered by China, Russia, and to a lesser degree the UK. The US recently publicized its international vaccine allocation plan and has criticized Russia and China for their refusal to commit to a no-strings-attached policy of vaccine distribution. Yet, the United

States also benefits from vaccine diplomacy even with its no-strings-attached approach; international vaccine distribution can increase a state’s reputation, and countries receiving vaccines from the United States may feel indebted to it in the future.

It is in America’s interest to assume a greater role in providing vaccines globally, just as it provided economic aid to Europe in the wake of World War II. Widespread vaccine distribution can stop the spread of the virus and decrease the likelihood of a future COVID-19 resurgence, but the impact of the pandemic extends beyond the realm of global health. A swift end to COVID-19 will allow the global economy to begin recovering, creating greater global demand for American goods and strengthening important trade partners and markets.

Furthermore, America has much to lose by not engaging in more widespread vaccine diplomacy, as it could see its international reputation and clout decrease relative to states with more robust global distribution strategies. If a geopolitical rival such as China were to erode

American soft power through successful vaccine distribution, it might deepen relationships with countries that were previously in the orbit of the United States. In doing so, key regional players might lean more toward China and its interests than the United States.

At the same time, geopolitical squabbles cannot crowd out legitimate opportunities for multilateral cooperation on the biggest challenges facing the community of states. Both health issues and environmental issues are complex, multidimensional, transboundary problems that will require global cooperation and creativity to solve. Even regional solutions, such as addressing the issue of gas flaring in the Middle East, may not result in immediate changes absent more widespread action. Individual national responses, especially when they are tied to nationalistic movements like in the Blue Nile dam proposal, are unhelpful and can even be directly contradictory to global and regional interests.

The environment, in particular, requires urgent, direct, cooperative action. Climate scientists believe we have as few as ten years to make broad systemic changes in favor of clean energy and sustainability to avoid environmental catastrophe, yet most environmental policies are incremental and oriented around a 2040 or 2050 goal. On questions of both climate and global health, policies must be centered around our best scientific understanding of the problems and must seek transboundary solutions. Such broad, fact-based action can be intimidating because of the amount of cooperation and logistics required to ensure success, but it is necessary to preserve the continued health and prosperity of the global community.

Session 2: Identity, Social Changes, and the Future of US-Qatar Relations

One of the biggest questions raised to the Qatari participants in this dialogue was whether the Qatari people view themselves first and foremost through the lens of their national identities, transnational identities, religious identities or something else? Based on research conducted pre- blockade, identity in the GCC tended to be predominantly trans-national, with national identity being heavily influenced and shaped by tribal identities. However, there is a need to conduct further research to determine whether the blockade has shifted these perceptions among the

Qatari people, particularly among the younger generations.

After the Ministry of Culture and Sports was formed as a replacement for the Ministry of

Youth and Sports, Qatari youth leaders raised the prospect of creating a government body designed to facilitate youth engagement and represent issues important to younger Qataris. After consultation, the minister agreed to form an advisory committee for youth issues whose members are elected by Qatari youth, making Qatar the first state in the region to develop such a body.

The ministry has created dozens of youth centers for youth to meet and exchange knowledge.

Some of these centers also helped provide COVID-19 guidance and PPE when supplies were scarce. Qatar currently lacks institutions dedicated to researching trends and developments among youth, which would be helpful in understanding the wider perspective of how young people view the world. Qatar has made a meaningful commitment to investing in its youth and engaging this important population and must make a similar commitment to highlighting these accomplishments on an international scale.

Social media has become an important tool for promoting youth engagement and for enabling politics and activism in the Arab world. Social media has proven capable of bringing attention to issues like the controversy surrounding the eviction of Palestinian families from

Sheikh Jarrah. There are also serious and profound debates being held on Arab social media on issues of religion in society, among others, that go largely unnoticed by the West, but which shed light on the complex political dynamics at play in the region.

It is commonly assumed in the West that the youth will be the primary activists driving progressive change in the Middle East. However, Egyptian anti-government protests during the

Arab Spring were largely driven by members of Generation X. President Sisi is significantly more popular among younger people in Egypt than would be expected given this narrative of young progressivism, and many people who grew up during the Arab Spring observed that agitation will be ruthlessly suppressed, ineffective, or create instability and civil war. Middle

Eastern youth tend to focus on financial stability and quality of life as their priorities, making them less inclined to support revolutionary politics than many American observers believe to be the case.

The American perception that Middle Eastern youth support political liberalization and progressive reform is based on the assumption that a few outspoken activists from these countries represent the youth as a whole. Due to language barriers, many American experts mostly engage with English-speaking activists who tend to espouse Western notions of liberalism and the need for political reform. America may choose to advocate for reform in these countries, but it must avoid overestimating local support for these movements and should not

assume that younger generations in the Middle East support a transition to Western style liberal democracies.

One area where Western powers have long advocated for reform among Middle Eastern nations is the treatment of women. The Qatari government and women’s advocacy groups within the country desire changes on the legal and national level to promote women’s empowerment, but much of their efforts focus on promoting equal rights for women within the family structure given the strong role family plays in the national and regional cultures. Women’s representation in governmental positions of power (judges, prosecutors, diplomats, etc.) has significantly increased, with the proportion of women in business leadership roles doubling since 2014. Four women have joined the Shura Council (Qatar’s legislative body). Women make up nearly 69% of total university enrollment in Qatar, as compared to men’s 31%. Qatari women are also heavily represented in degree programs for traditionally male fields like engineering. Despite this, only 36% of Qatari women are in the labor market, compared to 67% of men. A significant part of Qatari women in the labor force work in the education sector and other fields traditionally occupied by women. As a part of Qatar’s First National Development Strategy, the government set goals for the empowerment of women which were expanded upon by The Second National

Development Strategy.

One significant issue is the increasing prevalence of Qatari women marrying non-Qatari men, which calls into question the citizenship of any children they might have. Qatari women must currently receive permission to marry non-Qatari men, and the mother’s citizenship is not necessarily conveyed to any children born from such unions. This became a serious problem during the blockade, when GCC nations prohibited their citizens from residing in Qatar, and

Qatar prohibited its citizens from living in GCC nations. This resulted in the separation of mixed nationality families, including mothers from their children. The Qatari government did pass a law in 2018 allowing children of non-Qatari fathers to apply for permanent residency, but this falls short of granting these children Qatari citizenship, which many advocacy groups want to see.

Qatari women also face several other structural barriers to equality. Qatar continues to struggle with fairly compensating men and women both in terms of pay and social benefits such as housing allowances. Many workplaces also lack sufficient maternity leave. The Qatar

Foundation has been a leader among Qatari firms in promoting pay and benefits equality and championing these reforms to other organizations, but there is room for more progress on these issues.

US-Qatari Relations:

The final topic on the agenda for this dialogue was the future of US-Qatar relations. Ties between the two states were almost insignificant until the mid-1990s, when Qatar’s economic development gave it a truly prominent position in the region. Credit for this rise to prominence rests almost entirely with Emir Hamad Al-Thani (1995-2013), who sought to carve out a political niche for his country. Qatar’s decision to host US Central Command (CENTCOM) played a major role in making the country a critical American ally. Founding Al-Jazeera altered the balance of media power in the Middle East and gave Qatar significant soft power. Much of

Qatar’s influence can be credited to its relative neutrality, which makes it a frequent host of negotiations such as those between the US and Taliban, and which enabled its alleged role in helping broker an end to the most recent Israeli-Hamas conflict.

Several “black swan” events could threaten the US-Qatar relationship in the coming years. Iran remains a serious source of disagreement in the relationship and is perceived by

America as an unpredictable and revisionist state, aggravated by American actions in the region like the killing of General Soleimani. Ayatollah Khamenei is likely to die soon, and it is unclear how his successor might seek to change Iranian foreign relations.

The unpredictable behavior of and Erdogan could also trigger black swan events. Both men are supremely confident, prone to errors, and do not take advice well. Reckless or inflammatory actions by either leader could create major consequences for

America or Qatar. As it stands, Qatar is heavily invested in the Turkish economy, giving it an important stake in the state of the Turkish regime. But the United States itself represents something of a black swan. While Donald Trump was voted out of office in 2020, the 2024 presidential elections could see Trump or someone with a similar worldview run for the presidency. If such a candidate is elected, it could have dramatic consequences for US policy in the Middle East.

As a small country with an economy that is heavily based on imports and exports, Qatar needs and desires security, and this should be the underlying role of any alliance the country makes. Qatar’s precarious foreign policy position requires that it be friends with everyone. This acts as both a limitation and advantage. While the lack of many firmly entrenched allies can leave Qatar isolated at times, having several friendly states both regionally and globally paid off during the blockade, when countries as disparate as Germany, Iran, and Turkey provided aid to

Qatar.

While the aid provided by countries like Turkey formed the basis of their relationships with Qatar, the lack of similar support from the United States disappointed Qatar’s leadership.

While Qatar and America have deep economic ties and considerable bilateral investment in addition to shared military interests, Qatar’s relationship with the US is somewhat less secure because it lacks a lobbying presence in Washington comparable to those of other Gulf states.

Despite this, it is in the interest of both countries that they continue to deepen their relationship, including through bilateral exchanges which promote increased cultural understanding between the two countries.

The United States and the countries in the Middle East will face seismic changes in the coming year brought about by new political, technological, economic, and environmental developments. Given the intimate connections between each of these realms, broader international cooperation between Middle Eastern countries and with outside powers will be necessary to meet these new challenges. Whether effective cooperation will take place remains an open question and a critical challenge.

Participants:

Khadeja Ahmad Abuhaliqa- Senior HHSE Manager in the Security and Housing Department- Doha Institute for Graduate Studies Khalid Al-Abdulqader- Vice President- Community College of Qatar Aisha Al-Ammari- Assistant Dean for Student Affairs- Qatar University College of Law Majed Al-Ansari- President- Qatar International Academy for Security Studies Fatima Al-Dosari- Executive Director- Qatar America Institute for Culture Sherifa Noman Al-Emadi- Executive Director- Doha International Family Institute Khalid Al-Jaber- Director- MENA Center Mohammad Saleh Al-Mesfer- Professor of Political Science- Qatar University Aisha Al-Mesned- Deputy Defense Attaché, Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs- State of Qatar. Dhabia M. Al-Mohannadi- Assistant Professor of Chemical Engineering- Texas A&M University at Qatar Henri J. Barkey- Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Chair in International Relations- Lehigh University George Beebe- Vice President & Director of Studies- Center for the National Interest Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr.- Distinguished Fellow and Chairman Emeritus- Stimson Center Barbara K. Bodine- Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy, Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy- Georgetown University Steven A. Cook- Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies- Council on Foreign Relations Chas Freeman- Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Andrew Gilmour- Senior Scholar-in-Residence- The Catholic University of America Geoffrey Kemp- Senior Director of Regional Security Programs- Center for the National Interest Ellen Laipson- Director for the Center of Security Policy Studies- George Mason University Paul Saunders- President- Energy Innovation Reform Project Patrick Theros- Strategic Adviser (former US Ambassador to Qatar)- Gulf International Forum Dov S. Zakheim- Senior Advisor (former Under Secretary of Defense)- Center for Strategic and International Studies

About the Editors:

Geoffrey Kemp is Senior Director of Regional Security Programs at the Center for the National Interest. He served in the White House during the first Reagan administration as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council Staff. Dr. Kemp received his Ph.D. in political science at M.I.T. and his M.A. and B.A. degrees from Oxford University.

Matthew Reisener is Chief of Staff at the Center for the National Interest. He holds a Master of Arts in international relations from the University of Chicago and a Bachelor of Arts in political science and communications from William Jewell College.

Rachel Bernstein is an intern with the Center for the National Interest’s Middle East Studies and Regional Security programs. She is a student at the College of William & Mary

Harry Stevens is an intern with the Center for the National Interest’s Middle East Studies and Regional Security programs. He is a student at the University of Chicago.