CONCLUSIONS

Monenergism-Monothelitism and Dyenergism-Dyothelitism consti- tuted two alternative interpretations of how Christ acted and willed. Th ese interpretations, as they manifested themselves in the seventh century, were cut from the same cloth. Both were Chalcedonian and expressed in the same neo-Chalcedonian language. Monenergism, which over time would convert into Monothelitism, actually surfaced as a continuation of the neo-Chalcedonian attempts to fi nd points of theological rapprochement with the dissident anti-Chalcedonian com- munities. Th e postulations neither of the one-energeia-will, nor of the two-energeiai-wills adherents were clearly or adequately raised in the preceding theological tradition upon which the opposing parties relied. At the same time, the language of a single energeia was applied to Christ in traditions such as the Apollinarian, ‘Nestorian ,’ and especially the Severan. But the beliefs of these groups were deemed unreliable by both Dyenergists-Dyothelites and Monenergists-Monothelites in the seventh century. As Chalcedonians, they a priori rejected them. Th e two parties were faced with the formidable task of having to develop concepts of energeia and will without authorative theological indica- tions from past theological defi nitions. Prior to the seventh century, concepts of energeia and of will were scarcely distinguished (especially will) and remained undeveloped. Owing to the controversy, however, these terms occupied an important place in the Orthodox theological tradition. Despite their common Chalcedonian and neo-Chalcedonian background, Dyenergists-Dyothelites laid emphasis on the Christological formulas of Chalcedon and on those in the Tome of Leo, while their opponents appeared to prefer neo-Chalcedonian concepts and theologi- cal methods. Th is does not infer that Monothelites ignored Chalcedon or that Dyothelites shunned neo-Chalcedonian language. Monenergism-Monothelitism was exploited as a political project to establish a rapprochement between Chalcedonians and anti- Chalcedonians. In its initial form, concepts of the two natures and a single energeia in Christ were coalesced. Over the course of time it developed into Monothelitism, which focused on Christ having a single will. In political terms, Monenergism-Monothelitism was the child of the concordance (symphonia ) between the secular and 164 conclusions ecclesiastical authorities of the eastern Roman Empire. On occasion, it enjoyed a consensus in the major Episcopal sees of the Empire, including Rome , Constantinople , Alexandria , Antioch , and Jerusalem (the pentarchy). As such, it demonstrated that both symphonia and pentarchy could malfunction and cause harm to the unity of Church. Monenergism-Monothelitism eventually subsided, and this for many reasons. First, it began and remained as an artifi cial doctrine, rather superfi cially combining features of both the Chalcedonian and the Severan theological traditions. Secondly, it was restricted mostly to the élite, only on rare occasions did it excite popular interest. In fact the promotion of Monenergism-Monothelitism was oft en accompanied by violence and duly aroused protest from the people, especially in Egypt. Th irdly, not even the theological and political élite could reach complete agreement on it. Strong opposition surfaced in the West, both from the Church (aft er Honorius) and from the political authorities (especially in North Africa ). Th e infl uential monastic circles of the East, primarily in Palestine and Constantinople , became an obstacle to the spread of Monenergism-Monothelitism eventually contributing to its failure and condemnation at an ecumenical council. A complex question in connection with the controversy is whether the two arguing parties actually integrated the issue of Christ’s ener- geia and will in diff erent ways. Or, put diff erently, did they in eff ect share the same perspective on the issue? It would appear that crucial words such as θέλημα and θέλησις oft en connoted diff erent things to either party. For Dyothelites the term implied a broad variety of concepts, including physiological attributes such as growth, instinc- tive drives (for example, love of life), volitional impulses, and acts of rational choice. Monothelites, however, in referring to human θέλημα or θέλησις, primarily inferred a corrupted will, which, by defi nition, is contrary to divine will. Taking into consideration this diff erence in word usage, one might deduce that when the Dyothelites accused their opponents of denying the human will, they missed the point, because the Monothelites in eff ect denied a will that was corrupted. But this is an oversimplifi cation of the confl ict. Th e two parties oft en treated each other with hostility, but they also tried to understand better what the other side meant and endeavoured to explain their own points with great clarity in order to make them acceptable. Th is can be seen in the dispute between Maximus the Confessor and Pyrrhus . Dyothelites made it clear that they eschewed a corrupt will in Christ, since this