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Cesifo Working Paper No. 7803
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Ryan, John Working Paper The Brexit Conundrum Worsens the UK's Relationship with the European Union CESifo Working Paper, No. 7803 Provided in Cooperation with: Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Suggested Citation: Ryan, John (2019) : The Brexit Conundrum Worsens the UK's Relationship with the European Union, CESifo Working Paper, No. 7803, Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207194 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu 7803 2019 August 2019 The Brexit Conundrum Worsens the UK’s Relationship with the European Union John T. -
Exploding the Myths of Leaving the Customs Union
Exploding the myths of leaving the Customs Union A joint publication from the European Research Group and Global Britain Fact – NOT Friction Exploding the myths of leaving the Customs Union A joint publication from the European Research Group and Global Britain C O N T E N T S Foreword 3 Executive Summary 4 Introduction 6 Myths surrounding a UK-EU free trade deal 9 Myths surrounding ‘No Deal’ – or trading on WTO terms 20 About the publishers 23 20th November 2018 Cover picture: The Port of Southampton, Diego Torres 2 FOREWORD By Simon Boyd FinstD, Managing Director of Reid Steel It is often said that when the UK leaves the EU Single Market and its Customs Union that it will be far harder to trade whether it's import or export – that frictionless trade will become difficult with delays, obstacles and costs. From my own experience I can say the reverse is true. In my experience trading with our European friends is infinitely more difficult than it is to trade with other countries outside the EU. It has, for instance, been easier for us to export to Mongolia than to France, despite the fact we were founded there in 1919. The reasons for this are obvious, the EU is bureaucratic by its very nature and its Customs Union is a fortress designed to protect producers inside it rather than encourage open free trade where everyone can benefit. But we are not and never have been protected by this protectionist regime. Instead we have seen the steady ebb of manufacturing move to other areas of the EU – and even to areas beyond – as a result of our membership. -
This Spectred Isle James Bond, Alan Partridge, and Englishness
This SPECTREd Isle James Bond, Alan Partridge, and Englishness GILLIAN GROSZEWSKI Like the Aston Martin car he drives and the Savile Row tailors he frequents, James Bond is an English cultural icon. ndeed, in !"#!, $aniel %raig, as Bond, was the natural choice to &act' as the securit( escort for )er Majest(, the +ueen, as she made her wa( to the o,ening ceremon( of the -l(mpic .ames in Lon/ don, itself a celebration of all things English. Although ap,roximating the iconic, Steve %oogan2s 3ctional character, Alan 4artridge, does not ,ossess the same cul/ tural cachet as 5leming’s international man of m(ster(. A self/,rofessed Bond su,er/fan, 4artridge attempts, on a regular basis, to achieve the im,ossible: to become an icon. 7here Bond and brand become inseparable due to their so,h/ isticated interdependence, 4artridge desperatel( seeks cor,orate ,artnershi, in an attempt to increase his ,ersonal wealth and social ,ro3le. )owever, while 4artridge ma( ap,ear, at 3rst sight, a ,ale imitation of 5leming’s iconic sleuth, both characters ,ossess a similarl( acute awareness of what it means to be Eng/ lish. %hristine Berberich has written of Bond that &behind the suave secret agent lurks a character 0oth at ease and at odds with his time' 8!"#!, #9:. Looking be/ hind the ,reoccu,ation of Alan 4artridge with all things Bond highlights the changing conce,t of what it means to be English in contem,orar( Britain. Like Bond, 4artridge frequentl( 3nds himself to 0e at odds with those that surround him ; not least due to his encyclo,aedic knowledge of the Bond franchise ; but Gillian Groszewski +e12hes Englis3 1+ -higwell S2hool. -
House of Commons Official Report Parliamentary
Thursday Volume 664 26 September 2019 No. 343 HOUSE OF COMMONS OFFICIAL REPORT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (HANSARD) Thursday 26 September 2019 © Parliamentary Copyright House of Commons 2019 This publication may be reproduced under the terms of the Open Parliament licence, which is published at www.parliament.uk/site-information/copyright/. 843 26 SEPTEMBER 2019 Speaker’s Statement 844 there will be an urgent question later today on the House of Commons matter to which I have just referred, and that will be an opportunity for colleagues to say what they think. This is something of concern across the House. It is Thursday 26 September 2019 not a party political matter and, certainly as far as I am concerned, it should not be in any way, at any time, to any degree a matter for partisan point scoring. It is The House met at half-past Nine o’clock about something bigger than an individual, an individual party or an individual political or ideological viewpoint. Let us treat of it on that basis. In the meantime, may I just ask colleagues—that is all I am doing and all I can PRAYERS do as your representative in the Chair—please to lower the decibel level and to try to treat each other as opponents, not as enemies? [MR SPEAKER in the Chair] Sir Peter Bottomley (Worthing West) (Con): On a point of order, Mr Speaker. Speaker’s Statement Mr Speaker: Order. I genuinely am not convinced, but I will take one point of order if the hon. Gentleman Mr Speaker: Before we get under way with today’s insists. -
The Longer-Term Outlook Will Remain Tricky for UK-EU Relations
UK/EU/TRADE The longer-term outlook will remain tricky for UK-EU 24 Dec 2020 12:52 EST Mujtaba Rahman relations Managing Director, Europe +44 (0) 207.553.9823 [email protected] Having reached a deal, both the UK and EU are now involved in a serious “spin” operation to sell it to their respective audiences; this matters little, as the deal is guaranteed to be ratified by both sides. The deal will make it easier for the UK and EU to work together on the world stage, on issues such as climate change, while also cementing Boris Johnson’s relationship with US President-elect, Joe Biden. However, we are sceptical it will provide a platform for closer economic ties; the Government will now be keen to advance its “divergence agenda”, and the direction of both Tory and Labour party politics suggest closer links with Europe will remain unlikely—even over the medium to longer term. Boris Johnson went back to the basics of the 2016 EU referendum as he began the task of selling today’s EU trade deal to Eurosceptic Conservative MPs and the public. At a Downing Street press conference, he acknowledged the UK had made concessions, but claimed the five and a half year transition period for EU access to UK fishing was closer to the UK’s three-year opening bid and the EU’s 14 years (in fact, the EU asked for 10 years). The UK will eventually keep two thirds of the fish in its waters. But Johnson had raised greater expectations among UK fishing communities and this could prove his hardest sell. -
The 'Today' Programme's Coverage of the 2019
THE BBC AND BREXIT THE ‘TODAY’ PROGRAMME’S COVERAGE OF THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: This survey assesses coverage by BBC Radio 4’s Today programme of the European Parliamentary elections between April 12 and May 30, 2019. The volume of EU material was 28.5% of feature time, indicating the importance of the Brexit debate on the news agenda. This amounted to a third of a million words of transcripts. Standout points include: Pro-Brexit opinion was overwhelmingly swamped by those who wanted to avoid ‘no deal’. Speakers had only minimal time to express their views and presenters were not much interested in exploring the potential benefits of Brexit, but rather alleged malpractice or prejudice by pro-Brexit parties and spokesmen. The treatment of anti-Brexit figures was generally much more favourable. After the results of the poll, for example, presenters barely challenged assertions by Remain parties that they had ‘won’ (on a combined basis) the election. By contrast, Sir William Cash – brought on the programme to justify why he had described the government’s negotiating approach as ‘appeasement’ – was questioned by Nick Robinson as if his behaviour was verging on the criminal. Business News – a significant daily chunk of the Today programme – was heavily dominated by contributors who were against ‘no deal’, determined to push as hard as possible the scale of the disruption that would ensue, and who saw almost every negative business development as being the outcome of Brexit uncertainty. The perceived opportunities of Brexit were scarcely explored Almost 500 speakers (487) contributed to the Today coverage. -
ACCEA Personal Statements
ACCEA BRONZE AWARD 2016 Name: PAUL AVEYARD GMC/GDC Number: 3332407 Speciality: ACADEMIC GP My research showed for the first time that primary care teams were ineffective at supporting weight loss, but referral to commercial weight management services was effective and cheaper. This research is cited in NICE guidelines and informed Department of Health guidance, leading to a doubling of referral to commercial providers and decline in primary care treatment. I trained GPs to deliver a 30-second intervention to promote these referrals and showed that screening for obesity is popular with patients, easy for GPs to deliver, and led to 2.5kg of weight loss. My research created a new approach to GP brief interventions to motivate smoking cessation. The national online training video has been used by 95,000 clinicians. My subsequent work with the Department of Health changed national guidelines, increasing referrals by 39%. My research showed that smoking reduction creates lasting cessation and influenced NICE guidelines. I was the GP member of the guideline group and launched the guidance at the NICE press conference, making England the first country in the world to implement a harm reduction strategy. I am one of four editors of the Cochrane Tobacco Addiction Group and our reviews are cited four times more than the Cochrane average. Our work is cited in UK and many other countries' national guidelines. ACCEA BRONZE AWARD 2016 Name: TREVOR THOMPSON GMC/GDC Number: 3494806 Speciality: ACADEMIC GP I am an NHS clinician dedicated to creating "Tomorrow's Doctors": 1. In 2015 I was awarded a National Teaching Fellowship by the Higher Education Academy (Google: HEA Trevor Thompson). -
The Conservatives and Europe, 1997–2001 the Conservatives and Europe, 1997–2001
8 Philip Lynch The Conservatives and Europe, 1997–2001 The Conservatives and Europe, 1997–2001 Philip Lynch As Conservatives reflected on the 1997 general election, they could agree that the issue of Britain’s relationship with the European Union (EU) was a significant factor in their defeat. But they disagreed over how and why ‘Europe’ had contributed to the party’s demise. Euro-sceptics blamed John Major’s European policy. For Euro-sceptics, Major had accepted develop- ments in the European Union that ran counter to the Thatcherite defence of the nation state and promotion of the free market by signing the Maastricht Treaty. This opened a schism in the Conservative Party that Major exacer- bated by paying insufficient attention to the growth of Euro-sceptic sentiment. Membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) prolonged recession and undermined the party’s reputation for economic competence. Finally, Euro-sceptics argued that Major’s unwillingness to rule out British entry into the single currency for at least the next Parliament left the party unable to capitalise on the Euro-scepticism that prevailed in the electorate. Pro-Europeans and Major loyalists saw things differently. They believed that Major had acted in the national interest at Maastricht by signing a Treaty that allowed Britain to influence the development of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) without being bound to join it. Pro-Europeans noted that Thatcher had agreed to an equivalent, if not greater, loss of sovereignty by signing the Single European Act. They believed that much of the party could and should have united around Major’s ‘wait and see’ policy on EMU entry. -
Type Document Title Here
The other leadership race that really matters Blog post by Practice Lead Tom King, 13 June 2019 There is only one cast-iron certainty in British politics. That is that whoever replaces Theresa May in Downing Street this summer will be faced with the same set of problems. Of course, the identity of the prime minister matters. But it is not likely to change the questions facing MPs of all parties come the autumn. Largely unnoticed, there is another leadership contest underway that might have a much more important effect. The Liberal Democrats had an exceptional spring, roaring back into the public eye with a strong local election performance before comfortably pushing Labour into third place at the European Parliament elections. Ironically, the Lib Dems probably have a smaller party to thank for this turnaround. The party’s ‘Libby’ bird logo had been thought more of a dead duck, its brand too toxic after the coalition years to be restored. Under the directionless leadership of Vince Cable – who seemed to behave more like an analyst than a politician – there seemed little hope. And it was because of this that Change UK was born. The hodgepodge of frustrated Conservative and Labour Remainers, informally led by Chuka Umunna, Heidi Allen and Anna Soubry, chose to plough their own furrow rather than join the largest Remain-supporting UK party. It made sense: they simply looked over at the Lib Dems and thought, ‘we can do better than that’. The now divided Change UK’s biggest legacy may turn out to be to have forced the Lib Dems into action. -
Analyzing the Post-Brexit Conservative Party's Populist Status Quo1 Winn, Jacob2
Brexit: A Fluke or the Future of British Conservatism? 119 BREXIT: A FLUKE OR THE FUTURE OF BRITISH CONSERVATISM? Analyzing the Post-Brexit Conservative Party's Populist Status Quo1 Winn, Jacob2 ABSTRacT The Brexit vote — the British people’s vote to leave the European Union in 2016 — represents the outcome of a successful populist movement. More recently, the Conservative Party’s staggering 2019 electoral success demonstrated that the populist “Get Brexit Done” message remains popular among both traditional Conservatives and broad swaths of the working class in former Labour Party strongholds. This study aims to explain the Conservative Party’s marked change rhetoric and policy, as well as factional shifts within the halls of Westminster, in response to the ongoing Brexit negotiations. While some scholars look at the supply- side causes of populism (elites and political parties) and others look at the demand- side causes (the voters), this study applies a third school of thought that examines the relationship between supply and demand by analyzing a series of interviews with Conservative Party staff as well as public opinion polling. In doing so, the study concludes that there has been a deep, reciprocal, and simultaneous onset of populist Euroscepticism within both the Conservative Party and the working class 1 This work is licensed under CC BY 4.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons. org/licenses/by/4.0 2 Jacob Winn is a Fall 2020 graduate from The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Affairs, with a concentration in International Politics, and a double major in Political Science. -
The Inner Workings of British Political Parties the Interaction of Organisational Structures and Their Impact on Political Behaviours
REPORT The Inner Workings of British Political Parties The Interaction of Organisational Structures and their Impact on Political Behaviours Ben Westerman About the Author Ben Westerman is a Research Fellow at the Constitution Society specialising in the internal anthropology of political parties. He also works as an adviser on the implications of Brexit for a number of large organisations and policy makers across sectors. He has previously worked for the Labour Party, on the Remain campaign and in Parliament. He holds degrees from Bristol University and King’s College, London. The Inner Workings of British Political Parties: The Interaction of Organisational Structures and their Impact on Political Behaviours Introduction Since June 2016, British politics has entered isn’t working’,3 ‘Bollocks to Brexit’,4 or ‘New Labour into an unprecedented period of volatility and New Danger’5 to get a sense of the tribalism this fragmentation as the decision to leave the European system has engendered. Moreover, for almost Union has ushered in a fundamental realignment a century, this antiquated system has enforced of the UK’s major political groupings. With the the domination of the Conservative and Labour nation bracing itself for its fourth major electoral Parties. Ninety-five years since Ramsay MacDonald event in five years, it remains to be seen how and to became the first Labour Prime Minister, no other what degree this realignment will take place under party has successfully formed a government the highly specific conditions of a majoritarian (national governments notwithstanding), and every electoral system. The general election of winter government since Attlee’s 1945 administration has 2019 may well come to be seen as a definitive point been formed by either the Conservative or Labour in British political history. -
The Brexit Effect How Government Has Changed Since the EU Referendum
The Brexit Effect How government has changed since the EU referendum Lewis Lloyd About this report Implementing the result of the 2016 EU referendum has proven an unprecedented test for the UK Government – one that it has yet to pass. Brexit has challenged the status quo, upending conventions and inviting us to rethink how government, and politics more broadly, work in the UK. On the day the UK was originally scheduled to leave the EU, this report assesses the impact on six areas that have been particularly subject to the “Brexit Effect”: ministers, the civil service, public bodies, money, devolution, and Parliament. Our Brexit work The Institute for Government has a major programme of work looking at the negotiations, the UK’s future relationship with the EU and how the UK is governed after Brexit. Keep up to date with our comment, explainers and reports, read our media coverage, and find out about our events at: www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/brexit March 2019 Contents List of figures and tables 2 List of abbreviations 4 Summary 5 Introduction 6 1. Ministers 7 2. Civil service 13 3. Public bodies 17 4. Money 21 5. Devolution 25 6. Parliament 31 References 39 List of figures and tables Figure 1 Changes in Brexit ‘War Cabinet’ membership over time 8 Figure 2 Timeline of resignations under Theresa May, outside of reshuffles 9 Figure 3 Ministers and senior civil servants in DExEU, June 2016 to present 9 Figure 4 Percentage change in staff numbers (FTE) for whole civil service, Defra and the Home Office, 2010 –18 13 Figure 5 Percentage