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4o6 CHAPTER XVII. THE ADVANCE TO KOMATI POORT/ Sept. 1st, 1900. On September ist, Sir R. Buller's troops set out in two columns ^rchefon^"^ along the Lydenburg road. Leaving a post (a squadron 19th Lydenburg. Hussars, two guns 21st battery R.F.A., four companies ist Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers) on the southern crest of the valley of the Crocodile river, an uneventful march brought the force to Badfontein, where an iron bridge spanned the stream. Sir R. BuUer was now entering that wild region where the Drakens- berg range, beginning, as it were, to disintegrate after its un- broken procession up from the Natal border, shattered the countryAngloBoerWar.comin all directions with gorges and precipitous peaks. The road itself, crossing the spurs, rose and fell steeply. North of Badfontein it climbed high across a lofty shoulder which completely shut out all further view, whilst mountains flanking it on either side rendered it a defile as well as an obstacle. Ad- vancing to prove this stronghold next day (September 2nd) the troops met with a severe reception. Three 6-in. guns, a 4.7-in. Howitzer, and many Field and automatic pieces opened from the elevated rim of the horse-shoe shaped position, firing with such unusual rapidity that it was evident that the road to Lydenburg was to be barred at all cost. To attack in front, and there was no other way, seemed to the General likely to be too expensive an operation to be undertaken by but five battalions and a half. Is checked at Without assistance, therefore, it appeared that the northward Badfontein. expedition must be brought to an early check ; and Sir R. BuUer, reporting to the Field-Marshal in the evening, sug- gested that an auxiliary column should be despatched from See map No. 49. THE ADVANCE TO KOMATI POORT. 407 Belfast along the Dullstroom road. This route, which con- verged on that to Lydenburg, by a fortunate coincidence struck the hostile position just outside its western flank, turning it, therefore, at a point not too far for Sir R. BuUer to co-operate by a frontal demonstration with a force advancing along it. On receipt of this information Lord Roberts immediately ordered Ian Hamilton to Sir R. Buller's assistance, holding also the i8th brigade in readiness at Helvetia to support him if necessary. Hamilton, marching on September 3rd, with Smith-Dorrien's Sept.3rd,i9oo. °'' brigade (ist Royal Scots, ist Royal Irish, ist Gordon Highlanders, ^^^rcSo^ the C.I.V. mounted infantry, two 5-in. guns and two Field co-operate, batteries), halted at Zwartkopjes for the night. As he was with- out cavalry—his proper brigade (Mahon) not having joined before he set out—Sir R. Buller detached from his own force the 2nd cavalry brigade (Brocklehurst) with two guns R.H.A. to join Hamilton. By nightfall Brocklehurst had gained touch with Hamilton from Helvetia : and though still behind him at Zwartkopjes on the next night, sent on the i8th Hussars by a forced march in time to take part in his operations. Up to Dullstroom Hamilton met with continual opposition on the 4th ; but he AngloBoerWar.comcircumvented every effort of the Boer rearguard, and, passing through Dullstroom, camped on Palmietfontein, whence he was able to communicate with Sir R. Buller. On September 5th Ian Hamilton pushed on unopposed through a vast defile under the Steenkamps Berg to Wemarshoek, sending on half a battalion to seize the important gateway at Zwagershoek. He had thus not only placed himself almost in rear of the Boer position north of Badfontein, but was sure of access to Lydenburg itself, for the mouth of the valley approaching the town from the west was commanded from Zwagershoek. These movements had their inevitable effect on Badfontein. On the 5th the enemy drew off somewhat toward the east, covered by his heavy guns, which shelled Sir R. Buller's bivouacs, taking them in enfilade from the right at 10,000 yards range. During the morning the Boers fell to preparing a gun position in the same direction, but nearer by 3,500 yards, and Sir R. Buller despatched Major-General — 4o8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. Howard with three battalions and a battery to drive them off. Howard duly seized the hill, and though subjected to a hot musketry fire from a crest beyond, made good his hold. On the 6th the Boers fell back altogether, abandoning the powerful and carefully-prepared entrenchments near Badfontein to Sir R. Buller, who marched over them to Witklip. There Hamilton, whose rapid and well-directed dash had manoeuvred Botha out of a tremendous fastness only comparable to Laing's Nek, joined Sir R. Buller with all his forces in the afternoon. Sept. 6th, 1900. The 2nd cavalry brigade, riding on, entered Lydenburg, which °^ Lyde£g" ^^ formally surrendered by the sheriff. The Boer force, which was commanded by Commandant-General Louis Botha in person, now broke up once more, part retreating northward to Pilgrim's Rest, part drawing back eastward only to Paardeplaats, where a great hill, an offshoot of the Mauchberg, hung over Lydenburg. To capture this position was absolutely necessary ; for it guarded the Mauchberg Pass, which in its turn lay between Sir R. Buller and Spitz Kop, some thirty miles to the east. Now Spitz Kop, standing on the Nelspruit—Pilgrim's Rest road, was the key of the north at this moment, and had from the first been designedAngloBoerWar.comas the goal. Its occupation, by denying the road to the commandos on the railway, and perhaps to the President and his officials, would cut them off from breaking back into the open Transvaal, and imprison them in the inhospitable region into which they had been herded, just as French's march was Sept.8th,i9oo penning them in on the south. On September 8th Sir R. Buller Action at ^^^ jg^j^ Hamilton dehvered a combined attack on Paardeplaats. Paardeplaats. ^ The place was immensely strong. Barring the L^^denburg Spitz Kop road rose a steep semi-circular mountain, 1,800 feet high, whose horns, on each of which was emplaced a 6-in. gun, enveloped the track. Deep watercourses, with sides so sheer as to be almost impassable even by infantry, seamed the base of the hill. Assigning the road as a line of demarcation between the two portions of his attack. Sir R. Buller sent Ian Hamilton against the Boer left, ordering Lyttelton to move against the right, the two commanders thus operating south and north of the road THE ADVANCE TO KOMATI POORT. 409 respectively. To reach a point of extension it was necessary for Lyttelton's troops to march from their bivouacs on the southern side of Lydenburg out by the northern outskirts. So doing, they had to cross an open stretch, the range of which was known so accurately to the enemy's gunners that a series of 6-in. shells, launched from a distance of 11,000 yards, began to fall amongst the ranks as soon as they appeared upon the clearing. One of these, bursting over the Volunteer company of the Gordon Highlanders, laid low no less than 22 men, only one of whom was killed on the spot. Thus have modem weapons Moral effect of l^o^em widened the zone of danger ; and since death may be dealt by guns many hours' or, in certain circumstances, many days' march removed from their victims, a soldier is required to maintain his nerve through periods of strain many times longer than those which taxed the endurance of his ancestors. The outer flank of each attack was kept by cavalry, the 3rd mounted brigade (Dundonald) advancing on Lyttelton's left, the 2nd cavalry brigade (Brocklehurst) on the right of Ian Hamilton. The 5-in. guns fired from rising ground within the town of Lydenburg, the 12-prs. and Howitzers from near the road. The 7th brigadeAngloBoerWar.com(F. W. Kitchener) led the left attack, the ist Devonshire in first line ; Hamilton on the right deployed two battahons of Smith-Dorrien's brigade in front, the Royal Irish and Royal Scots on left and right respectively, the combined fighting Hne covering some six miles from flank to flank. In this order the troops began a long and arduous cHmb up the mountain spurs. Once upon their steep sides there was little actual opposition. The enemy early withdrew his heavy guns ; the Field and automatic pieces, which kept up the defence, did little damage from the very height of their stations. All day, from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., the soldiers struggled up the pre- cipitous gradients ; yet in spite of the wide separation at starting, and the extreme difficulties of the ground, both wings of the attack converged upon the summit at precisely the same moment, and the Boers decamped. Their only line of retreat lay along an elevated razor-backed ridge, only a few yards wide, flanked on either side with precipices ; and great 410 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. would have been the execution done amongst them here had not a thick mist, dropping suddenly, shrouded the fugitives just as the troops rushed over the mountain top to cut them off. The British losses in the affair were 31 killed and wounded, bringing the total casualties since the time of leaving the railway on September ist to 44. This action, though it did not give Sir R. Buller the Mauchberg and the pass over it, had placed him so favourably for an attack thereon that he Sept. 9th, 1900. could safely attempt it alone.

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