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Bibliografía No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by FIRST PROOFS - © Copyright 2017 digital or mechanical means without NOT SUITABLE FOR TRANSLATION Princeton University Press. prior written permission of the publisher. Bibliografía Abbe, Emmanuel A., Amir E. Khandani, and Andrew W. Lo. 2012. “Privacy- Preserving Methods for Sharing Financial Risk Exposures.” American Economic Review 102, no. 3: 65– 70. Acharya, Viral V., Lasse Pedersen, Th omas Philippon, and Matthew Richardson. 2009. “Regulating Systemic Risk.” In Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, edited by Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson, 283– 303. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Adolphs, Ralph, Daniel Tranel, Hanna Damasio, and Antonio R. Damasio. 1994. “Im- paired Recognition of Emotion in Facial Expressions Following Bilateral Damage to the Human Amygdala.” Nature 372: 669– 672. Alchian, Armen. 1950. “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Th eory.” Journal of Po- litical Economy 58: 211– 221. Alexander, Sidney S. 1961. “Price Movements in Speculative Markets: Trends or Ran- dom Walks.” Industrial Management Review 2: 7– 26. American Cancer Society. 2016. Cancer Facts and Figures 2016. Atlanta, GA: Ameri- can Cancer Society. Andersen, Espen S. 1994. Evolutionary Economics: Post- Schumpeterian Contribu- tions. London, UK: Pinter. Anderson, Philip W., Kenneth J. Arrow, and David Pines, eds. 1988. Th e Economy as an Evolving Complex System. Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley. Andrews, Edmund L. 2008. “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation.” New York Times, October 23. Aristotle. 1944. Aristotle in 23 Volumes. Vol. 21. Translated by Harris Rackham. Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1964. “Th e Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk- bearing.” Review of Economic Studies 31: 91– 96. Arrow, Kenneth J, and Simon A. Levin. 2009. “Intergenerational Resource Transfers with Random Off spring Numbers.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci- ences 106: 13702– 13706. Arthur, W. Brian, John H. Holland, Blake LeBaron, Richard Palmer, and Paul Tayler. 1997. “Asset Pricing under Endogenous Expectations in an Artifi cial Stock Market.” In Th e Economy as an Evolving Complex System II, edited by Arthur, W. Brian, Steven N. Durlauf, and David A. Lane, 15– 44. Reading, PA: Addison- Wesley. Bakalar, Nicholas. 2010. “In N.C.A.A. Pools, Picking Underdogs Is Overrated.” New York Times, March 14. Barnea, Amir, Henrik Cronqvist, and Stephan Siegel. 2010. “Nature or Nurture: What Determines Investor Behavior?” Journal of Financial Economics 98: 583– 604. Baron- Cohen, Simon. 1989. “Th e Autistic Child’s Th eory of Mind: A Case of Specifi c Developmental Delay.” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 30: 285– 297. Bartra, Oscar, Joseph T. McGuire, and Joseph W. Kable. 2013. “Th e Valuation System: A Coordinate- Based Meta- Analysis of BOLD fMRI Experiments Examining Neu- —-1 ral Correlates of Subjective Value.” NeuroImage 76: 412– 427. —0 —+1 125-68662_ch01_1P.indd 439 1/11/17 5:32 PM No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by FIRST PROOFS - © Copyright 2017 digital or mechanical means without NOT SUITABLE FOR TRANSLATION Princeton University Press. prior written permission of the publisher. Bass, Th omas A. 1985. Th e Eudaemonic Pie. Boston: Houghton Miffl in. – – – . 2000. Th e P r edictors. New York: Henry Holt. Baumeister, Roy F., Todd F. Heatherton, and Dianne M. Tice. 1994. Losing Control: How and Why People Fail At Self- Regulation. San Diego: Academic Press. BBC News Magazine. 2012. “Congenital Analgesia: Th e Agony of Feeling No Pain.” July 16. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18713585. Bechara, Antoine, Antonio R. Damasio, Hanna Damasio, and Steven W. Anderson. 1994. “Insensitivity to Future Consequences Following Damage to Human Prefron- tal Cortex.” Cognition 50: 7–15. Bechara, Antoine, Daniel Tranel, Hanna Damasio, Ralph Adolphs, Charles Rockland, and Antonio R. Damasio. 1995. “Double Dissociation of Conditioning and Declar- ative Knowledge Relative to the Amygdala and Hippocampus in Humans.” Science 269: 1115– 1118. Behrend, Erika R., and M. E. Bitterman. 1961. “Probability- Matching in the Fish.” American Journal of Psychology 74: 542– 551. Beinhocker, Eric D. 2006. Th e Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity and the Radical Remaking of Economics. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Benner, Samuel. 1876. Benner’s Prophecies of Future Ups and Downs in Prices: What Years to Make Money on Pig- Iron, Hogs, Corn, and Provisions. Cincinnati: Published by the author. Berkshire Hathaway. 2002. Annual Report. Bersaglieri, Todd, Pardis C. Sabeti, Nick Patterson, Trisha Vanderploeg, Steve F. Schaff ner, Jared A. Drake, Matthew Rhodes, David E. Reich, and Joel N. Hirschhorn. 2004. “Genetic Signatures of Strong Recent Positive Selection at the Lactase Gene.” American Journal of Human Genetics 74: 1111– 1120. Berton, Justin. 2010. “Biblical Scholar’s Date for Rapture: May 21, 2011.” SFGate.com, January 1. http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Biblical- scholar- s- date- for- rapture- May- 21– 2011- 3204226.php. Billio, Monica, Mila Getmansky, Dale Gray, Andrew W. Lo, Robert C. Merton, and Loriana Pelizzon. 2016. “Granger- Causality Networks of Sovereign Risk.” Working paper, MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering. Billio, Monica, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo, and Loriana Pelizzon. 2012. “Econo- metric Measures of Connectedness and Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors.” Journal of Financial Economics, 104: 535– 559. Bitterman, M. E., Jerome Wodinsky, and Douglas K. Candland. 1958. “Some Com- parative Psychology.” American Journal of Psychology 71: 94– 110. Black, Fischer. 1972. “Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing.” Jour- nal of Business 45: 444– 455. – – – . 1976. “Studies of Stock Price Volatility Changes.” Proceedings of the 1976 Meeting of the American Statistical Association (Business and Economics Section), 177– 181. Alexandria, VA: ASA. Black, Fischer, and André F. Pérold. 1992. “Th eory of Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 16: 403– 426. Black, Fischer, and Myron Scholes. 1973. “Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabili- ties.” Journal of Political Economy 81: 637– 654. -1— Blinder, Alan S. 2009. “Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis.” New York Times, 0— January 24. +1— 125-68662_ch01_1P.indd 440 1/11/17 5:32 PM No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by FIRST PROOFS - © Copyright 2017 digital or mechanical means without NOT SUITABLE FOR TRANSLATION Princeton University Press. prior written permission of the publisher. Blinder, Alan S., and Ricardo Reis. 2005. “Understanding the Greenspan Standard.” In Th e Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future: A Symposium, 11– 96. Kansas City, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Blume, Larry, and David Easley. 1992. “Evolution and Market Behavior.” Journal of Economic Th eory 58: 9– 40. Bocskocsky, Andrew, John Ezekowitz, and Carolyn Stein. 2014. “Heat Check: New Evidence on the Hot Hand in Basketball.” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com /abstract=2481494. Bogle, John C. 1997. “Th e First Index Mutual Fund: A History of Vanguard Index Trust and the Vanguard Index Strategy.” Electronic copy available at http://www.van guard.com/bogle_site/bogle_lib.html#1997. Boisjoly, Roger M. 1985. Interoffi ce memo to R. K. Lund, Morton Th iokol, July 15. Re- cords of Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards, 1893– 2008, Record Group 220. National Archives at College Park, College Park, Maryland. Online ver- sion available through Online Public Access (National Archives Identifi er 596263) at www.archives.gov. Bonner, John Tyler. 2006. Why Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whales. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Breimyer, Harold F. 1959. “Emerging Phenomenon: A Cycle in Hogs.” Journal of Farm Economics 41: 760– 768. Breiter, Hans C., Itzhak Aharon, Daniel Kahneman, Anders Dale, and Peter Shizgal. 2001. “Functional Imaging of Neural Responses to Expectancy and Experience of Monetary Gains and Losses.” Neuron 30: 619– 639. Brennan, Th omas J., and Andrew W. Lo. 2011. “Th e Origin of Behavior.” Quarterly Journal of Finance 1: 55– 108. Brennan, Th omas J., and Andrew W. Lo. 2012 “An Evolutionary Model of Bounded Rationality and Intelligence.” PLoS ONE 7, no. 11: e50310. –– – . 2014. “Dynamic Loss Probabilities and Implications for Financial Regulation.” Yale Journal on Regulation 31: 667– 694. Brown, Craig O., and I. Serdar Dinç. 2011. “Too Many To Fail? Evidence of Regulatory Forbearance When the Banking Sector Is Weak.” Review of Financial Studies 24: 1378– 1405. Buff ett, Warren. 1984. “Th e Superinvestors of Graham- and- Doddsville.” Hermes (fall): 4– 15. Burbano, Hernán A., Emily Hodges, Richard E. Green, Adrian W. Briggs, Johannes Krause, Matthias Meyer, Jeff rey M. Good, Tomislav Maricic, Philip L. F. Johnson, Zhenyu Xuan, Michelle Rooks, Arindam Bhattacharjee, Leonardo Brizuela, Frank W. Albert, Marco de la Rasilla, Javier Fortea, Antonio Rosas, Michael Lachmann, Gregory J. Hannon, and Svante Pääbo. 2010. “Targeted Investigation of the Nean- dertal Genome by Array- Based Sequence Capture.” Science 328: 723– 725. Burnham, Terence C. 2007. “High- Testosterone Men Reject Low Ultimatum Game Of- fers.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 274: 2327– 2330. – – – . 2013. “Toward a Neo- Darwinian Synthesis of Neoclassical and Behavioral Eco- nomics.” Journal of
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