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Investor Presentation, November 2017

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Investor Presentation, November 2017 A Premium Brand Built Over 175 Years Investor Presentation November 2017 Forward-Looking Statement Certain statements contained in this presentation are forward-looking in nature. These include all statements about People's United Financial, Inc. (“People’s United”) plans, objectives, expectations and other statements that are not historical facts, and usually use words such as "expect," "anticipate," "believe," "should" and similar expressions. Such statements represent management's current beliefs, based upon information available at the time the statements are made, with regard to the matters addressed. All forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause People's United’ actual results or financial condition to differ materially from those expressed in or implied by such statements. Factors of particular importance to People’s United include, but are not limited to: (1) changes in general, international, national or regional economic conditions; (2) changes in interest rates; (3) changes in loan default and charge- off rates; (4) changes in deposit levels; (5) changes in levels of income and expense in non-interest income and expense related activities; (6) changes in accounting and regulatory guidance applicable to banks; (7) price levels and conditions in the public securities markets generally; (8) competition and its effect on pricing, spending, third-party relationships and revenues; (9) the successful integration of acquisitions; and (10) changes in regulation resulting from or relating to financial reform legislation. People's United does not undertake any obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. 1 A Premium Brand Built Over 175 years • Leading market position in one of the best commercial banking markets in the U.S. • Customer centric approach to banking • Diversified portfolio of products & services • Relationship profitability focus • Consistent and sustainable earnings growth • Exceptional risk management & asset quality • Consistent return of capital to shareholders Unwavering commitment to building a strong banking franchise for the long-term Corporate Headquarters – Bridgeport, Connecticut 2 Corporate Overview Founded in 1842, People’s United is a premier, community-based regional bank with leading positions across the large and attractive banking markets of the northeastern United States Assets $44.0 Billion Loans $32.4 Billion Deposits $32.5 Billion Branches Approx. 400 Market Capitalization $6.3 Billion Dividend Yield 3.7% Expertise in Consumer, Business, Commercial Banking, Wealth Management, and Insurance Solutions 3 *Financial / branch data as of September 30, 2017. Market capitalization and dividend yield as of November 3, 2017 Seasoned Leadership Team Collectively over 250 years of banking experience Jack Barnes David Rosato President & CEO, Director SEVP & CFO Years in Banking: 30+ Years in Banking: 30+ Professional Experience: Professional Experience: People’s United Bank (SEVP, CAO), Chittenden, FDIC People’s United Bank, Webster, M&T Galan Daukus Chantal Simon SEVP Wealth Management SEVP & Chief Risk Officer Years in Banking: 30+ Years in Banking: 25+ Professional Experience: Professional Experience: People’s United Bank, Washington Trust, The Managers Fund, People’s United Bank, Merrill Lynch US Bank, Lazard Freres & Co. Harbor Capital Management Sara Longobardi Jeff Tengel SEVP Retail Banking SEVP Commercial Banking Years in Banking: 30+ Years in Banking: 30+ Professional Experience: Professional Experience: People’s United Bank People’s United Bank, PNC, National City Dave Norton Bob Trautmann SEVP, Chief Human Resources Officer SEVP, General Counsel Years in Banking: 5+ Years in Banking: 20+ Professional Experience: Professional Experience: People’s United Bank, New York Times, Starwood, PepsiCo People’s United Bank, Tyler Cooper & Alcorn Lee Powlus Kirk Walters SEVP, Chief Administrative Officer SEVP Corporate Development & Strategic Planning, Director Years in Banking: 25+ Years in Banking: 30+ Professional Experience: Professional Experience: People’s United Bank, Chittenden, Alltel People’s United Bank, Santander, Sovereign, Chittenden, Northeast Financial 4 Thoughtful Geographic Expansion Acquisitions expanded and then further deepened People’s United presence beyond Connecticut into the New York Metro area and New England, particularly Greater Boston Acquisitions 57 branches from Citizens in the which comprised: New York Metro area Danvers, MA Including 53 branches in Stop & Financial Federal Shop supermarkets Chittenden Bank Suffolk Bancorp New York, NY Burlington, VT Riverhead, NY (Equipment Finance) Since 1995, People’s United has had an exclusive Ocean Bank relationship with Stop & Shop to Portsmouth, NH operate branches in Connecticut stores Maine Bank & Trust Lowell, MA LEAF Commercial Capital Philadelphia, PA Portland, ME (Equipment Finance) c Merrill Bank Bangor, ME North Andover, MA Flagship Bank Worcester, MA Smithtown, NY Bank of West. Mass. Springfield, MA 2008 2010 2011 2012 2017 5 Successful In-Store Branch Strategy In-store locations are open 37% more hours per week, but are approximately 30% less expensive to operate • Operate 147 in-store branches at Stop & Shop grocery stores in CT & NY • Leverage People’s United brand with the ~3.3 million shoppers who visit CT & NY Stop & Shop locations each week • Offer same products and services as a traditional branch • Utilize hub and spoke strategy ‒ In-store locations situated near a traditional branch ‒ Customers often use both in-store and traditional locations Inwood, New York – (Long Island) • Open 56 hours per week versus 41 hours for a traditional branch In-Store Branches Traditional Branches (Last 12 months through September 30, 2017 ) 43% 46% 59% 66% 68% 73% 81% 57% 54% 41% 34% 32% 27% 19% Consumer Checking Savings Accounts Business Checking Investment Sales Home Equity Mortgage Loan Business Banking Accounts Opened Opened Accounts Opened Loans Originations Originations Loan Originations 6 Note: statistics represent Connecticut and New York branches only Long History of Relationship Management Our ability to build deep, multi-product relationships not only satisfies the needs of customers, but also improves the Company’s profitability • Long-term relationships with customers; average tenure of our top 25 relationships is over 16 years • Local decision making; customers relationships are with local management • Single point of contact with customers; break down silos to present a full range of solutions comparable to that of larger banks • Senior management frequently interacts with customers • Reputation and word-of-mouth referrals often drive new business • Broad distribution: ~400 branches across six states, ~600 ATMs, online and mobile banking • Call center operations locally located in Bridgeport, CT and Burlington, VT People’s United has received 35 awards since 2009 for distinguished quality service* 7 *Greenwich Associates is the leading provider of local market intelligence and advisory services for the banking industry. Diversified Loan Portfolio by Product Successful geographic expansion, organic growth, opportunistic acquisitions, investment in talent and new business initiatives have driven continued growth ($ in billions, end of period loan balances) CAGR: 9% Commercial & Industrial $8.6 / 27% Commercial Real Estate $11.2 / 35% Residential Mortgage $6.8 / 21% c $32.4 $29.7 $28.4 $26.6 $24.4 $21.7 Equipment Financing $3.7 / 11% Home Equity & Other Consumer $2.1 / 6% 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Sept. 30, 2017 Commercial: $23.5 / 73% Retail: $ 8.9 / 27% Note: Acquisitions of LEAF Commercial Capital & Suffolk Bancorp closed in August 2017 and April 2017, respectively. 8 Diversified Loan Portfolio by Product (At September 30, 2017, end of period balances) Commercial Commercial Real Estate: $11.2 billion Commercial & Industrial: $8.6 billion Equipment Financing: $3.7 billion Other Other Mining, Oil Health Care Other 4% 7% & Gas 3% Transportation/ 7% 1% Hospitality & Utility Packaging Entertainment 3% 3% 5% Health Services Health Service 4% Industrial / Services 18% Transportation Manufacturing Wholesale Dist. Residential 8% 5% / Utility 6% (Multi-Family) Retail Sales 30% 36% Finance & Waste 9% Office Buildings Insurance 5% 20% 17% Real Estate Printing 9% Construction 6% Retail Wholesale Rental 13% Manufacturing 26% Dist. Manufacturing Service & Leasing 16% 13% 6% 8% Services c 12% Retail Residential Mortgage: $6.8 billion Home Equity & Other Consumer: $2.1 billion • Originated weighted average FICO score – Sept. YTD ‒ Residential mortgage: 759 Adjustable Rate Home Equity 88% ‒ Home equity: 766 Lines of Credit 87% • Originated weighted average LTV – Sept. YTD ‒ Residential mortgage: 69% Fixed Rate 12% ‒ Home equity: 59% Other 3% • 63% of home equity originations during past 3 years in first lien position Home Equity Loans 10% 9 Diversified Loan Portfolio by Geography Leveraging investments in the New York Metro and Greater Boston areas, while also strengthening multi- product relationships across heritage markets Total Loan Portfolio: $21.7 Billion Total Loan Portfolio: $32.4 Billion December 31, 2012 September 30, 2017 Other $3.6 / 17% Other $5.8B / 18% Connecticut $7.8B / 24% Connecticut $6.6 / 31% New Jersey $0.6 / 3% c New York $7.3B / 22% Massachusetts New York Massachusetts $4.0 / 18% $2.9 / 13% $5.7B / 18% New York / Massachusetts New York / Massachusetts CAGR: 14% $6.9 Billion /
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